At the 2004 fall plenum, Jiang Zemin finally stepped down as chairman of the party Central Military Commission, abdicating the position to Hu Jintao. Jiang is also expected to relinquish the ceremonial chairmanship of the state Central Military Commission at the National People's Congress (NPC) meeting in March 2005. Hu now possesses the holy trinity of leadership positions: CCP general secretary, PRC president, and CMC chairman. This essay analyzes the origins and dynamics of this transition and ponders the implications of Jiang's retirement for civil-military relations and military modernization.

Understanding the kinds of leaders Hu Jintao currently promotes reveals the political and policy objectives he will most likely pursue in the future. Throughout 2004, especially after Hu consolidated his power at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee in September, China's provincial leadership underwent a major reshuffling. Most of the newly appointed provincial leaders advanced their political careers primarily through the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), received postgraduate education (usually in economics and management), and were leaders in less developed inland provinces. Their recent promotions are attributable not only to their political ties with Hu, but also to the fact that they share Hu's populist vision for China's development. Some of these provincial chiefs will be Hu's nominees for Politburo seats at the next party congress, as well as part of Hu's team to carry out political reform and socioeconomic policies in line with his perceived mandate.

When the Hu-Wen administration took power in spring 2003, it promised an ambitious two-stage program of administrative restructuring followed by decisive reform policies. While the first part of this program has been realized, the second has not. It would have been reasonable to expect a significant acceleration of economic reform and institutionalization during 2004. Instead, a general trend of slow and sometimes disjointed policymaking has emerged. This phenomenon is evident in the three most important areas of financial and macroeconomic policy: restructuring of the banking system, reform of the stock market, and the conduct of macroeconomic policy itself. In none of these three areas has decisive action been forthcoming, as policymakers have instead focused on redistributive policies, such as those affecting agriculture and regional development, a pattern of policymaking that presents numerous challenges and dangers.

The Hu Jintao leadership took advantage of the recent centenary of Deng Xiaoping's birth to lend authority to controversial proposals for reform of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that it seeks to ratify at the forthcoming Fourth Plenum of the party Central Committee. Preparations for the party plenum have stimulated more than the usual volume of rumors among Chinese of intensified leadership conflict, accompanied by a wave of related speculations in the Hong Kong and Western press. But available evidence from China's media provides little support for these speculations. Instead, the central leadership has sustained the public façade of unanimity and collective discipline that it has managed over the past several years, despite the disputes and debates over personnel and policy that may divide its members.