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It's been nearly twenty-five years since the shah of Iran was overthrown in a popular revolution. The ensuing American hostage crisis marked the beginning of an era of mutual hostility between Iran and the United States—Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini often called the United States "the Great Satan"; more recently President Bush placed Iran on the so-called axis of evil. But an increasingly visible democratic reform movement supported by young Iranians born after the revolution suggests that Iran may be entering a new era of change. Just how powerful is the reform movement in Iran? And what should the United States do, if anything, to help bring about a new Iran?
Guests:
Michael McFaul Michael McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is also a professor of political science at Stanford. An expert on international relations, Russian politics, political and economic reform in post-communist countries, and U.S. foreign policy, he is director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute, where he also serves as deputy director.
Abbas Milani Abbas Milani is a research fellow and codirector of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution. In addition, Milani is the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University. His expertise is U.S./Iran relations and Iranian cultural, political, and security issues.
Before coming to Hoover, Milani was a professor of history and political science and chair of the department at Notre Dame de Namur University and a research fellow at the Institute of International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, in addition to being an assistant professor in the faculty of law and political science at Tehran University and a member of the board of directors of Tehran University's Center for International Studies from 1979 to 1987. Milani was a research fellow at the Iranian Center for Social Research from 1977 to 1978 and an assistant professor at the National University of Iran from 1975 to 1977.
Guity Nashat Guity Nashat is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern history at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
An economic historian, she has written about the role of women in Iran and Islamic society. Her current research deals with the evolution of government in the Middle East since the rise of Islam.
Transcript:
Peter Robinson: Today on Uncommon Knowledge, the next Iranian revolution.
Announcer: Funding for this program is provided by the John M. Olin
Foundation.
[Music]
Peter Robinson: Welcome to Uncommon Knowledge. I'm Peter Robinson. Our
show today, the future of Iran. It's been almost a quarter of a
century since the Shah was overthrown in a popular revolution.
The hostage crisis soon after, marked a new era of hostility
between Iran and the United States. The new Iranian leader, the
Ayatollah Khomeini began referring to this country as the "Great
Satan." More recently President Bush has returned the favor
lumping Iran in the "axis of evil." Now though more than two-thirds of Iran's population of sixty million is twenty-five years old
or younger. This new generation born since the revolution is now
agitating for democratic reform. What are the prospects for
democracy in Iran? What should the United States do, if
anything, to promote it?
Joining us, three guests. Abbas Milani, a historian and political
scientist is a fellow at the Hoover Institution. Guity Nashat is a
professor of history at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
Michael McFaul is a professor of political science at Stanford
University.
Title: Laissez-Faire Diplomacy
Peter Robinson: Jahangir Amuzegar, Finance Minister for the Shah in the pre-1979
government of Iran, I quote: "The United States should refrain
from both unsubstantiated accusations and implied threats against
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Washington would be best served
by letting the currently accelerating process of democratization
run its course." Is that the right thing for the United States to do
or the wrong thing? Abbas?
Abbas Milani: I would think that if it implies allowing the indigenous democracy
in Iran take root, the very active democratic movement in Iran
take its own course, I think that's a very wise choice.
Peter Robinson: You're with him?
Guity Nashat: I think I'm absolutely with him and I'm surprised he made such a
statement. I would have thought he would be opposed to what's
going on in Iran but I'm really very happy to hear he said that and
I agree fully.
Peter Robinson: Mike McFaul?
Michael McFaul: Well, I agree but with one caveat, that in the margins, the United
States can play an important role in fostering the right forces, the
democratic forces in Iran. And we can also do very much harm to
those same forces if we do the wrong policies. So to sit on our
hands and to say our best policy is no policy, I think is naïve.
Guity Nashat: Mike, I think I really disagree with you because I think what it
would do, it would only strengthen the hardliners in Iran if the
U.S. tries to intervene in Iranian affairs. In fact, that's exactly
what happened in 1980 when the U.S. encouraged--and other
Western powers encouraged Iraq to invade Iran and it was one of
the means by which the Khomeini regime was able to strengthen
its hold in the country because it rallied the population to
Khomeini's regime. And I think today it would even be worse
because the democratic process in Iran has really taken a life of its
own and I think it's better and it's really moving ahead.
Peter Robinson: You have now established the overall theme for this entire show.
