The Solution to India’s Sikh Protests Lies Abroad

Last week, Sikh protesters damaged Indian diplomatic facilities in the United Kingdom and the United States, smashing windows and injuring personnel at the High Commission of India in London and the Indian Consulate in San Francisco. Indian reports suggest the protesters support radical preacher and Sikh separatist Amritpal Singh, who faces an arrest warrant under India’s National Security Act. India’s police have launched a manhunt for Singh, who is believed to have fled his home state of Punjab, and detained alleged supporters in the state. Over the weekend, hundreds of protesters gathered again at the Indian Consulate in Vancouver, Canada, to protest the crackdown.

Some analysts fear that the security breaches at Indian diplomatic missions could suggest the return of the separatist violence that wracked Punjab for more than a decade beginning in the 1980s. This violence spilled beyond the state: Sikh assailants carried out the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984, and a Sikh organization was implicated in the bombing of Air India Flight 182 in 1985. Given this history, India’s political leadership is understandably concerned about a revival of separatist ideology. But to prevent future terrorist violence, it will need Western countries with significant Sikh diaspora populations to take the threat seriously, too—presenting a delicate challenge for New Delhi.

In the 1980s, some members of the Sikh diaspora supported the separatist movement in Punjab. India eventually rooted out the insurgency through harsh methods that gave no quarter to the militants. Relative political normalcy returned to Punjab, which has since seen several peaceful transfers of power. However, elements within the Sikh diaspora—which includes communities in Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the United States—have remained committed to the vision of a Sikh homeland known as Khalistan (literally, “the land of the pure”). As this diaspora has grown in power, Western countries have voiced concern over the treatment of Sikh activists in India, with some even extending political refugee status to Sikh dissidents.

In 2020, social unrest returned to the forefront in Punjab, as Sikh and Punjabi farmers organized a mass protest movement in response to national farm laws designed to end state subsidies for farmers and open up agricultural markets. Demonstrators occupied India’s capital for more than a year, ultimately leading the government to withdraw the laws. The farmers’ protest movement received widespread international support and galvanized the Sikh diaspora. The protests were mostly peaceful, and many activists who seek an independent Khalistan have sought change through nonviolent means. But the farmers’ protests, along with recent developments in diaspora communities, seem to have spawned a new generation of militant pro-Khalistan leaders.

Singh’s group, which was formed in 2021, has reintroduced a violent political rhetoric that romanticizes the militance of the 1980s. Known as Waris Punjab De, or “heirs of Punjab,” the group is allegedly linked to a new wave of violence, including several encounters with the police. In response, the Indian government has cracked down across Punjab this month, arresting suspected members and sympathizers of Waris Punjab De. Singh has so far evaded capture, but the government has set up roadblocks and limited internet service throughout the state. This crackdown has prompted protests in cities around the world, including in London, San Francisco, and Vancouver.

India’s Western partners face a challenge in responding to the possible return of Sikh separatism. The U.K. and the United States have promised to coordinate with local authorities to punish those who targeted the Indian diplomatic facilities last week. But New Delhi rightly expects more from its partners, and it would prefer to see emerging Sikh separatist groups such as Waris Punjab De designated as terrorist organizations. This would boost India’s efforts to limit Sikh separatism, especially by helping to stop diaspora support for violent organizations. India is likely to ask for assistance in stemming this foreign financing, but it could also seek the extradition of those members of the diaspora who can be held legally responsible for supporting violent separatism in Punjab.

India’s Western partners are unlikely to honor such requests, given the political power of Sikh constituencies. Democratically elected leaders in the West are already sensitive to Sikh interests and may be hesitant to take a tough stance against supporters of Sikh separatism within their own borders. Consider Canada, which has a robust Sikh diaspora mostly concentrated around Toronto. There, elected leaders tend to pursue policies in line with the demands of the diaspora, including providing asylum, dawdling on extradition requests, and largely ignoring fundraising for separatist activities. And as the 2020 farmers’ protests showed, the Sikh and Punjabi diasporas can mobilize broad support against the Indian government on the world stage.

Furthermore, Western countries remain concerned about India’s recent declines in civil and religious liberties. Under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, religious minorities face an unprecedented level of state-led persecution—including Sikhs, whose faith is distinct from Hinduism and Islam. The rise of Hindu fanaticism in India and the resulting political environment make it more difficult for Western leaders to support India’s efforts to beat back Sikh separatism, lest they be seen as condoning Modi’s efforts to build a Hindu-first state. All of this makes full-throated support from the West more unlikely.

Against this backdrop, Indian policymakers must tread carefully. New Delhi’s attempts to swiftly contain a renewed insurgency are legitimate, but its leaders need to show that they will not further erode the rule of law—especially given the country’s recent history of police brutality. India’s efforts so far have been confined to lodging official protests about the security lapses that allowed its diplomatic missions to be vandalized. But as it seeks to curb the activities of the separatists at home, it will also have to assuage the concerns of Western partners that it will not disregard legal norms.

Ultimately, Western leaders should look past their own political calculations and condemn violent Sikh separatist movements. By failing to do so, they add fodder to the popular Indian notion that the West is a fair-weather partner—which is not entirely unfounded. For example, even though India staunchly supported U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan, it was mostly sidelined in negotiations with the Taliban and the 2021 U.S. troop withdrawal. India is also circumspect about Western entreaties to Pakistan, which continue to take place despite Islamabad’s long record of supporting terrorism, including Sikh separatism. Without taking a firm stance against violent pro-Khalistan movements, Western leaders risk further alienating India.

From a geopolitical perspective, the reemergence of Sikh separatism could not come at a worse time. A more powerful Sikh separatist movement would complicate relations between India and the West, just as Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the United States shift from focusing on terrorism to containing China in the Indo-Pacific region. If these Western countries want to establish a truly strong partnership with India, they cannot continue to support diaspora networks that enable violence, even tacitly.