Responders of First or Last Resort:

Central Bank Strategies (in Era of Ultra-Low Interest Rates)

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Fundamental Fed Reform

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# **Confronting the Challenge**

"I do not believe that the system can rise to the challenge without major changes in its method of operation."

-Milton Friedman in letter to Paul Volcker (1979)

#### The Fed's Predicament

- General purpose agency of government
- Ill-defined strategy
- Detrimental reliance on untested tools
- Chronic myopia
- Poor positioning for future economic scenarios
- Cacophonous communications
- Strained governance
- Expanding policy objectives
- Credibility, public support and standing at risk

# **Institutional Dynamics Matter**

- Fed policy is made neither by fixed rule nor unfettered discretion. It is made by committee.
- Institutional setting affects committee's policy decision
  - ✓ Statutory remit
  - ✓ History
  - ✓ Culture
  - $\checkmark$  Process of deliberation and decision
  - $\checkmark$  Relationship with rest of government
  - $\checkmark$  Relationship with financial markets
  - ✓ Ideas
  - ✓ Personnel
- Comprehensive, fundamental Fed reform agenda required
  - ✓ <u>Strategy</u>
  - ✓ Operating regime
  - $\checkmark$  Communications
  - $\checkmark$  Governance

### **Devising a Fed Strategy**

- Strategies endure. Plans are fleeting.
- Successful central bank strategies are:
  - $\checkmark$  Clearly delineated (and understood)
  - $\checkmark$  Within scope of policy tools (and achievable)
  - $\checkmark$  Broadly measurable (without false precision)
  - Attainable over time and circumstance (avoid regimeswitching)
  - ✓ Enhancing of institutional accountability (legitimacy)
  - ✓ Focused on medium-term (comport with lagged effects of policy)
- Do the Fed's words and actions in recent years satisfy these criteria?
- In the absence of a clear and consistent strategy, has the Fed, nonetheless, achieved appropriate policy?

# A New Strategy Paradigm

#### Existing Fed Statement on Monetary Policy Strategy

- Inflation target of 2.0% (PCE)
- Committee "seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its long-run goal and deviations of employment from the committee's assessment of its maximum level"

#### Real Reform Agenda

- Avoid false precision in inflation measurement
  ✓ Resurrect `comfort zone'
- Arrest fine-tuning of "deviations"
  - ✓ Policy should adjust when deviations are <u>large and</u> significant
  - ✓ Resist dangers of short-termism
  - $\checkmark$  Pay heed to `long and variable' lags
  - $\checkmark$  Be humble about defining deviancy down with r\* excuse
  - $\checkmark$  Resist exploiting any short-run Phillips curve tradeoff

### A New Strategy Paradigm

- Stop treating labor market data as the <u>ultimate arbiter</u> of price stability
  - $\checkmark$  Wages are not as central or forward-looking as other prices
- Concentrate on the <u>financial cycle</u>
  - ✓ Significantly higher loss function from credit cycle than business cycle
  - ✓ Finance, money and credit should no longer be at the fringe of Fed's dominant model and framework
  - ✓ Credit gap can be more consequential than output gap, especially given non-linearity of credit booms and busts on output and inflation
- Institutionalize new strategy and boldly pursue medium-term inflation target
  - ✓ Avoid the noise/myopia associated with `data dependence'
  - ✓ Substitute new concept of trend dependence
  - $\checkmark$  Keep the focus on the horizon
  - ✓ Change in strategy and operating regimes should be "experienced gradually and moderately"

# **Implications for Fed's Other Objectives**

- Prevailing Fed view: proliferation of tools required to match expanded responsibilities
  - ✓ Interest rates, balance sheet and forward guidance all needed to set monetary policy
  - ✓ Micro-prudential tools suffice for supervision/regulation
  - Macro-prudential policies well-suited for financial stability
- New reform strategy: Getting monetary policy right has <u>large</u>, <u>positive spillover effects</u> on Fed's other objectives
   ✓ More powerful, reliable and better understood than
  - newfangled tools (at least as of now)
- Relegate current <u>ride-the-wind policy</u> and elevate lean-againstthe-wind policies (especially at key points in cycle)
- New, effective strategy essential part of comprehensive reform
   ✓ Tools, communications and governance also demand
   fundamental review, revision and reform
   ✓ Stakes are high, and timing consequential