IRAQ:
Good Advice on Iraq

By Edwin Meese III

Contrary to what you may have heard, most of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group are being put into effect—and achieving some success. By Edwin Meese III.

After eight months of intensive work, including observations and interviews in Iraq, the Iraq Study Group submitted its report to the president and Congress on December 6. Much of the mainstream news media—commentators who appeared to have neither read the report nor understood it—dismissed it.

Among their reactions:

“The Iraq Study Group (ISG) report was designed to give the Bush administration a plausible way out of Iraq.”

“The ISG report was ignored by the Bush administration.”

“The ISG report provides nothing new to assist the Bush administration and Congress in developing future strategy for Iraq.”

A fair reading of the report shows that all these conclusions are false.

As stated in the report, the ISG had the same goal as the president: an Iraq that can “govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself” under a broadly representative government, democratically elected, that maintains its territorial integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn’t brutalize its own people.

With this goal in mind, the ISG set forth 79 recommendations, which fall into three general categories:

• Control the violence, and increase security and stability, within Iraq by intensifying and accelerating the training of the Iraqi army and police forces.

• Help the Iraqi government reach its own self-declared milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance.

• Shape a comprehensive strategy with which to build regional and international support for Iraq’s stability.

Contrary to news reports, most of the study group’s recommendations have been adopted by the Bush administration, as the president made clear when he laid out U.S. strategy in Iraq on January 10. Since then, even more of the recommendations have been incorporated in this nation’s plans. Moreover, virtually all of the Iraq plans and actions adopted by the Bush national security team have been consistent with the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations.

The ISG supported the idea of a surge of U.S. combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, a strategy the president put into practice earlier this year.

The ISG clearly set forth its understanding that the situation in Iraq is complex and difficult. In particular, it recognized how important it is that the Iraqi government and people accept responsibility for their future. At the same time, it recognized that the United States and the other countries involved in the coalition supporting Iraq have the responsibility—and the opportunity—to help the Iraqi government establish security and stability, control violence, improve people’s daily lives, and enable Iraqis to pursue a better future. These outcomes would deal a blow to terrorism, increase the prospect for regional and global stability, and protect America’s credibility, interests, and values.

On the other hand, the report stated that failure could trigger a collapse of Iraq’s government, a humanitarian catastrophe, a chaotic situation in the region, a propaganda victory for terrorists, and an increase in global instability.

The principal role for the U.S. military in the new strategy is to expand its training of Iraq’s army and police to the point where these forces can increasingly take over security. The report called for both the army and the police to increase the size, quality, and capability of their forces. The United States should help by significantly increasing the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, embedded in and supporting Iraqi army units. The report recommended that U.S. troop strength be increased by 10,000 to 20,000 military personnel, who would be carefully selected and specially trained officers and senior noncoms. They would be embedded with Iraqi army units down to the company and platoon level, as well as at the higher headquarters (battalions, brigades, and divisions). Drawing on previous success in such cooperation, the U.S. trainers would provide advice and technical assistance and be role models to help Iraqi units quickly develop a real combat capability.

In similar fashion, the report called for an increase in police trainers, and for assigning them to work with Iraqi police units down to the police-station level, providing not just training but leadership development.

Thus, the primary U.S. mission would evolve to supporting Iraqi forces, which would take over the jobs of combat and security, while retaining an important role for the United States and its allies. Besides the critical training mission, U.S. and allied forces would supply personnel for logistical support, rapid reaction, special operations, intelligence, and search and rescue, and would maintain a robust force-protection component to back up Iraqi units and ensure the safety of U.S. training teams. The ISG also supported the idea of a surge of U.S. combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, a strategy the president put into practice earlier this year.

These recommendations were embodied in the Iraq Strategy Review announced January 10 by President Bush. A hallmark of the “new way forward,” according to this review, is to place “primary security focus . . . on helping Iraqis provide population security” and “facilitate the transfer of security responsibility to Iraqis.”

Virtually all of the Bush national security team’s Iraq plans are consistent with the ISG recommendations.

