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Following World War II, Japan reinvented itself both politically, as it adopted the institutions of democratic government, and economically, as it became a dominant producer and exporter of consumer goods. These reforms were so successful that, ten years ago, experts were predicting that Japan would overtake the United States as an economic superpower. Instead, Japan experienced a decade of recession and economic stagnation that continues still. What happened? Is this a sign of serious structural problems in Japan's political and economic institutions? In other words, is it time for Japan to reinvent itself once again? If so, how should the United States alter its relationship with a new Japan?
Guests:
Steven Clemons Executive Vice President, New America Foundation.
T.J. Pempel Director, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
Steven Vogel Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
Transcript:
Peter Robinson: Today on Uncommon Knowledge, experts used to predict that
Japan would one day overtake us. Today, where's Japan?
Announcer: Funding for this program is provided by The John M. Olin
Foundation and the Starr Foundation.
[Music]
Peter Robinson: Welcome to Uncommon Knowledge, I'm Peter Robinson. Our
show today, Whatever Happened to Japan?
The year 2001 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of two
important treaties, the San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan
and the allies marked the formal end of the Second World War.
The Japan United States Security Treaty established the basis for
our relationship with Japan during the Cold War. For the first four
decades after signing those treaties, Japan engaged in a remarkably
successful transformation, reinventing itself politically as it adopted
the institutions of democratic government and economically, first as
an exporter of cheap consumer goods. Here's an old transistor radio
stamped, Made in Japan. Then as a technological powerhouse,
exporting the highest quality consumer goods, also computers,
automobiles. Then at the beginning of the fifth decade since
signing those treaties, that would be at the beginning of the 1990's,
Japan encountered trouble. Its economy went into a deep recession
and today more than ten years later, the economy of Japan is still in
a deep recession. Is this a sign of serious structural weaknesses in
Japan's institutions? In other words, is it time once again for Japan
to reinvent itself? If so, how should we in the United States
reinvent our relationship with Japan?
Joining us today, three guests. Steven Clemons is Executive Vice
President of the New America Foundation. Steven Vogel is an
Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of
California at Berkeley and T.J. Pempel is Executive Director of the
Institute for East Asian Studies also at the University of California
at Berkeley.
Title: Dire Straits
Peter Robinson: The noted observer of Japan, James Fallows, I quote, "Through the
century and a half in which America has been dealing with Japan,
fundamental change has always been right around the corner but
change has only come when the country has faced dire emergencies
such as the need to catch up with the industrialized west in the Meiji
era and the devastation at the end of the Second World War," closed
quote. Is Japan now facing so dire an emergency that it will
actually engage in fundamental change? T.J.?
T.J. Pempel: It's facing the crisis, the problem will really be whether they can
meet the challenge and make the kinds of changes that were made
in Meiji or at the occupation or whether they're going to be stalled
and go through an ever longer process of trying to make those
changes.
Peter Robinson: Steve?
Steven Clemons: I think there's a theatre about the notion of crisis in Japan today but
neither they think they're really in crisis nor do we because we're
still trying to work incrementally in our relationship and in our
sense of (?). I don't think we will know when the crisis hits but I do
think it's close and I think that means we will see terrific problems,
tremendous difficulties in Japan and we will have difficulty
responding at that time but it's not something we can calculate.
Steven Vogel: I think you're going to see fundamental change in Japan but the
crisis is not as dire or as immediate as it was in the Meiji period or
in World War II. And so the process of change is going to be much
more slow and protracted than it was in those days.
Peter Robinson: But fundamental changes will take place?
Steven Vogel: Yes.
Peter Robinson: Ten years ago, even more so, twenty years ago, Americans feared
Japan's economic strength. Pundits were talking about this century,
the twenty-first century as the Asian century led by Japan. Since
1991, Japan has experienced a rate of growth of a dismal one
percent a year on average. Deficit spending has taken place at such
a clip that Japan now has a public debt of 130% of GDP exceeding
even that of Italy. We read in the New York Times as we tape this
show that they're laying people off in large numbers in their
manufacturing plants in Japan itself. All but unheard of. That the
unemployment rate for men between eighteen and twenty-five
percent is about ten percent. What happened? T.J.?
T.J. Pempel: Basically the old system couldn't adjust to the changing economic
conditions. I think you had two things going on, a real globalization
and the introduction of production networks across Asia, the
movement of capital across borders. And I think simultaneously,
Asia's become a lot more regionally integrated than it was in the
past in ways that allowed Japanese manufacturing to move easily
into setting up operations abroad. But essentially Japan went
through an economic bubble, '85 to '90 and when that bubble burst,
the people inside began to realize that an awful lot of the old system
had been rusty and never really adjusted and I think that...
