CORRESPONDENCE: Mayor Bloomberg's report card; charter co-operation; lessons from Utah; education and the economy Mayor Bloomberg’s Report Card 
In their efforts to do what is best for children in the New York City Public Schools, Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein (“New York City’s Education Battles,” features, Spring 2008) have been willing to take on powerful entrenched interests. This administration has, for example, • embraced charter schools, often paying a big political price to provide much-needed facilities, with the result that the top charter school operators in the country, such as Uncommon Schools, Achievement First, and KIPP (the Knowledge Is Power Program, of which I am a board member), are flocking to New York City and expanding rapidly. • refused for years to sign a contract with the principals union, holding out for (and eventually getting) sorely needed changes in accountability, pay for performance, and the ability to remove ineffective principals. In return, the principals got a big bump in salary, a lot more money for their schools, and greater autonomy to manage them. • been willing, again and again, to do battle with the city’s powerful teachers union to introduce performance measurement systems and accountability, prevent seniority transfers, extend the school day, remove ineffective teachers, and make tenure decisions meaningful. It has also slashed the Department of Education’s notorious bureaucracy (though there’s still much work to do here) and embraced countless innovative ideas, such as REACH (Rewarding Achievement), a program that rewards low-income students for each AP exam they pass. Bloomberg’s and Klein’s critics raise some legitimate issues but take their criticisms much too far. To support the contention that little or no progress is being made, critics point to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores. Even assuming NAEP scores were the best way to evaluate NYC’s reforms (they’re not), in three of the four areas tested—4th-grade math, 4th-grade reading (adjusted for a doubling of English Language Learner students taking the test), and 8th-grade math—scores rose. The lone area of decline was 8th-grade reading. Though there is certainly plenty of room for improvement, this is a respectable report card and, when considered in the context of other evidence, reinforces my belief that Bloomberg’s and Klein’s reforms are showing positive results, which will accelerate over time. Whitney Tilson The story in Education Next about Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s school reforms in New York City was deeply flawed. These reforms have been both costly and ineffectual. The city’s education budget has grown from $12.5 billion annually to nearly $20 billion since the takeover by Mayor Bloomberg (the article wrongly attributes this increase to the court settlement of the long-running Campaign for Fiscal Equity lawsuit). Yet, despite this enormous increase in costs, the 2007 NAEP found no significant gains for students in 4th-grade reading, 8th-grade reading, or 8th-grade mathematics. Only in 4th-grade mathematics were the gains significant, but an extraordinary 25 percent of the students in that grade and subject were assessed with “accommodations,” a figure far higher than in any other city tested by NAEP and double the rate in New York City in 2003. The article treated the NAEP results as a matter of opinion, citing a Bloomberg supporter who insisted that “city students actually made gains in three of the four measures” on NAEP. This was factually untrue. Indeed, for the period since the mayor took charge, from 2003 to 2007, NAEP showed no significant gains on three of four tests for black students, white students, Hispanic students, Asian students, or lower-income students. According to the article, Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein “defended the results” and said that they showed “good progress.” Why they thought the latest NAEP scores showed “good progress” is not explained. The two graphs accompanying the article were even more misleading than the text. One showed state and city test scores in math and reading between 2001 and 2007. The text of the graph said that the mayor and his critics pick different dates and different points in time to make “their claims and counterclaims.” But, again, it is not a matter of opinion about when the Bloomberg reforms began. The state legislature passed the mayoral takeover law in June 2002. The mayor and chancellor spent the fall of 2002 deciding what to do. They announced their reform proposals in January 2003. Another misleading graph shows a closing of the achievement gap between black students in New York City and black students in New York State. This is an irrelevant factoid. The term “achievement gap” refers to score differences between black/Hispanic students and white/Asian students. Thus, this graph celebrates an event of no significance, while ignoring the continuing racial gap. Diane Ravitch Meyer replies: I appreciate Diane Ravitch’s belief that Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Chancellor Joel Klein are not moving New York City’s schools in the right direction. Unfortunately, however, her strong convictions have induced a misreading of my reporting. Even in her first paragraph, she inaccurately says that I “wrongly attribute” the city’s education budget increase “to the court settlement” of the CFE lawsuit. In fact, my story attributes the increase “to a strong economy, the end of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity’s long-running school finance litigation…and increased state funding for education by the new Democratic governor…” Contrary to Ms. Ravitch’s assertions, my article and the accompanying figures do not treat the NAEP scores as a “matter of opinion.” Instead, they accurately describe the trends within New York City and New York State for the entire period of the Bloomberg administration. I