Let me start asking you a few particular questions. In his 2002
State of the Union address, President Bush labeled Iran together
with North Korea and Iraq part of an "axis of evil." I will ask you
in a moment whether he was right to do so but first, if you were
putting the best construction on the President's statement that you
could, how would you defend it? That is to say, what has Iran
done or what is Iran doing that would justify placing it in the same
category with North Korea and Iraq? Mike?
Michael McFaul: Well, he did so because those were the three states that he thinks
have weapons of mass destruction, are on their way and harbor
and support terrorism. Most certainly Iran by that definition
would qualify. That's why they grouped them together. I think it
was unfortunate turn of a phrase.
Peter Robinson: Right, right, we'll get to that in a moment, but do you both grant
then that much at least is true?
Guity Nashat: Well, I'm not really sure that Iran at least until 2002 was at a stage
where it would have deserved this title because by then Pakistan
already had weapons of mass destruction and he didn't mention
Pakistan. Therefore, I was unhappy to see the President put Iran
on the same category as North Korea and Iraq.
Peter Robinson: Abbas?
Abbas Milani: I think there is another dimension to why the United States
included Iran. Again, I'm not sure that that was a good
formulation. I agree with Mike that…
Peter Robinson: I sense skepticism rampant here.
Abbas Milani: The third element other than the two that Mike referred to which
has been a cause of serious concern to the U.S. Administration is
Iran's role in the peace process, Iran's opposition to the peace
process, Iran's opposition to the Oslo agreement, Iran's insistence
that the peace process as it was going on is not to the interest of
the Arab population. It's not to the interest of the Palestinians and
Iran's support of Hamas and Hezbollah.
Guity Nashat: It's not really Iran's support of Hamas because Hamas is a Suni
organization and it was Iran's support of Hezbollah in Lebanon
but this really happened at least two decades ago and I think the
information that the administration got of that point was a little bit
outdated.
Peter Robinson: Next, understanding the revolution of 1979. Why was the Shah
overthrown?
Title: Shah No No
Peter Robinson: 1941, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi becomes Shah. He spends three
and a half decades doing what looks like to an American such as
myself, like modernization, westernization. He's using oil
revenues. He's putting up dams, hydroelectricity, power lines
even into remote villages. It all looks good and then in 1979 in a
popular revolution, this was not a coup staged by a small--this
was a popular uprising, they threw him and all that he stood for
out. And in his place you get Ayatollah Khomeini and a religious
regime, which looks again to me as though it wants to take the
country back to the Middle Ages. I cannot imagine why this
revolution took place. You spent a little time in prison as a result
of the revolution. Tell me what was going on.
Abbas Milani: Well, I think what was going on and that has nothing to do with
me individually, I think what was happening in Iran at large is that
the Shah began a process of reform. Some of the policies you are
talking about fundamentally changed the fabric of the Iranian
society. There was a middle class created, there was an educated
urbanite class created and the Shah was under the false
assumption and he is on record on that, that the economic
prosperity of the country is going to obviate democracy. The
Shah banked on buying the political acquiescence of this middle
class and this intellectual class and it was proven wrong. The
class became prosperous and the moment they could and Jimmy
Carter helped by saying that the Shah has to become human
rights. They rose against him and overthrew him and by…
Peter Robinson: But it almost sounds as though he created a class that objected to
the regime of the Shah because it wasn't western or modern
enough.
Abbas Milani: Wasn't democratic.
Peter Robinson: Wasn't democratic.
Guity Nashat: Okay, I think there was another element.
Peter Robinson: Yes?
Guity Nashat: One of the things that I think the Shah ignored and he wasn't even
aware of, was the role that Islam has played in Iranian society for
thirteen hundred years. And Islam developed institutions that
influenced many of the Iranian institutions in urban society. And
some of the reforms he was implementing seemed corrupting to
the majority of the people who didn't become middle class. They
were lower middle class and they felt threatened by what was
happening to their families, they felt he was trying to corrupt their
families, women and all kinds of things. So it was really the
majority that, as you said, it was a popular revolution…
Peter Robinson: So he creates a middle class and loses their trust or their support
because they want more democracy?
Guity Nashat: Right. But…
Peter Robinson: But meanwhile there's a more traditional aspect of society that
feels threatened…
Guity Nashat: Absolutely. Threatened and they're the ones…
Peter Robinson: He's imposing modernity on them.