Peter Robinson: So just how and why did Japan's current economic system first
arise?
Title: The Grasshopper and the Ant
Peter Robinson: Let me quote the provocative James Fallows again. This is a
relatively old quotation so this is before the crash but would still
apply. "The same country that has the biggest cash surpluses,
trading surpluses in the world also has by far, the highest consumer
prices and across the board, the least material--materially bountiful
life. The economy is broken up into tribes. The significance of the
system is not that it is collusive but that it is stifling." Why did that
system arise and why have they not been able to open up the system
more to ordinary forces of competition so that firms get founded,
firms fail and the whole economy adjusts more smoothly than it
has? Let--let's take the first--first question first. Why, for so
many years, did Japan favor producers over consumers?
Steven Vogel: Well I think there you've got to go to politics but also the decisions
after the World War II that they really wanted to focus on industrial
growth and that meant focusing on producers and they felt that the
free market was not going to help them to rebuild the economy, that
they needed a strong state led pattern of growth. But the one thing I
would add on the producers and the consumers is that the irony of
the Japanese story is that the consumers have been perfectly happy
with the situation. There has not been any consumer (?) in that the
consumers themselves, the Japanese people have accepted many of
the policies, the very policies that have favored producers.
Peter Robinson: If they had this strong state led growth, then from the point of view
of a free market economist, the question is, why did it work so well
for so long?
Steven Clemons: I think it worked so well for so long because Japan--as far as the
political--political reason and a geo-strategic reason to explain this.
Japan was a satellite of the United States. It was set up to become
largely a producer to satisfy the consumption needs of America and
Europe. They became an export engine for the rest of the world and
used lots of government policies to stifle consumption. I disagree
with Steve that--that consumers were just nat--naturally happy
with the circumstance. They accepted it, yes. But you had a--you
had a mission where--where the population in Japan was compelled
and sort of asked to sacrifice for country and company for a long
period of time.
Peter Robinson: In the back of my mind I have a thought which is, in some ways,
actually not a very attractive thought which is that this system
which did indeed succeed so beautifully, rapid growth, wonderful
industrialization of the country for several decades, was actually
built on the back of the Japanese worker who was so dutiful that he
worked efficiently, showed up for work on time, accepted low
wages, accepted tiny amounts of living space and so forth. And so
you have this notion of these kind of--I've said it's not an attractive
one but we have this western notion of--of Japanese going to work
and doing what they're told and behaving essentially like ants.
Fair?
T.J. Pempel: Fair perhaps from and American standpoint but I think if you put it
in the context of what the economy looked like in 1945, and the
changes…
Peter Robinson: It's quite sensible for them to…
T.J. Pempel: …the changes that took place by the sixties were--were basically
quite positive for the country as a whole.
Peter Robinson: All right.
T.J. Pempel: One of the great benefits I think that we fail to attribute when we
talk about market economics and the failure to provide individual
choices and so forth is that if Japan adopted American-style market
economics in 1945, Japanese electronics industry would be run by
GE or Motorola, etc., not by Toshiba or Hitachi, etc. I mean, for the
Japanese economy to develop substantial Japanese-owned
corporations, required an element of--of insulation. And I think
they benefited from that. And then Japanese got…
Peter Robinson: Japan may have benefited from that economic system for many
years but what about the United States?
Title: Rocking the Boat
Peter Robinson: Return to James Fallows one--once again. He views the Japanese
favoring producers, holding down consumption, building up these
huge trading surpluses as an abuse of the international trading
system. And Fallows was, at one point at least, quite firm in his
notion that we should imply trading sanctions to get them to stop
behaving this way. On the other hand, you could say well, if
they're all willing to accept a lower standard of living to produce
wonderful cars and electronics for us, what's the problem? My
question is, to what extent should America be concerned by
Japanese trading policy? Steve?
Steven Vogel: Today they shouldn't be concerned at all…
Peter Robinson: No sweat.
Steven Vogel: …because the American economy is doing relatively well, the
Japanese economy is--is not doing very well and on balance, the
trading relations that exist benefits both sides.
Peter Robinson: You'd all agree with that?
Steven Clemons: I would disagree.
Peter Robinson: You would?
