24. Public Diplomacy: How to Think about and Improve It

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Problem, Background, and Context

Foreign Perceptions and Domestic Consequences

America has an image problem. The problem is global—even the leaders of some traditional American allies have found it convenient and politically advantageous to disparage America. But the problem is especially acute in the Middle East and among predominantly Muslim populations.

Polls highlight the depth and breadth of the animus. In December 2001 and January 2002, Gallup conducted a poll of nearly ten thousand residents in nine Muslim countries.[1] By an average of more than 2 to 1, respondents reported an unfavorable view of the United States (see table 1).

The prevalence of an unfavorable view in Iran is unsurprising

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Table 1. Gallup Poll of Foreign Publics' Opinion
of United States, 2002 (in percent)

Nation	Favorable	Unfavorable
Lebanon	41%	40%
Turkey	40	33
Kuwait	28	41
Indonesia	27	30
Jordan	22	62
Morocco	22	41
Saudi Arabia	16	64
Iran	14	63
Pakistan	9	68
Total	22%	53%

because that country has had an adversarial relation with the United States for more than twenty years. More troubling are the results from ostensible allies. Only 16 percent of respondents in Saudi Arabia, supposedly one of America's long-standing allies in the region, held a favorable view; 64 percent reported an unfavorable view. Results from Kuwait were even more disconcerting. In a country that the United States waged war to liberate a decade earlier, only slightly more than a quarter of those polled expressed a favorable view of the United States.

A Pew poll conducted in the summer of 2002, which was repeated in some nations in May 2003 and March 2004, reported similar results (see table 2).[2]

Moreover, according to the Pew polls, opinions of the United

2. "Pew Global Attitudes Project: Nine Nation Survey (2004). Final Topline," Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (Washington, D.C.), 2004, 24; "Pew Global Attitudes Project: Wave 2 Update Survey (2003)," Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (Washington, D.C.), 2003, T-132-133; "2002 Global Attitudes Survey, Final Topline," Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (Washington, D.C.), 2002, T-45.

Table 2 Pew Poll of Foreign Publics' Opinion
of United States, 2002–2004 (in percent)

Nation	Very favor- able	Some- what favor- able	Some- what unfavor- able	Very unfavor- able	Total favor- able	Total unfavor- able
Egypt	3	3	10	59	6	69
Indonesia	5	56	27	9	61	36
May 2003	2	13	35	48	15	83
Jordan	6	19	18	57	25	75
May 2003	0	1	16	83	1	99
March 2004	2	3	26	67	5	93
Lebanon	8	27	21	38	35	59
May 2003	8	19	23	48	27	71
Morocco	*	*	*	*	*	*
May 2003	13	14	13	53	27	66
March 2004	8	19	23	48	27	71
Pakistan	2	8	11	58	10	69
May 2003	3	10	10	71	13	81
March 2004	4	17	11	50	21	61
Turkey	6	24	13	42	30	55
May 2003	2	13	15	68	15	83
March 2004	6	24	18	45	30	63
Uzbekistan	35	50	9	2	85	11

Note: Undated rows are for 2002.
*Morocco was the only nation that was not surveyed in 2002.

States appear to have worsened, although in some instances the March 2004 results reveal slight improvement from May 2003.

Without accepting the reliability of such polling evidence, it can be inferred that opinions of the United States held by most of those in Muslim and Middle Eastern nations remain distinctly unfavorable.

This displeasure cannot be easily dismissed as vague and loose views held by those in remote lands whose attitudes and behavior

are immaterial to the United States. It may not foreshadow ca-
lamitous outcomes for the United States, but it hardly provides
reassurance that such outcomes will not ensue. As one influential
member of Congress observed, "The perceptions of foreign pub-
lics have domestic consequences."[3] This is especially so when
those foreign publics and the behavior of the nations in which
they reside are having increasing effects on U.S. national security.

Charlotte Beers, the former undersecretary of state for public
diplomacy and public affairs, summarized the potential conse-
quences of Middle Eastern antipathy toward America.

> We are talking about millions of ordinary people, a huge num-
> ber of whom have gravely distorted, but carefully cultivated
> images of us—images so negative, so weird, so hostile that I can
> assure you a young generation of terrorists is being created. The
> gap between who we are and how we wish to be seen, and how
> we are in fact seen, is frighteningly wide.[4]

That gap must close. President George W. Bush plainly stated
the task, "We have to do a better job of telling our story."[5] That
is the job of public diplomacy.

What Is Public Diplomacy?

The Department of State defines "public diplomacy" as "govern-
ment-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public
opinion in other countries."[6]

The term was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, a career

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3. Dr. R. S. Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy and the Islamic and
Arab World: A Communication Update & Assessment," Panel Two of a Hearing
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 27, 2003 (quoting Henry
Hyde).

