Afghanistan, 7; CIA paramilitary operations in, 127-28; militias in, 18 Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier (Rosenau), 3 American intelligence, analysis and, 68-69; armed groups' implications for, 36-39; on bin Laden, xviii, 128; capabilities, trade-offs of, 155-56; career interest in, 160; centralization shortcomings of, 63; challenges for, xiv, 144; on China, 105; collection capabilities of, 139-40; commercial technologies for, 143–44; complexity of, 150–51; congressional oversight of, 130, 164; demand for, 97; denial and deception of, 152-53; effectiveness of, 132; elements of, 158-67; focus of, 158-59; force modification by, 92;

funding of, 106; higher-level issues and challenges to, 161-72; incentives for development of, 164; innovation of, 173; intelligence-sharing advantages for, 171; internal management of, 163-65; on Iraq WMD program, 152; against Islamic extremism, xvii–xviii; management issues concerning, 159, 164–65; media sources in, 126-27; military reliance on, 97; modernization of, 161, 163-64; oversight of, 130, 158; overstaffing of, 132; personnel challenges to, 160; policy implications for, 51; political impact on, 157; potential for misinterpretation of, 152; priorities, needs and requirements of, 162-63; production of, 132; on al Qaeda,

American intelligence (continued) 128; quality from agents of, 120–21; rate of change challenge to, 161; technology impact on, 142-45, 146; transparency of, 172–73 American intelligence agent recruiting, agent promotion in, 119; challenges of, 119–20; CIA success with, 103-5, 120-21, 126; for counterterrorism, 92, 122; diplomatic cover for, 118; Directorate of Operations practices of, 117; endemic problems with, 119; under Goss, 121-22; on Iraq, 120; methods of, 122; in al Oaeda, 123; quality of, 123n7; recruiting efforts of, 116–19; recruitment myth of, xviii; reform of, 121n6; science and technology in, 139-40, 145-46, 155–72; sharing and collaboration issues of, 154; shortcomings of, 121; standards of, 122; structural weaknesses in, 161; susceptibility of, 143; systems costs of, 157; targets of, 116–17; technical sources of, 142; under Tenet, 121-22; trade-offs between collection and analysis in, 171; tradition of, 44–50; transparency implications for, 143–45. See also American intelligence: American intelligence community; CIA; DCI; DNI; HUMINT; NIE

American intelligence community, analyst's advantage to, 59; armed groups' impact on, 30– 36; barriers for relations of U.S. industry with, 167; British v. U.S. intelligence system, 58n22; Clinton presidency and, 110;

cold war threats to, 74–76; collaboration with industry and academia of, 170; Congress oversight of, 105; culture's influence on, 35-36; current threats to, 74–78; effectiveness of, 78; external relations with U.S. industry of, 165–71; failures and deficiencies of, 109–11; foreign and domestic divides between, 75-76; goal of, 54–55, 92; government failures of, 91; information specialists in, 52; innovation of, 160-61, 166, 174; integration across, 99; media contrasted to, 52; need for integration of, 77–78; 9/11, before, 68-70; 9/11, changes since, 98–99; operation effectiveness of, xviii; opportunities for, 30–36, 168; organization of, 69–70, 156; personnel effectiveness of, 93; personnel requirements for, 158; policy-making and, 53–54; under Reagan presidency, 137; recruitment myth of, xviii; reforms to management and organization of, xix-xx; resistance to change of, 128; Soviet Union impact on, 74–76; technology implementation challenges of, 166; technology pressure on, 166 American intelligence operations,

diplomatic cover for, 118–19
American intelligence reform, to
agent recruiting, 121n6;
arguments against, 92;
assessing net effect of, 101–2;
CIA, 95, 107–8;
counterterrorism effectiveness
of, 92; for Directorate of
Operations, 129; for DO, 130–
31; Goldwater-Nichols Act

