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GIVE WAR A CHANCE? The Utility of War
Filmed on November 24, 2003
The Prussian military historian Carl von Clausewitz famously observed that "war is merely a continuation of politics by other means." These "other" (violent) means have been used on countless occasions throughout human history to settle conflicts over land, resources, and political rule. But what is the utility of war in the modern world? In a world with weapons of mass destruction, have the means of war delegitimized its use? In a world of expanding democracy, and cultural and economic interdependence, has the use of force become outdated?
Guests:
Victor Davis Hanson Victor Davis Hanson is the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is a classicist and an expert on the history of war. A regular contributor to National Review Online and many other national and international publications, he has written or edited sixteen books, including theNew York Times bestseller Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. His most recent book is A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War. He was awarded a National Humanities Medal by President Bush in 2007.
Jonathan Schell Harold Willens Peace Fellow, Nation Institute; Author, The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People.
Transcript:
Peter Robinson: Today on Uncommon Knowledge: War, what is it good for?
Announcer: Funding for this program is provided by the John M. Olin Foundation.
[Music]
Peter Robinson: Welcome to Uncommon Knowledge, I'm Peter Robinson. Our show today,
the utility or futility of war. The Prussian military strategist Carl
Von Clausewitz famously wrote, "War is the continuation of
politics by other means." Those other means, violent means, have
of course been used on countless occasions across the centuries to
settle disputes over land, resources and political rule. But what is
the utility of war in the modern world? In a world with weapons of
mass destruction, have the means of warfare delegitimized the ends
of warfare? In a world with growing democracy and increasing
economic and cultural interdependence, has the use of force become
outdated?
Joining us today, two guests. Jonathan Schell is a journalist and scholar. His most
recent book is entitled The Unconquerable World: Power,
Nonviolence and the Will of the People. Victor Davis Hanson is a
fellow at the Hoover Institution. His most recent book is entitled
Ripples of Battle: How Wars of the Past Still Determine How We
Fight, How We Live, and How We Think.
Title: Give War a Chance?
Peter Robinson: The fourth century Roman Vegetius, "Qui desiderat pacem praeparet
bellum." Did I do all right with that pronunciation?
Victor Davis Hanson: Yes, you did.
Peter Robinson: Let him who desires peace prepare for war. Seventeen centuries later, is
that still good advice? Victor?
Victor Davis Hanson: I think it is until the nature of man changes or we reach the end of
history. We're not quite there yet.
Peter Robinson: Jonathan?
Jonathan Schell: I don't think it's very good advice. I think another aphorism is if you want
war, prepare for war. It's not paradoxical and neat but it's more
deeply true.
Peter Robinson: All right. Victor, let me quote you to yourself. "We should appreciate the
frequent utility of war. The great ills of the last three centuries were
largely ameliorated by war not mediation." Explain yourself.
Victor Davis Hanson: I don't know how you would have convinced the slave owners of
the south to give up chattel slavery. We tried for over fifty years.
And as horrible as that war was, it did end chattel slavery and all the
great isms that have plagued the world, fascism, Japanese
militarism, Marxism, Soviet totalitarianism. They were either
ended by war or the threat of war. So it's until I--again, the nature
of man changes. Sometimes we should remember that there's great
evil in the world.
Peter Robinson: Now we'll come to your argument about the way things have changed in
the second half of the twentieth century in a moment. But do you
agree with that as a historical assessment? Do you agree with
Victor?
Jonathan Schell: Absolutely. Absolutely. Obviously what I want to say further is that I
think the nature of war has deeply changed let's say in the last half
century. Maybe you have to go back a little farther. And so I think
that the sphere in which war as a decision maker has been
drastically reduced let's say since 1945. It's hard to put a date on it
really so that once--what once worked is no longer working.
Peter Robinson: Hold that. I want to come to your notion--expand on your notion a little
bit that war is rooted in human nature. Is that the way you put it?
