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In this paper, we estimate the effect of the tax preference for health insurance on health care spending using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys from 1996-2005. We use the fact that Social Security taxes are only levied on earnings below a statutory threshold to identify the impact of the tax preference. Because employer-sponsored health insurance premiums are excluded from Social Security payroll taxes, workers who earn just below the Social Security tax threshold receive a larger tax preference for health insurance than workers who earn just above it. We find a significant effect of the tax preference, consistent with previous research.
In this paper, we use publicly available data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey - Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) to investigate the effect of Massachusetts' health reform plan on employer-sponsored insurance premiums. We tabulate premium growth for private-sector employers in Massachusetts and the United States as a whole for 2004–2008. We estimate the effect of the plan as the difference in premium growth between Massachusetts and the United States between 2006 and 2008—that is, before versus after the plan—over and above the difference in premium growth for 2004 to 2006. We find that health reform in Massachusetts increased single-coverage employer-sponsored insurance premiums by about 6 percent, or $262. Although our research design has important limitations, it does suggest that policy makers should be concerned about the consequences of health reform for the cost of private insurance.
John F. Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Daniel P. Kessler, “The Effect of Massachusetts’ Health Reform on Employer-sponsored Insurance Premiums”, Forum for Health Economics & Policy, May 20, 2010
This article examines the possibilities for health care reform in the 111th Congress. It uses a simple model of policy making to analyze the failure of Congress to pass the Clinton health plan in 1993–1994. It concludes that the factors that created gridlock in the 103rd Congress are likely to have a similar impact in the present.
David W. Brady and Daniel P. Kessler, “Why is Health Reform So Difficult?”, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 35, No. 2, April 2010, Duke University Press
David W. Brady and Daniel P. Kessler, “Who Supports Health Reform?” Political Science & Politics, Volume 43, Issue 01, January 2010, pp 1–6.
Will the health care plans lead to higher taxes, deficits, and health care costs without health gains? Glenn Hubbard of Columbia and John Cogan and Daniel Kessler of Stanford think so.
Cogan, John; Kessler, Daniel; and Hubbard, R. Glenn (2009) "Obama's Gamble: Doubling Down on a Flawed Insurance Model," The Economists' Voice: Vol. 6 : Iss. 10, Article 2.
This paper reports the results of a 2009 national survey that quantifies Americans’ willingness to pay to expand health insurance coverage. We asked respondents whether they would support a Medicaid expansion, a subsidy for low-income people, or a subsidy for the chronically ill, if they had to pay more income taxes to cover the program’s costs. Based on respondents’ reported income, we told them approximately how much, in dollar terms, their tax increases would be. Our results reflect a tension in public opinion rec- ognized by previous investigators: a desire for reform but limited willingness to pay for it.
David W. Brady and Daniel P. Kessler, “Putting the Public’s Money Where Its Mouth Is: Consumers' Enthusiasm for Health Reform”, Health Affairs (Web Exclusive) August 18, 2009