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Friday, September 6, 2019

Issue 60

The Monroe Doctrine and Current U.S. Foreign Policy
Background Essay
Background Essay

The Monroe Doctrine: Guide To The Future

by Williamson Murrayvia Strategika
Friday, September 6, 2019

The Monroe Doctrine, which purports to warn other states from interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, has supposedly remained a basic principle of American foreign policy since the first half of the nineteenth century. From the point when it was issued, its actual relevance has depended on the willingness to enforce it, or whether there was any real threat. President Monroe issued it during a period when all of the major Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere were in the process of gaining their independence from Spain. 

Featured Commentary
Featured Commentary

Principled Realism And The Monroe Doctrine

by Chris Gibson via Strategika
Friday, September 6, 2019

With the publication of the December 2017 version of the National Security Strategy, the Trump administration changed the course of American grand strategy. With it, the U.S. made a conscious choice to leave behind President George W. Bush’s controversial neo-conservative inspired policy of “preemption” and Barack Obama’s convoluted “consequentialism,” embracing instead the more traditional approach of “principled realism,” first articulated by President George Washington. In this new era all previous policies and approaches are under review, including one of our oldest foreign policy statements—the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

Featured Commentary

E Pluribus Plures

by Bing Westvia Strategika
Friday, September 6, 2019

A doctrine is a set of guiding principles shared widely by an organization or a nation. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 stated that any effort by a European nation to take control of any North or South American country would be viewed as “the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” In 1962, the Doctrine was invoked during the Cuban Missile Crisis. With the support of the Organization of American States (OAS), President Kennedy established a naval quarantine around the island.

E.g., 12 / 15 / 2019
E.g., 12 / 15 / 2019
Hoover Archives Poster collection: FR 1145
Saturday, November 2, 2013

Issue 08

Is Russia now an enemy, neutral, irrelevant to U.S. strategic interests, or a possible partner with shared concerns?

Background Essay

by Edward N. Luttwak Friday, November 1, 2013
article

Featured Commentary

by Ralph Peters Friday, November 1, 2013
article
by Kiron K. Skinner Friday, November 1, 2013
article

Related Commentary

by Bruce Thornton Friday, November 1, 2013
article
by Angelo M. Codevilla Friday, November 1, 2013
article
by Victor Davis Hanson Friday, November 1, 2013
article
Poster Collection, UK 2798, Hoover Institution Archives.
Tuesday, October 1, 2013

Issue 07

Is there any chance that Europe, either in common or in terms of individual European nations–in particular Britain, France, or Germany–will recoup its military capability?

Background Essay

by Andrew Roberts Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article

Featured Commentary

by Angelo M. Codevilla Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
by Josef Joffe Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article

Related Commentary

by Victor Davis Hanson Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
by Josef Joffe Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
by Williamson Murray Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
by Kori Schake Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
by Gil-li Vardi Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
by Bing West Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
by Bruce Thornton Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
by Ralph Peters Tuesday, October 1, 2013
article
African Pictorial Collection, Box 2, Hoover Institution Archives.
Sunday, September 1, 2013

Issue 06

Will the Arab Spring offer any improvement, either domestically or internationally, over what it has replaced?

Background Essay

by Frederick W. Kagan Sunday, September 1, 2013
article

Featured Commentary

by Bing West Sunday, September 1, 2013
article
by Andrew Roberts Sunday, September 1, 2013
article
Hoover Archives Poster collection: CC 137, Celebration of the occupation of Sout
Thursday, August 1, 2013

Issue 05

What exactly are the strategic aims that North Korea hopes to achieve by the possession of a few deployable nuclear weapons?
by Walter Russell Mead Thursday, August 1, 2013
article
by Barry Strauss Thursday, August 1, 2013
article
by Thomas Donnelly Thursday, August 1, 2013
article
by Victor Davis Hanson Thursday, August 1, 2013
article
by Bruce Thornton Thursday, August 1, 2013
article

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Strategika: "Empowering Iran: The Weaknesses Of The Nuclear Deal," With Tom Donnelly

interview with Thomas Donnellyvia Strategika
Friday, October 14, 2016

How the nuclear deal with Iran unleashed Tehran's ambitions in the Middle East.