Let me quote you again. "A common tenant of current pacifism is
that war is altogether rare or in fact unnatural to the human species,
yet history more often proves otherwise."
Victor Davis Hanson: Well, a great society like Athens fought three out of every four
years. So did sixteenth century Venice--fifteenth century Venice
as well. Whether we like it or not, as Heraclites said, "War is the
father of us all." And it's very important to keep that in mind
because every time someone convinces us that it's otherwise, some
innocent person in the Balkans or Rwanda is going to be--or
Cambodia is going to be killed because war is not just simply a
misunderstanding between two equally culpable parties. Usually
there's an onus of right and wrong on one side. And it behooves us
to take the moral courage and judgment to find out where that onus
lies and then try to create deterrence to avoid wars. But if we don't,
innocent people are going to get killed.
Peter Robinson: Let's examine Jonathan Schell's argument for the futility of modern
war.
Title: Lethal Weapons
Peter Robinson: In the twentieth century, your argument runs, a couple of things
changed the utility of war fundamentally. The development of what
you called people's warfare and the development of nuclear
weapons. Let's just take them one after the other and explain whey
they've changed the utility of war. Nuclear weapons?
Jonathan Schell: Well very clearly, at the level of the superpower or of the great
powers as they used to call them, war can no longer be a decision
maker because what you've got in that case is mutual assured
destruction which doesn't decide anything. It just eliminates
everybody. And so--and that really has been the prime level at
which war was a decision maker in the twentieth century, in the
First and Second World War. Those are out now. And that
paralyzing influence of the nuclear dilemma, I think, has spread
downward into the nation state system so that actually war between
fully fledged nation states--a very common thing in the past--has
actually become something of a rarity so that wars now tend to be
confined to the internal affairs of country ethnic and so forth. Those
are horrible but they're something to…
Peter Robinson: Spread downward--I mean the nuclear argument is clear. The
United States in the old days couldn't attack the Soviet
Union--actually even now because the Russians retain thousands of
nuclear warheads.
Jonathan Schell: Precisely.
Peter Robinson: Because you'll both be destroyed.
Jonathan Schell: That's right.
Peter Robinson: But in what way has this spread downward? What's the mechanism
by which it's spread downward? Part of it is proliferation of
nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, for example, both have them.
You're suggesting more.
Jonathan Schell: Yes, well in other words, if, you know, if there are eight or perhaps
nine now countries in the world that possess nuclear weapons and
they are incapable of fighting a war. They could blow themselves
up but it won't be a war. Then the countries that are allied with
those and so forth, are much more cautious about going down that
path because they're afraid it will drag the world back into nuclear
confrontation to put it very simply.
Peter Robinson: Okay. Victor?
Victor Davis Hanson: Well, we've had more people die in war since World War II than
before. That is after the advent of the atomic bomb because
obviously when two superpowers agree they can't use them, then
they channel their disputes to other theaters. So we have wars in the
Middle East. We have wars in the Falklands. We're always going
to have war. Just simply are we going to have a theater nuclear
exchange between two rational states? Probably not at least in our
lifetime. But I also think that war is sort of like water because it's
like human nature and the pump, the delivery system, will change
but the essence will not change until the nature of man changes. So
we won't have a theater nuclear exchange between two nuclear
powers but Pakistan and India can fight with each other without
using nuclear weapons. That's very obvious. And China can fight
with anybody they want as long as they don't want to use nuclear
weapons. That's why they have conventional arms.
