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FEATURES: The Bostonian
By Alexander Russo
Tom Payzant’s focused approach to school reform
In a national landscape dotted with dysfunctional urban school systems and
short-lived superintendencies, the Boston Public School district (BPS) and
its superintendent, Tom Payzant, both stand out. With over a decade at the
helm, Payzant is arguably the best big-city school leader in the nation and
Boston the most improved urban district. This June he retires.
The success side of the Payzant story is known to
many. Academic progress in Boston increased steadily under his leadership,
with Boston’s 4th and 8th graders handing the 65-year-old Boston
native a nice farewell gift by coming out on top in math improvement on the
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 2005 assessments among
ten participating urban districts (see Figure 1). Boston public school
students are also among the top (along with San Diego and New York) in
making the most overall progress over the past two years, outperforming
students in Atlanta, Cleveland, and Chicago. Boston has a smaller gap than
most other urban districts in achievement between white students and black
and Hispanic students. On state tests, Boston’s scores have almost
kept pace with the state average since the tests were first given in 1998.
The district has been a finalist for the Broad Foundation award for urban
school districts for each of the past four years.

Payzant himself has won numerous awards, including
state and national superintendent of the year. He was recently named one of
Governing
magazine’s public officials of the year—the only school
official to be so recognized. He has been praised for his intelligence and
his doggedness, traits that many believe are key to understanding his success over almost 40 years as an educator.
He reads voraciously and responds to an enormous amount
of e-mail. His stamina has abandoned him only once, five years ago, when he
fell ill with viral meningitis and had to take a few weeks off to
recuperate. A grandfather of five, Payzant is still working long days,
nearly every day of the week, right up to retirement.
For his hard work and depth of knowledge, Payzant is
admired almost universally in mainstream education circles.
“Everybody likes Tom a lot and really respects him,” says
Harvard Graduate School of Education professor Susan Moore Johnson.
“I don’t think there’s any doubt that the district is
better off for having him here.”
But even in the praise there is a hint of what it is
about this Harvard-educated superintendent that frustrates people.
“Many people would like the pace to quicken here,” says Moore
Johnson, who calls herself a Payzant supporter. “I think people would
like to see more improvement on test scores, stronger schools, and more
autonomy given to those schools that are performing well.”
Indeed, the most common criticism of Boston’s
improvement—and Payzant’s leadership style—is that there
isn’t more of it; the changes have been “incremental,”
suggesting that he could have made more substantial, dramatic, or even
radical changes, but instead made only small moves that produced marginal
achievements (see Figure 2).

And so a question lingers: Could Tom Payzant have done
more? Other, more flamboyant and hard-charging district leaders, like
former San Diego superintendent Alan Bersin and former Chicago
superintendent Paul Vallas, have come and gone (some of them, like Vallas,
popping up again in new locations), while Payzant remained. And yet, the
appeal of the hard-charging noneducator (think Roy Romer in Los Angeles)
remains powerful.
As it turns out, the questions often have as much to
do with expectations thrust on him, and the differing ideologies
surrounding school reform, as with Tom Payzant himself or the results that
he did and did not achieve.
These questions certainly aren’t parochial or
relevant to Boston alone. Many other major school districts are currently
trying to decide whether to find someone who can emulate Payzant’s
focused strategy or someone who is going to break down doors and take few
prisoners.

A Life in Education
Born Thomas William Payzant on November 29, 1940, in
Boston, a third-generation French-American (via Nova Scotia), the future
educator moved to nearby Quincy in his early years. He attended public
school there until his mother packed him off to the private Mount Hermon
School for Boys, founded by famed Protestant evangelist Dwight Moody (in
1881). Payzant says he considers it a great sacrifice on his mother’s
part to send him to Mount Hermon, in part because it meant she was left
alone at home. Payzant’s father died when he was six. At the school,
Payzant says he learned the value of hard work, as all the students had
duties, in addition to their classwork, cleaning bathrooms and waiting
tables for faculty in the dining hall.