Strategika: "The Iran Time Bomb," with Kori Schake

interview with Kori Schakevia Strategika
Friday, October 14, 2016

The nuclear deal makes conflict less likely in the near future ... but more likely in the long-term.

Featured Commentary

Missiles And More: Iran’s Threats To Israel And The Middle East

by Kori Schakevia Strategika
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Iran nuclear deal makes an Israeli strike less likely in the near term, and more likely in the medium term unless U.S. policy changes to restore the credibility of our own military options and suppresses the non-nuclear threats Iran is fomenting.

Featured Commentary

Time Is On Iran’s Side

by Thomas Donnellyvia Strategika
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The conclusion of the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal—formally the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”—last year has created a new and profoundly different set of strategic realities across the Middle East. While this shift is hardly irreversible, it is moving rapidly, and, by the time the next American president figures out where the restroom is in the White House, the process will, like quick-drying cement, be well set.

Related Commentary

Snake Charmers and Snake Killers

by Andrew Robertsvia Strategika
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The immediate result of an Israeli strike—assuming it were successful in destroying or at least very significantly degrading the Iranian nuclear program—would be a collective exhalation of breath across the Middle East and Europe. One of WikiLeaks’ most telling revelations came when the King of Saudi Arabia was heard urging the Americans “to cut off the head of the snake,” and if the Israelis undertook the identical action the Sunni Arab leadership would be cock-a-hoop with pleasure and relief (while of course publicly reserving the right to denounce Israel for aggression and war-mongering).

Background Essay

The US, Iran, And Israel

by Edward N. Luttwak via Strategika
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The disagreement with Israel over Iran’s nuclear endeavors long pre-dated the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015,” which the White House prefers to call “The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon”, but which should really be called Barjam, the Farsi acronym that is entering local parlance for any big deal.

Related Commentary

Israeli Jab, American Knockout

by Ralph Petersvia Strategika
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The challenge for Israel in responding militarily to Iran’s nuclear weapons program is that Israel has the capacity to start a conflict, but not to conclude it (save through the use of its own nuclear arms—an unlikely scenario, for now). Israeli airpower and missile forces could frustrate Tehran’s ambitions for a period of a few and perhaps several years, but it would prove a Pyrrhic victory, given Iran’s inevitable response.

Related Commentary

Increasingly Isolated, Israel Must Rely On Nuclear Deterrence

by Josef Joffevia Strategika
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

Five years ago, Jeffrey Goldenberg published “The Point of No Return” in The Atlantic. In 10,000 words, he laid out the pressing rationale for an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Like many such pieces, it prompted this author to formulate a law: “The U.S. can do it, but won’t; Israel wants to, but can’t.”

Related Commentary

The Ripple Effects of An Israeli Preemptive Strike

by Peter Berkowitzvia Strategika
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

An Israeli preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities is fraught with immediate and long-term ramifications.

Strategika: "Terrorism, In Perspective,” With Williamson Murray

interview with Williamson Murrayvia Strategika
Wednesday, September 7, 2016
While America hasn’t seen another attack on the scale of 9/11, the possibility of a devastating terrorist strike remains.

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The Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict strives to reaffirm the Hoover Institution's dedication to historical research in light of contemporary challenges, and in particular, reinvigorating the national study of military history as an asset to foster and enhance our national security. Read more.

Is there a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

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Strategika is an online journal that analyzes ongoing issues of national security in light of conflicts of the past—the efforts of the Military History Working Group of historians, analysts, and military personnel focusing on military history and contemporary conflict.

Our board of scholars shares no ideological consensus other than a general acknowledgment that human nature is largely unchanging. Consequently, the study of past wars can offer us tragic guidance about present conflicts—a preferable approach to the more popular therapeutic assumption that contemporary efforts to ensure the perfectibility of mankind eventually will lead to eternal peace. New technologies, methodologies, and protocols come and go; the larger tactical and strategic assumptions that guide them remain mostly the same—a fact discernable only through the study of history.

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The opinions expressed in Strategika are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Hoover Institution or Stanford University.