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CHECK THE FACTS: Donkey in Disguise
By Greg Forster
Jack Jennings and the Center on Education Policy
Checked (all titles published by the Center on Education Policy):
From the Capital to the Classroom, Year 1 (January 2003), Year 2 (January
2004), Year 3 (March 2005)
State High School Exit Exams series:
A Baseline Report (August 2002), Put to the Test (August
2003), A Maturing Reform (August 2004)
States Try Harder, but Gaps Persist:
State High School Exit Exams 2005 (August
2005)
Pay Now or Pay Later: The Hidden Costs
of High School Exit Exams (May 2004)
School Vouchers: What We Know and Don’t
Know … and How We Could Learn More (June 2000)
Do We Still Need Public Schools? (1996)
Checked by Greg Forster
With the
passage of the No Child Left Behind
Act (NCLB), the proliferation of high school exit exams, the
success of school choice initiatives, and a dozen other smaller if
more bitter battles, education has become one of the hottest policy
topics in Washington. That means there’s a booming market for
education experts, especially those who claim to speak with the
disinterested voice of reason among the gaggle of partisan
squawkers and interest groups. Jack Jennings, a one-time king of
Capitol Hill education policy and now head of the Center on Education Policy (CEP),
is one such expert.
Jennings and the CEP (he founded the
organization in 1995) provide research and expert opinion on a
variety of education issues. Jennings is one of the mainstream
press’s favorite go-to guys on education. He and the CEP appear frequently in the New York Times and the Washington Post
commenting on education issues and are variously described as
“nonpartisan” (Times, January 27, 2004; March 14, 2004; Post, March 16, 2004),
“nonprofit” (Times, August 18, 2004; February 7, 2006), “a research
group” (Times, April 4, 2005; May 11, 2005), and “independent” (Post, February 19,
2004; August 29, 2004; March 24, 2005). The Post’s David Broder
called the CEP “an independent advocate for more effective public
schools” (March 13, 2004). And on March 26 of this year, the Times turned over its
most valuable piece of real estate—two columns on the top of the
Sunday front page—to Jennings and CEP to announce, two days
before it was even released, a CEP study on NCLB’s impact on
curriculum, again calling the organization “nonpartisan.”
The media seem to see Jennings and the CEP as
the voices of education research and reason, an enviable position
at a time when nonpartisans are hard to come by. Jennings uses this
highly desirable media perch to promote findings that he says are
the result of empirical research conducted by the CEP. He says, for
instance, that NCLB is too strict and is underfunded, that its more
controversial requirements are unworkable and should be scrapped,
that only big new state spending can help kids pass exit exams, and
that school choice is unproved and dangerous. Is this
nonpartisanship or something else?
Accidental Social Science
Jack Jennings wasn’t always a
professional “independent,” “nonpartisan”
researcher. In fact, for the better part of three decades (from
1967 to 1994) he was one of the most powerful education
policymakers on Capitol Hill, as a Democratic staffer for the House
Education and Labor Committee at a time when the Democrats
completely controlled the House. His influence over federal
education policy was enormous: he worked on every major education
bill that went through Congress in those years. It is not
surprising that education journalists would still turn to a
prominent policymaker like Jennings for quotations. But how does a
lifelong partisan congressional staffer change his spots and become
a disinterested professional researcher who follows the evidence
wherever it leads?
The answer, in this case, is that he
doesn’t.
One of the CEP’s most important
publications, for instance, is an annual study of the effects of
NCLB and its associated rules and regulations, “From the
Capital to the Classroom.” These annual volumes make
assertions about empirical facts (“students’ scores on
the state tests used for NCLB are rising”; or “lack of
capacity is a serious problem that could undermine the success of
NCLB”) and provide policy recommendations (“some
requirements of NCLB are overly stringent, unworkable, or
unrealistic”; “the need for funding will grow, not
shrink, as more schools are affected by the law’s
accountability requirements”). On March 24, 2005, the Post carried a wire
report hailing last year’s CEP study as “the most
comprehensive review of the three-year-old No Child Left Behind
law.” The story opened with the claim: “States will not
come close to reaching all the struggling children unless the
government spends more and lightens demands, according to an
independent analysis.”