From Mount Hermon, Payzant decamped to Williams
College, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in American history and
literature. He moved back to his native Boston, to receive a master’s
in teaching, then a doctorate in education from
Harvard in 1968. He began his teaching career just a few miles away at
Belmont High, then went west with his new wife, also a teacher, to Tacoma,
Washington. The couple’s first child was born there in 1964, but in
1969 Payzant was tapped for his first district leadership position and came
back east to take the reins of a small, 4,500-student school district in
Springfield, Pennsylvania. He was just 28.
For the next ten years, Payzant cut his teeth as a
superintendent all over the country, moving from Springfield to Eugene,
Oregon, to Oklahoma City, then to San Diego. In southern California he
tested the tenets of longevity as a tactic in school leadership, staying in
San Diego from 1982 until 1993, about the same amount of time he would
preside over Boston schools.
One of the main things Payzant says he learned from
his San Diego experience was how to deal with issues of race, class, and
culture when there are more than two dominant racial groups in the
community. This would prove helpful in Boston, where long-established
African American and Hispanic communities have in recent years been joined
by immigrants from the Caribbean and elsewhere.
In San Diego, he also had his first taste of
continuity. “San Diego had a five-member elected board, but the board
that hired me did not turn over until I was there for seven years,”
says Payzant. “It turned over one board member at a time.”
Taking the Reins in Boston
Payzant returned to Boston by way of Washington, D.C.,
where he had a two-year stint as an assistant secretary in Bill
Clinton’s Department of Education, helping to write and then to
persuade Congress to pass the Improving America’s Schools Act, the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act reauthorization that was the
immediate predecessor of the No Child Left Behind Act. He also endured a
brutal confirmation process focused mainly on his decision to deny the Boy
Scouts of America access to San Diego school facilities for their ban on
gay scout leaders.
While Payzant’s time in Washington was
relatively brief, it gave him lots of practice working in a very political
environment. “It is tougher to be an urban superintendent than an
assistant secretary in D.C.,” says Payzant. “But I was better
prepared for Boston and the complexity of the city and its politics than I
would have been if I had come to Boston directly from San Diego.”
When he arrived back home in 1995, 26 years after
leaving, Payzant was a veteran superintendent with a clear vision of what
he wanted to do:
“I came to Boston to see whether or not you could
lead a midsized urban school district toward systemic reform,” says
Payzant. “I wanted to create a whole system of schools that would be
improved, so that my legacy would not be a few more good schools.”
Thus began Payzant’s relentless focus on a small
set of interconnected instructional issues, a strategy of implementing a
few ideas carefully and thoroughly so that they would, like the proverbial
stone dropped in the water, ripple throughout the system. Over the next
decade Payzant would create new programs only when needed and only for a
specific purpose. This is a stark contrast to the modus operandi of many
urban superintendents, who roll out new initiatives nearly every year,
stretching district resources (and credibility) along the way.
“Nearly everything Tom does is purposeful, and planned for, and
executed very, very well,” says Robert Peterkin, director of
Harvard’s Concentration on the Urban Superintendency.
“It’s just very, very thorough.”
During his first five years as chief of Boston
schools, Payzant focused the district on literacy instruction, creating a
new team of literacy coaches who worked with classroom teachers in a small
set of schools, using money freed up from an “audit” of
professional development endeavors that revealed too many disparate efforts
around the district. The coaching program was later expanded to include
math as well.
Payzant would go on to encourage teachers and
principals to use test data and develop formative assessments for use
throughout the year. He also pushed for a gradual narrowing of curriculum
options for most schools. Instead of letting each teacher in each school
come up with his or her own curriculum and approach, resulting in an
incoherent and in some cases ineffective system of instruction, Payzant
gradually narrowed the range of options for schools and teachers to
materials and teaching strategies that he and his teams of coaches thought
worked best for Boston students. This included pacing guidelines and
home-grown efforts to improve principal and teacher preparation.
Payzant created one of the nation’s only
in-house teacher training and certification programs, the Boston Teacher
Residency, through which the district prepares a small but growing number
of teachers largely independent of traditional colleges of education.
Along the way Payzant fired seven principals, not all
of whom went easily. His district-wide curriculum prescriptions would also
eventually engender a certain amount of pushback from the teachers union.