4. Charlotte L. Beers, Hearing on American Public Diplomacy and Islam,
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 27, 2003.

5. Zaharna (quoting George W. Bush).

6. U.S. Department of State Dictionary of International Relations terms,
1987, p. 85.

foreign service diplomat and subsequently dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, in connection with the establishment at the Fletcher School of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy. At that time the Murrow Center's institutional brochure stated that:

> public diplomacy . . . deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy . . . [including] the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another . . . [and] the transnational flow of information and ideas.[7]

Government efforts—sometimes though not always successful—to distinguish public diplomacy from propaganda contend that diplomacy always deals with "the known facts," whereas propaganda is typically based on some combination of falsehoods and untruths mixed in with facts.[8]

Other formulations frequently define public diplomacy by what it is *not.* For example, the planning group for integration of the U.S. Information Agency into the Department of State in 1997 distinguished "public diplomacy" from "public affairs" in the following terms:

> Public affairs is [*sic*] the provision of information to the public, press, and other institutions concerning the goals, policies and activities of the U.S. government. The thrust of public affairs is to inform the domestic audience . . . [whereas] public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences.

7. "What Is Public Diplomacy?" See www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm.
8. See references to U.S. Information Agency, Edward Murrow testimony before congressional committees and other sources cited in ibid., www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm, 2002.

The semantic niceties of these multiple distinctions recall the hairsplitting of sixteenth-century theology. Indeed, the tasks of public diplomacy and of public affairs converge more than their definitions imply. The provision of information intended for domestic audiences is frequently received by foreign audiences as well; conversely, information intended for foreign audiences is also accessible to domestic ones.

Another formulation of public diplomacy in terms of what it is *not*—intended by this commentator to be critical if not dismissive—asserts that

> United States public diplomacy is neither public nor diplomatic. First, the government—not the broader American public—has been the main messenger to a world that is mightily suspicious of it. Further, the State Department, which oversees most efforts, seems to view public diplomacy not as a dialogue but as a one-sided exercise—America speaking at the world.[9]

Public diplomacy (PD) can perhaps be better defined by contrasting its principal characteristics with those of "official diplomacy" (OD). First, PD is *transparent* and widely disseminated, whereas OD is (apart from occasional leaks) *opaque* and its dissemination narrowly confined. Second, PD is transmitted by governments to wider or, in some cases selected "publics" (for example, those in the Middle East or in the Muslim world),[10] whereas OD is transmitted by governments to other governments. Third, the themes and issues with which OD is concerned relate to the behavior and policies of governments, whereas the themes and issues with which PD is concerned relate to the attitudes and behaviors of publics.

Of course, these publics may be influenced by explaining to

    9. See Michael Holtzman, *New York Times*, October 4, 2003.
    10. Whether this presumed governmental exclusivity in transmission should be altered is another question to be considered below.

them the sometimes misunderstood policies and behavior of the U.S. government. Additionally, to the extent that the behavior and policies of foreign governments are affected by the behavior and attitudes of its citizens, PD may affect governments by influencing their citizens.

In this essay we consider how to inform and persuade foreign publics that the ideals that Americans cherish—such as pluralism, freedom, and democracy—are fundamental human values that will resonate and should be pursued in their own countries. Associated with this consideration are two questions that are rarely addressed in most discussions of PD: (1) Should the U.S. government be the only, or even the main, transmitter of public diplomacy's content, rather than sharing this function with such other potential transmitters as nongovernmental (nonprofit) organizations and responsible business, labor, and academic entities? and (2) Should PD transmissions and transactions be viewed and conducted to encourage dialogue or "multilogue" (for example, through call-ins, debates, structured "cross fires"), rather than as a monologue through one-way transmission by the United States?

Purpose and Motivation: Private Goods and Public Goods

Four linked propositions—each of questionable validity—have, implicitly or explicitly, motivated the United States to energize and improve its "public diplomacy." Partly reflecting these propositions, Newton Minow has forcefully advocated the need for this improvement:[11]

1. The prevalence of anti-Americanism abroad—especially but not exclusively in the Middle East and among Muslims more generally—is partly due to the inability of "the United States government to get its message of freedom and democracy out

11. See his eloquent "Whisper of America" lecture, Loyola University Chicago, March 19–20, 2002.

to the one billion Muslims in the world . . . [and] to explain itself to the world."[12]

2. Lack of success in conveying the U.S. message has ensued despite the fact that "our film, television, and computer software industries dominate these markets worldwide."