Steven Clemons: I would disagree because I think that we--if you can imagine Japan
and the United States being two big elephants in a boat that is okay,
it's floating, both elephants are keeping their balance. If one
becomes sick or becomes reckless or dies, the boat will sink,
the--will tip over. That's the situation we're in today. So while the
trading relationship today and tomorrow may be relatively benign
and okay and you don't have the same kinds of trade disputes that
you might have seen in the eighties and early nineties, nonetheless,
you have an economic behavior in Japan that's threatening the
global trading system and the United States. And that's the failure
to reform…
Peter Robinson: What's the threat?
Steven Clemons: The threat is the failure to really move beyond the kind of structural
corruption and the relationship-based decisions and mistakes that
Japan has made a long time. There's been no fundamental reform
in that area as--as far as I can see.
Peter Robinson: They're both champing at the bit to join us…
T.J. Pempel: Where I--where I disagree with the whole premise is the
assumption that the bilateral trade balance is a significant number.
You know, Japanese trade with the U.S. is up or down two percent
or whatever. I think that's an irrelevant number. I mean, the reality
now is that production has become so internationalized that the
United States auto manufacturers, for example, will manufacture
many of their best machines…
Peter Robinson: Ford is as likely to be in Mexico or Brazil…
[Talking at the same time]
T.J. Pempel: …Europe or wherever. I mean, if you look at the bilateral trade
balance, one of the ironies is that a Honda made in Marysville, Ohio
that is shipped to Japan is a plus for U.S. trade but clearly it's a
Japanese owned company that has done well and it's American
workers who have done well.
Peter Robinson: Okay, so let me…
T.J. Pempel: And the integration…
Peter Robinson: Let's take a look at Japanese Prime Minister, Koizumi and his
proposed reforms.
Title: Iron Chef or Hello Kitty
Peter Robinson: The Economist magazine, I quote, "The LDP," that's the Liberal
Democratic Party of which Koizumi is the leader, "remains a loose
assembly of factions dedicated to a wide range of special interests.
Mr. Koizumi's proposed reforms challenge these interests. The real
battle has yet to be joined," closed quote. In the face of opposition
from his own party, can Prime Minister Koiz--Koizumi reform the
economy? T.J.?
T.J. Pempel: It's going to be a very tough battle and I think what you're going to
see is a very interestingly different kind of politics in Japan because
I think Koizumi's real strength is that he, unlike virtually every
previous Prime Minister, has mastered media. He can go on
television and bypass an awful lot of the deep-rooted established
interests and, in effect, do what Ronald Reagan was so good at in
the United States or even Bill Clinton was good at in the United
States, namely, circumventing the injury of politics…
Peter Robinson: Changing the entire political landscape and…
T.J. Pempel: …and putting a new…
Peter Robinson: …by appealing directly to the electorate.
T.J. Pempel: …putting a new issue on the table.
Peter Robinson: What reforms does he need to take?
T.J. Pempel: Well I--I think he's got to reform financial…
Peter Robinson: Give me let's say, two so that we can--for the purposes of
television.
T.J. Pempel: He's got to--he's got to drastically deal with the banking crisis and
get those bad loans off the books so that Japanese banking can get
back to being a serious…
Peter Robinson: How does he do that? The way we handle the Savings and Loan
problem…
T.J. Pempel: Yeah.
Peter Robinson: …which is effectively bail them out, in effect?
T.J. Pempel: We--they've been bailing them out for, you know, for almost ten
years on an ad hoc basic and they've not allowed enough banks to
fail and now allowed enough financial institutions to fail.
Peter Robinson: And that would be the first step in your view?
T.J. Pempel: I think it's--I think it's a combination of failure and…
[Talking at same time]
Peter Robinson: Does everyone…
Steven Vogel: I agree--yeah, I agree with T.J. on what needs to be done but
they--what--what I would add is that I think Koizumi is going to
deliver in terms of some major reform because--because, in a
sense, he has to. The anti-LDP sentiment is so strong and he's such
a--a ma--you know, he's--he's made his career running against
his own party and I think he's going to continue to do that. The
question is not whether he's going to reform or not but whether he's
going to make the right reforms. I mean, he's talking about banking
reform which I think is…
Peter Robinson: So he actually has an opportunity to put in place reforms and you
don't doubt that he'll be able to do that. You wonder--you
question his judgment as to which reforms…
Steven Vogel: Yes because, for example, he's talking about the banking reform, if
he starts to take on his deficit which is huge, if you do that too soon,
you ruin any chance of recovery.
[Talking at same time]
Peter Robinson: When you said you thought Koizumi will certainly deliver, I saw
the smile of a skeptic appear on this Steve's face.