Education professionals looking for a detailed
review of the policies, procedures, and regulations used under NCLB
will find much that is useful in these annual studies and other CEP
publications on NCLB. The CEP has also debunked some of the more
intemperate claims about NCLB that have arisen from both sides of
the political aisle.
The trouble with the studies is that they do
not gather data about the issues they purport to examine. The
authors have read large volumes of legal, regulatory, and
administrative documents related to NCLB. This puts them in a good
position to know, in detail, exactly what policies are being set.
However, the CEP claims to be studying not what the policies are,
but how they are implemented and how they are affecting education.
To examine implementation the CEP relies exclusively on surveys of
state education officials and interviews with public school staff.
In other words, CEP researchers report as facts what the public
school system says about how things are going in the public school
system.
The CEP does not hide its methods. The studies
quite openly attribute their findings to surveys and interviews.
Phrases like “officials told us that…” and
“according to the teachers we interviewed…” appear here
and there. Nonetheless, both the studies themselves and
Jennings’s public comments about them present the findings as
scientifically confirmed facts, not merely as the claims made by
public school officials and staff. They rely on the accuracy of
these claims as a basis for policy recommendations.
Survey and interview data need not be
dismissed across the board as unscientific. A survey using
scientific methods—such as random sample generation and,
where appropriate, credible assurances of anonymity for
interviewees—can produce legitimate empirical data on many
subjects. But the CEP is investigating the merits of an
accountability system by asking the opinion of the institution that
is being held accountable.
The CEP also claims that its annual NCLB
reports include “case studies” of numerous districts.
Use of the term case studies creates an impression that some kind
of scientific data gathering was involved in at least some
localities. But at the back of the study, we find out that the case
studies are simply a more extensive set of interviews, including
site visits to conduct in-person interviews. “Other
research” was involved, though not identified or described,
and there is no sign that it involved any independent collection of
data.
What the CEP does when it studies NCLB
implementation is barely distinguishable from public relations
work. It ascertains the public schools’ party line and then
broadcasts it as fact.
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Collaborative Union Leaders Get Lauded—and Unseated
Before founding the Center on Education Policy
in 1995, John F. (Jack) Jennings had a career that would be the
envy of any loyal Democrat. Growing up with a “typical ethnic
Catholic background” in Chicago in the 1950s, as he told Education
Week in a 1994 profile, his early career choices were limited to
“one of the three Ps—priest, politician, or policeman.
My mother wouldn’t let me be a policeman, so I chose the
seminary.” But Jennings gave up the idea of becoming a priest
and enrolled at Loyola University, where he got an early taste of
the third P, joining the College Democrats. Later, while
studying law at Northwestern University, he worked as a precinct
captain for the local Democratic ward committeeman, Representative
Roman Pucinski, who was elected to Congress in 1959.
Pucinski brought the young Jennings to
Washington in 1967 and gave him a job as staff director of the
Education and Labor Committee’s Subcommittee on
Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education. In 1973 Jennings
was promoted to associate counsel of the subcommittee by
Representative Carl Perkins (D-Ky.) and soon became the full
committee’s general counsel. During his long tenure, Jennings saw
his influence grow substantially. His thumbprint is on nearly each
major piece of education legislation—from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to the
Higher Education Act—passed or reauthorized during the years when Democrats
controlled Capitol Hill. “Colleagues and lobbyists describe Mr.
Jennings as at once disarming and demanding,” commented Education Week at the
end of Jennings’s 27-year Capitol Hill career, “a
consensus builder and a partisan.”
— Peter Meyer
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Partisan Assumptions, Predictable
Conclusions
The party line has been fairly consistent:
public schools support the goals of NCLB, but they need more money
and more “flexibility” from Washington to accomplish
these goals. Sure enough, the CEP consistently finds that
NCLB’s goals are laudable and that schools are refocusing
their efforts on raising achievement among disadvantaged groups.
