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DEPARTMENTS: We Hold These Truths
By Dennis Shea
The case for impeaching rogue judges
Federal judges are about as popular today as auditors from
the Internal Revenue Service. And for good reason.
In case after case, federal judges are expressing contempt
for democracy, overturning laws passed by state legislatures
or adopted directly by the people through the initiative
process. In recent years, federal judges have blocked the
implementation of two California ballot initiatives, one that
denies government services to illegal immigrants and one that
bans racial and ethnic preferences. In Washington state and
New York, federal judges have overturned state laws banning
physician-assisted suicide. And the Supreme Court overturned
a Colorado initiative to deny giving special legal
preferences to homosexuals.
Why bother
voting
when the judiciary
can knock down laws
like so many
bowling pins? |
The American people are asking themselves,
why bother voting when the judiciary can knock down laws like
so many bowling pins?
Term Limits?
In conservative circles, exploring ways to curb the
activism of some of our federal judges has also become a hot
topic. One suggestion that seems to be gaining currency is
limiting the terms of federal judges, who now enjoy lifetime
appointments. In fact, the 1996 presidential campaign of Bob
Dole, of which I was a part, seriously considered making term
limits the centerpiece of its critique of the federal
judiciary and President Clinton's judicial appointments.
After all, poll after poll show that term limits for judges
are enormously popular with the American people. The Dole
campaign ultimately rejected the idea. And so, too, should
those interested in curbing the excesses of judicial power.
For starters, imposing term limits on judges would be
difficult. Article III, section 1 of the Constitution states
that federal judges are to hold their offices "during
good Behaviour." Changing this provision would require a
constitutional amendment. In recent years, Congress has
proposed dozens of constitutional amendments on everything
from balancing the federal budget and campaign spending
limits to flag desecration and voluntary school prayer.
Unlike many of these proposed constitutional amendments,
which are mainly designed to overturn specific decisions by
the Supreme Court, an amendment to impose term limits on
federal judges would alter the fundamental structure of our
system of government. Anticipating that the judiciary would
be the weakest of the three branches, the Framers explicitly
granted federal judges lifetime tenure so that they would be
able to protect the Constitution against "legislative
encroachments."
As Alexander Hamilton explains in Federalist No. 78,
"nothing will contribute so much as [lifetime tenure] to
that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential
to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty." Is it
smart to monkey with the fundamental mechanics of our
constitutional structure? Do we really want to second-guess
the Framers?
Perhaps as important, term limits would not drain the
batteries of activist judges. Imagine a 10-year limit. During
this period, what would stop a federal judge from
micromanaging a state prison system, raising property taxes
to finance the overhaul of a school system, or striking down
a ballot initiative passed by a popular majority? A term
limit might prompt activist judges to rush to make their mark
on history.
Some argue that term limits should be linked to
reappointment: When a federal judge's term expires, he or she
would be eligible for reconfirmation by the U.S. Senate. But
what would this accomplish? Anxious about reappointment,
judges might tack their decisions to the prevailing political
winds as the expiration of their terms grew near. Would
judges resort to lobbying the Senate for reappointment? What
kind of deals would be made? And what about a conservative
judge, properly committed to the principle of judicial
restraint, who must face reappointment by a hostile Senate
controlled by liberals?
For Shame!
Finding the right balance between judicial independence
and judicial accountability is difficult. But there is a way.
It's called shame.
Shame is one of the most underutilized checks on a runaway
judiciary. Remember Harold Baer, the federal district court
judge in New York, who suppressed more than $4 million worth
of drugs seized as evidence by the New York City police? Baer
claimed that the police lacked a "reasonable
suspicion" that a crime was occurring, even though they
observed four men at 5 a.m., in an area notorious for
drug-dealing, load bags into the trunk of a car without
speaking to its driver, and then run away after noticing the
cops. According to Baer, it was perfectly normal for them to
flee from the police since "residents in this
neighborhood tended to regard police officers as corrupt,
abusive, and violent."
The foolishness of this ruling transformed Baer into the
poster child for an out-of-control and out-of-touch federal
judiciary. After being publicly denounced by both President
Clinton and Senator Dole, the judge hastily reversed himself.
Even the Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he
operation of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges
are matters of utmost public concern." When a federal
judge issues a "prison cap" order, resulting in the
early release of hundreds of violent criminals, that's a
matter of real public concern that should concern politicians
too. The same can be said when a federal judge strikes down a
popularly enacted ballot initiative using half-baked
constitutional analysis. Elected officials at all levels of
government have an obligation to speak out when a judge
crosses the line. Can you imagine Abraham Lincoln not
commenting on the infamous Dred Scott decision?