Steven Clemons: I--I am--I have been trained after watching so many Prime
Ministers come in with good ideas and fail. Koizumi is tapping into
something that is phenomenal in Japan which is a--he's been
flirting with a sense of--of--of national purpose, of national
interest and of nationalism that many other Prime Ministers haven't
been able to do. So it's not the reform talk per se that's getting
them--him these eighty percent popularity ratings. It's--it's this
populist nationalism, visiting Yasukuni shrine where war dead are
honored…
Peter Robinson: So…
Steven Clemons: …but let me--let me finish this one point.
Peter Robinson: Sure.
Steven Clemons: The--the interesting thing about him is that yes, he's been running
against his own parties and the single benchmark I'd like to see
beyond the most--beyond the loan issue is this guy has to put out of
business ninety percent of Japanese construction firms. That's the
problem. If he delivers on that but if he does deliver that--on that,
the LDP is dead and I see no evidence, no factual evidence that he's
Japan's Gorbachev.
[Talking at same time]
Peter Robinson: The constructions firms is, in effect, a gigantic public good
racquet…
Steven Clemons: Absolutely.
Peter Robinson: …whereby the government overbuilds and there are powerful
interests who get the--it's just the way that two-bit cities get run in
this country…
[Talking at same time]
T.J. Pempel: And a lot of the money that--and a lot of the money from the
construction firms goes back to the LDP for its election campaigns
and for the maintenance of politics.
Peter Robinson: So you agree that's the litmus test for Koizumi? If he's serious, he
has to start putting them out of business? And give me--give me a
sort of percentage chance. What do you thi--within the next five
years that he can make fundamental reforms, 50/50?
T.J. Pempel: I think it's 50/50--I think it's 50/50.
Peter Robinson: And you think 80--80/20?
Steven Vogel: 80/20 although I would add that that doesn't necessarily mean that
he's going to dismantle the whole system but that there are going to
be real changes.
Steven Clemons: I--I think he's got a ten percent chance. I think that the kind of
reforms that I'm talking about are impossible in Japan's political
system without a crisis. That's why I do believe that a crisis…
Peter Robinson: And this is not a bad enough crisis…
Steven Clemons: …an uncontrollable crisis. No, it's not because it…
[Talking at same time]
Steven Clemons: It--it would--it would--we would create a political realignment.
You--you would basically…
Peter Robinson: What kind of crisis would it have to be?
Steven Clemons: I think it has to be something where the population--you have to
remember, I'm not a great fan of Koizumi. I'm not--I don't want
to be seduced by the charisma of this one person. If you look at the
fact that the Japanese have had nearly ten Prime Ministers in a
decade, they've had a lot of lousy weather in terms of political
leadership. A guy comes in, says a few things, looks pretty good,
but yet I worry about that expectation level plummeting in Japan
after his inability to deliver. So…
Peter Robinson: Okay.
Steven Clemons: …at that point, the question is, what will the public do? It's a
function of what the public's ability to do what Steve had
mentioned earlier is to--whether they'll continue to sacrifice or
whether they say, you know, we've really had it and they go to the
streets…
[Talking at same time]
T.J. Pempel: I just want to quickly…
Peter Robinson: Sure.
T.J. Pempel: …disagree with one aspect to this and I think what you're seeing
now being built into the system is a growing recognition on the part
of an awful lot of Japanese businesses, particularly the export
competitive industries that change has to take place. The Toshiba's,
the Hitachi's, the…
Peter Robinson: So you…
T.J. Pempel: …Honda's are not going to sit still…
Peter Robinson: You've got a business class, they travel the world, they're familiar
with business practices in Europe and the United States…
T.J. Pempel: Right.
Peter Robinson: …and they're a pressure point for change.
T.J. Pempel: They're a pressure point for change and they're not going to
tolerate, it seems to me, continued funding for the LDP if the LDP
does not begin the kinds of economic reforms that will allow them
to do business in a truly international…
Peter Robinson: Now from economics, let's turn to geo-politics.
Title: Political Tectonics on the Pacific Rim
Peter Robinson: Half a century ago, President Harry Truman and Prime Minister
Yoshida, did I pronounce that more or less correctly?
Steven Clemons: Yes, perfect.
Peter Robinson: …signed the Japan United States Security Treaty. For this last half
century, we have guaranteed the security of Japan. Japan ha--I
think currently they're paying us some six billion dollars to defray
the costs of keeping troops over there but there's no question that
it's been an expensive endeavor on net to the American taxpayer.
