Iran holds the key to democracy in the Middle East.
It is geographically located in the heart of one of the world’s most
volatile regions. Transition in Lebanon, progress in Israel/Palestine,
attempts to foster democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and democratization
in Ukraine are all contributing to the spread of democratic ideals in the
region and chipping away at the foundations of autocratic rule.
Iran—a country of strategic, political, and economic importance to
the region—has the potential to drastically change the Middle East,
for, in much of the twentieth century, it has been the bellwether state for the region. This change will only take
place, however, if some form of democratic opposition remains active in Iran. With the
hard-liners taking back the Majles
(parliament) in February 2004, and the presidency in June 2005, reformists
have effectively been eradicated from the government, leading many to ask
whether the political resistance in Iran is dead or alive.
With the departure of President Khatami after eight
years, it is almost impossible to avoid looking back on the hopes and
promises first fostered and then dissipated by his election in 1997. The
stunning results of the election, and the
victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an unknown hard-liner, make even more urgent the question of what went wrong. On the
surface, it appears that the hard-liners have monopolized power and
entrenched themselves; it seems as if Iran has moved backward and been
permanently derailed off the road to
democratization. The population seems dangerously depoliticized and appears to have lost its desire to resist
politically. There is some truth to all of this, but it does not tell the
full story. The reality beneath this facile
surface is that the economy is in shambles, the government lacks legitimacy, corruption is endemic, high unemployment
has become chronic, and the pseudo-totalitarian rule of a small number of
unelected mullahs is increasingly challenged by the populace and even by
elements within the regime itself. As the bitter presidential election
showed, there is now a serious rift in the
ranks of the ruling clergy, and such rifts have always been one of the necessary preconditions for a transition
to democracy in any despotic society.
The social and political advancement brought about by
the popular expression in the 1997 and 2001
presidential elections is not a sunk cost, and
neither is the nearly 70 percent of the
electorate who in the recent presidential
elections in effect voted against the status quo. Although Iranians take to
the streets less frequently than in the past, the growing recognition both inside Iran and in the international community is that the
Iranian people are the regime’s greatest
vulnerability. The population is young, pro-Western, freedom loving, and
anti-regime. Although they are not politically active in the traditional sense, the people harbor sentiments that place
them further from the regime than has
ever been the case in the history of the Islamic Republic. The
regime’s control of the population is based on a superficial
allegiance held together by a combination of coercion and
bribing-cum-patronage.
The result is that the Iranian domestic situation is
more precarious than it appears on the surface. Although the overt
political aspects of resistance are
diminishing, Iranians are resisting as much now as they have in previous periods of the Islamic Republic. That resistance, however,
no longer appears in traditional forms of oppositional activity, such as
massive political demonstrations and an organized opposition. Instead, it
often manifests itself in the form of a “passive revolution,” a
widespread social resistance that, given its methodology of engaging in
activities that are antithetical to the regime’s values, is political
in and of itself. Therefore, rather than becoming depoliticized, the
Iranian population has experienced a transformation in how it channels its
opposition to the regime. The people have become strategic, seeking change
through the gradual process of civil disobedience rather than reformist
legislation. Although there are promising aspects
of the “Passive Revolution,” it alone will not produce regime
change, transformative reform, or a
transition to democracy in Iran.
The Roots of Traditional Depoliticization
Before examining the impact of Iran’s passive
revolution, we must first understand what factors are responsible for the
shift away from traditional political resistance. One important and obvious
fact about Iran is that the people are growing more detached from the
regime and its ideology. They recognize, however, that the mullahs are
still in control, that the regime is brutal and still capable of violence,
and finally that the opposition has yet to offer a viable alternative or a
cogent leadership. Students openly speak out against the regime, but when
you ask them if they are willing to take to the streets, they back down and
explain that they cannot and will not risk life and limb.
This apparent depoliticization is the result of three
different factors. First, Iranians have become more afraid to resist.
Despite the fact that people continue to want change, many high-profile
arrests, disappearances, and known cases of extrajudicial murder of
opposition figures—one opposition figure has suggested more than 80
such deaths have occurred in the last few years alone—have terrorized
them. They are unable to assemble and oppose the regime legally, and they
lack the freedom or leadership to do so covertly. The regime has made the
price of such resistance far higher than many people are, understandably,
willing to pay.
Second, the Iranian people are experiencing a loss of
hope brought on by the failure of the reformist
movement to meet even the minimal expectations
of the people. In 1997, most Iranians felt as
if change and democracy were at the tips of their fingers, having seen their pressure
finally producing forward-moving returns. But
the mood began to change in July 1999, when 25,000 students at the
University of Tehran demonstrated against the banning of a reformist
newspaper. Riots began after Tehran police forcibly entered one of the
university hostels. During the protests, students chanted “Khamanei
must quit” and “Ansare Hezbollah commits crimes and the leader
backs them.” The riots spread to eight other cities and resulted in
the death of one student at the University of Tehran. The reformists,
notably President Khatami, failed to stand by the students, a gesture that
would come to symbolize the
“betrayal” of the people by the reformists. Even more
disheartening was that Khatami refused to
attend that year’s opening of the University of Tehran, a function he
normally would attend. Thus, the population as a whole began to question
whether the reformists had their interests in
mind or whether they were simply another manipulative tool of the
theocratic establishment. Similar events over the next five years
exacerbated the growing rift between the reformists and their constituency
base—particularly the students. In fact, some people have come to dislike the
reformist movement even more than the
regime, arguing that “while the regime is bad, at least it
didn’t bring false hope.”