Index 177

impact on, 66–68; legislative activity for, 84, 100–102; questions of implementation for, 101; reductionist focus of, 91; vision of, 100–102

analysis, all-source, 95; centralized, 56; competitive, 96; competitive v. consensus, 57; gap between expectations and performance of, 61–62; imaginative analytical effort of, 60; intelligence and, 69; of intelligence collection, 68-69; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act impact on, 62; Kent alternative of, 57–58; Kent model's shortcomings for, 61-62; 9/11 Commission on, 64; policy makers' influence on, 44, 46-47, 56–57; of al Qaeda, 34; science and technology contributions to, 145; social science positivism in, 45–46; trends in, 43-44

armed groups, alliances between, 16; American intelligence culture preparation for, 30–36; American intelligence implications from, 36-39; American security interests impacted by, xv; asymmetrical attacks by, 27–29; categorization of, 8-22; in Central Asian states, 7–8: challenges to United States by, 2; CIA response to, 30; of criminal organizations, 21-24; current trends in, 36-37; direct and indirect impact of, 27–29; drug trafficking by, 23-24; fragmentation and failing states with, 5-8; globalization of, 25-27; government corruption by, 7, 22; information technology

used by, xv, 3, 10, 25–27; insurgents in, 11–14; integration and fragmentation of, 4; Kennedy administration policies toward, 30–32; in lawless/ ungoverned territory, 7–8; of militias, 10; network-based organizations of, 25–27; objectives and strategies of, 9, 12; post–cold war security and evolution of, 2–8; Reagan administration policy toward, 32–34; taxonomy of, 9–11; threat of, xv; trends and implications of, 37–38; types of, xv

asymmetrical threats and attacks, definition, 28; al Qaeda's use of, 28; state's policies toward, 27–29

Baer, Robert, CIA and, 116–17 Berkowitz, Bruce, 169 bin Laden, Osama, American intelligence on, xviii, 128; failed strategic assessment of, 42–43; globalization influence on, 26– 27; NIE on, 42–43

British intelligence system, American intelligence system v., 58n22

Bush, George W., American intelligence size increased by, 137; CIA bureaucracy reform under, 138; Tenet services retained by, 128

business, government and technology sectors in, 169; intelligence relationships with, 165

Casey, William, CIA history of, 133–34; CIA performance under, 137

Central Intelligence Agency. See CIA

China, 4n3, 105 Church Committee, 43n6 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), all-source analysis by, 95; analytic community influenced by, 63; armed groups' response to, 30-36; Baer and, 116-17; British intelligence system v., 58n22; budget and performance of, 107n2; Casev history in, 133-34; against change, 128-29; critical oversight of, 106; criticism of, 108; Cuba fiasco by, 138; Directorate of Operations success for, 32-34; DNI relation to, 79, 86, 93-94; Executive Branch and congressional objectives for, 136; Executive Branch relations with, 71–74; FBI relation to, 70; funding and politics of, 107; Hussein WMD programs assessments by, 128; independence from policy making of, 46-48; In-Q-Tel success of, 168; intelligencereport reviewers of, 130; interagency coordination and, 90; Iran and, 104-5; Islamic radical group penetration by, 136; leaks to media by, 127; NIE production by, 96–97; NSC and DCI coordination with, 69; officer qualifications for, 132; operational history of, 103-5; paramilitary personnel in, 127-28; politics' influence on, 108, 125; production audits of, 126; recruiting success of, 103–5, 120-21; recruitment audits of, 126; reforms of, 95, 107-8; requirements of, 155; Senate Intelligence Committee impact on, 59, 107-8; shortcomings on al Qaeda by, 60; standards for

achievements for, 136–37; STEP program of, 170; Tenet and, 107n2; training and mobilization of local forces by, 31; Woolsey and, 108

CIA Mission Requirements Board. See MRB

Clinton, William F. *See* American intelligence community

cold war, agent recruiting during, 117–18; armed groups after, 2–8; intelligence capabilities during, 139; pace of intelligence during, 75; security after, 2–8; threats to intelligence community during, 74–76

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, results of, xiv; Silberman report of, 124–25 communication technology, 76–77,

Congress, CIA objectives from, 136; intelligence oversight by, 105 Congressional Joint Inquiry, DCI and, 93

corruption, 22; armed groups' cause of, 7; authority of state undermined by, 6–7

counterintelligence, Chinese penetration of, 105; technology support of, 148

counterterrorism, evaluating effectiveness of, 81–82; Executive Branch–wide planning of, 81–83; improvements needed for, 91; intelligence agent recruiting for, 122; intelligence reform impact on, 92; NSC operations for, 82; paramilitary operations v., 128; tasks of, 81; U.S. capabilities for, 65. See also National Counterterrorism Center

