IRAQ:
Victory Is the Word

By Shelby Steele

Why the United States must win in Iraq. By Shelby Steele.

Possibly the most confounding feature of the Iraq war, from the very opening of hostilities to the present day, has been the U.S. government’s utter failure to define what victory would be in this war. “Victory” has been a conjure word for the Bush administration, a Churchillian allusion meant to evoke the heroic perseverance shown in the great wars of the past. But no one in the administration has ever said what victory would actually look like. And, lacking this description, even those of us who have supported the war have seen trouble coming for some time. Without a description of victory, a war has no goal.

Historically, victory in foreign war has always meant hegemony: You win, you take over. We not only occupied Germany and Japan militarily after World War II, we also—and without a whit of self-doubt—imposed our democratic way of life on them. We took our victory as a moral mandate as well as a military achievement and felt commanded to morally transform those defeated societies by the terms of our democracy. In this effort we brooked no resistance whatsoever and achieved great success.

But today, as Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi recently put it, “You can define victory any way you want.” And war, she said, was only “a situation to be resolved.” If this sort of glibness makes the current war seem a directionless postmodern adventure, it is only because those who call us to war have themselves left the definition of victory wide open. And now, as if to confirm that this is a “relativistic” war meaning everything and nothing, at least three national commissions—the White House, the Pentagon, and the Baker-led Iraq Study Group—have been given the task of creating the meaning that will give us a dignified exit. Of course, America is now quite beyond any possibility of dignity in this situation save the one option all these commissions have or will likely dismiss: complete military victory.

Why don’t we know the meaning of this war and our reasons for fighting it? I think the answer begins in the awkward fact that America is now the world’s uncontested superpower. If this fate has its advantages, it also brings an unasked-for degree of dominion in the world. This is essentially a passive dominion that has settled on a rather isolationist nation, yet it makes America into something of a sheriff. Whether the problem is Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or Darfur, America gets the call. Thus our youth are often asked to go to war more out of international responsibility than national necessity. This is a hard fate for a free and prosperous citizenry to accept—the loss of sons and daughters to a kind of magnanimity. Today our antiwar movement is essentially an argument with this fate, a rejection of superpower responsibility.

And this fear of responsibility is what makes us ambivalent toward the idea of victory. Because victory is hegemonic, it mimics colonialism. A complete American victory in Iraq would put that nation—at least for a time—entirely under American power and sovereignty. We would in fact “own” the society as a colony. In today’s international moral climate this would both undermine the legitimacy of our war effort and make an ongoing demand on our blood and treasure. If we are already a good way down this road, complete victory would only take us further.

Is it any wonder, then, that we have failed to completely win this war? Since World War II, American leaders—left and right—have worked out of an impossible double bind: They cannot afford to win the wars they fight. Thus the postmodern U.S. war in which the world’s greatest power deconstructs its own motives for fighting until losing becomes a better option than winning. And yet the end of the Cold War has made these wars between the West and the Third World inevitable. When the world was clearly divided between the free West and the communist East, Third World countries could play the ingenue by offering their alignment to the most generous suitor. At the center of a market in alignment, they could extract financial support and enjoy a sense of importance.

But after the Cold War, these countries suddenly lost appeal or leverage in the West. And it was out of this sense of invisibility, this feeling of having fallen out of history, that certain Middle Eastern countries found their new role. They would not compete with or seduce the West; they would menace it.

Islamic extremism is an ideology of menace. It empowers those who, but for menace, would languish in the world’s disregard. The dark achievement of bin Laden, Nasrallah, and Ahmadinejad, names we know only because of their association with menace, is that they have used menace to make their people visible in the world, to bring them back into the scheme of history. And they are greatly loved for this. If their achievements follow from evil rather than from good, this is a small thing. Worse than evil is invisibility.

So, in the Middle East, America has gone to war not against Islam but against menace as a formula for power—menace as the force that makes bargaining between the two inevitable. Whether the issue is an obsession with nuclear weapons or terrorism in London or assaults against Israel, menace is the power that draws the West backward into engagement with otherwise forgotten parts of the world. Iran cannot produce a digital camera or a Ferrari but, through menace, it can affect the balance of power in the world. We in the West, and especially the United States, then, are at war with menace—the indulgence of evil for strategic advantage—because today it is the power that most compromises us.

Without a description of victory, a war has no goal.

And yet Americans are also at war in the Middle East with our own fate as the world’s singular superpower. Our sacrifice is more in proportion to our responsibility as a superpower than to our survival as a nation. We fight menace in Iraq, and yet we know that complete victory there will only make us into colonialists and thus expand our level of responsibility even further. So we fight a little against victory even as we fight for it. At the beginning of this war we delivered the “shock” but not the “awe,” and then as the insurgency developed, we made a kind of space for it, almost as if we believed it had a right to fight us. Victory threatens us with the obligations and moral stigma of empire.

Only reluctant superpowers go to war with a commitment to fight until they can escape. So today the talk is of “drawdowns,” “redeployments,” and so on. But all these options are undermined by the fact that we simply have not won the war. We have not achieved hegemony in Iraq, so there is no umbrella of American power under which a new nation might find its own democratic personality or learn to defend itself. We have failed to give “peace in the streets” to the people we are asking to embrace the moderations of democracy. Without American hegemony, these drawdowns and redeployments are acts of outrageous moral irresponsibility because they cede hegemony to the forces of menace—the Sunni insurgency, the Shiite militia, the Islamic extremists, the wolfish ambitions of Iran. It was America’s weak application of power that made space for these forces to begin with. To now shrink the American footprint further would likely offer the country up as a killing field and embolden Islamic radicals everywhere.

America, now the world’s uncontested superpower, did not seek its current degree of dominion in the world. The role has settled, passively, on a rather isolationist nation.

For every reason, from the humanitarian to the geopolitical to the military, Iraq is a war that America must win in the hegemonic, even colonial, sense. It is a test of our civilization’s commitment to the good against the alluring notion of menace as power that has gripped so much of the Muslim world. Today America is a danger to the world in its own right, not because we are a powerful bully but because we don’t fully accept who we are. We rush to war as a superpower protecting the world from menace, then leave the battle before winning as a show of what, humility? We confuse our enemies, discouraging them one minute and encouraging them the next.

Could it be that our enemies are really paper tigers made formidable by our unceasing ambivalence? And could it be that the greater good is in both the idea and the reality of American victory?

Available from the Hoover Press is American Security: Back to Basics, by Angelo Codevilla, part of the Essays in Public Policy series. To order, call 800.935.2882 or visit www.hooverpress.org.

Shelby Steele is the Robert J. and Marion E. Oster Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He specializes in the study of race relations, multiculturalism, and affirmative action. He was appointed a Hoover fellow in 1994.