3. A potential remedy for the failure of our public diplomacy may be found in the "American marketing talent [for] . . . successfully selling Madonna's music, Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola, Michael Jordan's shoes and McDonald's hamburgers around the world."[13]

4. Linking these propositions, it might be inferred that America's "marketing talent" should enable our "public diplomacy—the process of explaining and advocating American values to the world"[14]—to be more effective in combating anti-Americanism and promoting more positive views of the United States.

The foregoing argument is deeply flawed. It is fanciful to believe that redeploying American "marketing talent" would enable the $62 million appropriated to launch a new Middle East television network[15] to significantly diminish the prevalence of anti-Americanism.

The preceding argument suffers from three fundamental flaws. The first arises from the conflation of *private goods* and *public (or collective) goods*, and the inference that what works in marketing private goods will be effective in marketing public goods. In fact, marketing efforts and marketing skills attuned to and grandly

12. Ibid. pp. 12–13.
13. Ibid. p. 13.
14. The quotation is from *RAND Items*, August 22, 2002.
15. David Shelby, "Satellite Station Scheduled to Be Launched in Late December," *Federal Information and News Dispatch*, September 25, 2003.

successful in promoting the former may be ill-adapted to promote the latter.

Madonna's music and McDonald's hamburgers are private goods whose marketing can describe and evoke a personal experience. Individual consumers can readily connect with these products by seeing, listening, feeling, tasting, and smelling to test whether his or her reactions are positive or negative. Where private goods are under scrutiny, each consumer can decide for herself apart from what others decide or prefer. Empirical validation is accessible at low cost.

But these attributes of private goods sharply differentiate them from such public goods as democracy, tolerance, the rule of law, and, more generally, American values and the "American story." Instead, the meaning, quality, and benefits associated with these public goods largely depend on a high degree of understanding, acceptance, adoption, and practice by *others*, rather than by individuals acting alone. For example, one person's valuation of tolerance depends to a considerable extent on its reciprocal acceptance, valuation, and practice by others. Not only are these public goods "nonrivalrous"[16], but realization of *individual* benefits from them depends on their *collective* adoption (consumption) by all, or at least by the larger group of which the individual is a part. And the benefits of these collective goods, once the goods are provided, are accessible to others without imposing any additional costs on them. Beneficiaries of private goods pay incrementally for the benefits they receive. Beneficiaries of public goods do not.

Acceptance and support (including funding) for private goods depends on purchases of discrete amounts of these goods by individual consumers at market-based prices. Acceptance and sup-

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16. Rivalry in consumption means that consumption of a private good by one consumer subtracts from consumption of that same good by another.

Table 3 Comparing Private Goods and Public Goods

	Private Goods (e.g., Madonna's music, McDonald's hamburgers)	*Public Goods* (e.g., U.S. values, interests, the American "story")
Conditions of Supply (Production)	Many competing suppliers	Single or few producers (principally government, sometimes also NGOs or others via outsourcing)
Conditions of Demand	Consumption of separate units by individual consumers	Collective consumption by members of constituency group
Support and Financing	Market-based prices charged to consumers' individual purchases	Collectively based and accepted by constituency, or by sponsoring group (e.g., U.S. taxpayers)

port for public goods depend on other means, namely, on endorsement by a *constituent group* (hereafter referred to as the "constituency") whose members collectively share in the benefits of the collective goods and (directly or indirectly and sooner or later) can accept the burden and responsibility of their attendant costs. For a summary of the key differences between public and private goods, see table 3. Later we suggest the implication of these differences for the conduct of U.S. public diplomacy abroad.

Another key difference between public goods and private

goods is relevant and important for the conduct of public diplomacy. Because private goods are discrete and separable ("rivalrous"), one person's taste for and consumption of a private good does not require another to consume the same good. The situation is different for public goods, which must be collectively consumed (hence, nonrivalrous), or at least collectively purchased. Similarly, those who dislike a private good may largely insulate themselves from its distastefulness simply by refusing to consume it. Because public goods are collectively consumed, no one is shielded or insulated from them. Their availability to one beneficiary entails their imposition on all. An individual can consume a Madonna CD without anyone else doing so, but that same individual cannot "consume" democratic values unless democratic values have been collectively adopted and sustained.

This difference creates barriers for the potential consumers of public goods that the potential consumers of private goods do not face. A constituency group that regards voting rights, women's rights, civil liberties, and democratic values as collectively appealing public goods, may therefore face hostility from an implacable *adversary group* that regards this package as offensive public "bads."[17]

We discuss later certain Islamic groups that illustrate the respective designations of constituencies and adversaries.[18]

Such are the differences between public goods and private goods that methods and techniques for effectively marketing one cannot be presumed to be successful in marketing the other. Success in each of these arenas may depend on rules and strategies as different from one another as those that account for success in basketball differ from those accounting for success in football.