Jonathan Schell: Well, I'm very nervous about arguments that invoke human nature
because if human nature were responsible, we wouldn't have had
let's say a nineteenth century in which warfare in Europe, or for
most of it, was greatly reduced. In other words, it would have to
be--you'd have to posit that it's a kind of constant which is I think
what you're saying when you liken it to water--that it's like an
impulse that's a sort of a given of human nature that has to go
somewhere. I disagree with that. I think that it's a historical
phenomenon. I think that war is an institution much like the state
and that it's capable of tremendous transformation and even one day
of transforming itself out of existence. Now you're perfectly right
that in the nuclear age there have been many wars fought but it's not
a negligible fact that the wars that plagued the world between fully
fledged nation states, as I say, have tended to be very much reduced
in that period, although there are some examples of it and that
violence has been pushed to the internal sphere. That's a very
notable…
Peter Robinson: Pushed to what?
Jonathan Schell: Into to the internal sphere of nations. In other words, you have a
Balkan type situation or you have situations where, you know…
Victor Davis Hanson: Nineteenth century, I mean, more people were killed in the
twentieth century outside of war than in war during the twentieth
century and far more than the nineteenth. If you count up the tally
of Stalin off the battlefield, Hitler off the battlefield, Mao, fifty
million people off the battlefield. Stalin, Pol Pot, Milosevic, most of
the people in our twentieth century who were killed were not killed
in fighting. They were killed because people either could not or
would not use force to stop whatever that insanity was in the
beginning. We could have stopped Milosevic. We could have
stopped the Rwanda. We could have stopped Mao. We could have
done all of those things in the beginning. But there's a hundred
million people dead in the twentieth century.
Peter Robinson: So you're--in a curious way, this can't be quite what you're
arguing Jonathan, but it sounds as though you view the advent of
nuclear weapons as progress.
Jonathan Schell: In terms of preventing great power war, unquestionably. That's
true. Then we get to the further question, was the bargain worth it?
Now the price of that, of course, is that you suspend our entire
species over the abyss of its extinction. That's a roulette game that
I don't think was worth the deal. But as just a cold fact of history, I
think nuclear weapons have had that influence. So for me, the
program has to be--now that war has been reduced, to get rid of the
nuclear weapons.
Peter Robinson: On to the other key aspect of Jonathan Schell's argument against
war.
Title: Guerillas in Our Midst
Peter Robinson: Explain your notion--this development of people's war, the notion
that somehow politics has supplanted warfare is a critical point in
your argument.
Jonathan Schell: It's really what's central to this recent book that I've written, The
Unconquerable World, because it suggests that really the entire
imperial enterprise which was quite a strong possibility throughout
most of history, has really been lost because local peoples have
discovered the will and the means to resist imperial powers, much
the way they are now in Iraq as a matter of fact. And so if you look
at the history of empire, what's notable to me or most notable is that
all of the empires that were standing at the beginning of the
twentieth century, Dutch, British, French, etc, etc…
Peter Robinson: All gone.
Jonathan Schell: …went under the waves of history and that goes, by the way, for the
imperial empires of the mid century too, the fascist empires of
Germany and Japan. You know, Leonard Wolf called this the world
revolt and what it really meant was that each small country kind of
became a super power within its own borders. And this, I think, is
the specific reason that these empires have fallen.
Victor Davis Hanson: Well United States is--the latest empire is quite different. If you
look at the people the United States has so-called been extending
empire to or imperia, Noriega, there's a consensual government.
Milosevic was of seeds of consensual government. Grenada, seeds
of consensual government. Afghanistan, Iraq, fifty million people
were on the two most barbarous regimes. Now it's hard to classify
the empire or the United States as an imperial power when it
doesn't take treasure, it doesn't take minerals, it doesn't charge rent
for its bases and it's not setting up as was true of the Cold War
calculus, a authoritarian thug who promised to pump oil and keep
out communists. There's something happening in the world with
the use of force that we haven't seen before I think as far as an
imperial power. There's nothing in the United--in Afghanistan for
the United States to get out in the material, imperial sense except a
consensual government that might not let Al Qaeda back in. And
that's hard for people to resist. I mean, there is a message besides
gunboats and that is consumer capitalism, popular culture, freedom,
democracy. That seems to be very powerful weapon.