Has it been a good deal for the United States? Steve Clemons?
Steven Clemons: Until 1991, it was a good deal.
Peter Robinson: What happened then?
Steven Clemons: The Cold War ended.
Peter Robinson: Ah, okay.
Steven Clemons: This--the--the terms of our engagement with the world changed
and we decided to elect not to change at that point. The Soviet
Union collapsed. The way in which they managed their satellites
around the world collapsed. We didn't collapse…
Peter Robinson: So the entire rationale…
Steven Clemons: …and we had a very hard time changing direction.
Peter Robinson: …for that security arrangement simply disappeared?
Steven Clemons: In my view, yes, with the exception of North Korea and I'm a realist
when it comes to the fact that you don't want to leave a power
vacuum. There's no place…
Peter Robinson: But you do need a huge space in Okinawa?
Steven Clemons: You do not need manned troops in Okinawa. You might need an air
base in Okinawa but the local costs of those air bases in terms of the
resentment of the population about the marines, undermines the
support for the kind of assets that you want in the future. And that's
what we've been very stupid about.
Peter Robinson: What about the notion of Japan rewriting the constitution to permit
it to use a--to establish a military--a--a force--well the self
defense forces are pretty considerable--but permit the Japanese to
use their military the way other countries use their military to
support their interests abroad?
Steven Clemons: I think Japan has to go through a process where it struggles with
what its interests are without the United States meddling…
Peter Robinson: But should Bush let it be known that he would oppose that? Should
he let it be known that it's up to the Japanese? What's your view on
that quickly?
Steven Clemons: I think Bush--I think Bush should remove himself from the
Japanese domestic debate. We shouldn't have any role in it at all.
We--we…
Peter Robinson: (?) comment?
Steven Clemons: …corrupt the process.
Peter Robinson: Okay. T.J.?
T.J. Pempel: I think we'd be--I think it would be a big mistake on the part of the
Japanese to revise the constitution. There's no need for it. They're
already got one of the mo--world's most sophisticated military
forces even though they call it a self defense force. I don't think
there's any need to open up the entire issue of the constitution. It's
served the Japanese public pretty well. It's kept domestic politics
calm. You could expand…
Peter Robinson: But doesn't it introduce a note…
T.J. Pempel: …and have expanded…
Peter Robinson: Doesn't it just introduce a note of corruption may be too strong a
word, but of dissembling at the highest level when everybody in
Japan…
T.J. Pempel: That's what politics is about.
Peter Robinson: Oh, oh, oh thou cynic.
Steven Vogel: I'm going to disagree with--with T.J. on that because I think that…
Peter Robinson: They have a military, shouldn't they revise the constitution to
accept that they do?
Steven Vogel: The--the constitution as written is--is as you suggest, a farce in the
sense that Japan has a military that already defies the letter of that
constitution. So I think that, in the long run, Japan has to revise that
constitution first just because to recognize to current reality, second,
to allow them to really engage in peacekeeping operations. And I
think the constitution has served Japan very well as a kind of a lid
on Japanese militarism. So I would suggest that if they were going
to revise the constitution, they should revise it with new limitations
set on Japanese military capacity perhaps even written into the
constitution.
Peter Robinson: Now…
T.J. Pempel: I think this would be--I think this would be a big mistake because I
think the--the implications of a revised constitution across Asia
would be very, very serious. I mean, it would clearly be a signal,
whether directly implied or not, to both China and South Korea as
well as to Southeast Asia that something fundamental had changed
in Japan and would require…
Peter Robinson: Last question, why hasn't Japan ever been able to come to terms
with its actions during the Second World War?
Title: Tokyo Rose-Colored Glasses
Peter Robinson: Contrast Japan with Germany. Germany, for fifty years has stoutly
castigated the--the Nazis and its past. It has been forthright about
facing its war past. We know that today that textbooks approved by
the Japanese Ministry of Education fudge all kinds of questions
about what actually took place during the war. And then we have
Prime Minister Koizumi visiting the--name the shrine for me…
Steven Clemons: Yosi Kuni…
Peter Robinson: Yosi Kuni. Thank you very much. Shrine, which is a shrine to the
Japanese war dead. Basic question…
T.J. Pempel: …much as…
Peter Robinson: …why haven't they faced their war past the way the Germans did?
T.J. Pempel: Because they have a very ambig--Japan generally, has a very
ambiguous and conflicted notion of the causes of World War II.
