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DEFENSE:
NATO's Next Mission
By William J. Perry and Warren Christopher
NATO achieved its first mission—preventing attack from the communist East. Now it must take up its larger mission—ensuring a stable and secure demo-cratic Europe. By Hoover fellow and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
Fifty years ago Secretary of State George Marshall called on the people of the United States to
contribute to the building of a new Europe "united in freedom, peace, and prosperity." Succeeding
generations of Americans rallied in support of Marshall's vision, electing leaders who were
committed to fostering and maintaining the strongest possible ties between America and Europe's
democracies, both old and new.
The most important expression of this commitment has been the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). And, we believe, NATO still has that central responsibility even though
the political and military circumstances that prevail in Europe have changed.
It is true that the alliance has achieved its original military mission, having deterred attack from
the Warsaw Pact. But that was never its only role. It was given that task in the context of General
Marshall's much larger vision--of a democratic Europe committed to working together instead of
against itself, with the unflagging involvement of the United States as the ultimate guarantor of
that spirit of cooperation.
The United States must continue to play this role as democratic Europe itself enlarges, which is
why a Senate vote against enlarging NATO would be a major mistake.
But it is also time to move beyond the enlargement debate. Adding new members is not the only,
or even the most important, debate over the alliance's future. A much larger issue looms: What is
the alliance's purpose?
The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: The danger to the security of its
members is not primarily potential aggression to their collective territory but threats to their
collective interests beyond their territory. Shifting the alliance's emphasis from defense of
members' territory to defense of common interests is the strategic imperative.
These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of
oil, terrorism, genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other regions that threaten to create
great disruption.
To deal with such threats, alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions
that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory. This concept is not new. Such a "coalition of
the willing" made up the Implementation Force in Bosnia under alliance command and control,
and another made up the war-fighting force in Desert Storm, which drew heavily on alliance
training and procedures.
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What should NATO do about the Russians? An evolution from defense of territory to defense of
common interests would signal to Russian skeptics that NATO had moved beyond the purpose of
containing Moscow. |
Such coalitions will include some--but not necessarily all--NATO members and will generally
include nonmembers from the Partnership for Peace program, the alliance's program of training
the militaries of the former Warsaw Pact. In both the Persian Gulf war and Bosnia the coalitions
did not include NATO members alone. So the distinction between full membership and
partnership promises to be less important in the alliance of the future.
The decision to use the alliance's forces beyond NATO territory would require a unanimous
decision of its members, including the United States. That is the answer to those who fear that
such troops might be deployed imprudently on far-flung missions to other continents.
Defense of members' territory would remain a solemn commitment of the allies, of course. But
such territory is not now threatened, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future.
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What to Do about the Russians
What should NATO do with, and about, the Russians? An evolution in the alliance's focus and
forces from defense of territory to defense of common interests would signal to Russian skeptics
that NATO had moved beyond its original purpose of containing Moscow. Moreover, Russian
military leaders can well understand the alliance's shift from the large static deployments of the
Cold War to smaller, more mobile forces. They are trying to do the same in their own program of
military reform. They have a strong incentive to carry out such reforms in cooperation with other
partners.
The NATO-Russia Founding Act, which provides the framework for the new alliance and the new
Russia to work together, is an important step toward forging a productive relationship between
the two. Putting the act's political provisions into practice will require responsible actions on both
sides. But the Founding Act's military provisions are less problematic and more important. They
offer tangible benefits to both sides in the short and long term.
The objective of these provisions should be permanent, institutionalized military relationships
modeled on those forged in Bosnia, where NATO and Russian soldiers have served shoulder to
shoulder. As has happened before in the alliance, such cooperation changes attitudes by creating
shared positive experiences to supplant the memory of dedicated antagonism. It also engages a
critical constituency in the formation of the new Eurasian security order: the Russian military.
Practical cooperation dealing with real-world problems of mutual concern is more important than
meetings and councils.
And what should the alliance do about other countries seeking admission? It should remain open
to membership to all states of the Partnership for Peace, subject to their ability to meet the
stringent requirements for admission. But no additional members should be designated for
admission until the three countries now in the NATO queue are fully prepared to bear the
responsibilities of membership and have been fully integrated into the alliance's military and
political structures.
What about the alliance's relations with other nonmember states? The security concerns of most
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will be addressed outside the context of
NATO membership. But the alliance and the United States must play a crucial role. Partnership
for Peace should receive attention comparable to that accorded to enlargement. In particular, the
partnership should receive substantially more financing from alliance members. Partnership for
Peace countries should be as capable of working with NATO as NATO members are.
The alliance must also devote time, attention, and resources to its relations with Ukraine, now
formalized through the NATO-Ukraine Charter, and continue its strong support of regional
military cooperation among partnership members.
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A Call for Leadership
We well understand that some of the ideas we are advancing go beyond tradition. But to resist
change because it entails risk is not only shortsighted but also dangerous.
One thing is clear. Neither the American public nor the citizenry of its allies will continue to
support an alliance--enlarged or unenlarged--that appears to focus on nonexistent threats of
aggression in Europe. For NATO to succeed, it must develop the ability to respond to today's
security needs.
Leadership requires vision. It also entails determination, persistence, and the courage of one's
convictions. George Marshall understood what it meant to lead. So must we.
Originally published in the New York Times, October 21, 1997, as "NATO's True Mission."
Available from the Hoover Press is the videotape "Brave New World Order," an episode of the
weekly television program
William J. Perry, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, with a joint appointment in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies, where he is codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities. His previous academic experience includes professor (halftime) at Stanford from 1988 to 1993, when he was the codirector of the Center for International Security and Arms Control. He also served as a part-time lecturer in the Department of Mathematics at Santa Clara University from 1971 to 1977.
Warren Christopher
was U.S. secretary of state from 1993 to 1996.
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