Guity Nashat: Absolutely.
Peter Robinson: So he loses.
Abbas Milani: But I have, once he finishes, I have a very different take on Islam
and the Shah.
Peter Robinson: All right.
Michael McFaul: Well, I'm not an expert on Iran like our colleagues here but if you
look at the revolution comparatively, I think it's important to
remember one very critical thing, that now we know who wins,
who takes over after the fall of the Shah, right? But at the
moment of the revolution and I think if one can look at the
Bolshevik Revolution this way and remember the February
Revolution before that, look at the fall of the communist puppet
regime in Afghanistan, you have a united front that are united
against the Shah for all kinds of different reasons. Some are
intellectuals. Some are this middle class. Some are these folks
that want to go and then take it a different direction. And it was in
the chaos that comes after that the collapse of the ancien regime.
That word comes from the French Revolution, right? The
moderates are there and there's a struggle for power and in this
particular case, a particular extremist, in my view, wing won out,
just like Lenin in February of 1917…
Peter Robinson: So instead of Robespierre, they end up with Khomeini?
Michael McFaul: Exactly.
Abbas Milani: I have a very different take than Guity...
Peter Robinson: Let's hear it. Let's hear it.
Abbas Milani: My take is that the Shah made, in fact, a great historic strategic
mistake in the sense that he assumed that the clergy are his allies.
The Shah had a very wrong sense of who his enemies are. He
thought his primary enemies were the communists and then he
thought that the middle class democratic forces were his enemies.
So he united in fact with the bulk of the clergy. If you look at
Iran, the number of mosques built in Iran, between 1970 to 1975
is unprecedented in modern history of Iran. This is a regime that
is clamping down on the left; it is clamping down under
democratic forces. It is clamping down to the national front. The
only body of institutions that is allowed to thrive in Iran are the
mosques.
Peter Robinson: So he tries to…
Abbas Milani: When the society goes through crisis, it's clear that these
guys--these are the…
Guity Nashat: But the point is it's... that it was a state-run type of religion and I
think many of the Ayatollahs and religious leaders were aware of
that. And he started, for instance, a religious...what was it?
Abbas Milani: Core.
Guity Nashat: … religious core in order to teach his brand of Islam to a lot of
rural population, to small town people in order to sever the control
of the clergy over the masses of the population. And, of course, it
backfired.
Peter Robinson: Let's take a look at Iran's next ruler, the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Title: He Hates Us, He Really Hates Us
Peter Robinson: Khomeini appears on the scene and what's striking again to me
about Khomeini is that he is intensely anti-American from the get-go. What did we ever do to him? We're the Great Satan before
we even know who he is, he's calling us the Great Satan. Why?
Mike? Where does the anti-Americanism come from?
Michael McFaul: Well, he associated…
Peter Robinson: Why us?
Michael McFaul: …modernization and these trends that we've been talking about
with the West and with the United States as the great enemy.
Peter Robinson: Because we were close to the Shah? Is that…
Michael McFaul: We were close to the Shah; we were close to these democratic
ideals, the whole bundle of things. We were westernization and
he was anti-westernization.
Guity Nashat: Well, I'm not really sure he was anti-westernization in the sense
that yes, he was--he didn't want women for instance, to appear in
miniskirts, not to cover their hair but he was not opposed to
western technology. In fact, he was making use of it by producing
tapes and sending them through using telephones. And, in fact, if
you look at the Iranian constitution of 1979, you will see there are
some articles that say it's the duty of the state to encourage
scientific investigation, technological fields, etc.
Michael McFaul: And religion.
Guity Nashat: And religion, of course.
Michael McFaul: And that's anti-western.
Guity Nashat: Of course.
Michael McFaul: The separation of church and state which is the existence...
Abbas Milani: There's a more important thing.
Peter Robinson: What's that?
Abbas Milani: The clear link is that Khomeini rose to prominence in 1963 and
that was when the United States, in fact, was--Defense
Department insisted that if the United States is going to accept the
Shah's request and send military advisors to Iran, they need to
have what are called extra-territorial rights…
Guity Nashat: Capitulation treaties.
