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THE LEGAL BEAT: Doubtful Jurisprudence
By Josh Dunn and Martha Derthick
Court offers schools little guidance
The reconstituted Supreme Court of President
Bush and Chief Justice John G. Roberts rendered two significant constitutional decisions about schools in
its October 2006 term, one “for” and one
“against” school
administrators. Their common thread is a want of clarity and hence
an invitation to more litigation. The
case that went in favor of a school administration was Morse v. Frederick, more engagingly known as “Bong Hits 4
Jesus.”
This was the legend on a 14-foot banner that
Joseph Frederick, a high school student in Juneau, Alaska, unfurled
in 2002 at a school-sponsored parade. Detecting a celebration of
drug use—a bong is a marijuana water pipe—the school
principal, Deborah Morse, ordered Mr. Frederick to lower the banner
and suspended him for 10 days. He sued, claiming a violation of his
First Amendment rights to free speech. A three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit not only ruled for him, but also concluded that
Ms. Morse was personally liable.
Robert’s opinion for the court, in which
four other joined, did not go so far as to say that students have
no First Amendment free-speech rights, as Justice Clarence Thomas
wished. Thomas would have overruled Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, a Vietnam-era (1969) case
involving students who wore black armbands in protest of the war.
In Tinker the Court ruled for the students and famously said
that neither students nor teachers “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.” Nor did the Court duck the constitutional question
altogether, as Justice Stephen Breyer wished. Breyer said that the
Court need not decide the First Amendment issue on the merits, but
should merely hold that Ms. Morse was immune to Frederick’s
claim for monetary damages.
The majority ruled that students at school or
a school function do not have a First Amendment right to promote
ille
gal drugs. Breyer worried that, rather than being
a help to teachers, this seeming victory would merely incite the
nation’s adolescents to mount new challenges. What if a student
flew a “Wine Sips 4 Jesus” banner, Justice John Paul
Stevens mischievously asked. The good news for school administrators
was that neither he nor any other member of the Court believed that Ms.
Morse should be liable for damages.
The case that went against school
administrators—really two cases, one from Seattle and a
companion from Jefferson County, Kentucky—involved school
districts’ classifying and assigning students by race in
order to achieve racial balance. A majority opinion written by
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Constitution is colorblind
and struck the plans down. But though Justice Anthony Kennedy found
defects in the two plans and therefore joined in the result, making
a 5–4 majority possible, he did not embrace Roberts’s
enunciation of the constitutional principle. The Constitution
cannot be colorblind in the real world, he said, and school
districts can adopt race-conscious measures as long as they
don’t treat “each student in a different fashion solely
on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”
Justice Kennedy offered what he regarded as
acceptable methods of considering race such as “strategic
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods;
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and
faculty in a targeted fashion; and
tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.” But knowing the general
demographics of neighborhoods or recruiting students and faculty in
a targeted fashion would seem to require some systematic,
individual typing by race. Such confusions led commentators on the
Kennedy opinion to despair and will likely have the same effect on
school administrators. Local districts are obliquely invited to
construct affirmative action plans, with the knowledge that they
may in time be scrutinized by a divided and inscrutable Court.
“Liberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt,” the Court said in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992),
in a rhetorical phrase commonly attributed to Kennedy. But the
jurisprudence produced by the early Roberts Court on schools is
steeped in doubt. The Court has taken a fresh plunge into the
constitutional thicket, wherein it is the prerogative of judges to
write and rewrite the maps.
Joshua Dunn is assistant professor of
polical science at the University of Colorado–Colorado
Springs. Martha Derthick is professor emerita of government at the
University of Virginia.
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