Index 179

Counterterrorism Center, 104
Counterterrorist Center (CTC),
effectiveness of, 78; purpose
and history of, 33–34
criminal armed group, 21–24
criminal organizations, 21–24
Crocker, Chester, 6–7
CTC. See Counterterrorist Center
Cuba, counterespionage on, 138

DCI (Director of Central Intelligence), acquisition authority of, 168; authority of, 73, 74, 92; budgets of, 71–73; conflicts of interest of, xvii, 74, 95; Executive Branch influence on, 74; institutional weakness of, 70–74, 93; origin of, 69–70

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Total Information Awareness. *See* Terrorism Information Awareness

Defense Intelligence Agency, NIE input by, 96–97; purpose of, 69 Department of Defense. See DoD Department of Defense Joint Requirements and Operations Council. See JROC

Department of Homeland Security, intelligence requirements of, 155; interagency coordination in, 90

Director of Central Intelligence. See DCI

Director of National Intelligence. See DNI

Director of Operations. *See* DO Directorate of Intelligence, insurgency as a security issue for, 31–32; National Counterterrorism Center's purpose for, 89

Directorate of Operations, armed groups policies of, 32–35; CIA

policy changes impact on, 32–34; effectiveness and performance of, 103–5, 132–33; recruiting exaggeration and fraud in, 121; recruiting practices of, 117; reform of, 129; support and management structure problems of, 133

Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, 89

DNI (Director of National Intelligence), authority of, 94, 100; budgets of, 80-81, 86-87; challenges for, xix; CIA relations to, 79, 86, 93-94; community affairs of, 79; competitive analysis impact on, 96; Executive Branch support for, 100; function of, 62-66, 79-80, 94-96, 100-1; funds and personnel transfers by, 87-88; hiring authority of, 88; Intelligence Reform Act impact on, xvii; military operations influenced by, 97; missionoriented centers and, 79-80; National Intelligence Center relation to, 88, 94-95; Office of Management and Budget impact on, 87; organization of, 89; origin and purpose of, xvi-xvii; performance of, 80; shortcomings of, 64–65; technical intelligence management by, 155

DO (Director of Operations), budget and performance of, 107n2; intelligence culture of, 130–31; NOCs use by, 133–35; personnel types in, 131; reduction in size of, 131; reform of, 130–31

DoD (Department of Defense), intelligence requirements of, 155; National Intelligence

180 Index

DoD (continued)
Center's model of, 80;
organizational structure of, 67
drug trafficking, 23–24

emerging technologies, potential importance of, 148–50; types of, 148–49

espionage operations, 128
Executive Branch, CIA objectives
affected by, 136; CIA relations
with, 71–74; counterterrorism
planning by, 81–83; DCI
influenced by, 74; DNI support
by, 100; National
Counterterrorism Center
relation to, 90, 102

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), CIA relation to, 70; intelligence community relation to, 70; interagency coordination with, 90; 9/11 Commission impact on, 124 FE. See foreign agents Federal Bureau of Investigation. See FBI foreign agents, 103–4 foreign intelligence, 105 fragmentation, failed states caused by, xv; failing states and, 5–7; integration and, 4

Gates, Robert, 53n19 GEOINT (geospatial intelligence), changing technologies of, 153; intelligence collection with, 146 geospatial intelligence. See GEOINT

globalization, armed groups influenced by, 2; failed states caused by, xv; bin Laden affected by, 26–27; nation-state affected by, 25; al Qaeda affected by, 26–27; U.S. threatened by, 76–77

Goldwater-Nichols Act, DoD impact of, 66–68; intelligence reform from, 66–68; purpose of, 67–67 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. See Goldwater-Nichols Act Goss, Porter, CIA bureaucracy reform under, 138; CIA recruiting under, 121–22

