Five of the top 25 most-cited American political scientists are Hoover senior fellows. A new report from the American Political Science Association examined journal citations of 4,089 tenure-track faculty members at 133 doctorate-granting political science departments in the United States.
In April 1979, president Jimmy Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) after the breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan. The act allows for a special authority created specifically for Taiwan known as the American Institute in Taiwan to serve as a de facto embassy, and provides for Taiwan to be recognized under...
I think the question (Will Europe ever fully partner with the U.S.—or will the European Union and NATO continue to downplay the necessity of military readiness?) is lagging the reality of European acknowledgement of their military shortfalls. Europeans are no longer downplaying the necessity of military readiness.
Are there circumstances in which the European Union and NATO will partner fully with the U.S.? At the moment, they don’t. In 2017, for example, only a very few European countries contributed more than 2 per cent to defense, in spite of a 2014 promise to do so. Meanwhile, the U.S. contributed more than 4 per cent.
The Hoover Institution at Stanford University posed this question—Will NATO Europe fully partner with the U.S., or continue to downplay military readiness? The brief answer is that the leading economic powers in Europe have moved beyond national defense into a never-never land of post-military globalism. The liminal leap into self-induced delusion assumes that major conflict will never again embroil the European continent. So there isn’t enough money for a credible military force in Europe because there is not the political will. The moral is to the physical as four to one in battle, and Europe lost the spirit to fight long ago.
The notion of an Atlantic alliance consisting of Europeans and Americans as full partners was once a useful fiction. Today it is a dysfunctional one, an obstacle to all sides’ understanding of what useful cooperation may yet be possible.
The United States should never expect to achieve full burden-sharing with the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even in the most balanced alliances, the most powerful member will pay some premium for ensuring its credibility and effectiveness. The United States can strive plausibly to minimize but not eliminate the massive degree of free riding and strategic incoherence that has become politically untenable and strategically unwise.
Clio, the muse of history, has a fabulous sense of irony: As the human pageant unfolds, she delights in confounding our intentions and expectations. Thus, two public enemies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (whose acronym, NATO, sounds like another Greek deity) promise to be the unwitting saviors of the alliance, rescuing it from complacency, lethargy, and diminishing relevance.