Presidential election seasons inevitably lead to calls for bipartisanship in foreign policy.

Hazardous waste regulation in the United States under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act has several significant problems. The regulations prioritize risks poorly, failing to set tougher standards for more-hazardous wastes. They have forced firms to spend billions of dollars on diverting waste from disposal on land, without convincing evidence of high health and environmental benefits. Finally, because the regulations raise the cost of legally managing wastes, they may encourage illegal dumping of wastes and thus actually hurt the environment more than they help it.

The program needs fundamental reform. Such reforms would relax the regulations and rely more on economic incentives. Setting up these incentives, however, requires some thought. Hazardous waste policy addresses a wide variety of substances, and its environmental effects depend on how facilities manage their wastes. Thus, traditional incentive policies, such as "green" taxes, must be tailored for this purpose. Taxes should be levied not on the wastes themselves but on the environmental releases from waste management facilities. These taxes would decentralize decisions and, perhaps more important, more clearly link the policy to its environmental goals. A modified deposit/refund (similar to bottle bills) could have similar benefits and would eliminate the policy's incentives for illegal disposal.

Our system of campaign financing fosters subterfuge and corruption, favors wealthy candidates over those not so blessed, puts candidates on a perpetual fund-raising treadmill, and is slanted in favor of incumbents over challengers.

These problems are the direct result of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act. Although the Supreme Court has struck down significant portions of this legislation as a violation of freedom of speech, what survives has done significant damage.

The usual prescription is to limit contributions even more than we now do and to put expenditure controls on congressional as well as presidential campaigns.

Such an approach would only make things worse. In 1996 the presidential candidates of the two major parties, both of whom accepted federal funds in return for agreeing to limit direct spending, had $62 million each to spend in the general election, or 31.5 cents per person in the 1996 voting-age population--less than the price of a first-class postage stamp.

The only spending candidates control is that of their own campaigns. When that spending is limited, the spending of other groups who communicate with voters--the media and special interest groups--becomes more important. Funds that cannot be given directly to a candidate are diverted to organizations that can accept them legally and spent indirectly on behalf of the candidate.

Campaign spending in the primaries and the general election in 1995–96 for all federal offices--435 members of the House of Representatives, 33 senators, and the presidency--was about $2 billion. That's only $10 over a two-year period for each person of voting age in the United States in 1966. At the same time, the Federal Election Commission spent less than 5 percent of its funds for public disclosure of campaign contributions.

Instead of further restricting and regulating campaign financing, we should

• Abolish campaign spending limits, so that candidates themselves can communicate effectively with voters
• Abolish campaign contribution limits, so that candidates can raise more money with less time and effort, give challengers the possibility of raising the money they need to compete against incumbents, and reduce the advantage of personally wealthy candidates
• Establish real-time campaign finance reporting requirements, so that we know quickly and effectively--on the Internet in twenty-four hours--who gave what to whom

Half a decade has elapsed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and nearly four years have passed since Bill Clinton became president of the United States. These two events, nearly simultaneous in occurrence, present a fitting time for an assessment of specific international policy decisions made by the White House. This juncture is particularly appropriate for an evaluation of President Clinton's handling of prominent foreign policy crises as he seeks a second term.

The Clinton administration has dealt with four high-profile problems- Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea-which demanded presidential attention, resulted in the deployment of U.S. military forces, and generated congressional and public controversy. All were small-scale operations when compared with U.S. involvement in major twentieth-century conflicts. Yet they are significant because the way they were handled may determine the way future large-scale emergencies are managed.

The Clinton administration displayed hesitation, vacillation, and ambivalence in addressing turmoil in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, which carried international ramifications. Somalia emerges as a defining foreign policy decision for the Clinton administration. After suffering a setback in Somalia, the White House moved overcautiously and abdicated leadership in the Bosnian crisis. When Clinton intervened in Bosnia and Haiti, he first narrowed the operational scope, set rigid timetables, put undue restrictions on the missions, and finally emphasized exit strategies. The results of these American efforts, therefore, are likely to be transitory. In the case of North Korea, the White House has been correct to engage the decrepit but dangerous North Korean regime, but the administration's nuclear agreement is difficult to verify and has secured inadequate quid pro quos in return for American, Japanese, and South Korean inducements for cooperation. Most important, the Geneva Agreement set a bad international precedent in the fight against nuclear proliferation.

Whoever wins the national election and takes office as president must reassert America's moral and strategic leadership to bolster U.S. credibility in a world undergoing profound change. The next president must articulate with clarity and conviction for Congress and the public the importance of America's international responsibilities that accompany its power and influence. Among the specific recommendations for the incoming administration in 1997 are the eastward enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the construction of a missile defense system, and an increase in military spending to meet future crises, which are almost certain to be greater challenges than Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, or North Korea.