Where relations between U.S. and Russia stand a year after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine

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• Amna Nawaz:

  As Russia's invasion of Ukraine marks one year and President Putin announces Russia will suspend its participation in the New START Treaty, where does that leave U.S.-Russia relations?

  Rose Gottemoeller was the chief U.S. negotiator for that treaty during the Obama administration. She's now a distinguished lecturer at Stanford University. And Angela Stent worked in the State Department during the Clinton administration and served as a top intelligence officer on Russia during the administration of George W. Bush. She's now a professor at Georgetown University.

  Welcome to you both.

  And, Rose, I want to begin with you.

  Just tell me, what is the practical implication of this, of Putin saying that this treaty is being suspended? What changes immediately?

  Rose Gottemoeller, Former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs: What has happened during this war in Ukraine is that the Russians have continued to provide the notifications that are vital to the verification regime of the treaty.

  Frequently, during the week and sometimes even multiple times a day, they would send the United States notification of the movement of their strategic nuclear forces. For example, if an ICBM has to go to a maintenance facility, they would have to notify the United States. And then, when it returns to its deployment base, they would have to notify the United States.

  In that way, we had a great 24/7 view of what was going on with the Russian strategic nuclear forces, and they as well, of course. They had, I would say, reciprocal rights under the treaty. But they have now suspended those rights on their own recognizance.

• Amna Nawaz:

  So, Rose, does that mean the U.S. has less of an ability to know when Russia is moving its nuclear weapons and if they could potentially use one?

• Rose Gottemoeller:

  I think it's important to know that our knowledge of Russian readiness is very much dependent on our so-called national technical means, our overhead satellites, our radars, all the capabilities that we have of our intelligence establishment.

  So it's not as if we are left blind by this action. But the mutual predictability that comes from the treaty really helps us to have that 24/7 understanding, backed up, of course, by what we know from our own intelligence.

• Amna Nawaz:

  Angela, what about the timing and the intent of all this? Why would President Putin be delivering this particular message at this particular point in time?

  Angela Stent, Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, Georgetown University: Well, he skipped his address to the federal assembly last year. And so it was really timed to address the Russian nation and also foreign listeners.

  They knew that the Munich Security Conference was happening when it happened. They didn't know that President Biden was going to visit Kyiv until a couple of hours before he did. But Putin wanted to, first of all, restate all of the myths about the origins of this war, that it's the West's fault, that we didn't negotiate seriously with Russia beforehand, and that the West threatens Russia.

  And then he wanted to tell his own people again that this world will continue for a long time. He said: The Americans want a strategic defeat of Russia, but we cannot be defeated in the battlefield.

  So, his message both to his own people and to the international audience is that this war will go on until Russia has achieved its objectives. But, of course, he hasn't spelled out what those objectives are. We think it's the — at least the annexation and full control of these four territories and to get the Ukrainians to recognize it.

  But there may be other goals. He just said: We will continue until we achieve our goals.

  And then I think there was also a slight element that would cause concern to the Ukrainians and the outside world, which are the veiled hints that Russia could develop some new nuclear weapons. There wasn't a direct threat of the use of nuclear weapons, but certainly that this war could escalate because of what the West were doing, so unsettling the outside world and trying to calm his own people, but to tell them, this war is going to go on, and you have to accept it.

• Amna Nawaz:

  Rose, to Angela's point, Putin did say their strategic systems have been put on what he called combat duty. What does that mean to you?

• Rose Gottemoeller:

  Well, this is something that I think we're all puzzling about, because — and we have to wait and see if there are any actual changes in the operational status of the strategic nuclear force posture.

  A year ago, at the time of the invasion of Ukraine, he also said that the forces were being put on higher alert, but we know for a fact that it actually meant that there were more — more soldiers in the command posts, that they were upping their level of oversight of what was going on, but they were not actually changing the operational status of their nuclear forces and putting them on higher alert.

  That's a very — to go to a higher alert status is destabilizing. In many ways, it sends the warning of a possible escalatory action, which I don't think is either in the Russian interests. But, at the same time, it also is very stressing for the nuclear forces and is something that, on a day-to-day basis, the commanders, of course, do not want to do, because it means that they possibly will be less effective and efficient should they need to be called upon, heaven forbid, of course.

  But there are downside operational risks to that kind of approach as well. But I want to stress, Amna, that I'm not sure at this moment that there are any actual changes in the operational status of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

• Amna Nawaz:

  So why would he make this announcement then, if there are no changes?

• Rose Gottemoeller:

  I think it's a — it really echoes what he said a year ago when he was trying to really rattle the nuclear saber and make it clear that this was going to be part of his overall rhetoric throughout this war and that it — for him, of course, it underscores the seriousness of the threats that Angela outlined in her comments.

• Amna Nawaz:

  Angela, on the rattling of the nuclear sabers, we should point out the New START Treaty only relates to strategic and long-range nuclear weapons.

  But there has been concerned about Putin potentially using a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Do you share that concern?

• Angela Stent:

  Well, you can't dismiss it entirely.

  But I think Putin has used these threats to intimidate the Ukrainians, to intimidate the outside world, and really to break Western unity on this. We just saw at the Munich Security Conference how great the Western unity still is a year into this war, and given the fact that European countries particularly have suffered from the economic aftereffects.

  But he wants people to believe that he could use a nuclear weapon, a tactical nuclear weapon, particularly were the Ukrainians to try and take back — take back Crimea. And we do see, even in the Biden administration, for all of its support of Ukraine, a concern not to take actions or to allow the Ukrainians to take actions that could lead to a Russian nuclear escalation.

  So, you can't rule it out, but you shouldn't be intimidated by it.

• Amna Nawaz:

  Angela, in terms of where we are now, President Biden just today recommitted support to Ukraine. He said more sanctions are going to come against Russia. We just heard Vice President Harris in Munich say that Russia has committed crimes against humanity.

  As we're marking one year in the war, does all of this make it more likely for President Putin to negotiate or to be more deeply dug in?

• Angela Stent:

  I did not hear anything in his speech today to indicate that he's interested in negotiations, unfortunately.

  And I think, again, that was really the mood in Munich too, the understanding that this was not the time for negotiations, because Putin still thinks that he can outlast the West, that Western unity will crack, and that he will force the Ukrainians to make significant territorial concessions.

  So, I'm afraid I don't see any time in the near future the possibility for real, genuine negotiations.

• Amna Nawaz:

  Rose, I will give you the last word here. What's your take?

• Rose Gottemoeller:

  My take is that we really need to do everything we can, the United States of America, as well as other countries around the world.

  The Chinese, for example, have an interest in the Russians of staying in the New START Treaty, so that there is a good deal of predictability and stability between the two biggest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia. Of course, we're all worried about Chinese modernization, but I think it's in the general interest of the nuclear weapons states, as well as the non-nuclear weapons states around the world, to get the message out there that the strategic nuclear arms treaties that we have had now for 50 years have served a good, really strong strategic purpose.

• Amna Nawaz:

  That is Rose Gottemoeller and Angela Stent joining us tonight.

  Thank you both for your time and insights.

• Angela Stent:

  Thank you.

• Rose Gottemoeller:

  Thank you.