In the early years he tried to close a school, but was forced to relent in
the face of community opposition. At one point he threatened to decline
outside funding that did not match his collaborative, focused vision for
the district. In this endeavor, he eventually prevailed. More recently, low
initial pass rates by high-school students on state exams led to calls for
him to criticize the state standards and exams, which he refused to do.
Throughout, Payzant’s concentration has been on a
small set of classroom and “schoolhouse” issues including
school leadership, instructional capacity, and quality curriculum, combined
with a careful approach to implementation.

The Perks of Perseverance
The intensity of Payzant’s vision did much to
undo the resistance and cynicism of career educators who had seen many
superintendents—and many short-lived initiatives—come and go.
He was also at the helm long enough for educators to see that he was not
going to go away and was not going to change his focus from year to year.
He returned to the same issues of instruction and curriculum year after
year, adjusting and correcting along the way, but always moving
consistently forward along a narrow path.
And his longevity had other benefits as well: private
funds (estimated at $100 million over ten years) poured in from education
foundations looking for a district with stable leadership. Along the way
Payzant cultivated a generally positive relationship with the wide variety
of education groups in and around Boston, including the local teachers
union. Key among nonunion groups to support him was the Boston Plan for
Excellence, an organization that grew in part out of the 1993 Annenberg
Challenge and continues to receive funding from that foundation. Run for
many years by Ellen Guiney, a former education advisor to Senator Ted
Kennedy, the Plan (as it is known) has helped develop pilot schools and
administer several of the district’s initiatives, such as the
literacy coaching program and the teacher preparation program.
“The hard part is not inventing new things but
translating what the standards are into actual instructional supports that
can work at scale,” says Guiney. Payzant was “lucky enough to
be given the first four or five years, but also brave enough to do a few
things at a time and not try and be a big glitz.”
He avoided significant resistance from teachers by
being very careful in the materials he required and approaches he
implemented, trying out his ideas on a small set of teachers and schools,
and making adjustments as needed, before rolling them out district-wide.
Only of late, after a change in union leadership, has
the Payzant method come in for criticism. Richard Stutman, current
president of the Boston Teachers Union, recently called the Boston
curriculum that Payzant helped create “one-size-fits-all.”
Turnover at the top and well-warranted resistance from
the bottom are often cited as reasons that progress has been so slow in so
many big cities. Today the average tenure for urban superintendents is only
two and a half years, according to a Council of the Great City Schools
report that surveyed big-city school leaders. Just 14 percent of urban
superintendents last more than five years.
Built-In Advantages
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In His Own Words Tom Payzant looks back
Q: What are you
most proud of about your tenure in Boston?
TP (Tom Payzant): I
think we’ve kept a laser-like focus on teaching and learning
and closing the achievement gap.
Q: Has the state
standards and accountability system (known as MCAS) helped or
hindered your efforts?
TP: I’m a
supporter of the MCAS. Compared with state assessments in other
places, it is probably in the top half dozen or so with respect to
rigor. The percentage of students passing has improved
significantly, but now the goal is to accelerate the number of
students reaching proficiency. Getting there has been very tough.
Q: How important
have principal selection and assignment been to your success?
TP: I have appointed roughly 75–80 percent of the
principals who are now leading our schools. The goal in Boston
is to improve a whole system of schools. Developing knowledgeable
and effective school leaders through grow-our-own programs has been
a top priority. The quality of school leadership is second only to
the quality of classroom instruction to improve student
achievement.
Q: You’re
known for slow, careful implementation, starting with a handful of
guinea pigs. Any downsides to that approach?
TP: We
didn’t have the resources to go with all schools at once in
the literacy initiative, but still I wish that we had pushed it. I
would have moved the math effort up by a year or two, even though
there would have been some major pushback from the elementary
schools about bringing in a new program in more than one subject at
a time. It’s worth noting that with math we went with a
single math curriculum and didn’t give choices as we had with
literacy.
Q: Boston was one
of the first districts to implement a broad coaching approach to
professional development. Did it work as you’d hoped?
TP: The coaching
model has changed a lot over the years, but I still believe it is
critical to support teachers in the improvement of their
instruction. In the beginning, coaches focused on school-wide
professional development and some one-to-one work with classroom
teachers. Now we have a collaborative coaching and learning model,
where groups of teachers during common planning time focus on data,
curriculum, and instructional strategies.
