Cheap Drones for Strategic Effect
Putin's use of drones to attack strategic targets in Ukraine hints at evolving Russian strategy to keep fighting.
Russia’s recent use of suicide drones to attack civilian targets in Ukraine hints at how Putin might think he can change his fortunes in this war.
On Oct. 10 and 16, Russia used modified versions of the Iranian Shahed-136 suicide drone, called the Geran-2, to strike targets across Ukraine. Like a cruise missile, but much slower, the drone flies to a GPS coordinate and rams itself into that location. Cheap and destructive, reporting suggests strikes on Oct. 10th hit 29 critical infrastructure targets including power and heating stations, 35 residential buildings and four high-rises with estimates of 14 civilians killed and 95 injured. The attacks on Oct. 16 hit similar targets and locations killing at least 4 civilians.
Comparisons of Russian suicide drones to Nazi vengeance weapons like the V-1 and V-2 suggest that Putin, like Hitler in the waning days of World War II, is bent on revenge and losing his grip. There may be some truth to this. The Oct. 10 attacks occurred after the destruction of the Crimean Bridge on Oct. 8 where Putin threatened a “harsh” response to “Ukrainian acts of terrorism.” Similarly, the wreckage from a drone on Oct. 16 showed graffiti saying “for Belgorod”, suggesting at least someone in the Russian military considered the strike a retaliation for Ukraine’s attacks in the Belgorod region that left many without power. But focusing on Putin’s actions as vengeful, and by insinuation emotional or foolish, risks obscuring the real and dangerous cunning of a man who has no intentions of losing this war.
It is no secret that Russia is not doing well. Beyond tactical failures, Russia entered this war without the capacity to fight a state backed by powerful allies. In any war, military victory depends more on capacity than capability. Russia has impressive capability, including hypersonic missiles, tanks, aircraft, drones, and certainly nuclear weapons, but it lacks the capacity to replace losses in ammunition, fuel, equipment, and manpower.
Ukraine has billions of dollars in resources from the U.S. and Europe, but continued support is not guaranteed. Zelensky is on the clock to win the war before political sentiment in the U.S. and Europe change, while Putin needs to hang in there long enough to come up with a solution to replenish his dwindling capacity so that he can resume the offensive. The mass use of suicide drones reveals some clever ways that Putin can buy the time he needs.
If Putin continues to attack Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian targets, he presents Zelensky and his allies with a dilemma: should limited air defense systems protect cities and infrastructure, or should air defenses prioritize combat forces? Ukraine is trying to do both with limited success. This month Zelensky claims Ukraine intercepted 43 of 84 missiles and maybe 50 of perhaps 70 drones. This is actually pretty good, but Russia is still degrading Ukraine’s power infrastructure and killing civilians. As winter approaches Putin may be forcing Zelensky to shift his air defenses away from combat forces in the East to protect the power grid and civilians. This could slow Ukraine’s advance just enough for the Russian army to survive the winter and perhaps prepare for a renewed offensive in the Spring.
The crux of this strategy for Putin is to pressure Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and civilians within his dwindling resources. This cannot be done with complicated and expensive guided missiles that are hard to replace. Some analysis suggests that the Oct. 10th missile attacks may have cost about $400 million-$700 million. The suicide drones, at only $20,000 each, kept the Oct. 16 attack to a reasonable $1M and Russia will reportedly receive 2400 of them from Iran over the coming months.
While it is difficult to accurately count Russia’s remaining Shahed-136/Geran-2 drone fleet, it seems reasonable to assume, without disruption of the pipeline from Iran, Russia could have thousands of these systems at its disposal over the next few months. That implies plenty of capacity to keep pressure on Ukraine’s air defenses unless something changes.
Zelensky continues to plead with Europe and the U.S. for more air defense assets and the allies seem to be responding. But this is also useful for Putin. If logistics pipelines are focused on air defense assets, then other critical resources could be delayed, affecting essential equipment and ammunition like Javelin and HIMARS missiles. With winter approaching, Putin’s clever use of cheap imported drones may help him regain the strategic initiative, relieve pressure on his ground forces, and set the stage for continued fighting in the year to come.