Too often today lower federal court decisions are issued
without much public notice. They are tucked away in court
reports, inaccessible to the public. And don't expect the
liberal and often lazy mainstream press to bring these
decisions to light. That's why the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees should cull through recent federal court decisions
and publicize those that fall within the "shameful"
category. Perhaps the two Judiciary Committees should
establish special subcommittees for this purpose.
The congressional leadership should also consider passing,
on a routine basis, nonbinding resolutions expressing
disapproval of those decisions that show a clear disregard
for established law. The purpose of these resolutions would
not be to change the outcome of any particular case, but to
serve as a warning to renegade federal judges that the
people's elected representatives are monitoring their conduct
in office.
What About Impeachment?
In those extraordinary cases where a federal judge has
clearly, deliberately and consistently exceeded his
authority, there is also another option. Let's take our cue
again from Alexander Hamilton, this time in Federalist No.
81. In it, Hamilton woefully underestimates the mischief
judges might cause in the future: "Particular
misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the
legislature may now and then happen; but they can never be so
extensive as to amount to an inconvenience, or in any
sensible degree affect the order of the political
system." But then he redeems himself by suggesting an
antidote to those rare occasions of chronic judicial
arrogance: impeachment. As he explains, "There never can
be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate
usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard
the united resentment of the body entrusted with it, while
this body was possessed of the means of punishing their
presumption by degrading them from their stations."
In other words, Hamilton and the Framers envisioned that
any judge who consistently and deliberately exceeded his
judicial authority would be given a pink slip. The
impeachment process should be regarded as the ultimate check
on a rogue judiciary.
The
impeachment
process is the
ultimate check
on a rogue judiciary.
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Representative Tom DeLay of Texas performed
a public service recently by suggesting that renegade federal
judges could be removed from office through the impeachment
process. Not surprisingly, this suggestion has met with
fierce criticism. Even some of DeLay's Republican colleagues
have dismissed the impeachment remedy out of hand.
Not so fast. Congress should first sort out and evaluate
the competing arguments over impeachment. Article II, section
4, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he President,
Vice President and all civil officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors." (Italics added.)
Some observers have cited the "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" phrase to argue that only an indictable
criminal act, not a ruling in a contested case, can be
grounds for impeaching a federal judge. This view, however,
is not universally shared. In 1833 the famed Justice Joseph
Story explained in his Commentaries on the Constitution
that "misdemeanor" refers to forms of misbehavior
well beyond indictable criminal acts. According to Story, the
impeachment power applies to "what are aptly termed,
political offenses, growing out of personal misconduct, or
gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the
public interests." More recently, law professor Raoul
Berger points out that "impeachment itself was conceived
because the objects of impeachment for one reason or another
were beyond the reach of ordinary criminal redress."
Yes, the most recent examples of judicial impeachments
have all involved indictable criminal behavior on the part of
the impeached judge. But in 1803, one of the impeachable
offenses cited against Judge John Pickering was his failure
to adhere to the requirements of an act of Congress, hardly a
criminal act.
And none of the articles on which the House of
Representatives impeached Judge Robert Archbald in 1912
amounted to an indictable offense. In fact, the congressman
managing the Archbald case insisted that a judge could be
impeached for "the entering and enforcement of orders
beyond his jurisdiction"-in other words, an abuse of
power. Isn't an abuse of power a form of
"misbehavior"?
Ultimately, it's up to the Congress to determine the
proper grounds under the Constitution for impeaching a
federal judge. The Supreme Court ruled just four years ago
that matters governing impeachment are left to Congress and
that the courts are powerless to review impeachment decisions
(Nixon v. United States, 1993). Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist reasoned:
"[j]udicial review [of impeachments] would be
inconsistent with the Framers' insistence that our system be
one of checks and balances. In our constitutional system,
impeachment was designed to be the only check on the judicial
branch by the Legislature."
As the 105th Congress looks at ways to curb the
"imperial judiciary," it should consider breathing
new life into its own impeachment authority. A very careful
and highly selective use of this authority would send a
powerful message to the federal bench that its renegade days
are over. Sure, it would be highly controversial for the
House of Representatives to initiate impeachment proceedings
against a federal judge for noncriminal acts. But who says
that controversy is incompatible with good sense?
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