The second flaw is that among some groups, cultures, and

17. See below, pp. 133–135.
18. See below, pp. 142–144.

subcultures American values and institutions are already reason-
ably well understood yet intensely resisted and disliked. *Mis-
understanding American values* isn't the principal source of anti-
Americanism. The source lies in explicit rejection of some of the
salient characteristics of American values and institutions.
Women's rights, open and competitive markets, equal and secret
voting rights, let alone materialism and conspicuous display, are,
in some places and for some groups, resented, rejected, and bit-
terly opposed. When this hostility is mixed with envy, the com-
bination can lead to violent resistance.

The third flaw is that some *U.S. policies* have been, are, and
will continue to be major sources of anti-Americanism in some
quarters. The most obvious and enduring policies that arouse
anti-Americanism are strong U.S. support for Israel. Much of the
Middle East views this stance as providing support for an already
strong, dominant, and overbearing military occupation, whereas
U.S. concern and support for the plight of the Palestinian victims
is viewed as halfhearted and grudging.[19] To explain, let alone
extenuate, U.S. support for Israel as actually a reflection of dem-
ocratic values, tolerance, and the defense of freedom, rather than
a denial of these values to the Palestinians, may be an insuperable
task.

Nevertheless, public diplomacy may mitigate this source of
anti-Americanism. What we have in mind is not a concession to
the cliché about "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom
fighter." Instead, PD might emphasize the long history of U.S.
support for *Muslim* Bosnians, Kosovars, and Albanians in force-
fully combating the brutal "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans in
the 1990s. This support often placed the United States in strong

19. Consider the following characterization by Israel's own minister of justice
of Israel's home demolitions in the Gaza refugee camp: Israelis, he said, "look
like monsters in the eyes of the world," *Los Angeles Times*, May 30, 2003. Those
who support people viewed as monsters tend to be viewed negatively.

opposition to both Russia's backing of the Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims and to European reluctance to commit military forces in accord with Europe's verbal condemnation of ethnic cleansing.

Another part of the story that could be usefully conveyed to the Muslim constituency by U.S. public diplomacy is the perennial American support for Muslim Turkey's admission to the European Union, also perennially and vehemently opposed by the European Union, especially by Germany and France within the Union. Reiteration of U.S. support for an independent Palestinian state is a third theme that a suitable PD effort could appropriately emphasize.

As important as it is to communicate America's history of support and defense of Muslim populations, it is equally important to communicate the rationale motivating these policies. In these instances, U.S. policies reflected and furthered the values of democracy, tolerance, the rule of law, and pluralism. The overarching message PD should convey is that the United States tries, although it does not always succeed, to further these values regardless of the religion, ethnicity, or other characteristics of the individuals and groups involved. Highlighting the instances in which the United States has benefited Muslim populations by acting on these values may make this point more salient.

Convincing others that U.S. efforts to further these values are genuine, persistent, and enduring requires that those receiving the message believe that the values themselves are worthwhile, that they are "goods." Potential disposition toward U.S. policies can be divided into three discrete groups: those who accept that the values America seeks are goods; those who may believe that the values America seeks are not goods but who nonetheless see them as a means to achieve other core goals (such as personal or family betterment, improvements in health, education, skills, and the assurance of personal dignity) that are associated with

the preceding values; and those who believe that the goals America seeks, as well as the associated core goals, are bads and would therefore reject the entire package.

The first group is sometimes considered to be the least populous of the three, although one especially knowledgeable observer has recently suggested that the size and influence of this component of Islam may well be larger than has usually been assumed.[20]

Those in the first category will be most receptive to the contention that U.S. policies are beneficial. Because they already believe that the values the policies seek are "goods," they need only be convinced that the policies really do engender these values. Convincing those in the second category requires the antecedent step of convincing the members that the values themselves are associated with goals that are valued by those in this category (e.g., opportunities for personal or family betterment, improvements in health, education, etc.).

These two categories comprise what we have referred to as PD's "constituency." Those in the third category are presumed to be beyond persuasion; they comprise PD's "adversary."

Thus, two tasks emerge. One is to convey and persuade that U.S. policies are pursued because they seek to further values that are already accepted by the audience, including Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere. The second is to persuade that the values themselves have other derivative effects that are accepted as goods.