Q: Have the pilot
schools lived up to their promise?
TP: The pilot
schools have enabled us to compete with the charter schools
approved by the state. They have most of the same autonomies
granted to the charter schools, and they provide more school
options, adding to the broad range of school choices for parents in
the Boston Public Schools. The achievement results are strong, and
the pilot schools are doing better than the charter schools at
attracting special-education students and English-language learners
to their already diverse student populations.
Q: You’ve
got a reputation as a top-down technician and an incrementalist. Is
that accurate? Or fair?
TP: I see my
leadership style as somewhat eclectic. I try to get the balance
right between the top-down and bottom-up approaches. This requires
collaborative leadership, but sometimes those who are resisting
change must be prodded and directed so that the interests of
children will be served. I do believe that leaders have to focus on
a few priorities, go deep, and get good results rather than play to
many special interests. That approach can lead to fragmentation and
poor results.
— Alexander Russo
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Some Payzant critics—and even he has
them—believe that the veteran superintendent’s accomplishments
must be viewed in the context of the relatively good hand he was dealt in
Boston.
For starters, they say, the district is small; fewer
than 150 schools and 60,000 students make it much more manageable than
Chicago, for instance, which has some 600 schools and more than 435,000
students. In fact, Boston ranks number 67 in the nation in enrollment, and
its student poverty rates—73 percent—are lower than in many
other urban districts (Chicago’s is 85 percent). Boston does not
suffer from a tremendous falloff in student spending and teachers’
salaries compared with neighboring districts. The average teacher’s
salary in Boston is almost $79,000. Average spending per pupil was about
$10,000 in FY2003, according to the district—just $500 less than
nearby Brookline and more than $1,500 more than the statewide average.
Payzant also benefited from a 1993 state education
overhaul, which, among other things, took principals out of the collective
bargaining process and gave the superintendent control over administrative
appointments. This allowed him to transfer and fire administrators and
principals as needed, without involving the board or having to deal with a
collective bargaining agreement.
The 1993 state law also called for new standards and
test-based accountability for student achievement—an approach that
fit well with Payzant’s background in Washington.
Finally, since 1991 Boston schools have been
controlled by the mayor, who appoints school board members and the
superintendent. Mayor Tom Menino, first elected in 1993, chose Payzant for
the schools job in 1995. In ways large and small, Payzant and the Boston
Public Schools were protected by Menino, elected to his fourth four-year
term in 2005, throughout his tenure as schools chief.
Such a close relationship with the mayor was not
always a plus, however, especially from the perspective of those who felt
Payzant could have taken better advantage of that liaison for the benefit
of the schools. According to John Mudd, senior project director for
Massachusetts Advocates for Children and perhaps Payzant’s most vocal
critic, the mayor gave Payzant nearly everything he could ask for:
“continuing support, freedom to create education policies, to hire
and fire people, and help fighting for city budget support even in a time
when our state hit hard times. And he didn’t try to meddle. Given the
ten years,” says Mudd, Payzant “could have—and should
have—done more.”
The Stealth Radical
It is a testament to Payzant’s skills as an
education diplomat that he survived despite the length of the various
“wish” and “to do” lists that others had for him.
The things still undone after 11 years include a relatively small but
stubborn achievement gap, a high dropout rate, and struggling programs for
English language learners and special-education students. Compared with
2003, the 2005 NAEP showed that the achievement gap broadened in 8th-grade
math and 4th-grade reading. Minority enrollment in the city’s three
exam schools and preparation programs is also declining, though this
appears to be because of a legal mandate to drop affirmative action
programs.
For reform-minded educators to the center and right of
the political spectrum, calling Payzant’s efforts a success refutes
the notion that radical changes are needed to improve urban education. He
was never the type of reformer to talk about “blowing up” the
system or “turning things on their head” to achieve laudable
ends. “No doubt there is a sense of urgency that needs to be created
around the gaps that exist in urban school systems,” he explains.
“But there’s not a lot of evidence that the strategy of trying
to blow up a place and start over will get the long-term results that can
come from continuity of leadership.”
