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James Ceaser is the Harry F. Byrd Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, director of the Program for Constitutionalism and Democracy, and was a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author of several books on American politics and American political thought, including...
Why Do Nations Fail?
Beyond Austerity
My Primer for Obama
What Was Roberts Thinking?
The Chief Justice was neither an umpire nor a statesman. Only a lawyer.
The Court that Couldn't Say "Stop!"
At a crucial moment, the Roberts court blinked, setting back both the Constitution and any dreams of limited federal power. By John Yoo.
Franklin Delano Obama
The Unpredictability Of Deregulation: The Case Of Airlines
Some unlikely policy lessons from Jimmy Carter and Teddy Kennedy.
Native American Heritage: It’s Not What You Think
The ideas defining a free Native American society.
Yes, Be Very Worried Over Growing Polarization
Beware a fetish for 'data' and faux statistical exactitude.
The Anti-Stimulus Bill
The CARES Act cannot properly be called a "stimulus" bill.
ObamaCare vs. The Commerce Clause
Health Care vs. Health Insurance
The Palestinian Proletariat
Permanent refugees, generation after generation: these are the fruit of a U.N. agency that blocks both peace and a Palestinian state. By Michael S. Bernstam.
Glimpses of Economic Liberty
Bit by bit, courts are being forced to ponder the laws and licenses that stifle people’s freedom to work. By Clint Bolick.
The Right to Private Property
If there is one really serious intellectual and cultural problem with capitalism, it stems from the lack of a sustained and widely known, let alone accepted, moral defense of the institution of private property rights.
Few doubt, in today’s world, that a society with a legal infrastructure that lacks this institution is in serious economic trouble. The failure to respect and legally protect the institution of private property—and its corollaries, such as freedom of contract and of setting the terms by the parties to the trade—has produced economic weakness across the globe. But many also believe that this institution is not founded on anything more solid than the arbitrary will of the government to grant privileges of ownership (for the latest statement of this position, see Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership [Oxford University Press, 2002]).
Without a moral, prelegal defense, the institution of private property, which is the source of a great many benefits to us all, will forever remain vulnerable to the critics, starting with Karl Marx, who said that “the right of man to property is the right to enjoy his possessions and dispose of the same arbitrarily, without regard for other men, independently from society, the right of selfishness.” This essay argues that, contrary to widespread academic sentiments and impressions, the institution of private property rights fully accords with a sensible conception of human morality, indeed, rests on a solid moral foundation.
The Economic Effects of the Liability System
Liability law has two principal objectives: compensation of parties injured in accidents and deterrence of negligent behavior of potential injurers. Considerable evidence, however, suggests that the current liability system in the United States achieves neither. The system has high transaction costs and fails to compensate injured parties appropriately. There is evidence that liability pressure has distorted firms' incentives for innovation. In the health care sector, liability pressure has led to defensive medicine--precautionary treatments with minimal medical benefit administered out of fear of legal liability.
This essay summarizes recent empirical research on the economic effects of liability-reducing reforms to tort law. The strategy of this research is to compare time trends in economic outcomes from states that adopted law reforms with trends in outcomes from states that did not, controlling for other determinants of the outcomes in question. Differences in trends between the two types of states provide an estimate of the effect of the reforms.
In general, this research suggests that reductions in the level of liability improve productive efficiency. But even if these studied reforms improve efficiency, they may not improve the performance of the system in terms of the compensation goal. The essay concludes with a discussion of the potential effects of a wide range of largely untried reforms to the liability system, some advocating radical changes to the allocation of responsibility for accidental injuries, that seek to address both compensation and deterrence goals.
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