Hypothesis: Constituencies and Adversaries

Reflecting on the earlier discussion of the differences between marketing public goods and private goods, and relating that dis-

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20. See Bernard Lewis, "Democracy and the Enemies of Freedom," *Wall Street Journal*, December 22, 2003.

cussion to the previously cited examples of potentially promising public diplomacy themes, we propose the following "constituency/adversary" hypothesis to guide thinking and debate about PD, and the formulation and implementation of more effective PD efforts by the United States:

> Effective marketing of the public goods represented by the values and ideals America cherishes requires two ingredients: (1) an existing or identifiable *constituency* expected to be relatively receptive and more or less congenial to the content of the message to be conveyed by PD; and (2) an existing or identifiable *adversary* whose actual or expected opposition to the public diplomacy message can be directly or indirectly invoked as a challenge and stimulus to mobilize and activate the constituency.

The effectiveness of PD efforts and messages, and more generally effective marketing of public goods, depends on (1) appealing to the identified *constituency* by focusing on the goods and goals to be achieved; (2) explicitly or implicitly recognizing the *adversary* or adversaries standing in the way of the constituency's interests in the delivery of those goods; and (3) capitalizing on the tension between PD's appeal to the constituency and the adversary's resistance to it.

In some cases and situations, effectiveness may be maximized by focusing the PD effort on the constituency and ignoring actual or potential opposition by the adversary. Constructing or reconstructing hospitals, clinics, and schools in Iraq is a case in point; the appeal does not need to be highlighted by acknowledging the expected opposition of the adversarial group. Instead, PD can be advanced by ignoring the potential adversary or relegating it to only limited recognition.

In other cases, PD's effectiveness may be maximized by acknowledging—perhaps even anticipating—inhibitory and perhaps violent oppositional efforts to be expected from the adversary. In advance of, or in response to those efforts, the constitu-

ency can be mobilized to stand up for the public goods in question. Training and equipping indigenous Iraqi police and self-defense forces are examples: opposed by adversary groups and sought and welcomed by the constituency.

We apply and elaborate the constituency/adversary hypothesis in the section below dealing with the case studies of Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela.

Learning from Past Successes

To test the constituency/adversary hypothesis, this report applies it to past successes in two different contexts of marketing public goods that are, or are close cognates of, core American values, and doing so in adverse and at times hostile environments. Specifically, we examine the speeches and public writings of Martin Luther King Jr. in his attempt to achieve basic civil rights for people irrespective of color, and of Nelson Mandela in his attempt to end apartheid in South Africa.

To be sure, there are manifest differences between the circumstances in which King and Mandela operated, and the conduct of PD by the United States. King and Mandela were individual charismatic figures whose public causes and public messages were intimately connected with their personal styles and characters. By contrast, PD is conducted by, or at the instigation of, a government or a governmental institution, although it may be important and useful to devolve some of this responsibility to nongovernmental entities.[21]

Despite the differences, the efforts of King/Mandela and of PD share a linkage that may make the experience of the former instructive for conduct of the latter. In both instances, the central concern is effective marketing of public goods: civil rights, racial equality, and the end of apartheid in the King/Mandela context;

21. See pp. 145–147 ff.

democratic values, open societies, and competitive markets in the
PD context. In both instances the messages articulated by these
highly effective protagonists relate directly and forcefully to the
marketing of public goods sufficiently congruent with those en-
compassed in public diplomacy that inferences derived from the
former may be useful in improving the latter.

The following sample of significant, high-profile public writ-
ings and speeches was assembled.

Martin Luther King

1. Address to First Montgomery Improvement Association
   (MIA) Mass Meeting, at Holt Street Baptist Church, Decem-
   ber 5, 1955.

2. The Birth of a New Nation, April 7, 1957.

3. Give Us the Ballot, May 17, 1957.

4. Letter from Birmingham Jail, April 16, 1963.

5. I Have a Dream, August 28, 1963.

6. Address Delivered in Acceptance of Nobel Peace Prize,
   December 10, 1964.

7. Beyond Vietnam, April 4, 1967.

8. Where Do We Go From Here, August 16, 1967.

Nelson Mandela

1. No Easy Walk to Freedom, September 21, 1953.

2. Our Struggle Needs Many Tactics, February 1, 1958.

3. General Strike: Statement by Nelson Mandela on Behalf of
   the National Action Council Following the Stay-At-Home in
   May 1961, June 1, 1961.

4. Black Man in a White Court: First Court Statement, October
   1, 1962.

5. Address to Rally in Cape Town on his Release from Prison, February 11, 1990.

6. Address to Rally in Soweto, February 13, 1990.

7. Address to the Swedish Parliament, March 13, 1990.

8. Statement to the President and Members of the French National Assembly, June 7, 1990.

9. Address to the Joint Session of the Houses of Congress of the USA, June 26, 1990.

10. Works from before and after his lengthy incarceration were selected.

For each work, data were collected on King and Mandela's explicit references to the following: the good (G) or value to be attained; the constituency (C) addressed; peaceful activities the constituency conducted or was urged to pursue (ACP); activities the constituency conducted or was urged to pursue that may or may not be peaceful (ACA); violent activities the constituency conducted or was urged to pursue (ACV); the adversary (A); activities of the adversary (AA); and negative remarks about competing leaders (CL). In addition, we summed and characterized as positive references to the good or value to be obtained, the constituency, and peaceful activities the constituency conducted or was urged to pursue $\Sigma(G, C, ACP)$. We have also summed and characterized as negative references to violent activities conducted by the constituency or encouraged for it to pursue, identification of the adversary, activities of the adversary, and negative references about or activities relating to competing leaders $\Sigma (ACV, A, AA, CL)$.