There's a very strong belief within Japan and there's a lot of
historical evidence to back it up, that much of Asia's troubles in the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries were the result of Western
Imperial countries, Dutch colonies in Indo--Indonesia, the British
in Southeast Asia, the French in Southeast Asia, everybody carving
up China, etc. Japan was the one country in Asia that stood up to
the West. Now that's not in any way to justify the aggression in
China or the takeover of Korea as a colony or to justify World War
II but, within Japan, there's a tremendous difficulty in dealing with
the history of the nineteenth and early twentieth century and
Western imperialism. And, at the same time, dealing with the way
in which Japan's military behaved during World War II.
Peter Robinson: What about this notion of the old-fashioned nationalism
reappearing?
Steven Vogel: Well there's always been a very strong strand of nationalism in
Japan. But I think that the overwhelming majority of the populous
believes that Japan should be much more forthright about its past.
So, in a sense, it's a domestic political problem where you have
factions that, you know, are strongly nationalist. They believe that
somehow that if they recognize their own crimes, that this is
somehow denigrating the nation.
Peter Robinson: What do you make of this problem of nationalism in Japan?
Steven Clemons: Well I think we have to remember that America, the--the United
States was largely complicit in this issue of the Japanese not
looking back and--and dealing with these questions of its World
War II involvement, of the emperor's potential liability with--with
war crimes. And there are lots of other issues…
Peter Robinson: Because MacArthur during the occupation simply said…
Steven Clemons: …it was MacArthur, it was John Foster Dulles. It became a session
after sort of 1947, '48, after the real concern about communist
expansion. And the next challenge, we wanted Japan to be turned
from being our public enemy number one into our best friend in
Asia. And we basically set up the mechanisms to force Japan
forward, to restore the conservatives and we shut down public
debate in Japan. That--we are dealing with the inertia of that
historical legacy today. And I--I do think the Japanese need to take
responsibility for their history but we can't deny--we can't sit back
and criticize without dealing with the fact that we were the
architects of this historical amnesia in Japan.
Peter Robinson: Okay. Television, so final question. I'm going to ask you all two
questions and it ha--we have to move fast because it's television.
Throughout the decade of the 1980's, Japan averaged close to five
percent a year economic growth. In the decade since then, 1991,
2001, about a percent a year annual growth. A decade from now,
where will they be? Closer to one or closer to five?
Steven Vogel: They'll be at two percent which is healthy for a mature economy.
Peter Robinson: T.J.?
T.J. Pempel: I'd have to agree.
Steven Clemons: Two percent.
Peter Robinson: So no dramatic change, no…
[Talking at same time]
Steven Vogel: …the normalcy will be dramatic.
[Talking at same time]
T.J. Pempel: Yes.
Peter Robinson: Will be dramatic?
T.J. Pempel: And the--and the important issue that I think we need to suggest is
I think the two percent implies, in one way or another, that many of
the reforms that Koizumi is claiming will take place, will in
somehow or another…
Peter Robinson: Will take place.
T.J. Pempel: …will somehow or another take place.
Peter Robinson: And let's say a decade from now, will relations between the United
States and Japan be better, worse, what do you think?
Steven Clemons: I--I--I think that they'll be healthier…
Peter Robinson: Japan will have a greater sense of itself…
Steven Clemons: Yeah. Japan will have a greater sense of itself…
Peter Robinson: Feel free to disagree with us?
Steven Clemons: It will be disagreement. I think the marines will be out of…
Peter Robinson: Will we make the Chinese more nervous?
Steven Clemons: I--I think that we will probably begin to have the--the great states
in Asia begin to sort of deal more responsibility with security
issues. The United States will be involved but we're not--United
States isn't going to be wedged in as the critical power in every
deal.
T.J. Pempel: When you ask about how the relationship will evolve over the next
ten years, I think all of us probably feel a lot more comfortable
predicting where Japan might be in ten years than we feel--I feel at
least, predicting where the U.S. will be in ten years.
Peter Robinson: Steve?
Steven Vogel: I think overall, relations are going to be better but I think that
they're going to be considerably better on the economic side and
considerably worse on the security side.
Peter Robinson: Steve, T.J. and Steve, thank you very much.
Steven Clemons: Thank you.
Steven Vogel: Thank you.
Peter Robinson: Without substantial reforms, our guests agree, Japan could find its
economic woes lingering for years to come yet even then, Japan
will remain one of the most powerful nations on earth. So the eyes
of the world will remain upon it. I'm Peter Robinson, thanks for
joining us.
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