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DRUG POLICY: Addicted to the Drug War
By Robert Leeson
The war on illegal drugs engenders corruption,
terrorism, and family breakdown, weakening America while strengthening our
enemies. By Robert Leeson.
The post–9/11 assault on terrorist assets was
organizationally impressive. As former U.S. Treasury undersecretary John
Taylor documents (Global Financial Warriors, 2007), 172 countries and jurisdictions issued freezing
orders, 120 countries passed new laws and regulations, and 1,400 accounts
were frozen. But the stock of frozen assets (U.S. $137 million) looks
meager compared to the annual flow of U.S. $380 billion generated by the
illegal drug industry (about 8 percent of total international trade).
Agents of organized political violence are often
beneficiaries of these illegal flows: FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia) receives $300 million a year from the sale of cocaine, and the
PKK (the Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is believed to be
responsible for most of the narcotics seized in Europe.
Those who associate being “tough on drugs”
with righteousness will only reluctantly admit that their policies have
been “doing the devil’s work.” The evidence, however, is
clear: The war on drugs has left some terrorists smelling of poppies, if
not roses.
Afghanistan produces 92 percent of the world’s
opiates. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda take a cut at all stages: production
(institutionalized taxation at 10 to 20 percent of the yield), processing,
and transporting. From 20 to 30 percent of Al-Qaeda’s bucks for bangs
may derive from drugs.
Partial supply-side “victories” in the war
on drugs are doomed to be illusory. According to the United Nations’
counternarcotics agency, the export value of the 2004 Afghan opium crop was
$2.8 billion (about 60 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP). In 2005, an
internationally funded $860 million blitz cut Afghan production by an
estimated 21 percent. Yet, given the nature of demand, any cut in supply
will cause a more than equivalent increase in price.
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The war on drugs has left some terrorists smelling of poppies,
if not roses.
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Afghan farmers responded predictably to the incentives
provided by this “victory”: The United Nations’ 2006
Opium Rapid Assessment Survey reported an increasing trend in poppy
cultivation in 13 provinces but a decrease in only three. Ninety-six
percent of growers offered market forces as the primary explanation for
their decision to ignore the fact that opium poppy cultivation is illegal
and considered to be prohibited by Islam.
Those who lead the fight against terror, crime, and
drugs have not grasped the interrelationships between the component parts
of this unholy alliance; nor do they realize that their war on drugs has
created a common interest between these groups. President Bush correctly
states that “trafficking of drugs finances the world of
terror”—but how accurate is former House Speaker Dennis
Hastert’s statement that, “by going after the illegal drug
trade, we reduce the ability to launch attacks against the United
States”?
The demand for drugs (as a category) is inelastic,
that is, relatively unresponsive to price changes. Drug revenue can be
targeted by reducing demand at any given price, reducing the price, or
both. If “going after” means reducing supply, this will tend to
increase prices and thus revenue for drug dealers.
To break this drug-terrorist nexus requires a major
attack on the demand side and a major rethink of supply. All feasible (but
less than perfect) options must be systematically evaluated. Those who
conjure up the image of a drug-free earthly paradise have forged an
unintentional alliance with those who peddle the specter of a heavenly
paradise to motivate suicide bombers.
Because demand creates its own supply, we must decide
who is to control supply: criminals or health professionals. Many of these
drugs were developed by pharmaceutical companies: Shouldn’t these
companies be allowed to develop, test, and manufacture similar drugs? This
alternative must be evaluated. Alcohol and tobacco—the biggest
killers—are sold with appropriate health warnings. Why not allow
dependency-minimized versions of currently illegal drugs to be supplied
with similar warnings?
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Prohibition of alcohol revealed that the costs outweighed the benefits;
the current experiment reveals the same.
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The alternative is that drug users will be supplied
from shady sources: This is the reality of the market. Although consumption
might increase with decriminalization, self-harm would be reduced with
safety oversight in manufacturing. Fewer shared needles would restrict the
transmission of HIV and AIDS.
The war on drugs weakens America and strengthens its
enemies in at least five ways.
First, prohibition effectively supplies criminals with
skills demanded by terrorists: specialized knowledge about how to cross
borders undetected.
Second, prohibition helps finance terrorist
operations. After decriminalization, terrorists would harvest fewer bombs
from planting poppies.
Third, prohibition contributes to the supply of
drug-corrupted “gangster cops” (the title of a forthcoming book
by Joe McNamara, former police chief of Kansas City, Missouri, and San
Jose, California).
Fourth, about a quarter of convicted property and
drug offenders in the United States (and one-third of incarcerated mothers)
commit their crimes to obtain drugs or money for drugs. Eighty-five percent
of parents in state prisons have a history of drug use, and a majority
reported that they had used drugs in the month before their current
offense. The prison industrial complex incarcerates more than a million
parents of minor children: Between 2 percent and 3 percent of American
children have a parent in jail. The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics
reports that almost 10 percent of imprisoned mothers have left behind at
least one child in out-of-home care. Since
family breakdown is associated with intergenerational poverty and
subsequent drug abuse, it would be preferable to deal with these issues
within the health, rather than the criminal, system. Moreover, as the price
of drugs falls, drug-related property crime would also fall.
Fifth, successive “drug czars” have
expanded their empires, but after 18 years, the U.S. Office of National
Drug Control Policy has failed to curtail drug consumption while continuing
to consume taxpayer funds, with $245 million allocated for 2007.
The war on drugs is responsible for almost one-quarter
of the $40 billion swallowed up each year by the U.S. prison system. Many
of those caught become permanently trapped in tangled webs woven by drug
crusaders. With decriminalization, American taxpayers would be relieved of
these often counterproductive burdens.
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Those who lead the fight against “terror,” crime, and drugs have not grasped the
interrelationships between the parts of this unholy alliance; nor do they realize
that their war on drugs has created a common interest among these groups.
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Alcohol once made the mob rich and powerful but now
generates state and national tax revenue (in 2005, the federal treasury
received almost $9 billion from that source). Other taxes could be reduced
by squashing illegal (nontaxable) drug revenues. This would both reallocate
expenditure towards nondrug taxable activities and shift spending on drugs
away from the underground into the overground taxable economy.
Prohibition of alcohol (1920–33) revealed that
the costs outweighed the benefits; the same is revealed by the current
experiment. A “peace dividend” from the war on drugs would free
up resources for a country already fighting on multiple fronts and degrade
the resources of its enemies.
If policy makers fail to make peace work and become
nostalgic for current arrangements, the proceeds of the drug industry can
be transferred from pharmaceutical companies back to Osama bin Laden and
his associates.
The bombs dropped on Vietnam “exploded”
in American cities; the drugs peddled on American streets now finance
roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan. President Bush declared that
“the first shot in the war was when we started cutting off their
money”; but those who prosecute that war are being shot in the foot
by an incentive structure that increases the ability of terrorists to
launch attacks against the United States and its allies.
This essay appeared in the Australian Financial Review on
October 20, 2006. Contributing to this article were: Alexandra Baecker,
Nicolas Beck, James Morrison, Nelson Ray, Jadie Rendon, and Adam Yuan of
Stanford University.
Available from the Hoover Press is Drug War Deadlock:
The Policy Battle Continues, edited by Laura E. Huggins. To order, call
800.935.2882 or visit www.hooverpress.org.
Robert Leeson is a W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow for 2006-2007 at the Hoover Institution.
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