FOUR MORE YEARS: We need a better class of dictator running North Korea. Challenges the administration faces in dealing with Kim Jong Il. By Henry S. Rowen.
The North’s weapons pose three dangers. Mounted
on its long-range missiles, they could inflict devastation at long
distances, including the United States; the threat to Japan is already
rousing it to re-arm and could lead to a nuclear-armed Japan—and
South Korea as well. Worse still, the regime might sell bombs to
terrorists.
The crisis was set off by the North admitting in
October 2002 that it had a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of
the 1994 Agreed Framework, which promised economic benefits in return for
“freezing” its nuclear program. (It apparently began its secret
program in the mid-1990s.) Since openly breaking it, the Kim Jong Il regime
has loudly proclaimed that the United States is planning to attack and has
demanded a guarantee of security from us. But we are very unlikely to
attack without South Korean concurrence, which isn’t in the cards. As
for the North starting a war, Kim doesn’t seem to be suicidal.
Kim’s strategic position is weak. Despite some
liberalizing steps, the country is an economic
basket case, and evidently Kim sees his hold on power as too fragile to
stand Chinese-style openness. What’s left is using nuclear weapons
for extortion.
Kim might not understand the fire with which he is
playing. Despite the inhibitions we have against using force there, a
serious prospect of North Korean-originated bombs being detonated in
Manhattan could overcome them. Of course, we are not the only concerned
party; the Bush administration is rightly
treating this as also a problem for Kim’s Asian neighbors. The Japanese see it that way, but what about the South Koreans
and Chinese?
Much has changed for the worse between South Korea and
the United States. In the past we were aligned with the South’s need
to consolidate its democracy and security. With its democracy now solid,
the problem is security. Southerners don’t expect the North’s
nuclear weapons to land on them or to be the
target of nuclear-armed terrorists, but Americans see themselves as endangered both ways. To many South Koreans,
especially younger ones, the North is less of a threat than the United
States. They also fear that political collapse in the North will cause
millions of people to head south and burden them with building the
North’s economy. These are worries that South Korea’s friends
can help to allay.
China’s position is pivotal. Despite
protestations to the contrary, Kim Jong Il could not stay in power without
at least its tacit support. China’s leaders
don’t want a communist regime to collapse, a flood of refugees, a war that might bring American
forces to the Yalu River, or a re-armed Japan. They say they oppose the North’s
nuclear programs, but, despite having the power to
end them, they have not done so, which could lead to the undesirable
outcome of three more nuclear-armed neighbors, two in Korea plus Japan.
What should we do? A new deal allowing more intrusive
inspections would be incompatible with the character of North Korea. Some
argue that we should negotiate anyway, suggesting that this would
“buy time” during which something good might happen. Given our
options, that argument should not be rejected out of hand. But how much
time might we “buy”? The record suggests very little;
agreements or no, Kim Jong Il will not give up his nuclear weapons.
As Nicholas Eberstadt puts it (Weekly Standard, November 29, 2004), we need a better
class of dictator running North Korea. A Park Chung Hee or a Deng Xiaoping
would mean economic liberalization and a step toward political
liberalization—and eventual unification. The Chinese would surely
prefer that to the consequences of Kim remaining in power.
That brings us full circle to the assets the United
States might bring to bear, raising the
question of how we have dealt with the many other economic, political, and security issues we have with China. Putting
them all on the table together might change the
dynamics of our relationship. If the Chinese government realizes that we won’t deal with North
Korea, that the Japanese will react
negatively, and that we will try to bring about Kim’s removal, it
might decide to do something decisive about the North.
We also need to have a frank discussion with South
Korea. On the one hand, we should offer to help it with the burdens that
might emanate from a destabilzed North; on the other, we should make it
clear that it cannot have U.S. protection while sustaining a regime that
threatens us.
If the American government focuses on a goal and
devises a long-term strategy, it can do remarkable things. Here is a
challenge to it of a high order.
Special to the Hoover Digest. Available from the Hoover Press is The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons, by Sidney Drell and James Goodby. To order, call 800.935.2882 Henry S. Rowen, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a professor of public policy and management emeritus at the university's Graduate School of Business and a member Stanford University's Asia/Pacific Research Center. |
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