provide for the reader a variety of perspectives on those facts, quoting, for example a New York Times reporter as saying that NAEP scores showed “no significant progress.” Even more to the point, I quote Ms. Ravitch herself as saying the gains in test scores are “vastly inflated” and report that she “accused Bloomberg of counting increases from 2002-03…before he even got control of the schools, let alone implemented any reforms.” Ms. Ravitch seems to think it is “misleading” to compare the progress of the scores of African American students in New York City with those of African American students elsewhere in the state. But all were subject to the same state policies and were taking the same examinations. If the math performance of New York City African Americans, who are of lower socioeconomic background, is improving at a more rapid rate than elsewhere, that is something to be celebrated, not ignored. Ms. Ravitch seems not able to even countenance the fact that the story’s graphs “leave it to the reader” to decide who should “get credit for test-score gains.” What prompts her critique of my reporting as “deeply flawed” remains a mystery to me. All the significant dates of the events in New York are contained in my story, as is Ms. Ravitch’s interpretation of those events. That the Bloomberg-Klein side of the story is also reported is only consistent with professional journalistic standards. Education and Economic Growth Promoting quality education for economic growth has become a priority in more nations than ever before. The belief in the power of education is strong in policy circles. But the question remains, does education contribute to economic growth, and how? The work of Hanushek et al. (“Education and Economic Growth,” research, Spring 2008) demonstrates that what people know, and not just how many years of schooling they complete, is the key to understanding how schooling investments improve productivity. Information from standardized tests and especially international assessments of student learning provide an excellent measure of skills. Putting together these scores over time and by country is extremely useful. Showing the link between learning and economic growth is even more valuable. Hanushek et al. have shown that improvements in learning will boost economic growth by an amount sufficient to cover the cost of the reform. This is good news for policymakers. The challenges now are to demonstrate what investments will improve learning, and to extend the measurement of human capital to low-income countries, where the returns to improved learning would be even greater. Harry Anthony Patrinos The Vallas Effect 
I salute Dale Mezzacappa for her astute portrait of the frenetic Paul Vallas (“The Vallas Effect,” features, Spring 2008). In Philadelphia, Vallas had some key successes improving learning. He standardized the curriculum, helping the large numbers of students transferring during the school year; this alone might account for the recent gains in test scores. Other initiatives will have long-term payoffs. Vallas increased the numbers of schools, decreased their size, and moved to a K–8 and 9–12 grade configuration. He also improved teacher recruitment. Yet Vallas could not keep good relations with a seemingly reasonable governing board. Despite his reputation as a numbers guy, Vallas underestimated the operating deficit until after his contract renewal. This enraged the School Reform Commission, making him a dead man walking through his last year. And while he publicly promoted certain pet charter schools, Vallas is no friend of school choice, viewing it mainly as an enrollment management tool. Locals believe that behind the scenes he stymied new charters. The burgeoning New Orleans charter sector might have to hunker down so long as Vallas is in town. That’s too bad, because while capable superintendents like Vallas have had some success on the elementary school level, only the better schools of choice have done well with urban middle and high school kids. In short, Paul Vallas is the right leader to start a turnaround, but might not have the staying power to see reforms through. In my book he rates a B+, but not quite an A. Robert Maranto The Third Way Andy Smarick (“Wave of the Future,” features, Winter 2008) divides charter proponents into those who see charter schools as a separate education system and those who see chartering as a tool to improve districts. At NewSchools Venture Fund, we believe there is a third option: both/and. Individual charter schools and larger-scale charter management organizations can increase the supply of high-quality school options and serve as points of innovation and excellence for districts and policymakers. Operating outside the existing system gives these organizations real leverage to influence the status quo. At NewSchools we call this “co-opetition.” Entrepreneurs can spark change through competitive pressure, through collaboration, or both. The value of these independent organizations can be magnified, and the pace of transformation accelerated, by collaboration with visionary district leaders who embrace their potential for stimulating new thinking within the existing system. For example, in Chicago, emerging charter management organizations are opening scores of high-performing schools. New Leaders for New Schools is recruiting and training dozens of new principals, while The New Teacher Project helps Chicago Public Schools (CPS) hire hundreds of teachers annually. These organizations have increased the supply of excellent teachers, principals, and schools. But the game-changing influence is their impact on broader public school reform. In 2004, Mayor Daley and schools CEO Arne Duncan announced Renaissance 2010, a plan to close underperforming schools and open 100 new small, autonomous schools, both charter and noncharter. As the CPS web site notes, “student achievement, increased demand, and strong parent satisfaction” in