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FEATURES: Is There a “Qualified Teacher” Shortage?
By Michael Podgursky
What factors do affect the market for teachers, anyway?
WASHINGTON—As American schools reopen, a 15-year effort to
“professionalize” the job of teacher is running up
against a strong counterforce—the urgent need to fill
classroom vacancies.
— Christian Science Monitor, August 26, 2002
The headlines in those early years of No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) were consistently alarming. “As Standards Rise, Too
Few Teachers,” was the one the Christian Science Monitor story referred to above. “Federal Education Report
Finds Shortage of Qualified Teachers,” noted a headline in
the Washington Times the following year.
In the flurry of activity surrounding
implementation of NCLB’s student proficiency mandates, the
federal requirement to have a “highly qualified”
teacher in every classroom by 2005 seemed more like an impossible
goal. The concern predated NCLB, of course: “Clinton
Addresses U.S. Teacher Shortage” was a headline from August
2000. But NCLB’s demand that all new teachers hold at least a
baccalaureate degree or higher, be fully licensed, and have
demonstrated subject-matter competence in the areas they teach
surely heightened the anxiety. However, 2005 has come and gone and
the highly qualified–teacher crisis never happened. Why
not?
The shortest answer is that the dearth of
qualified teachers is largely a myth. So is the related notion that
raising teachers’ pay across the board would bring
significantly more qualified numbers to the profession. In fact,
the resources provided to most public schools are adequate
to recruit and retain a competent teaching workforce. A much more
productive line of inquiry is one that explores the costs of the
inefficient, rigid structure of the teacher compensation system and the
possible benefits of replacing it with a more market-based system.
In Search of a Qualified-Teacher Shortage
Are school districts really beset by a
shortage of the qualified teachers needed to meet regulatory
standards? Despite the headlines telling us of the teacher drought,
there are at present no nationwide data that would help us answer
this question. One reason for this is
that licensing standards vary from state to state. The most
commonly used national data file, the Schools and Staffing Survey,
includes a survey in which roughly 42,000 public school teachers
were asked about their education
backgrounds and teaching credentials.
In the most recent available survey (1999–2000), 90 percent
of public school teachers reported that they have regular state
certification in their primary teaching area.
Administrative data from states or
school-district report cards tend to reinforce these findings, even
in those states that are said to have the most significant
problems. California certainly represents one of the most highly
stressed public-school systems in the nation. The school-age
population is growing rapidly. The state has major fiscal
difficulties. Much of the stress is self-inflicted: recall that in
1996 voters on a statewide ballot passed a class-size reduction
initiative that greatly exacerbated teacher shortages and led to an
exodus of teachers from many urban classrooms as suburban jobs
opened up. In spite of these travails, in school year
2003–04, 89.4 percent of California public school teachers
held full teaching credentials in their teaching area. Another 5.3
percent were in supervised intern or pre-intern programs. Only 5.2
percent were teaching with substandard credentials (emergency or
waiver).
Still, virtually no school district is in full
compliance with licensing laws. Missouri, for instance, tracks the
percentage of courses taught by teachers with inappropriate
licenses. During the 2002–03 school year, only two Missouri
K–12 school districts had no courses taught by an
inappropriately licensed teacher. The state average for teachers
without proper credentials was 9.5 percent per district. Worth
noting is that the prevalence of such teachers seems to have little
to do with per pupil district spending. In fact, the district data
show that higher spending per student is associated with a decrease in the
percentage of courses taught by licensed teachers (see Figure 1).

Why is noncompliance unrelated to spending?
Presumably, districts with higher relative pay would have lower
turnover and thus fewer vacancies. They would also have larger
applicant pools and thus more qualified applicants per vacancy.
But consider teacher licensing laws in
Missouri. Like most other states, Missouri issues a single license
to practice medicine, law, dentistry, accounting, nursing, and
veterinary medicine. However, in the area of K–12 education,
its Department of Elementary and Secondary Education currently
issues 260 different certificates and endorsements (171 vocational,
89 nonvocational). This is only part of the story. There are levels
of certification (permanent or provisional) for all of these and a
host of grandfathered codes. The result of all this is 781 valid
certification codes in the master teacher-certification file. And
there is nothing unique about Missouri.
Now combine this complex licensing system with
the dynamics of the teacher labor market, and the result is less
than complete compliance even under the best of conditions. At the
district level, roughly 10–12 percent of teaching positions
turn over each year. Many of the exits are temporary, for child
rearing or other family matters, and roughly one-third of
district-level turnover comprises interdistrict transfers of
experienced teachers. Inevitably, many school administrators find
themselves scrambling against short deadlines to fill classrooms
with qualified teachers.
Even with qualified teachers available, some
classrooms necessarily will be filled with teachers whose
certification papers are not in order. Perhaps the teacher’s
license has expired and new approval is pending. Or maybe the state
regulators have simply misplaced the certification paperwork.