Abbas Milani: …when in Iran are called capitulation treaties, what they
articulated as the Vienna Convention. According to this if the
United States and the United States Army or anyone connected to
them or their family commit a crime in Iran, they cannot be tried
in Iranian court. Khomeini went on attack saying that--in a
famous phrase he says that, if an American sergeant kills the Shah
of Iran, we can't take him to court but if the Shah of Iran does the
slightest thing to an American, they will take him out.
Khomeini's prominence--before that Khomeini was a
secondhand cleric.
Guity Nashat: That's very true. That's the beginning.
Peter Robinson: And you all agree that's a crucial moment?
Guity Nashat: That was the beginning, yes, of his…
Michael McFaul: A very important lesson for post-war Iraq right now.
Peter Robinson: From the history of the revolution to present day Iran and the
movement for democratic reform.
Title: The Force Is With Us
Peter Robinson: Two-thirds of the population is under the age of twenty-five in
Iran, the so-called Third Force. What does the Third Force want?
Abbas Milani: The Third Force wants what every youth wants in the world.
They want jobs, they want entertainment, they want freedom, they
want to be able to go into the streets and hold the hands of their
beloved. They want what any educated youth of the world want.
They are no different anywhere else. They are very wired. The
Iranian youth are enormously connected to the Internet. Iran, after
Israel, is on record as the most wired…
Guity Nashat: That's very true.
Abbas Milani: …country in the Middle East. They're online, on the net, they're
surfing the net, they see American values, British values, French
values and some mullah wants to tell them that if they want to
hold the hand of a woman, they're going to get eighty whips. That
doesn't work.
Peter Robinson: Okay so if you have two-thirds of the population under twenty-five…
Abbas Milani: …and jobs.
Peter Robinson: …and they're all on the Internet…
Guity Nashat: I think unemployment is the most important, yes.
Peter Robinson: …but all we have to do then for Iran, we don't have to call them
the axis of evil or threaten them. All we have to do is wait. As
this demographic bulge moves through, Iran will be transformed
in a way that we would like, right?
Michael McFaul: Maybe.
Peter Robinson: Oh, back to the margins, back to the margins.
Michael McFaul: If you were to have lived in Poland as I did in the 1980s, you
would have seen all these things, not the internet, but it was
fiercely, fiercely anti-communist, anti-Soviet society from day
one. We know that for a fact. And that regime lasted forty years.
So don't get me wrong, I think Iran is a lot like Poland. But to say
that we know…
Peter Robinson: But there were Soviet troops on the border.
Guity Nashat: Exactly. But Mike, what you're ignoring…
Michael McFaul: Who controls the guns right now in Iran? Who puts people in jail?
Who just arrested pollsters, pollsters to tell us what we know,
they're in jail today. They're not out there demonstrating.
Guity Nashat: But there is a very big difference. And the difference is that the
Iranian Army--many people within the Army, many people
within the clerical establishment are opposed to these policies and
there is a fierce debate going on in Iran today between two
different groups of clergy. The majority would like--and the
reason why this condition is still enforced in Iran is because the
constitution gives the spiritual leader this complete authority, that
could have made Saddam Hussein happy, supreme leader. He has
authority above the law.
Peter Robinson: The top office holder. Right
Guity Nashat: Absolutely. And this is really the struggle I think that's really
essential that's going on in Iran even though…
Peter Robinson: It's a struggle for constitutional reform.
Guity Nashat: Constitutional reform…
Peter Robinson: To limit the leaders of the supreme leader or to redraft the
entire…
Guity Nashat: No, no, to have an amendment to the constitution and to limit the
authority of the spiritual leader. And this is coming from
members of the clergy. And to me, this is really the important
thing that's going on in Iran.
Peter Robinson: Okay, let me ask you--okay, hold on--hang on.
Abbas Milani: I think you have to...first of all, the reform movement is not united
in what they want. Some of the reform movement including
Khatami wants to essentially preserve…
Peter Robinson: Who is?
Abbas Milani: Who is the president.
Peter Robinson: Thank you.
Abbas Milani: Khatami is on record as wanting to preserve this system but make
it a little more amenable to democracy. That's not going to work.
This system is inherently anti-democratic.
Peter Robinson: Next topic, how should the United States respond to the reform
process in Iran?
Title: Ch-Ch-Changes
Peter Robinson: Let me quote this man whose name I can't pronounce once again,
Amuzegar?