HUMINT
Human Intelligence Directorate,
131n9
Human Rights Watch, 18
HUMINT (human intelligence),
quality and effectiveness of,
106–7; technical intelligence at
expense of, 109; technology
challenges for, 144
Hussein, Saddam, 128

human intelligence collection. See

imagery intelligence. See IMINT IMINT (imagery intelligence), 139 indications and warning (I&W), 54 information technology, armed groups' use of, xv, 3, 10, 25–27; changes for American intelligence community from, 166

information, transparency of, 142 In-Q-Tel, CIA creation of, 168 insurgency, definition and classic model of, 11; ethnic and religious, 13; indicators of, 13–14; as a security issue for DNI, 31–32; terrorist groups v., 14–15

integration, DoD methods of, 67–68; of foreign and domestic intelligence, 76; fragmentation and, 4; Goldwater-Nichols Act and, 67–68; military operations affected by, 67–68 intelligence. *See* American

intelligence; American intelligence community intelligence collection, adversaries' programs of, 157, 161 Intelligence Reform Act, centralization of intelligence from, xvi; DNI creation by, xvii Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, creation of, 83-84; creation of DNI by, 164; history of, 83-91; intelligence analysis impact of, 62; legislative background of, 84-91; legislative provisions of, 86-88; 9/11 Commission influence on, xiv; purpose of, 66; science and technology focus of, 140 intelligence technology, 152-53 intelligence-report reviewers, 130 interagency coordination, 90 Iran, CIA agent role in, 138; CIA performance in, 104-5 Iraq, intelligence agent recruiting

fraq, intelligence agent recruiting for, 120; intelligence on, 152; U.S. policies and commitments to, 1

Islamic radical groups, NOC penetration of, 134; types of, 136

Islamic terrorism threat, intelligence agent recruiting for, 123; Tenet verification of, 132 I&W. *See* indications and warning

Joint Chiefs of Staff, purpose of, 67 JROC (Department of Defense Joint Requirements and Operations Council), intelligence planning review by, 162

Kennedy, John F., 30–32 Kent model, 58 Kent, Sherman, on alternative analysis, 57–58; on intelligence and policy, 51n18; Soviet

estimates by, 50; Strategic

Intelligence for American World Policy (1949), 44–45

lawless/ungoverned territory, armed groups in, 7–8

MASINT (signature intelligence), 139

military services, DNI impact on, 97; integration influence on, 67– 68; intelligence reform consequences for, 98

militias, in Afghanistan, 18–19; armed groups of, 17; civil war between, 19; definition of, 16– 17; differences between, 17–19; leadership of, 19; violence used by, 17–18

MRB (CIA Mission Requirements Board), 162 multi-Int, definition of, 147

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, creation of, xiii; recommendations of, 65–66

National Counterterrorism Center, authority of, 90; budget influence of, 83; creation and purpose of, xvi–xvii; DNI impact on, 90; Executive Branch's relation to, 90, 102; operational planning by, 99; purpose of, 65–66, 82–83, 89–90

National Geospatial Agency. See NGA

National Intelligence Center, allsource analysis by, 95; DNI reliance on, 94–95; DoD model for, 80; purpose of, 80, 101 national intelligence estimates. *See* NIE

National Reconnaissance Office. See NRO

National Security Act of 1947, DCI impact of, 69; NSC impact of, 69

National Security Action

Memorandum 124, operational
training mandated by, 30–31

National Security Agency. See NSA
National Security Council. See NSC
National Security Strategy of the
United States, 9

Negroponte, John, 100

NGA (National Geospatial Agency),
purpose of, 69; technology
management by, 155

- NIE (national intelligence estimates), on bin Laden, 42–43; DoD Defense Intelligence Agency contribution toward, 96–97; formulation of, 55–66; participants in, 97; policy makers' influence on, 55–56; on al Qaeda, 42–43, 60–61; State Department contribution toward, 96–97
- 9/11, changes since, 98–99; intelligence community before, 68–70; weaknesses highlighted by, 65
- 9/11 Commission, failure of, 124, 129; National Counterterrorism Center recommendation for, 82– 83; objections to, 91–100; recommendations of, xiii–xiv, 35, 41–43, 79; report of, xiii; science and technology considerations of, 140
- NOC (nonofficial cover officer), advantages of, xviii; appeal of, 135; CIA use of, 129; Islamic radical organizations penetration by, 134; organization of, 134; proposed salaries of, 135; qualifications for, 135

nonofficial cover officer. *See* NOC NRO (National Reconnaissance Office), Innovation Initiative of, 170; purpose of, 69; technology management by, 155
NSA (National Security Agency),
DoD origins of, 69; military reliance on, 97; purpose of, 69; technology management by, 155
NSC (National Security Council), counterterrorism operations influence on, 82; origin of, 69

