Military and foreign policy issues for the '96 campaign

James A. Baker, who for a long time ran the Office of Intelligence Policy Review in DOJ (which focused on FISA), and more recently worked in the Deputy Attorney General's Office on cyber issues, gave a Constitution Day address at Dickinson College.  The sp

Liam Julian on Devil May Care by Sebastian Faulks

On Thursday, May 3, 2012, David Brady, deputy director and Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, hosted a conference titled “Global Hotspots: Briefings from Insiders” featuring special guests from different countries. To begin, Oliver “Buck” Revell from the FBI gave remarks titled “The Most Significant Threats to the American People.” His Excellency M. K. Narayanan, past head of India Security, discussed “India’s Worries, Capabilities, Military and Intelligence Cooperation with the United States.” Joseph Felter, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and former national security affairs fellow (2008–9), gave a talk during the luncheon.

For more than a decade, General Xiong Guangkai used his position as the head of military intelligence to influence Chinese leadership assessments of foreign and security policy, especially Sino-U.S. relations. News reports suggest that General Xiong has finally retired, after staying in his position well past the mandatory retirement age, a longevity that most foreign observers attributed to his self-described and perhaps real indispensability. His replacement, General Zhang Qinsheng, is not a military intelligence officer by training, but has instead occupied a series of critical staff and command positions. This article analyzes General Zhang's known biographical data and presents his limited public comments for clues about his outlook and attitudes.

The conduct of the Chinese government during the recent EP-3 crisis raised important questions about the state of civil-military relations in China. Observers at the time were divided as to whether the comments of senior military leaders and editorials in military newspapers were different in content than their civilian counterparts. They were also divided over whether these differences reflected only variations in propaganda or actual institutional divergence. In addition, most analysts seemed convinced that the military monopolized critical information flows to the leadership, especially data about the causes of the collision and the lack of mayday calls by the EP-3, thus tying the hands of Foreign Ministry negotiators and perhaps even unnecessarily drawing out the crisis. Using interviews, some secondary sources, and detailed content analysis of civilian and military media during the crisis, this essay explores these themes.

Wang Ke was born Wang Maoqing in August 1931 in Xiaoxian County, Jiangsu Province (later Anhui Province). In the early 1940s, this part of Jiangsu became an operating base for the New Fourth Army. With only an elementary school education, Wang joined the local unit of the New Fourth Army as a “young soldier” at the age of 13, serving as a communicator for the armed working team of Xiaoxian County. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) commander of the local military subdistrict was Zhang Zhen, a future top People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer and powerful patron for Wang for the remainder of his career. Wang was reportedly personally trained by Zhang, who sent him first for additional education and tactics instruction.

On 15 March 2012, Chongqing Municipality leader, princeling and aspiring national elite Bo Xilai was stripped of his leadership posts, following the dramatic flight of his former deputy police chief Wang Lijun to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu and revelations about the possible involvement of Bo’s wife in the murder of a British businessman. In the wake of his purge, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Falungong-controlled media were rife with rumors about Bo’s relationships with senior military officers and even a possible coup attempt in Beijing. This article examines Bo’s ties with the PLA through his career, assesses the validity of various claims about the fallout in the military from his purge, and speculates about any possible implications for party-military relations.

Corruption among Chinese officers and enlisted personnel continues to be a point of tension between civilian and military elites in China. While the level of corruption reached its apex during the late 1980s and early 1990s, affectionately known as the "go-go" years of PLA, Inc., the repercussions of the center's decision in 1998 to divest the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of its commercial operations are still being felt in the system. For the first time, investigators and prosecutors from outside the military apparatus were given the authority to probe and pursue PLA malfeasance, and many in the military felt that the civilians pursued their assignment with far too much vigor and tenacity. This animosity was further exacerbated by reports of PLA complicity in the massive Yuanhua scandal in Xiamen and by the public prosecution of former General Staff Department intelligence chief General Ji Shengde on multiple counts of corruption. This paper analyzes PLA corruption since Tiananmen, with special emphasis on the civil-military aspects of the issue. The first section outlines the course and character of PLA corruption since 1990, as well as efforts by the military and civilian leadership to stamp it out. Particular attention is paid to the divestiture process in 1998, as well as the Yuanhua and Ji Shengde investigations. The article then concludes with an evaluation of the implications of these trends for Chinese civil-military relations and offers predictions for the future.