Guity Nashat: Amuzegar.
Peter Robinson: Amuzegar: "Any U.S.," "Any U.S. strategy that even remotely
raises the specter of foreign interference in Iran is doomed to fail."
Now I quote McFaul: "The very existence of a battle between
democratic and anti-democratic forces in Iran creates an
opportunity for American officials to push the process in the right
direction." Michael, you foreign interventionist you.
Michael McFaul: Well, two things. First of all, you can't have a policy of calling
Iran the axis of evil, treating the place as a unitary actor and not
recognize that there's this battle that we've been talking about. So
at least as a minimum, we have to have a policy that has a little
more sophisticated edges to it and that we recognize that our
allies, in fact, are this third force and most of the people in Iran.
Second, intervention--I don't know where you're quoting from,
doesn't matter…
Peter Robinson: It's in my briefcase.
Michael McFaul: I was not talking about bringing in the Third Battalion. I'm
talking about education; I'm talking about Internet sites that talk
about democracy. And the notion that somehow the state should
be sovereign and just because I happen to have a blue passport
rather than some other color, do not have the right or ability or
should if I believe in democracy, to interact with an individual
who happens to live in Iran and have the same thoughts, I think is
ludicrous. Our government unfortunately blocks some of the kind
of interconnectivity that I can have with my colleagues…
Peter Robinson: We do?
Michael McFaul: Yes, we do.
Guity Nashat: Yeah, I think what the U.S. government is doing is by creating an
embargo, economic embargo against Iran, it has kept Iran in a
state of--the status quo is continuing.
Peter Robinson: Okay.
Guity Nashat: What Iran needs is to--or what the U.S. needs is to lift the
embargo and to allow the private sector in Iran to bloom and to
improve…
Peter Robinson: Okay. Now you let me…
Abbas Milani: But if you go back to your question…
Peter Robinson: Yes.
Abbas Milani: And I agree with Mike. The notion that the United States can play
no role in Iran or in that region and completely leave Iran alone, I
think is a very, first of all, dangerous proposition.
Peter Robinson: Right.
Abbas Milani: The United States is a major force in there--there are 250,000
American troops there. There are bases there.
Michael McFaul: On both sides. We're there.
Abbas Milani: You can't assume--I mean, this is an absolute utopian dream.
And furthermore, it is to the detriment of the interest of the Iranian
people and to the detriment of the interest of democracy in
general.
Peter Robinson: Okay. Advise the President. Give him the top two things he ought
to do here.
Abbas Milani: My advice would be what policy has worked in the past in this
country, vis-à-vis Iran, is to defend democracy. Stand for
democracy, defend democracy, do not negotiate with the people
who do not represent the democratic constitutional. Do not
negotiate, do not make a deal with Khomeini who is now out to
make a deal with the United States because he feels threatened.
That would be to the detriment of Iranian people. It would be to
the detriment of the United States and it would be to the detriment
of democracy. I am against U.S. forces going to Iran, as Mike
says. There are some Iranians who are trying to get the United
States to go in. I think they're very foolish. I think they're
hurting Iran. But I also think that because of what happened in
Iraq, the Iranian government released the thirteen Jews that it was
holding. The last five…
Guity Nashat: Only five…
Abbas Milani: …the last five--no the…
Guity Nashat: The last five.
Abbas Milani: The last five.
Guity Nashat: Right, right.
Abbas Milani: They began releasing them as soon as United States began.
Peter Robinson: But isn't that an argument for pressure?
Abbas Milani: There should be pressure.
Peter Robinson: There's a quarter million troops there and suddenly they're
responding. So…
Guity Nashat: But my point is that, yes, I do agree that we should have a
consistent policy.
Peter Robinson: Right.
Guity Nashat: But we cannot go around and name countries that have, let's say
dictatorships as axis of evil. Egypt is a much greater dictatorship
than Iran, as is Saudi Arabia. We have good relations with both,
so let's call them also axis of evil. Saudi Arabia is the first
country that in terms of its financial support for terrorism, it's the
most important country. Pakistan also…
Peter Robinson: So I see the inconsistencies but tell the President what he should
do.