Office of Management and Budget, DNI relation to, 87

paramilitary operations, counterterrorism v., 128; success of, 128
PCN. See political criminal nexus policy makers, analysts' relations with, 51–52; competitive analysis for, 56; deliberation incentives for, 55; information specialists' influence on, 52–53; intelligence community relations with, 54, 58–59; objective analysis for, 56; opportunities for, 55; U.S. behavior influence on, 58

policy making, goal of, xvi; intelligence contrasted with, xvi political criminal nexus (PCN), armed groups in, 24; security problems created by, 29 post–cold war security, 2–8 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, origins of, 84– 86

al Qaeda, analysis of, 34; asymmetrical attacks by, 28; CIA assets in, 60; clandestine service on, 128; failed strategic assessment of, 42–43, 60–61; globalization impact on, 26–27; intelligence agent recruiting from, 123; intelligence production on, 132; NIEs on,

Index 183

42–43, 60–61; Tenet war memorandum on, 78–79, 92; U.S. policy toward, 1

RAND–St Andrews index, 15
Reagan presidency, CIA
performance during, 137
Reagan, Ronald, 32–34
Relationship and Comparative
Advantages of Government and
Commercial Technology Sectors,
169chart

Robb-Silberman report, CIA reform recommended by, 131n9; clandestine service recommendations of, 137n13; Human Intelligence Directorate recommendation of, 131n9

Rosenau, James, 3 Rotberg, Robert, 5 rule of law, armed groups' influence on, 10; ungoverned areas' impact on, 29

safe havens, terrorist groups in, 7 science and technology, advantages for American intelligence of, xviii-xix; agent recruitment with, 139-40, 146-46, 155-72; challenges for U.S. intelligence of, 145-46, 154; contribution to analysis of, 145; expectations for, 140; information overload challenge of, 140; intelligence community attention to, 140n2; intelligence transformation through, 145; long-term American intelligence impact of, 172–74; management challenges of, 141, 155-72; success of, 141; transparency of, 145 Senate Intelligence Committee, CIA analysis impact of, 59; CIA reform efforts by, 107-8 SIGMIT (signals intelligence), challenge of changing

technologies for, 153; technical intelligence impetus of, 139 signals intelligence. See SIGMIT signature intelligence. See MASINT Silberman Report, 124 social science positivism, 49 Soviet Union, intelligence community affected by, 74–76; perception of U.S. resolve toward, 57–58; terrorist groups supported by, 48n12

State Department, bureaucratic malaise of, 133; intelligence agent recruiting cover of, 118–19

states, economic integration of, 4n3; fragmentation and failing, xv, 4–7; globalization impact on, 25

TECHINT (technical intelligence), challenges to capabilities of, 156–58; challenges to the development of, 161; combinations of intelligence gathering through, 146–47; commercial technologies for, 143–44; cost of, 162; deception of, 143; intelligence planning for, 162; investment in, 159; JROC planning review of, 162; link to consumer intelligence of, 162–63; priorities, needs, and requirements of system planning for, 162–63

technology, collaboration resulting from, 149; collection-centric nature of, 150; counterintelligence supported by, 148; data analysis with, 149; effectiveness of U.S. intelligence through, 147–48; government and industry comparative advantages regarding, 169–70; horizontal

technology (continued)
integration of, 150; imbalances
and weaknesses of, 150–54;
intelligence collection and
analysis value of, 117, 148;
NGA management of, 155; NRO,
155; NSA management of, 155;
space and sensor impact on,
148–49; support of
counterintelligence by, 148. See
also communication technology;
emerging technology;
information technology; science
and technology; TECHINT
technology intelligence. See

Tenet, George, CIA budget under, 107n2; CIA recruiting under, 121–22; effectiveness of, 92–93; Islamic terrorist threat verification of, 132; media influenced by, 128; al Qaeda memorandum of war by, 78–79, 92

**TECHINT** 

terrorism, by armed groups, 15; challenges posed by, xvii; definition of, 14–15; detection of, 16; insurgents and, 14–15; as a judicial/law enforcement matter, 33; safe havens for, 7; Soviet Union support for, 48n12. See also counterterrorism; National Counterterrorism; Counterter

Terrorism Information Awareness, intelligence and data gathering by, 144; social and economic implications of, 144

Terrorist Threat Integration Center, shortcomings of, 99

U.S. intelligence. *See* American intelligence

warning. *See* indications and warning
Woolsey, James, CIA reform efforts
of, 108, 126