Peter Robinson: You grant all that?
Jonathan Schell: Democracy did make considerable advances in the late twentieth
century, in the last decade. The lesson of that to me though was that
it was almost always done by peaceful means throughout Eastern
Europe, Philippines, Southern Europe, Spain, Greece and so forth.
Peter Robinson: Okay, hold on. There I have to stop you. As I read the piece that
you wrote in Harper's, I have to admit my jaw dropped. You write
about the Velvet Revolution of 1989 as toppling the Soviet Union.
Vaclav Havel and so forth, I kept waiting for a paragraph in which
you would grant at least that the United States applied during the
1980's increased--engaged in a military buildup, challenged the
Soviets in placement of intermediate range nuclear forces in Eastern
Europe by deploying our Pershing missiles in Western Europe and
increased economic pressures on the Soviets. In other words, there
is an entire, a kind of realpolitique placement of increasing pressure
on the Soviets which creates a space for Havel and Walensa. But
you write about that as though it was just Havel and Walensa and a
kind of people's outpouring. They take to the streets in Prague and
the Soviet Union collapses.
Jonathan Schell: Yeah, I do think that the collapse of the Soviet Union was
overwhelmingly due to internal events and I think we have to
review the history of that period, you know, the rebellion in East
Germany in '53, Hungary in '56, Czechoslovakia in '68--these all
look like noble defeats, sort of hopeless enterprises at the time. But
actually they turned out to be the precursors to the collapse of the
whole thing. Now I will say, I do think that the
American--especially its technical military superiority was a factor
in the collapse of the Soviet Union because it was a symptom of a
much deeper problem there which was their whole economic
backwardness. They couldn't keep up either in the civilian
economy or in the militaries there. And I think it did give them
pause and I think it did frighten them but I think it was a secondary
factor.
Peter Robinson: How do you sum up then the collapse of the Soviet…
Victor Davis Hanson: The problem with all this is the course--the logical end of
totalitarianism doesn't work and it will collapse. But before you get
to A to Z, there's going to be millions of people killed. If you look
at places like Korea, the reason that South Korea has a democracy is
because of A, United States military operations and B, United States
military deterrents. If you look at the Falklands, most people--that
whole situation was caused by aggressive behavior by a dictatorship
which was humiliated, defeated and fell and you have democracy
come in and there the same thing in Central America. Same thing
in Taiwan.
Peter Robinson: Okay.
Victor Davis Hanson: Taiwan is a democratic state and the mainland is not. It's only
because of U.S. deterrence.
Peter Robinson: Next topic, how do our guests apply their views on the utility of war
to the war on terror?
Title: Fight for Your Right to (Political) Party
Peter Robinson: Jonathan, I quote you now to yourself. "The goal of taming the
violence endemic in human affairs has always been at the very core
of the liberal program. Every peaceful transfer of power is a coup
d'tat avoided. Every court case is a possible vendetta or bloodshed
averted." Isn't it the case that Afghanistan and Iraq now have a
chance for at least some rudimentary form of democracy precisely
because the United States went to war in each of those countries?
Jonathan Schell: I doubt that things are going to work out that way. Of course, we're
looking into the crystal ball here and it's hard to know what will
happen in the future. I have so far seen very little evidence that in
either of those places, a delightful Switzerland, you know, on the
Tigress, or in Afghanistan is in the cards here. That's my instinct in
the matter. And the reason once again, has to do with the very
nature of military force and of democracy. If democracy is a system
of consent which is essentially a non-violent thing, then it's almost
a matter of principle that it cannot be imposed from without. It's
something that happens through the force of example, through the
local will of the local people. I don't think that we can force it on
either of those countries. And the tragedies that we see--have seen
so far unfolding there, to me are symptomatic of that fact.