Summary statistics were generated for King and Mandela. Through the course of this study, a marked contrast was noted between Mandela's rhetoric before and after imprisonment. To better display this difference, Mandela's summary statistics were

reported as totals and were bifurcated between those before and after imprisonment (see table 4).

First, a caveat. Special caution should always be exercised in drawing conclusions from a small convenience sample. Moreover, a simple tabulation of numbers of references, as in table 4, lacks any indication of emphasis or intensity that might be conveyed by the context.

Still, some results reveal stark differences between the approaches of King and Mandela. In every speech or writing, King made substantially more positive than negative references. In contrast, before Mandela was in prison, his negative references always equaled or exceeded the positive ones. After imprisonment, his speeches were markedly different. In each of them, positive references substantially exceeded negative ones.

Turning to the individual categories, the data suggest that King consistently and frequently referred to the good to be achieved as his main focus. In six of the eight works cited in the sample, the good to be achieved was referred to more than any other single reference category. With few exceptions, King gave little attention to the adversary, averaging only one adversary reference per speech, or to the adversary's activities. This contrasts markedly with Mandela, who, before prison, made an average of three or four references in each speech to the identified adversaries and their activities. After his release from prison, however, Mandela's emphasis was sharply reversed; his attention focused instead on positive references and on the constituency, rarely making negative references or even mentioning the adversary.

In addition to these general points, a closer look at the individual works suggests lessons that may be applicable to public diplomacy more broadly and to the constituency/adversary hypothesis in particular.

Table 4 References in Collected Works of Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela

Work	Date	Words	Good	Constitu-ency	Peaceful	Nonpeace-ful	Violent	Adversary	Activities	Competing Leaders	Pos	Neg
King												
1	12/1959	1585	3	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	4	2
2	4/1961	7027	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1
3	5/1961	2537	3	4	8	0	0	1	2	0	15	3
4	4/1967	6863	1	3	4	0	0	3	3	1	8	7
5	8/1967	1574	4	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	6	2
6	12/1968	1125	3	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	6	1
7	4/1971	6738	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
8	8/1971	7627	4	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	8	2
Subtotals												
Mean		4385	2.88	1.63	2.38	0.00	0.00	1.13	1.00	0.13	6.88	2.25
Standard Deviation		2902	0.99	1.41	2.50	0.00	0.00	0.99	1.07	0.35	3.72	2.12
Mandela												
Before prison												
9	9/1957	4534	0	4	2	1	0	4	6	0	6	10
10	2/1962	2005	1	1	2	0	0	3	1	0	4	4
11	6/1965	5582	2	3	4	0	0	2	6	4	9	12
12	10/1966	3199	2	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	2	3

After prison												
13	2/1994	1607	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	4	1
14	2/1994	1996	1	4	3	0	1	0	0	0	8	1
15	3/1994	1158	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
16	6/1994	1847	3	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	6	2
17	6/1994	2667	3	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	5	2
Subtotals												
Before prison												
Mean		3830	1.25	2.00	2.00	0.50	0.00	2.75	3.50	1.00	5.25	7.25
Standard Deviation		1559	0.96	1.83	1.63	0.58	0.00	0.96	2.89	2.00	2.99	4.43
After prison												
Mean		1855	2.00	2.20	1.20	0.20	0.40	0.20	0.60	0.00	5.40	1.20
Standard Deviation		554	1.00	1.10	1.10	0.45	0.55	0.45	0.89	0.00	1.67	0.84
Overall												
Mean		2733	1.67	2.11	1.56	0.33	0.22	1.33	1.89	0.44	5.33	3.89
Standard Deviation		1466	1.00	1.36	1.33	0.50	0.44	1.50	2.42	1.33	2.18	4.23

Note: The numbers indicate the number of references—that is, explicit referrals to the subject of each column heading.

Implications and Concluding Observations

The preceding question highlights a dilemma facing U.S. public diplomacy in general and especially in the Middle East.