Given the byzantine complexity of state
teacher-licensing laws, the natural dynamics of the teacher labor
market, and bureaucratic delay in granting and transferring
credentials, full compliance is nearly impossible. Teacher labor
markets likely have a natural rate of noncompliance that is above
zero for many of the same reasons that the national economy has a
“natural rate of unemployment” that is above zero. For
this reason, it is unrealistic to hold school districts to a
standard that requires perfect compliance with state licensing and
NCLB requirements.
Pay: Teachers Compared with Other Professionals
Interestingly enough, pay is not the main
stumbling block to more, and more-qualified, teachers. Despite the
conventional wisdom that teachers are underpaid relative to other
professions (thereby depressing the quality of the pool of teachers
that schools can recruit and retain), teachers are paid a salary
that is comparable to that of other professionals.
I compared teacher and nonteacher pay for 2003
in the 15 largest metropolitan areas, accounting for roughly
one-third of the U.S. population. We can safely assume that they
represent roughly one-third of the public school teachers as well.
For the comparison, I selected occupations
for which college degrees (but generally not postgraduate degrees)
are common or required and for which U.S. Department of Labor data
are available for many of these metropolitan areas. I do not claim
that these occupations represent the relevant nonteaching earnings
for teachers in all fields, but they probably are relevant for
some. More likely, these occupations represent the general wage
structure in the local labor market. Most teachers take jobs near
where they grew up or went to college. So it isn’t national
earnings of, say, computer analysts that matter; it’s the
earnings of computer analysts in the local labor market. The weekly
salary calculations shown in Figure 2 are based on pay for weeks
worked rather than weeks under contract. Measuring pay by weeks
worked increases the weekly pay for nonteachers because they have
more paid leave than teachers.

The analysis of these data shows that, in
these 15 metropolitan areas, teachers have a very large premium in
comparison with clinical lab technicians and social workers.
Compared with librarians, teachers have virtual parity in annual
earnings but a 20 percent premium in weekly earnings. Their annual
pay is roughly 10 percent below computer programmers, but on a
weekly basis is 20 percent above. Teachers’ annual pay is
less favorable than that of architects, engineers, managers, and
administrators, but weekly pay is very similar. In sum, these data
suggest that on a weekly basis, teachers’ pay is quite
competitive with that of many other professions.
Data from a survey of households by the Census
Bureau’s March 2003 Current Population Survey reinforces the
findings based on the Department of Labor data. The data from this
survey enable us to look at teachers’ pay in both urban and
rural areas. Since wages tend to be lower across the board in rural
areas, one will overestimate the nationwide teacher versus
nonteacher gaps unless one takes urban and rural pay differences
into account. Once we do so, the annual pay of female teachers
rises to 96 percent of that of other female college-educated
workers. Thus, on a weekly basis, female teachers earn more on
average than nonteachers.
Anecdotal data also suggest that, even setting
aside the enormous benefit of the job security that accompanies
tenure, the fringe benefits of public school teachers compare
favorably with those in the private sector. According to recently
released Department of Labor data, insurance (primarily health
insurance) and retirement contributions are a substantially larger
percentage of total compensation for teachers compared with
professional employees in private-sector employment (see Figure 3).
Most teachers are not covered by the federal Social Security
system, so legally required contributions by their employers are
somewhat smaller for teachers, but overall, benefits total
20.2 percent of payroll for teachers and 17.0 percent for
private-sector managers and professionals.
Whether we look at salary or fringe benefits,
there seems to be ample evidence that, when compared with other
professions, teachers are paid adequately enough to attract
qualified individuals to the job.

Better Teachers’ Pay Does Not Mean Better Student Outcomes
Even if our nation’s schools are not
beset by a widespread shortage of qualified teachers and teachers
are paid salaries comparable to other professionals, there are
still those who believe that teachers’ pay is too low, that
their salaries are simply not commensurate with our expectations of
a good education for our children. This conviction, which we can
call “social underinvestment,” views teachers’
qualifications as a continuum. We are underinvesting in teacher quality in the sense that a dollar increase in
teachers’ pay would yield more than a dollar of benefit to
society in the form of student achievement gains. However, research
to date finds little evidence of a strong positive effect of
teachers’ pay on student achievement.
One review finds that 14 of 17 studies that
use student-level data and include measures of previous student
achievement to assess the value that a teacher adds to student
learning showed teachers’ pay to have no effect on student achievement. Two sophisticated studies
of teachers’ effects conducted in 2005 cast further doubt on
a positive wage effect. Brian Jacob and Lars Lefgren find no
relationship between teachers’ pay and their performance in a
mid-sized, western school district (see “When Principals Rate
Teachers,” research, page 58); and Eric Hanushek, Steven Rivkin, and
Daniel O’Brien, in a 2005 working paper published by the
National Bureau of Economic Research, report no relationship
between teacher productivity and changes in pay, suggesting that
surrounding districts do not pull the most effective teachers from
the city by offering higher salaries. Moreover, even in studies
finding a positive effect, there is no evidence that
across-the-board pay increases are a cost-efficient policy.