This finding is always followed by claims that schools need lots
more money to produce real improvement and that the most
challenging NCLB requirements are unreasonable and need to be
relaxed.
In the foreword to the first report in the
series “From the Capital to the Classroom,” Jennings
compares NCLB to the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA). “Some critics of the original ESEA say that it failed
because it provided money without accountability, and that the NCLB
Act will succeed because it requires strict accountability,”
he wrote. “The ESEA of 1965 may have offered money without
much education accountability, but the NCLB Act demands heavy
accountability without much greater federal financial and technical
assistance—an approach no more likely to succeed.”
The trouble with this reasoning is that the
school system still has all the extra resources we have been
pouring into it since 1965. In other words, schools now have both
very high spending levels and accountability. Isn’t this
exactly the combination Jennings says he wants?
The dynamic that’s really at work in
these studies becomes particularly clear as the studies are read in
succession. The first came out in January 2003, when state fiscal
crises had been in the headlines. The CEP found, “The fiscal
crisis in most states, coupled with the prospect of limited
additional federal aid, could threaten the successful
implementation of this very ambitious law.” In 2004 and 2005,
the CEP made no more mention of fiscal crises, but left unchanged
its finding that states can’t implement NCLB without large
spending increases. The later studies also acknowledge that NCLB is
producing academic improvements, yet the schools still need more
money and relaxed requirements. “Some supporters of the Act
contend that early gains in state test scores mean that the Act is
being administered effectively and is succeeding, so no changes are
needed. Our intensive study of the Act for the last three years
leads us to disagree.”
These studies’ factual claims and
policy recommendations, which are their main purpose, have no
scientific basis. They should be taken for what they are: the
public school system’s party line, not valid empirical
research.
Quality Babysitting: Teaching Costs Extra
The CEP’s other major line of research
concerns high-school exit exams, on which it also produces an
annual study, titled “State High School Exit Exams,”
and other publications. As with its NCLB research, the CEP’s
work on exit exams has useful aspects, including detailed
information on state policies and regulations. Again, this will
satisfy the wonks. The CEP has contributed reasonable discussion on
secondary issues such as giving students who fail exit exams
alternative ways to prove their academic proficiency. And it has
been commendably principled on the question of whether exit exams
increase dropout rates: The 2003 edition of its annual study
snidely commented, “Exit exams are certainly not helping to keep students in
school.” However, as subsequent
research produced new evidence that
exit exams do not in fact increase dropout rates, the CEP moderated
its stance to one of reasonable agnosticism.
But the exit exam studies are no more
scientific than their NCLB cousins. In 2004 the CEP published its
largest study of these exams, “Pay Now or Pay Later: The
Hidden Costs of High School Exit Exams.” The title sums it up:
schools need more money to cover the “hidden” costs of
living up to the expectations set by exit exams.
The CEP’s central thesis is that while
exit exams may appear to be inexpensive, they actually create the
need for new spending by imposing on schools the burden of
educating students to pass the test. “The direct costs of
developing and administering the tests themselves represent a small
share of the total costs of implementing a mandatory exit exam
policy,” says “Pay Now or Pay Later.” “A
realistic estimate of exam-related costs must also take into
account the costs of remediation for students who fail exit exams
or crucial state tests in earlier grades, as well as the
‘hidden’ costs of services needed to give students a
substantial chance of passing these tests.”
The assumption here is that exit exams impose
new responsibilities on schools. In fact, exit exams are only
holding schools accountable for teaching basic skills, always
assumed to be their primary responsibility. The CEP view implies
that schools are a babysitting service. You pay them $9,000 a year
for 12 years to watch your child during the day. Teaching reading
and math is an extra service, and it costs more.
Professional Judgment: Spend More
In “Pay Now or Pay Later,” the CEP
calculates the alleged hidden costs of exit exams using what is
known as the “professional judgment” method. It
assembled panels of educators and asked them what education
services, in their professional judgment, a typical school district
would need to reach two benchmarks: the current level of student
performance on exit exams and a higher level of student performance
that represents a desired goal. The CEP then calculates the costs
of providing those services.
