Today's huge global energy problems in no small measure reflect the essentially 19th-century business plans that three of the world's largest industries still pursue. . . .

The U.S. war against ISIL risks helping the enemy in the long run by lessening locals’ incentives to develop their own military and state capabilities, and that it also helps with the enemy’s recruitment and PR. The more the U.S. does militarily, the less our friends and allies in the region do.

Jacquelyn Schneider, Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution, discussed “A No-First-Use Cyber Policy? The Solution to the U.S. Two Threshold Cyber Strategy Problem.”

At Hoover's 2014 Fall Retreat, General James Mattis, an Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Hoover, discussed US foreign policy in a talk entitled “The Worsening Situation in the Middle East–and America’s Role.”

For nearly two years, former secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former secretary of defense William Perry, and former senator Sam Nunn have spearheaded renewed interest in the Reykjavik Summit of October 1986, where U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev seriously discussed the elimination of nuclear weapons...

In May 2006, the Combatant Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral William “Fox” Fallon, visited the People’s Republic of China, traveling to four cities and meeting with a wide range of civilian and military officials. During his meetings, Fallon invited the Chinese military to attend the “Valiant Shield 2006” exercise in June, an invitation the Chinese side accepted during the Defense Consultative Talks in June. This article examines the press coverage of Fallon’s trip, analyzing the comments of his Chinese interlocutors and the symbolism of his various meetings and activities.

The advent of the 18th Party Congress in early November 2012 marked a large-scale turnover of senior military personnel in the People’s Liberation Army, including eight out of the ten uniformed members of the leading Central Military Commission. Moreover, the Party’s new general-secretary Xi Jinping also replaced Hu Jintao as CMC chairman, defying expectations that the latter would stay on for an additional two years. This article examines the reasons for Xi’s “early” promotion and profiles the new members, exploring their backgrounds and possible clues to their preferences and outlooks.

As a result of the 18^th Party Congress and its subsequent plenums, especially the Third Plenum in the fall of 2013, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has embarked on a broad set of institutional reforms, tackling training, political work, command and control, and corruption among others. These reform efforts fall under the purview of newly established “leading groups,” led by senior officials in the relevant offices. This article examines the personnel and institutional makeup of these new groups, outlines their declared and undeclared missions, and assesses the probability of their success.