To put the president’s strategies into practice, a new U.S. commanding general and top commanders took over. In early March, the White House indicated initial progress: “The plan General Petraeus is executing is in its very early stages, but there are some encouraging signs. [Although] it is far too early to judge the success of his operation . . . Iraqi and U.S. forces are making gradual but important progress.” The White House said additional Iraqi army brigades had been deployed to pursue illegal militia groups, establish joint security stations throughout Baghdad, round up those affiliated with extremist terrorist groups, and recover large weapons caches and stockpiles of explosives and projectiles. This indicates not only that the new strategies recommended by the ISG are being put into practice but that early signs indicate some success.

The ISG built into its recommendations a series of milestones—touching on national reconciliation, security, and governance—that the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had set for itself. The goals include laws relating to the distribution of oil revenues; a program to revise the de-Baathification law, which prevents many Sunnis from taking part in government and society; a framework and calendar for provincial elections; and constitutional review. Other milestones include cracking down on armed militias, approving an amnesty agreement, fostering economic development, and making the ministries function better. The recommendations on political reconciliation and governance have been adopted by the White House, which has indicated that the Iraqis are beginning to deliver on these benchmarks.

Even as the report recognized the destructive conduct of both Iran and Syria, it recalled the example of President Reagan, who kept lines open with the Soviet Union even during U.S. economic, military, and diplomatic efforts against it.

The ISG report also insisted on looking outside Iraq for a broad solution. It proposed a new diplomatic offensive, which emphasized the importance of a secure and stable Iraq to the other countries in the region and called for regional and international initiatives. The report recommended holding a conference in Baghdad with the participation of neighboring countries, international organizations such as the United Nations, Arab groups, and other key nations.

The ISG also recommended creating an international support group, to include all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countries in the region and the world. The support group would mobilize members’ efforts to solve diplomatic, political, and security problems affecting Iraq and its neighbors, promoting tasks such as these:

• Developing ways to support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq

• Putting a stop to destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s neighbors

• Securing Iraq’s borders

• Preventing the expansion of instability in conflict beyond Iraq’s borders

• Promoting economic assistance, trade, political support, and other assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim nations

Supportive countries would also validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad.

The Bush administration adopted those recommendations: “The United States supports the Iraqi government as it pursues an international initiative to build diplomatic, economic, and security support for its young democracy.”

One controversial recommendation of the ISG was that the United States, under the aegis of the new diplomatic offensive and the international support group, “engage directly with Iran and Syria to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies towards Iraq and other regional issues.”

The ISG recognized the destructive conduct of both Iran and Syria, including their efforts to destabilize Iraq and to bolster terrorist and insurgent forces in Iraq. But at the same time, it recalled the successful example of President Reagan, who, during the Cold War, continued to communicate with the leaders of the Soviet Union even as the United States was engaged in economic, military, and diplomatic efforts against the communist regime.

The ISG made it clear that the United States, while engaging in a dialogue and offering both incentives and disincentives, should not give up its principles or interests, nor should it reward misconduct on the part of Iran and Syria. Rather, it should try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies towards Iraq and other regional issues, while emphasizing how Iran and Syria could be harmed by Iraqi chaos and territorial disintegration.

Further, should Iran and Syria reject a constructive role, the rest of the world (particularly European countries) would witness their hostile attitude, and this could lead to their isolation.

In a hopeful sign, Iran and Syria participated in the first Baghdad peace conference in March. Alongside this development, and in another nod to the ISG recommendations, the Bush administration recently decided to engage in direct communication with Iran and Syria.

This, then, is a very different account of the content, acceptance, and response—as well as the results—of the recommendations contained in the Iraq Study Group report. The group had no illusions about the difficulty of success in Iraq; it recognized that if the situation deteriorated, the consequences for Iraq and the United States, as well as the world in general, could be severe. Having considered a full range of approaches for moving forward, the ISG submitted its recommendations in the belief that they included the best strategies and tactics for success in Iraq and the region. The favorable response by the Bush administration, as well as many members of Congress, to the ISG’s proposals has been heartening to its members. Likewise, the initial progress that has been made concerning the implementation of the recommendations has been encouraging.

No plan for Iraq will be perfect. But the prospects for a “new way forward,” incorporating the ideas proposed in the report of the Iraq Study Group, should be hopeful to all who look at the report in an objective manner.

Available from the Hoover Press is The Fall of the Berlin Wall: Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War, edited by Peter Schweizer. To order, call 800.935.2882 or visit www.hooverpress.org.

Edwin Meese is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. He served as the seventy-fifth attorney general of the United States from February 1985 to August 1988.