The professional judgment method does not rely
on empirical data gathering or analysis of actual budgets. It is
analogous to the method the CEP uses to study NCLB: ask the system
what it thinks it needs, then report that figure as the amount
needed. The calculations produced by the professional judgment
method are more or less just speculation: expert speculation, to be
sure, but speculation. Even the cost estimates for achieving
current outcomes are speculative; the CEP asks its panels of
experts to judge what “a hypothetical average school
district” would have to spend to produce the current outcome
levels.
The problem is that the experts have an
overwhelming incentive to inflate their cost estimates, even if
only unconsciously. It is only natural for education practitioners
to believe that exit exams entail the need for lots of new,
additional education services. And education practitioners know
that higher cost estimates for complying with exit exams will
produce a political impetus to spend more money on education
practitioners.
One justification the CEP offers for the
professional judgment method is that it “best reflects the
experiences of people who are actually responsible for delivering
education services” and “reflects the views of actual
service providers.” But that is exactly the problem: because
they are the “actual service providers,” the experts
sitting on these panels cannot help but be affected by the
financial incentives they face as employees of the school system.
Another justification the CEP offers is that
the professional judgment method is “the most commonly
used” for studying education resource needs. Unfortunately,
this is all too true. Following the proliferation of
“adequacy” lawsuits, studies using the professional
judgment method to calculate how much it costs to provide an
adequate education have become an explosive growth industry. (See
“Pseudo-Science and a Sound Basic Education,” check the facts, Fall
2005). The reason adequacy studies tend to prefer the professional
judgment method is clear enough, and it does not seem like a
stretch to suggest that the CEP might prefer that method for the
very same reason.
“Pay Now or Pay Later” also states
that “the cost estimates appear to be reliable within
approximately 5–10 percent.” How do they know this,
given that their method involves no empirical data collection?
“Panels in the same state with the same task but different
members and a different moderator on a different day will often
differ from the average by between 5 and 10 percent.” In
other words, the expert panels all reach results that are similar
to one another, so therefore the results are
“reliable.”
Looking the Other Way
In the end, too many of the CEP’s
publications reflect poorly on the organization’s ability to
treat controversial issues fairly and face the empirical evidence
squarely, the very qualities that induce major media outlets to
seek Jennings and the CEP for their opinions.
It is no surprise, then, to discover that the
CEP’s take on school choice is as compromised as its views on
other hot-button education issues. It does not produce a big annual
study on school choice, but early in the debate it released a
review of the existing research, “School Vouchers: What We
Know and Don’t Know … and How We Could Learn
More.” The review found the evidence on vouchers to be
“inconclusive,” a result achieved only by throwing out
all research on privately funded voucher programs, then declaring
that the rest of the research produced “varying
findings.” In fact, there have been seven scientifically
valid random-assignment analyses of voucher programs, and all seven
found either that all voucher students perform significantly better
than their nonvoucher contemporaries, or at least that most of them
do (in some studies the results for black students, the majority of
participants, are positive, while the results for other students
fail to achieve statistical significance). There is room for
legitimate discussion on the limits of the existing research on
vouchers, but to describe the research as
“inconclusive” is a gross misrepresentation.
The CEP has even published a history of public
schooling, titled “Do We Still Need Public Schools?”
that does to history what its other publications do to current
events. For example, the report uses quotations from the American
founders about the importance of education to suggest that the
founders were “early supporters of public schools,”
which they were not. Public schools as we know them today
didn’t exist at the time, and the historical record makes
clear that most of the founders would not have supported a
government-owned and government-run school system.
If Jack Jennings and the Center on Education
Policy want to publish their opinions and call them
“research,” that’s their right. But social
scientists, commentators, and journalists have a responsibility to
distinguish between unfounded opinions and serious empirical
research and to warn people when a study doesn’t adhere to
scientific standards. There’s no hope for improving education
policy if we don’t keep the facts and evidence distinct from
the public-school system’s party (and often partisan) line.
Greg Forster is a senior fellow at the Milton
and Rose D. Friedman Foundation.
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