School closings, new-school creation, merit pay for
teachers, technology initiatives, and other common stand-ins for innovation
have been few and far between under Payzant’s tenure. He hasn’t
spent a lot of time trying to take on union work rules that affect
transfers, overtime, and, to some extent, recruitment and diversity. And he
hasn’t focused very much attention on school choice and competition,
key issues for conservative and centrist reformers alike. As of
2005–06, there are just 16 charter schools in Boston, all authorized
by the state, and 19 “pilot” schools, which are charter-like
schools created in partnership between the district and the teachers union.
The union blocked the expansion of pilot schools for two years—a move
that Payzant complained about but did not take dramatic action to undo.
For these reasons, Payzant gets a mixed review from
pro-choice reform groups like the Pioneer Institute. “He’s been
tentative on choice issues,” says the institute’s executive
director, Jim Stergios, citing Payzant’s refusal to push for more
charters and his slowness in expanding the student assignment system used
to determine where children attend school. “But he’s been very
good about expanding the number of pilot schools, and the small steps
he’s taken, combined with the stability, have had a big cumulative
impact on the school system here.”
His approach seems also to have disappointed some
liberals and progressives, for whom the fact that he has made so much
progress without a strong commitment to parent and community engagement is
troubling. Payzant hasn’t gotten deeply involved in community issues,
and in fact admits that the racial divide that long dominated Boston school
politics before his arrival was one of the main considerations he had
before taking the job. His slowness on this front is widely cited among
community and minority leaders as a Payzant fault. Even his supporters
concede that Payzant has moved too slowly. “It is his fault,”
says Guiney about community and parent engagement by the district.
“He kept trying, but he never got it quite right. It has taken too
long.” This concern and others detailed in a recent Aspen Institute
report on Payzant’s tenure are already issues in planning for
Payzant’s successor.
In the end, there is no real way to know what might
have been. Of course, Payzant might have gotten a lot more done had he
pushed harder or worked more closely with community groups; at the same
time, he might have gotten a lot less done—and helped fewer schools
make progress—had he rolled out half-baked initiatives or gotten
himself fired.
“He could have made a lot of bone-headed
decisions,” says Guiney. “No matter what the situation, he
still had to be able to deliver.”
And he did. In fact, since he did reform the school
system without always appearing to, he has earned a reputation for what one
former Payzant deputy called his “stealth radicalism.”
Whatever his flaws, no other big-city superintendent
seems to have done a better job steering an urban district in the right
direction. For reformers on both sides, the underlying problem may be that
Payzant simply doesn’t fit the current vision of school district
leader. He’s white and male. He’s a career educator, not a
former general or federal prosecutor or governor. He is smart and
articulate, but not media hungry. Though capable of standing up to vested
interests and outside agendas, he generally favors private conversations
over public confrontation. He has no apparent political ambitions.
In short, there’s nothing flashy about him or
his ideas. Instead, he’s dogged, persistent, and—to use the
term many use to describe his focus—“technical.”
He’s that much-maligned thing: a traditional educator, a professional
who communicates most, and best, with other educators. Substantively,
Payzant’s agenda seems quaint to those on both ends of the political
spectrum who want immediate improvement.
“I’ve struggled my whole career to figure
out the right balance,” says Payzant. “I’ve been very
top-down on some things, and as a result convinced some people that
that’s my style. Then when I’ve been more deliberative,
I’m characterized as an incrementalist.”
To some extent, Payzant may simply be a victim of his
own success. Having brought stability and demonstrated some positive change
and stuck around long enough to have to clean up his own messes, he had to
face the never-ending demand by all education stakeholders for him to do
more—to do everything.
After 37 years in the business, Payzant leaves Boston
a strong believer in staying focused, even if it means no more than steady
progress and a BPS still in need of improvement. “The great thing
about Boston is that there are so many
institutions and organizations interested in education,” he says.
“The challenge is that this is a very complex city—much more so
than some larger school districts. You’ve got to take advantage of
the talent and the potential and interest but try and keep everyone focused
on the teaching and learning agenda.”
Alexander Russo is a Chicago-based education writer
whose web site, This Week In Education
(www.thisweekineducation.com), covers school
reform policy and media coverage of education issues.
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