Chicago’s charter schools “set the stage for the Renaissance 2010 initiative.” Based in part on the success of high-quality school operators, CPS recently announced plans to pursue additional partnerships as part of its school turnaround strategy. Chicago demonstrates a reinforcing loop: entrepreneurial activity informs changes in district policy, which in turn unlocks new opportunities to transform district structures and develop school systems that look more like diverse “portfolios” than the one-size-fits-none approach. It’s clear that charter schools can, and do, serve as both independent alternatives and agents of systemic change. Julie Peterson Jordan Meranus Design Challenge Newstead, Saxton, and Colby (“Going for the Gold,” features, Spring 2008) hold that turning a new design for schooling or learning into reality requires resource allocations, as well as systems and processes that support the design’s intent; practitioners with a passion for devilish details; and sacred cows that are allowed to fall from the altar. Based on inferences drawn exclusively from the experiences of charter schools, the authors’ conclusions beg the question: Can these principles take on the more pervasive challenge of turning around poorly performing schools and districts in this country? Efforts to spur fundamental changes in the schooling process have unraveled, in large measure, as developers and practitioners struggled to identify the congruence, or lack thereof, between a design’s intent and the rules and processes of a district. The alignment challenge varies dramatically by district and design. Negotiating change is not for the faint of heart. Not even a superintendent can anticipate the various roadblocks that may compromise an innovation. Consider the case of a small school district that wanted to provide more time at school to struggling students. After more than a year of negotiating, bus drivers agreed to forgo the convenience of having students who live close to the driver’s own residence populate the last bus leaving school in order to provide transportation home for students needing additional tutoring or support. Successfully changing existing systems requires renegotiating the terms and conditions of work, which in turn requires incentives, trust, and capacity—conditions assumed by the analysis of Newstead, Saxton, and Colby, but not common in troubled urban systems. Incentives, which can encompass far more than financial remuneration, establish a motivation for change; trust, the willingness to take risks; and capacity, the skills and knowledge needed to be effective in the new system. Trust, by far, is the greatest challenge in battle-fatigued districts. Sally B. Kilgore Revisiting Utah 
Parents for Choice in Education (PCE) has worked for the past seven years to refine and tailor a school choice program that would serve Utah’s families and address the concerns of Utah political leaders (“Voting Down Vouchers,” features, Spring 2008). PCE’s objective has always been broad school choice. After careful study and compromise among our elected leaders, a universal voucher program became law. The education establishment quickly filed a referendum against the law. And they had no shame in exploiting the public’s affinity for public education and fear of change, and the ignorance of the average voter. As experienced in other states, in a vote of the general public it is easy for trusted education leaders (for example, teachers and PTAs) to sow fear and doubt. They will continue to sacrifice the future of children to protect their power and the failing status quo. Against these tactics it is nearly impossible to convince the average, uninterested voter otherwise. The lesson here isn’t that Utah overplayed its hand. The lesson is to know your state constitution and the opportunities the teachers unions might have to force a vote of the public. If not for Utah’s referendum provision, we would still have the nation’s first universal voucher program. Choice surely begets more choice. But Utah’s experience should not be taken as a lesson that incrementalism is always the best strategy. Each state should continue to pursue whatever is politically most feasible. Our children’s futures are depending on it. Elisa Clements
Clint Bolick makes some excellent points about the school choice wars. We’ve made people more comfortable with choice as a rescue strategy to help the least advantaged, but not as the transformation catalyst called for by A Nation at Risk. Celebration of modest gains has led to statements that choice and competition, though not present to any significant degree in any school system, have been found to be inadequate as a systemic reform strategy. In such misperceptions lies the danger that benefits to a relatively few children will sacrifice much larger benefits for all children further down the road. Since no one knows whether incrementalism is a quarter horse or a marathon runner, I urge a straight-talk, two-pronged approach. Straight talk means honesty about the likely effects of limited programs. Don’t create unrealistic expectations. Positive effects of restriction-laden programs need to be celebrated as just a tiny taste of what transformational versions would yield. The second, largely absent, prong is to build the intellectual case for transformation catalysts without regard to present political feasibility. That was the approach the United Kingdom’s Institute of Economic Affairs took, which yielded major benefits after 20 years of obscurity and derision. The Utah defeat says that the best incrementalist approach exploits existing, rather than hypothetical, approaches. A strong charter law that allows mission-compatible selective admissions, regulates the conditions under which schools can ask parents to top off their vouchers, and operates amid genuine market forces may be the best route to school choice.
John Merrifield |
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