On the one hand, there is a risk that a new, perhaps more sensitive and tactful public diplomacy effort may be too passive and ineffectual because its strategy is to appeal to an overly broad constituency (embracing all of the first two categories of people discussed in the section above) and therefore perhaps appearing bland and trite.[22]

On the other hand, there is a risk of appearing combative and arrogant if the adopted strategy seeks to mobilize the more receptive constituency(ies) by aggressively identifying and targeting specific adversaries within the Muslim community.[23]

Identifying real adversaries both within the Middle East,[24] as well as outside it,[25] may hedge against the first risk, but would increase exposure to the second.

Yet this dilemma is perhaps too sharply drawn. Mixed strategies may be feasible with different emphasis placed on avoiding one risk without unduly increasing the other. Moreover, the effective mix may prudently change or alternate over time, as did Mandela's strategy and message before and following his imprisonment.

To translate and transfer to the Islamic Middle East the framework we have used in analyzing the King and Mandela experiences is feasible, although perhaps something of a stretch.

In both contexts the challenge that faced King and Mandela

22. This first risk might be called the "King risk."

23. The second risk might be called the "Mandela risk."

24. For example, the militant and autocratic Islamists. See Lewis, "Democracy and the Enemies of Freedom."

25. Such as some Europeans (especially the Germans and the French) who have adamantly and perennially opposed admission of Muslim Turkey to the European Union.

in the past and is now facing U.S. public diplomacy is how to formulate and transmit a compelling case espousing public goods: civil rights in the United States and South Africa in the King-Mandela contexts; open and free societies, tolerance, and human rights in the case of U.S. public diplomacy.

As in the United States and South African settings, Middle East ethnography and sociology are no less susceptible to distinctions among different groups of Muslims in terms of their acceptance or rejection of the public goods that the United States cherishes for itself and favors for others. For example, Cheryl Benard distinguishes among four ideological positions in the Muslim world.[26] Ranging across the right-to-left spectrum, they are

- *Fundamentalists*, who reject democratic values and Western culture, and endorse violence to resist these values;

- *Traditionalists*, who want a conservative society, and are suspicious of modernity, innovation, and change;

- *Modernists*, who want to reform Islam to bring it into line with the modern world;

- *Secularists*, who want Islam to accept a division between mosque and state.

Benard suggests that the primary constituency for a realistic PD should be the modernists. The secularists and traditionalists comprise in varying degrees intermediate and shifting groups[27] that, depending on the issue and circumstances, may join with the modernists. Fundamentalists can be consigned—more or less

26. This discussion is drawn from Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies*, RAND, MR-1716, 2003; and Cheryl Benard, "Five Pillars of Democracy: How the West Can Promote an Islamic Reformation," *RAND Review* 28, no. 1 (spring 2004).

27. Ibid.

unalterably—to an adversarial role. Benard suggests they should be opposed "energetically." It can be inferred, moreover, that such energetic opposition can contribute to unifying and strengthening the modernist constituency.[28]

Other putative experts describe Islamic constituencies and adversaries in terms that are philosophically and theologically closely congruent with Benard's discussion, though their expositions tend to be vaguer and less programmatic than Benard's.[29]

As is always the case with discretely categorizing things that exist across a spectrum, it may be that the ideological spectrum cannot be so neatly cleaved into these four categories. There may be a significant overlap of traditionalists and modernists: people who are troubled by the problems in their societies due to a persistent rejection of modernity but who wish to retain traditional values. These skeptical modernists (or progressive traditionalists) may lean toward a desire to modernize Islam, if only partially or slowly, and nonetheless be suspicious of a fuller reformation. Depending on the tactics employed, if PD were to oppose fundamentalists too "energetically," the effect might be to repel traditionalists or skeptical modernists whose support may be valuable.

Here, the King and Mandela case studies illustrate potential effects of different tactics. The "Mandela risk" warns of stridently targeting fundamentalists in such a broad way that traditionalists and skeptical modernists also feel targeted and their support driven away. Following King's approach would counsel focusing not on the fundamentalists but on the goods the modernists and

28. Benard's program for "energetic" opposition to the fundamentalists includes the following: challenging and exposing the inaccuracies in their interpretations of Islam, exposing their linkage to illegal groups, demonstrating their inability to develop their countries and communities, exposing their corruption, hypocrisy, and immorality. See ibid.

29. See Jack Miles, "Religion and American Foreign Policy," *Survival* (Institute for Strategic Studies) spring 2004; and Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 2003).

maybe the progressive traditionalists seek. The "King risk," however, is that polarization may be instrumentally necessary and that failing to target the fundamentalists "energetically" may dissipate the sought-after galvanizing effect on the constituency.

