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TERRORISM: The Proper Use of Power
By Benjamin Wittes
Fans and critics alike seem to believe that a new book, The Terror
Presidency, presents a thoroughgoing condemnation of presidential
authority. It doesn’t. By Benjamin Wittes.
By now you’ve probably read something about Jack Goldsmith’s new book
on his brief service as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel. Goldsmith is suddenly everywhere: a big feature in the New York
Times Magazine, a front-page story in the Washington Post, and broadcast
interviews. The intense coverage is no surprise. His book, The Terror Presidency:
Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration, contains a wealth
of unflattering details concerning the highest echelons of the legal war on
terrorism—from the absentee landlordism of former attorney general
Alberto Gonzales to the executive—power fanaticism of David Addington,
the vice president’s then counsel and current chief of staff. And it details an
extraordinary story: that of a conservative lawyer who found himself saying
no to the president of the United States on some of the nation’s key
intelligence programs in the midst of a war.
All of this has turned Goldsmith, who only a few short years ago was a
highly controversial hire among lefties at the Harvard Law School, into
something of a liberal hero. He is the man, after all, whose legal analysis
triggered the famed showdown in then–attorney general John Ashcroft’s hospital room over the National Security Agency’s warrantless surveillance
program and who withdrew the infamous “torture memos.”
Jack Goldsmith, the author of "The Terror Presidency," is shown speaking at a Hoover retreat.
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Far be it from me to dissent from the current lionization of Goldsmith.
He is a close personal friend and someone whose work I admire deeply. We
are both members of Hoover’s Task Force on National Security and Law.
(I also consulted with him extensively as he was writing the book and am
consequently acknowledged within it.) Goldsmith’s actions in government
took immense courage, and he deserves all of the plaudits anyone wants to
throw his way.
But I hope that his new fan club reads more than the juicy and damaging
zingers about his former colleagues in its enthusiasm about this deeply
interesting piece of work. For the story Goldsmith tells is, in truth, a complicated one. It is not all a critique of the Bush administration; on many
points Goldsmith defends his former colleagues. Indeed, his story in some
ways poses as great a challenge to the Left as it does to the hard-line mavens
of executive power.
You don’t have to read very far into The Terror Presidency to realize that
Jack Goldsmith is no human-rights lawyer. For starters, he disputes the
common wisdom that the problem with the Bush administration is its
“lawlessness.” In his account, the real problem was very nearly the opposite:
“The administration has been strangled by law, and since September
11, 2001, this war has been lawyered to death.” The administration, Goldsmith
argues, was obsessed with legal considerations to the exclusion of
sound political judgment. Administration lawyers put too much faith in
old precedents and failed to think about how the legal culture had changed.
Intense fear of the next attack made them want to do everything legally
permissible to stop it—so propriety and wisdom merged with legality, putting
immense pressure on lawyers to, well, beat the law until it confessed.
The result was, in some cases, fatefully shoddy legal work. But in other
cases, where the law did support the administration, the administration
failed to anticipate the bait-and-switch when the Supreme Court did not
stand by the precedents on which the government had relied in good faith.
“It seemed crazy to require the commander in chief and his subordinates
to get a judge’s permission to listen to each communication under a legal
regime that was designed before technological revolutions brought us
high-speed fiber-optic networks, the public Internet, e-mail, and ten-dollar
cell phones.”
On the merits of many disputed issues, Goldsmith is far closer to the
administration he criticizes than to his fellow critics. He decries, for example,
the legalization of warfare and the application of criminal statutes to
foreign policy decisions, describing “a paralyzing culture of risk-averse legalism
in the military and, especially, intelligence establishments before 9/11.”
He defends the decision to hold Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters as “unlawful
enemy combatants” and the legal propriety of military commissions.
While he considered the torture memos legally unsupportable and withdrew them, he offers no objection in principle to highly coercive interrogation,
writing that he had “very little basis for second-guessing my superiors’
judgment that certain detainees should be questioned as aggressively
as legally possible.“
He also “shared many of the White House’s concerns with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),” the same law over which he and others
were prepared to resign to force the administration to comply with it:
“It seemed crazy to require the commander in chief and his subordinates
to get a judge’s permission to listen to each communication under a legal
regime that was designed before technological revolutions brought us highspeed
fiber-optic networks, the public Internet, e-mail, and ten-dollar cell
phones.” Goldsmith criticizes liberals for not taking the terror threat or the
conflict with Al-Qaeda seriously.
The Bush administration, Jack Goldsmith argues, was obsessed with legal
considerations to the exclusion of sound political judgment.
The war according to Jack Goldsmith, in short, would look a great deal
more like the war according to George W. Bush than it would the war
according to the many people around the country who have fallen in love
with Jack Goldsmith.
Except for one very big thing: in Goldsmith’s war on terrorism, the presidency
would act in conjunction with the two other branches of government,
not on its own.
Goldsmith’s critique of the administration, in other words, is more about
the proper sources of presidential power in this arena than it is about the
substance of the powers the president should have. He believes—as I have
also argued—that the administration should have pervasively involved
Congress as a way of legitimizing its own actions, and should have accepted
some limitations on its power by way of garnering that legislative support.
This is a profound challenge to those who believe, as Goldsmith quotes
Addington as saying, that “the Constitution empower[s] the president to
do what he thinks is necessary to prevent an attack”—whatever that may
be and whatever Congress may have said on the subject. But it is no less
profound a challenge to those who believe that the proper response to the
Bush administration is simply to tighten legislative restrictions and increase
court oversight over all aspects of the war. The proper approach to an
administration already “strangled by law” is not, after all, to tighten the
noose.
The idea that the president ought to have a fairly free hand in the war
on terrorism, but that the source of his freedom should be congressional
permission for bold action rather than broad claims of inherent presidential
power, lacks much of a constituency today. The ire directed at Democrats
who supported the recent temporary FISA amendment is one
dispiriting indication of that. The administration’s willingness to run the
NSA’s program for years without getting such a statutory change is another.
Yet seeking authorization from Congress for the sort of authority the presidency
needs is the direction that the next president, Republican or Democrat,
will have to pursue if the United States is to avoid endless litigation
and political polarization over defeating terrorists, which ought to stand
above partisan politics.
The rule of law is not always about restrictions; sometimes it’s about
granting permission. In his brief career in government, Goldsmith
reminded the Bush administration about the importance of restrictions.
His book tells that story. It also, however, contains a plea for more permission.
The question is how many people are prepared to engage both halves
of the book.
This essay appeared in the New Republic online on September 11, 2007.
Available from the Hoover Press is Confirmation Wars: Preserving Independent Courts in
Angry Times, by Benjamin Wittes. To order, call 800.935.2882 or visit www.hooverpress.org.
Benjamin Wittes is a fellow and research director in public law at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (Penguin Press, 2008), Starr: A Reassessment (Yale University Press, 2002), and Confirmation Wars: Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times (Rowman & Littlefield and the Hoover Institution Press, 2006). He is a columnist for the New Republic online and a contributing editor for the Atlantic Monthly. Between 1997 and 2006 he served as an editorial writer for the Washington Post specializing in legal affairs. Wittes also covered the Justice Department and federal regulatory agencies as a reporter and news editor at Legal Times. His writing has appeared in a wide range of journals and magazines, including Slate, the New Republic, the Wilson Quarterly, the Weekly Standard, Policy Review, and First Things. Wittes graduated from Oberlin College.
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