A new military command takes a broad, sophisticated view of the U.S. role in a neglected continent. Its job won’t be easy. By James J. Hentz.

The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) called for a shift in objectives and methods in dealing with threats to national security from an emphasis on law enforcement to prevention based in part on the use of force. The NSS proposed that, in addition to continued reliance on diplomacy, economic sanctions, and other methods short of the use of force, the U.S. should resort to force in order to prevent grave dangers where necessary, in some cases even when the threat they pose is not imminent, and despite the absence of Security Council approval. These positions raise important and unsettled issues, which the sponsoring organizations propose to consider at a meeting on Preventive Force, to be held from May 25th to May 27th, 2005, at the headquarters of the Hewlett Foundation in Menlo Park. It is being planned and organized by the Hoover Institution, in cooperation with the Hewlett Foundation and the Stanford Institute for International Studies. The meeting on Preventive Force will bring together a small group of practitioners, scholars, and officials experienced in the relevant fields of international security affairs to discuss the following issues among others: the need to consider using preventive force; the nature of preventive (as opposed to preemptive) force; the dangers of relying on preventive force as part of a national security strategy; the standards by which resort to preventive force should be governed, if its use is ever appropriate; and the principles and measures that might if adopted reduce the need to resort to preventive force. In addition to panels and speakers on these subjects, the meeting will include a televised session for the PBS program "Uncommon Knowledge," at which some of the participants will offer perspectives on the utility and wisdom of relying on preventive force as an avowed element of U.S. national security, and on the role of the Security Council in controlling such decisions. We will be joined by scholars from the Brookings Institution and members of the Princeton Project on National Security, sponsored by Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. We appreciate their help in preparing a program for the initial meetings. We will also have the participation of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

The first test for George W. Bush’s liberty doctrine. By James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul.

Hoover's Workshop on Totalitarian Regimes studies the history and development of totalitarian regimes in order to understand why they came into being, how they work, and the sources of their durability. By bringing scholars together who study the different regimes, the workshop promotes the comparative study of modes of personal dictatorship, of institutions of coercion and repression, and of the economic and social consequences of totalitarian rule. The workshop's principal resources are the unique and fast- growing holdings of the Hoover Archives on totalitarian regimes in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

The end of the cold war a decade ago has ushered in a greatly transformed international landscape. Instead of a pacific era of peace and political harmony, the world, and particularly the United States, has been confronted with a menacing challenge of rogue regimes whose propensity for violence is matched by their intentions to disrupt regional stability, contribute to outlaw behavior worldwide, or to possess weapons of mass destruction. Ruthless rogues also endanger American interests and citizens by their active or passive sponsorship of terrorism. If left unchecked, rogue states like Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and others will threaten innocent populations, undermine international norms, and spawn other pariah regimes, as the global order becomes tolerant of this political malignancy.

As a major beneficiary of a global order of free markets, free trade, growing prosperity and spreading democracy, the United States, the world's sole superpower, must take the lead in confronting rogue governments, even though our allies may balk from time to time. Specifically, American power should be used to enhance the credibility of our diplomacy. Law and diplomacy alone are unlikely to affect rogue dictators. They must be reinforced with power. Four broad policy options, which in most cases should be combined rather than implemented individually, can be applied:

• Sanctions and isolation to achieve containment of and inflict economic damage on a rogue state
• International courts and domestic prosecution to bring rogue criminals to justice
• Shows of strength and armed interventions to coerce or eliminate rogue regimes
• Support for opposition movements or covert operations to oust rogue figures

Unless the United States addresses the challenge of rogue states with a combination of force and diplomacy, the new millennium will witness a widening of global anarchy, deteriorating progress toward economic development, and declining political reform. Dire consequences await the United States if it fails to react forcefully to international roguery.

The comments of my colleagues Charlie Hill, James Noyes, Henry Rowen, and Abraham Sofaer were helpful and are gratefully acknowledged along with those from Addison Davis, David Gillette, Bradley Murphy, Douglas Neumann, Piers Turner, and Robin Wright.

For more than a decade, General Xiong Guangkai used his position as the head of military intelligence to influence Chinese leadership assessments of foreign and security policy, especially Sino-U.S. relations. News reports suggest that General Xiong has finally retired, after staying in his position well past the mandatory retirement age, a longevity that most foreign observers attributed to his self-described and perhaps real indispensability. His replacement, General Zhang Qinsheng, is not a military intelligence officer by training, but has instead occupied a series of critical staff and command positions. This article analyzes General Zhang's known biographical data and presents his limited public comments for clues about his outlook and attitudes.

This section collects opinion pieces from across the world commenting on the harms caused by the activities of the Chinese Communist Party and provides insight into the various solutions that experts and leaders suggest we pursue to protect our interests.

European lawmakers want to protect their favorite regulations—effective or not, now and forever. By James Huffman.