Victor Davis Hanson: Well, it was imposed--we wouldn't have had our freedom if the
French had not used the French had not used the French fleet at
Yorktown. It was imposed on the Japanese. It was imposed on the
Germans. It was imposed on the Italians. It was imposed on the
Indians when the British left. So there's all sorts of examples
throughout history that oppressed peoples can benefit from having
democracy offered to them. If you have of woken up on September
12th and said in two years that the cost of four hundred and twenty
American lives that you were going to offer a consensual
government to fifty million people, in the two most odious fascistic
regimes, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein will be gone in twenty-four months, by any standard of military history in war, that
would--nobody would have believed you. But that's exactly
what's happened. So yes, there's still chaos there but…
Peter Robinson: And that is a good thing that in a certain sense opens the door to his
liberal program.
Victor Davis Hanson: I do--I think we will agree where we want the ultimate aim but it
just a disagreement of how we get there.
Jonathan Schell: Yes it--in these cases, it was not the wars that were going to
impose the cost. It's what's happening now. And, in fact, already
there have been more casualties in Iraq since the so-called war
ended than happened during the war. So it's the future of the
United States in that part of the world that is going to be the cause.
Peter Robinson: You'd rather we had not gone into Iraq?
Jonathan Schell: Yes, indeed.
Peter Robinson: And you'd rather we had not gone into Afghanistan?
Jonathan Schell: As a matter of fact, yes, although that was a much more
sensible--that--at least the goal there was a clear one and you
didn't have all this flim-flam about weapons of mass destruction
and so forth.
Peter Robinson: Is Jonathan really against war or just against the use of force by
America?
Title: Might and Wrong
Peter Robinson: In the piece that you wrote in Harper's, you call for--I'll quote
you, "a program of international intervention," international
intervention, "to ameliorate, contain or end local and regional wars
and a concerted effort to enforce a prohibition against crimes
against humanity." Intervention enforcement. You're granting the
continued utility of war. You simply want it to be conducted by a
party other than the United States. So I put it to you that it's not
war in and of itself that you're arguing against. It's the United
States of America.
Jonathan Schell: You know, I do not take a pacifist position. I do see situations in
which I think that the use of force would be justified and useful.
Peter Robinson: So the quest…
Jonathan Schell: The genocide in Rwanda would be a perfect example of that. But I
think it should be out at the margins of international affairs and I
think it should be done as we said before, multilaterally in concert
with our allies or others at the U.N. and all of this. And in that
circumstance, you have a very, very important difference which is
that you have legitimacy. That goes back to the difference…
Peter Robinson: How will we have…
Jonathan Schell: …between the occupation of Iraq and Japan and Germany because
there we had absolute international legitimacy because we had
reacted defensively…
Peter Robinson: Hold on.
Jonathan Schell: …against two empires that had attacked us. That's what we were
doing in the Second World War. And so we had global legitimacy
at that time. Now we entirely lack it because we do not do it in
concert with the world.
Peter Robinson: I beg you--I beg you explain to me why the United Nations which
has a hundred and ninety some members, many of whom are not
only not democratic but heady, tin pot dictatorships and some very
big and powerful, muscular dictatorships--why a dictate by that
group should carry more moral legitimacy than a decision by the
duly elected government of the United States. I simply don't see it.
You grant the need for force. You simply want to shift the locus of
decision making and authority from us to a group of lunatics.
Jonathan Schell: Well, I don't think that we can call the assembled representatives of
the peoples of the earth a bunch of lunatics.
Peter Robinson: At least a third of them…
Jonathan Schell: Because the U.N. is not a country like France or something…
Victor Davis Hanson: Since 1967, almost fifty percent of all the U.N. resolutions have
been condemning Israel. When there's fifty million people have
been killed all around the globe in Africa and Asia, up in former
Soviet Union, they never said a word. And why was that? Because
the U.N. has been basically ideological--far more ideological than
we are and they have a preexisting deductive idea that Westernism
as it's symbolized by the United States and Israel are the causes of
most of the great sins of the world. So they concentrate on these
two powers, United States and Israel and they will not apply the
same standard of behavior to the Russians or--we talk about
occupied land, they'll pass hundreds of resolutions about Palestine
and not one about Cyprus, about Tibet, about the Sakhalin Islands.
