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HURRICANE KATRINA: To New Orleans, a Few Words from California
By Pete Wilson
In the wake of the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina, former California governor Pete Wilson offers advice and encouragement to the citizens of New Orleans.
LOS ANGELES—Natural
disasters, like wars, test human mettle and bring out the best in many
people—courage and selflessness, acts of heroism, and great
generosity to afflicted neighbors and total strangers. Sadly, but very
predictably, they also generate political opportunism and partisan
finger-pointing that is worse than counterproductive. Practitioners of the
“blame game” typically do far more
to exploit than to assuage the pain of the victims with whom they so ostentatiously sympathize. Katrina has
certainly been no exception, with said practitioners absurdly and
contemptibly charging the president with racist neglect.
Rather than point fingers, I presume to offer a few
practical pointers that I hope will be useful
to those who are, or may in future be, challenged to lead their constituents on the hard road
back to recovery from a natural disaster.
In early 1994, a major earthquake (measuring 6.7 on
the Richter scale) jolted the residents of greater Los Angeles from their
slumbers and knocked houses off their foundations. Within seconds, the
Northridge earthquake reduced to rubble the overpass bridges of Interstate
10, Los Angeles’s major east-west artery, and thereby instantly shut
down the most heavily trafficked freeway in
the world. I was advised that it would require some two years and two months to repair the bridges and restore the I-10 to
use. For as long as it remained unavailable,
it would mean not only driver inconvenience on a dramatic scale but delays that would translate into economic
dislocation conservatively estimated to cost $600,000 per day. The
interruption to the life of the nation’s second-largest city would be
of a plainly intolerable magnitude and duration.
Instead, we completed the repairs and reopened the
freeway to its normal heavy traffic in
just 66 days. How? We did two things.
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First, I quickly exercised the extraordinary
emergency powers conferred on the governor of
California by the state Government Code. I suspended the operation of statutes and regulations that would have
required the protracted public hearings called
for before environmental impact reports could
be filed and acted upon, and suspended other normally demanded procedural
hurdles. Eliminating these legal requirements drastically reduced
purposeless delays that would have impeded recovery and compounded the
injury inflicted by the quake.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that governors
need to be given such clear emergency powers
if they are not already provided them by existing state law.
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Second, we took a
page from the book of private sector incentives for accelerating performance. We told contractors bidding to repair the
bridges that their bids must specify not only
the cost but the date of completion and that they must agree to an added
condition: For every day they were late, they would incur a penalty of
$200,000; and for every day they were early, they would be rewarded with a
bonus of $200,000. The winning bidder, C. C. Myers, Inc., put on three
shifts that worked 24/7. To prevent any delay
in the work, the company hired a locomotive and crew to haul steel sitting on a siding in Texas to Los Angeles.
Myers made more on the bonus than it did on the bid.
Incentives work. The reward to the contractor in
this instance was well worth the price of restoring critical infrastructure
two years early.
In New Orleans, all levels of
government—federal, state, and local—and the city’s
private sector leadership face a challenging threshold decision as to how,
or even whether, to rebuild.
Voices from outside the city have been heard
dismissing the very notion of rebuilding a
place that is 12 feet below sea level. In New Orleans, the critical
infrastructure—the system of
levees—is, in fact, far more critical than
even the world’s busiest freeway. Although the prolonged loss of the
I-10 severely affected the functioning of Los Angeles, the loss of the levees
threatens the very survival of New Orleans.
I am not an engineer but have been advised that an
engineering solution exists that would ensure the reliability of the
levees, even in the alluvial soil of New Orleans without the bedrock found
elsewhere. That assurance of reliability is key, the prerequisite to the
confidence that investors must feel if they are to be induced to rebuild
the city and its economy. The rub is that the engineering solution is of
such cost that it will challenge its advocates to justify that cost to
opponents. Many will demand to know why taxpayers living outside the region
should be forced to subsidize it.
Before dismissing that solution out of
hand—before abandoning New Orleans and retreating to the terrestrial,
if not the moral, high ground—we must exhaust all justifiable
alternatives. I suggest that the needed super-levee solution will require
sharing its cost between taxpayers and private investors. The public should
do what it has done in the past to provide for a measure of flood
protection where needed elsewhere in the nation.
Participation by private investors should be enabled
by whatever state and federal legislation is required to authorize tax
increment bonding to finance the creation of
new levees. It should authorize terms that will be able to attract pension funds and other institutional investors,
while permitting the city to continue providing essential services.
Purchase of the bonds would provide the front money for levee construction.
The tax increment legally dedicated to redeem the bonds would be built up
as new properties are built in New Orleans, continually adding new assessed
valuation to the city’s property tax base.
Tax increment bonding to finance the redevelopment of
urban areas is a proven method of attracting private investors to replace
blight with privately owned improvements that translate into a growing
economy and employment base. I suggest that the same mechanism be employed
to finance not only the land assembly for redevelopment of the ruined
sections of the city but also the creation of the levees that have to be
built if New Orleans is to be brought back.
A final suggestion: I respectfully suggest that New
Orleans consider creating a nonprofit corporation to which it can delegate
authority to act as the city’s agent in making the complex real
estate deals that will be essential to redevelopment. San Diego did so when
I was mayor, creating a nonprofit with a paid staff and a board of
volunteer real estate and land-use professionals who possessed the
expertise and time that the job required—time that the City Council,
though designated by state law as the city’s official redevelopment
agency, simply could not devote to it. Deals negotiated by the nonprofit
Center City Development Corporation were made subject to ratification by
the mayor and the City Council. The result was that the pace of
redevelopment of downtown San Diego remarkably accelerated. And the quality
was so enhanced that our relatively modest public effort continues 30 years
later to spur far greater private redevelopment. It has transformed a
decaying core with a declining tax and job base into one of America’s
most vibrant and thriving urban environments.
I make this suggestion confident that New Orleans is
blessed with the dynamic business and civic leaders needed to supply the
same kind of motivation to the rebuilding of their city. I have seen this
leadership in action. I am privileged to serve as a member of the board of
trustees of the National D-Day Museum, which Congress has designated as
America’s official World War II museum. It is located in New Orleans,
not Washington. It is New Orleans’s gift to America, so that our
children and grandchildren will never forget that freedom is not free but
must be purchased with the courage and sacrifice of those willing to fight
and die for it.
I am convinced that, given time and the right tools,
that kind of leadership can be expected—and should be given every
chance—to rebuild New Orleans and to make it even better.
This essay appeared in the Wall Street Journal on September 13, 2005.
Available from the Hoover Press is Leviathan: The Growth of Local Government and the Erosion of Liberty, by Clint Bolick. To order, call 800.935.2882 or visit www.hooverpress.org.
Pete Wilson is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. He served as the thirty-sixth governor of California (1991-1999), the culmination of more than three decades in the public arena that included eight years as a United States Senator (1983-1991), eleven years as mayor of San Diego (1971-1983), and five years as a California state assemblyman (1967-1971).
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