Guity Nashat: I would tell the President they should not intervene in Iranian
affairs. They should allow this process that has been unleashed in
Iran to take its own course and the fact that we are present in the
neighborhood, in Afghanistan and Iran, will exert sufficient
pressure on Iran to change on the hardliners. But I also would
advocate the lifting of embargoes. Why? Because I believe if
today the hardliners control 80% of Iran's economy, 80% of Iran's
economy is in the public sector and it's the source of the power of
the hardliners. If we lift the embargo and allow Iran, Iran's
private sector to expand, I think this will undermine the control of
the hardliners.
Peter Robinson: Okay. So stand for democracy. Lift the embargo. Do you buy
that?
Michael McFaul: Absolutely.
Peter Robinson: Both of those.
Michael McFaul: But I would be more aggressive, frankly.
Guity Nashat : How could you be more aggressive?
Michael McFaul: Let me give you one example, okay.
Guity Nashat: Because you will discredit...
Michael McFaul: No, no, no. You…
Guity Nashat: ...the forces of change.
Michael McFaul: With all due respect because you know this country better than I
do but it is quite arrogant of us to sit in Palo Alto and tell the
people who are fighting on the front lines in Iran, what they can or
cannot do. Let me give you one example. We have a thing called
the National Endowment for Democracy, set up under Ronald
Reagan. They give grants to democrats all over the world. We
can't give grants to Iran because of our legislation right now
because it's helping a regime that is considered part of the axis of
evil.
Peter Robinson: Okay, that's stupid.
Michael McFaul: That to me--right. And then they put out the thing and then let
the people of Iran apply it. If they want to apply--they're the
ones that are going to jail, not you--not us.
Guity Nashat: Right.
Michael McFaul: We need to be aggressive in that kind of stuff. How many Iranian
students are here? Next to none compared to the Russians and
Ukrainians. That is a…
Abbas Milani: But they're the best of students.
Michael McFaul: Yes, and they are.
Abbas Milani: Systematically, they're some of the best students.
Peter Robinson: Time now for final predictions.
Title: Weapons of Mass Democracy
Peter Robinson: Five years from now, will Iran possess nuclear weapons? Abbas?
Abbas Milani: I cannot say absolutely yes or no. I know that they are on the path
to trying to develop it but if my guestimate is correct, in five years
Iran will be a democratic society and a democratic Iran…
Peter Robinson: That's the next question. Hold on you is answering two questions
at once. What about nuclear weapons?
Guity Nashat: I'm not really sure they will because they have realized that
hostility of America to their development of atomic weap--of…
Peter Robinson: Nuclear weapons.
Guity Nashat: …weapons of mass destruction, therefore, I doubt if they will do
that. They may use it for peaceful purposes but not for war.
Peter Robinson: These are two fairly encouraging predictions. You'd go with that?
Michael McFaul: Well, it depends on your next question, which is about democracy.
Peter Robinson: Exactly.
Michael McFaul: Democracy, no weapons. No democracy, weapons most
definitely.
Peter Robinson: Really?
Michael McFaul: Absolutely.
Peter Robinson: Okay. So then let's just go around the table. Five years from
now, will Iran be significantly more democratic than it is today?
Abbas Milani: I think Iran will be significantly democratic and I 100% agree
with Mike that the radicals have learned the lesson from Iraq. If
they have a nuke, they will get treated like North Korea,
differently than Saddam Hussein. If they stay in power, they are
going to go full force trying to get a nuke and…
Peter Robinson: So there is a mad scramble on?
Abbas Milani: I think if the democracy does not win in Iran, that possibility--I
mean if you put yourself in their position, that's the rational
choice to make. I mean, if you want to make a rational prediction
and put yourself in that shoe, that shoe which has always done
what is required to survive, will see the writing on the wall.
Peter Robinson: Guity?
Guity Nashat: A democracy, yes.
Peter Robinson: And Mike?
Michael McFaul: Yes.
Peter Robinson: You think so too?
Michael McFaul: Hopefully. Hopefully.
Peter Robinson: Oh, hopefully but I mean, realistically what's your best…
Michael McFaul: I teach comparative democratization and I teach revolution…
Peter Robinson: Do you tilt one way or the other?
Michael McFaul: It's the most important country undergoing democratization in the
world today.
Peter Robinson: All right. Thank you very much.
Peter Robinson: I'm Peter Robinson for Uncommon Knowledge. Thank you for
joining us.
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