So when we in America look at this, we see that it's ideologically
driven and a lot of people die where they adjudicate in New York.
Jonathan Schell: Well, there's a lot of substance to what you say. And I look at it
very much historically. Obviously during the Cold War, the U.N.
was completely disabled by the Cold War because of the veto in the
Security Council and so forth. It could never work its function in
that period. When the Cold War ended though, I think a moment of
real opportunity opened up because not withstanding--well they
weren't doing it yet in Russia and Chechnya. That hadn't really
begun. But there was a moment of where they could have really
been substantial agreement on some very positive--a very positive
agenda it seems to me in the 1990's. That moment may have waned
now. I have to confess.
Victor Davis Hanson: The Balkans, that was the first task in the post-Cold War and they
did not do anything in the Balkans.
Peter Robinson: Last topic, the utility of war and its impact on America's role in the
world.
Title: War and Peace
Peter Robinson: A decade from now, will the United States have become more
republican or more imperial? Jonathan?
Jonathan Schell: I think that this imperial enterprise as I think it's rightly called is not
going to work. I think it's going to blow up in our faces. But
whether that means that we'll be more republican at home, I'm not
sure because I'm afraid that in the process of that--of the collapse
of this plan, of this effort, that we may see these serious inroads into
the constitutional rule and civil liberties that I was talking about
before in the form of other terrorist attacks. The other day General
Tommy Franks who ran the Iraq effort, of course, said that he
thought that if the weapon of mass destruction were used against the
United States, that we would lose the Constitution here at home.
Now that was a very disturbing thing to be hearing from a General
who had just fought a war. And I do worry about those things.
Hasn't happened, but I worry about it.
Peter Robinson: Isn't that an argument for granting whatever minor concessions may
be necessary--surrendering in some minor way civil liberties now
to make sure that the FBI, all these people are charged with
defending the country, have all the powers that they need to make
sure no such other event ever takes place? If some second event is
the real threat to civil liberties, we need to give them what they ask
for.
Jonathan Schell: Well I--not what they ask for...
Peter Robinson: What they need.
Jonathan Schell: ...What we think they need and what is consistent with the survival
of American liberty. And it's not these things that they are doing
now in Guantanamo with the enemy combatants and so forth. So…
Peter Robinson: Victor, more imperial or more republican a decade from now?
Victor Davis Hanson: Just look at what's going on in the world right now. Ten thousand
troops out of Saudi Arabia.
Peter Robinson: Ten thousand of ours?
Victor Davis Hanson: Out a hundred thousand troops downsized in Germany, troops
reduced in South Korea, redeployed down to Pusan, Turkish troops
down. If you look at what the Pentagon says they're trying to do,
it's--I would call it a muscular independence. They are bringing
troops in Eastern Europe but the total size of the number committed
abroad doesn't need to be any bigger and it's probably going to be
smaller. If Iraq has taught Americans anything is we don't really
want to go to defend people who either will not…
Peter Robinson: We the military?
Victor Davis Hanson: We the military, we the United States. The biggest problem the
United States is going to have is not imperial intervention as I see it.
It's going to be a resurgence of strong, nationalistic isolationism
that was pretty much the history of the United States until the
European wars that started in 1939. When I go across the United
States, people say to me all the time, why do we have any troops in
Germany? Why do--they think we have troops in France. Why do
we have troops in France? But the message is it's time to look after
the interest of the United States and let Europe and the E.U., the rest
go their way.
Peter Robinson: Victor Davis Hanson, Jonathan Schell, thank you very much.
Peter Robinson: I'm Peter Robinson for Uncommon Knowledge, thanks for joining
us.
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