Third, and perhaps most important, the combination of
hard-liner monopolization of power and the loss of popular support for the
reform movement has left the people without an ally inside the existing
establishment in Iran. Without any force inside the government to protect their actions or serve as a
body susceptible to popular pressure, the majority of the population
no longer sees the potential for political
resistance to elicit a favorable outcome. The presidential election of June
2005 now puts all three branches of the government—as well as the armed forces, the media, and a big part of the
national economy—in the hands of
hard-line conservatives.
The Passive Revolution
Given this apparent depoliticization of the Iranian
population, what is happening inside Iran? Although
outwardly the Iranian people seem to be
losing the desire to resist,
there are many signs of their willingness, indeed eagerness, to participate in the passive revolution and
resistance. The Iranian youth, in
particular, have made the calculation that because resisting politically
risks life and limb and rarely produces any positive results, they will
engage in massive and widespread social resistance. Women, despite the
regime’s constant attempt to segregate them from society, are leading
this revolution, whose main characteristic is that the Iranian people will
love anything their government hates and hate anything their government
loves.
The United States—the quintessential example of
something the regime hates—has become a symbol of hope for the social
resistance. The United States is loved by the people because they see it as
the only country in the world that has seriously stood up to the Islamic
regime and its bullying. The admiration one experiences in Iran as an
American is magnificent: Taxi drivers will sometimes not charge you because
you are American, students may prevent you from taking photos of
anti-American propaganda, and students openly express a love for President
Bush. The disenchantment with the reformists has led Iranians to fill the
vacuum by embracing American culture as a symbol of freedom, liberty, and
hope.
The youth, having created innovative ways to meet
members of the opposite sex, engage in wild
parties with alcohol, gambling, and premarital romance. In the evenings, some Iranian youth hold drag races down
the long straightaways of Jordan Street in downtown Tehran. Despite bans on
most movies and records, Iranian youth still manage to acquire pirated or
black market American DVDs and CDs. They do not get their news from the
state-run television or radio but from CNN, Voice of America, and Radio
Israel.
These acts of social defiance are driven by two
motivations: first, the desire for greater individual liberty and, second, a means for
expressing defiance of the regime. Following on the heels of the hard-liners’
decision to manipulate the election
process, particularly the first run of the presidential election, and the
surprise victory of the virtually unknown Ahmadinejad, the Iranian people
have found new, more private ways in which to embrace their individuality
under a pseudo-totalitarian regime.
The most effective means for group expression in this
passive revolution is through what we call virtual association. Although
the population cannot associate freely,
unspoken movements and aspects of the social resistance transcend the need
for physical organization, good examples of which are scarves and Western
clothing. Women do not meet with one another and decide to Westernize their
clothes or to wear brightly colored scarves far back on their heads as
expressions of defiance. It happens naturally. These virtual associations
threaten the regime because there is no leadership, network, or covert
movement to crack down on. Instead, virtual association operates above the
grid of clerical despotism.
Chat rooms and bloggers—Iran has more than
75,000 bloggers—have become another favorite form of virtual
resistance to the regime and its austere politics.
How the Regime Is Combating the Passive Revolution
The government, recognizing its unpopularity and the
demographic challenges posed by an unusually young population, prioritizes
staying in power and keeping its people silent, demobilized, and censored.
This is the chief goal of both its foreign and domestic policies. Because
the regime is focused on staying in power, its foreign policy is focused
less on international objectives and the country’s true national
interests and more on bolstering its control over the country through its
international image and actions.
Thus, the mullahs have mastered crafting foreign
policy issues to effect changes at home. Nowhere is this clearer than with
the nuclear issue. Although the mullahs want the bomb for their own
self-preservation, they are using the nuclear issue to capitalize on Iranian
pride, and most of the population seems to support the idea of Iran’s
nuclear ambitions.
Newspapers and speeches by the Iranian government
refer to a “right to master this
technology” and a “need to advance the sciences.” Given
the sense of pride that is so deeply
embedded in Iranian culture, it is not surprising that, when presented in
this manner, the population is sold on the idea. People often do not
understand, however, that nuclear technology will lead to nuclear weapons
and only further consolidate the regime in power. The mullahs want to
follow the North Korean example: deterring regime change by possessing
nuclear capabilities. In talking with Iranian youth, when the question of
Iran’s nuclear program was described not in terms of “national
pride” and Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty but instead in terms of what a nuclear Iran will mean for the
longevity of the mullahs, they became almost unanimously opposed to the
idea.
By galvanizing the Iranian people behind issues of
national pride, the regime has won the
propaganda war on the nuclear issue. In fact, the nuclear question has become the sole issue around which it has
successfully mobilized mass support. As a result, that issue has become too
valuable an asset for the regime to forfeit on terms other than its own.
The regime’s second means of undermining the
passive revolution in Iran is allowing
certain social acts of defiance to persist so as to ensure a usable arsenal
of concessions that can be withdrawn if the population gets too
politicized. Two examples of these are the Westernization of head scarves
and the high prevalence of illegal satellite dishes. The government looks
the other way until the population begins to take to the streets or becomes
too political; then the government often tightens its control on female
attire and confiscates satellite dishes.
Conclusion: Implications of the Passive Revolution
It is no secret that the United States would surely
prefer an alternative regime in Iran, an ambitious and challenging goal in and of
itself. The United States possesses few assets
inside Iran, making it difficult to construct a cohesive strategy. The one
asset the United States does possess is the 70 percent of the population
who are under the age of 30 and who seem overwhelmingly supportive of both
the United States and President Bush. Past experience in other despotic
societies has shown that at the right moment—a “tipping point,” which is a mystery in its timing and which no
one can predict—the passive
revolution will become active, and at that moment, the sentiments of this
70 percent, if they have continued to be nourished, will be the greatest
asset the United States could have in helping shape a democratic future for
Iran.