However the risks faced by an overly aggressive or overly passive PD may be hedged, one general inference from the previous discussion should be repeated. It should not be assumed, as it sometimes has been, that the skills, techniques, and tactics that have been effective in marketing private goods will be applicable to and effective in promoting public goods.

That said, it is nonetheless important to recognize that concentrations of creative people and innovative ideas are not confined to the government agencies charged with responsibility for conducting PD. Marketing private goods is, as we've emphasized, very different from an effective and sustained effort to market public goods through PD. This proposition is quite different, however, from contending that government (i.e., the public sector) should be the only or even the principal locus of PD. Enlisting, as well as refocusing, the talents of the information-communication-publicist sectors and practitioners should be a priority concern for enhancing U.S. PD.

Nancy Snow makes the point forcefully:

> Public diplomacy cannot come primarily from the U.S. government because it is our President and our government officials whose images predominate in explaining U.S. public policy. Official spin has its place, but it is always under suspicion or parsed for clues and secret codes. The primary source for America's image campaign must be drawn from the American people.[30]

30. Nancy Snow, "How to Build An Effective U.S. Public Diplomacy: Ten Steps for Change," Address delivered to the World Affairs Council Palm Desert, California, December 14, 2003. In *Vital Speeches of the Day* 70, no. 12 (April 1, 2004): 369–374.

With these thoughts in mind, a few approaches—some new, some retreads—are worth consideration:

- The tasks of public diplomacy and the obstacles confronting them are so challenging that the enterprise should seek to enlist creative talent and solicit new ideas from the private sector, through *outsourcing of major elements* of the public diplomacy mission. Whether the motivational skills and communicative capabilities of a King or a Mandela can be replicated through this process is dubious. In any event, government should not be the exclusive instrument of public diplomacy. Responsible business, academic, research, and other nongovernmental organizations could be enlisted and motivated through a competitive bidding process. Outsourcing should be linked to a regular midcourse assessment, with rebidding of outsourced contracts informed by the assessment.

- It would be worthwhile to consider differing modes of communicating the "big ideas" of public diplomacy through debate and discussion rather than through the typical monologic conveyance of the message. Other modalities are worth attention, such as structured debates, call-ins by listeners, "conversation and controversy" programming, and live interaction among different elements of the audience, including members of both constituency and adversary groups.

- Current efforts to bring honest, unbiased information to people in the Middle East may provide platforms for implementing the foregoing ideas. Radio Sawa and Al Horra are publicly funded but independently operated endeavors of public diplomacy. They build off past successes of outsourcing public diplomacy through radio transmissions, but success in this medium may be applied to other media. Television is already under way through Al Horra but so too could

be other media, through print and public speeches. Radio
Sawa broadcasts popular music interspersed with news. An
implicit assumption of its approach is that the listener will be
more engaged by the music and news reporting than news
reporting alone. This rationale is equally applicable to de-
bates, call-in programs, and live interaction among different
elements of the audience. Indeed, such approaches have the
added benefit of using tools that directly reflect the goals pub-
lic diplomacy seeks: open debate, free expression of compet-
ing and conflicting ideas, and participation by citizens with
sharply different views. The conduct of public diplomacy can
be enhanced by employing instruments that directly reflect
the collective goods that it seeks. In this case, the medium
can become the PD message.

Still, a reformed and enhanced PD should be accompanied
by limited expectations about what it can realistically accomplish.
U.S. policies—notably in the Israel-Palestine dispute as well as in
Iraq—inevitably and inherently will arouse in the Middle East and
Muslim worlds opposition and deafness to the PD message the
United States wishes to transmit. Although these policies have
their own rationales and logic, the reality is that they do and will
limit what PD can or should be expected to accomplish. The
antipathy for the United States that some U.S. policies arouse is
yet another argument that supports outsourcing some aspects of
PD. The message America is trying to sell about pluralism, free-
dom, and democracy need not be delivered by the U.S. govern-
ment. The message itself may be popular among potential
constituents who view the United States unfavorably, but if the
government delivers the message, it may not get heard. Never-
theless, even if outsourcing proves effective, expectations should
be limited. Although outsourcing may put some distance between
a potentially favorable message (pluralism, freedom, and democ-

racy) and an unfavorable messenger (the United States govern-
ment), inevitably the two will be linked.

POSTAUDIT

Some of the key distinctions highlighted in this essay (for
example, between marketing private consumer goods and
"selling" the public goods represented by the American
"story," between transmission by government and outsourc-
ing its transmission by others) are no less important now
than when this was written in 2004. Moreover, contrary to
conventional wisdom about America's public image, in
many of today's most crucial international relationships (for
example, those between China and Japan, between India
and Pakistan, between China and India, and between Israel
and Palestine), the United States is regarded as a valued
friend by the other parties who don't typically view each
other in this light.