To supplement this research evidence, one can
also learn from the private-school market for teachers. Suppose,
for instance, that the benefits of higher teachers’ pay did,
in fact, outweigh the costs, and that public schools were setting
teachers’ pay inefficiently low. If that were the case, one
would expect to see private schools, which operate in a very
competitive market, paying teachers more. After all, private-school
parents should be willing to pay higher tuition to support
higher-quality teachers if it enhances their own children’s
achievement. And many of these same parents will soon be paying
college tuition rates, far in excess of those in K–12.
There are, of course, legitimate objections to
public–private comparisons. First, many private schools
have a religious orientation and are staffed by teachers of the
same religious denomination. To the extent that such schools are
advancing a religious mission, they and their teachers are not
comparable to public K–12 schools. Second, private schools
are generally more selective in admissions than public schools and,
on average, have students with higher socioeconomic status. To
the extent that this results in better-behaved and more
academically motivated students in private-school classrooms, it
makes for a more attractive teaching environment.
I attempted to compare public and private
school teachers’ salaries in a way that would address these
concerns. I analyzed earnings data only for private school teachers
in nonreligious private schools. In addition, I excluded private
schools that have a special emphasis (such as special education,
Montessori, Waldorf) and focused on schools that most closely
resemble traditional public schools in mission.
Even with these adjustments, the data suggest
that private school teachers earn only 87 percent on average of
what public school teachers earn. A critic of private–public
comparisons might still argue that private school teaching is not
comparable to public school teaching since the socioeconomic status
of the former students is higher. In order to make public schools
more comparable to private ones, therefore, I exclude more than 90
percent of the public school teacher sample and retain public
school teachers only in low-poverty (less than 5 percent eligible
for free or reduced-price lunch) suburban schools. In such cases,
private school teachers earn even less, just 80 percent of what
their public school counterparts earn. And not only are private
school salaries lower, but the benefits are lower as well.
It is possible that teachers find the ability
of private schools to exclude unruly students a form of
“compensation,” but the fact that we observe selective
private schools paying much lower teachers’ salaries suggests
that whatever positive effects higher teachers’ pay could
have on teachers’ quality, administrators must believe that
the outlay would not produce commensurate benefits in student
achievement, or at least benefits of sufficient magnitude that
parents would be willing to pay for them.
The Bottom Line
In the end, the most reasonable standard for
determining if teachers’ pay or quality is adequate is
whether a district is meeting current regulatory standards. Some
skeptics argue that qualified-teacher standards are not very high.
And no doubt there is some merit in this charge. But what standards
do we use?
However seriously we may wish to improve
student achievement through higher teacher quality, the research to
date does not provide observable buttons to push. In fact, the
evidence linking any type of teacher training, licensing, or
testing to student achievement is mixed at best. While measures of
teachers’ general academic skills, such as SAT scores and
college selectivity, are often statistically significant predictors
of teachers’ effectiveness in raising student achievement,
their effects are modest in size.
All of this virtually guarantees shortages, or
recruitment difficulties, in some fields and schools at some time,
even if the overall level of resources for pay and benefits in the
district are more than adequate. For example,
in 2004 there were 25 applicants for
every elementary-school vacancy in Missouri, but just 5 for
each chemistry opening. If a single-salary schedule for a school
district yields a large surplus of qualified applicants for
elementary education, social studies, and physical education, but
no qualified applicants in physics or speech pathology, is
teachers’ pay in this district adequate? By suppressing
performance or field-based pay differentials, these schedules may
be driving able teachers out of the profession. A district that
insists it must raise the pay of all teachers in the district
because it cannot recruit a certified speech pathologist is not
spending money wisely.
Finally, state licensing standards must have
some flexibility. As noted above, the large number of
certifications and endorsements guarantees that virtually no
district can assure that every class will be taught by a teacher
with the right certificate and endorsement. Indeed, most of the
“out of field” teaching in public schools would
disappear overnight if states issued a single license in K–12
teaching as they do in medicine, law, accounting, and other
professions. Short of that, aggressive development of
“alternative route” licensing programs that target
existing vacancies holds considerable promise. Teachers in some
small rural schools cannot be licensed in every field in which
their teaching skills are required. Here, too, licensing standards
must have some flexibility.
In short, there may be a good case for raising
the pay of some teachers—such as those in fields or schools
that are difficult to staff or who are exceptionally effective in
the classroom. However, there is little evidence that
across-the-board increases in relative pay for all teachers are
necessary to staff public schools with qualified teachers.
Michael Podgursky is professor of economics at
the University of Missouri–Columbia.
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