FOUR MORE YEARS: The Russia of Vladimir Putin is becoming increasingly authoritarian—and President Bush should say so. By John B. Dunlop.
But has Putin in fact been engaging in state-building
and strengthening the Russian state? If by the term state-building, one
means authoritarian state-building, then the answer would be maybe yes, but also maybe
no. On the other hand, if one is speaking of democratic state-building then the answer must be unequivocally
no.
State-building refers to the processes of
strengthening the relative power of the state vis-à-vis society and
other non-state actors. Max Weber long ago defined the state as “a
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory.” In this sense, and perhaps in this sense alone, Putin could be
said to have been a successful
state-builder. He has demonstrably strengthened the relative power of the
state vis-à-vis society and other non-state actors (for example,
certain leading oligarchs).
Putin has built upon the super-presidentialism
embodied in the Yeltsin Constitution of 1993 and has significantly
ratcheted up the power of the so-called siloviki
(power ministries), especially of the secret
police, the FSB. One well-known Russian sociologist, Olga Kryshtanovskaya,
recently calculated that the siloviki make up approximately 25
percent of Russia’s ruling elite and
58 percent of Putin’s close entourage.
A major problem connected with the increasingly
authoritarian power amassed by the siloviki in Russia is that they are now involved in, and indeed direct, areas of national life for which they have little
professional training or expertise, including art, culture, the mass media,
and even elections.
A fundamental distinction has to be made between
strong states that are repressive dictatorships (such as present-day
Russia) and strong democratically oriented
states (such as the United States). In a liberal democratic state such as the United States individual rights are protected,
as are capitalistic property rights, while an independent court system
protects the rule of law and a reasonably honest bureaucracy implements
regulations. Asked by a recent poll whether “the level of stealing
and corruption in the country had changed since
Putin was elected president,” 51 percent of Russian respondents replied that the level of
corruption in the country remained about what it had been under Yeltsin. Twenty-two
percent thought that there was “less corruption,” but 21 percent believed that there was “more
corruption.” Obviously a high level of corruption serves to block or hinder any
efforts at state-building, even
authoritarian state-building.
In Russia today, the ruling elite and the upper ranks
of the bureaucracy are eagerly joining the ranks of the wealthy oligarchs. To take just
one example, Putin’s chief of staff also
serves as the chairman of the council of directors of the huge gas
monopoly, Gazprom. “State capitalism” is being actively fostered by the Putin regime. Not surprisingly, popular
support for a market economy has been on the wane in Russia. In 1998, 20.9 percent of
Russian respondents supported “the
creation of an effective market economy”; by 2004, that level of
support had dropped to 15.5 percent.
It would seem self-evident that any effort at
successful state-building would require the
existence of a largely uncorrupted judiciary and police force. A recent
poll showed, however, that only 12 percent of Russian citizens believe that Russian judges are honest and uncorrupt. Sixty-seven
percent (that is, two-thirds) contended that, in rendering their decisions,
“judges in general are not ruled by the
law, and they pass unjust sentences.” Forty percent cited personal greed as the chief motivation behind the
judges’ sentences.
The deep suspicion and even contempt of the Russian
citizenry for their police force are well known. Asked in a poll whether
the practice by the Russian police of
soliciting bribes, shakedowns, extortion, and so on represented a “stable system,” 58 percent of Russian
correspondents stated that it did; 28 percent
cited individual instances of corruption. Self-evidently, a corruption-ridden judiciary and venal police render the
prospect of effective state-building
unlikely.
President Putin recently publicly regretted the fact
that in Russia “we do not, unfortunately, have a developed civil
society.” A former high-ranking aide to President Yeltsin, Georgii
Satarov, has recently noted, however, that the Putin regime finds itself on
the opposite side of the barricades from endangered Russian civil society.
“There is a civil society in Russia,” Satarov underlined.
“It is more honest, smarter and more far-sighted than the regime. It
is different from the regime, not the same thing. Civil society is working
in the interests of the country while the authorities have their own
concerns.”
One organization often singled out as the most visible
example of civil society in Russia today is the Union of Committees of
Soldiers’ Mothers, headed by Valentina
Melnikova. In early November 2004, representatives of this organization
from 50 regions of Russia gathered in Moscow to create the United People’s Party of
Soldiers’ Mothers. A recent poll of Russian residents found 64 percent of respondents approving the activity
of the mothers’ groups while 27 percent opposed it. The new
party’s main goals are to abolish the Soviet-era compulsory military
draft and to participate in the State Duma elections of 2007. The party is
currently being harassed both by the Russian bureaucracy and by the police.
One of its leaders has been arrested and given a two-year prison sentence.
The Putin leadership has decided to abolish the
elections of governors in Russia’s 89 regions. This step was
formalized by the State Duma in early December
2004. There have been reports that Putin also supports abolishing the election of Russia’s mayors. This giant step
backward from federalism has incensed representatives of Russia’s
minorities, who make up about 20 percent of the country’s population.
Putin’s ill-conceived federal reform could generate new Chechnyas
within the Russian Federation, especially in
the combustible North Caucasus region with its heavily Muslim populace.
At the outset of this article I asked whether or not
Putin has in fact been engaged in strengthening the Russian state during
his nearly five years in office. Although Putin and his entourage see him
as a vigorous state-builder, he has de facto
(“objectively,” as the Russians say) been engaged in weakening
the Russian state. The chief reason for this has been because he has
consciously rejected the model of
democratic state-building, with its separation of powers, free parliament,
unfettered press, independent judiciary, rules of the game, and dynamic
federalism.
Special to the Hoover Digest. Available from the Hoover Press is Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union, by Roman Szporluk. Also available is The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, by Charles King. To order, call 800.935.2882. John B. Dunlop is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. |
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