China’s Rise And Prospects For Security And Stability In The Indo-Pacific Region | 2020 Conference on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region | Panel 6.

Vladimir Putin's autocratic regime is bad news...for Russia and the United States. By Michael McFaul and James Goldgeier.

Despite its instability, Russia shows no signs of adopting prudent economic policies. Yet the IMF recently agreed to lend the country another huge sum of money. Hoover fellows Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, and Hilton L. Root on a gigantic act of folly.

The first test for George W. Bush’s liberty doctrine. By James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul.

Within the next several weeks the United States and its partners could well agree with Iran for the ‘return’ of the U.S. and Iran to the provisions of the 2015 “Joint Comprehensive Program of Action” or JCPOA regulating Iran’s nuclear programs.

The end of the cold war a decade ago has ushered in a greatly transformed international landscape. Instead of a pacific era of peace and political harmony, the world, and particularly the United States, has been confronted with a menacing challenge of rogue regimes whose propensity for violence is matched by their intentions to disrupt regional stability, contribute to outlaw behavior worldwide, or to possess weapons of mass destruction. Ruthless rogues also endanger American interests and citizens by their active or passive sponsorship of terrorism. If left unchecked, rogue states like Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and others will threaten innocent populations, undermine international norms, and spawn other pariah regimes, as the global order becomes tolerant of this political malignancy.

As a major beneficiary of a global order of free markets, free trade, growing prosperity and spreading democracy, the United States, the world's sole superpower, must take the lead in confronting rogue governments, even though our allies may balk from time to time. Specifically, American power should be used to enhance the credibility of our diplomacy. Law and diplomacy alone are unlikely to affect rogue dictators. They must be reinforced with power. Four broad policy options, which in most cases should be combined rather than implemented individually, can be applied:

• Sanctions and isolation to achieve containment of and inflict economic damage on a rogue state
• International courts and domestic prosecution to bring rogue criminals to justice
• Shows of strength and armed interventions to coerce or eliminate rogue regimes
• Support for opposition movements or covert operations to oust rogue figures

Unless the United States addresses the challenge of rogue states with a combination of force and diplomacy, the new millennium will witness a widening of global anarchy, deteriorating progress toward economic development, and declining political reform. Dire consequences await the United States if it fails to react forcefully to international roguery.

The comments of my colleagues Charlie Hill, James Noyes, Henry Rowen, and Abraham Sofaer were helpful and are gratefully acknowledged along with those from Addison Davis, David Gillette, Bradley Murphy, Douglas Neumann, Piers Turner, and Robin Wright.

On Thursday, May 3, 2012, David Brady, deputy director and Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, hosted a conference titled “Global Hotspots: Briefings from Insiders” featuring special guests from different countries. To begin, Oliver “Buck” Revell from the FBI gave remarks titled “The Most Significant Threats to the American People.” His Excellency M. K. Narayanan, past head of India Security, discussed “India’s Worries, Capabilities, Military and Intelligence Cooperation with the United States.” Joseph Felter, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and former national security affairs fellow (2008–9), gave a talk during the luncheon.

For Western observers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the 16th Party Congress presented a curious mixture of the past, the present, and the future. Jiang Zemin's long-rumored and ultimately successful bid to retain the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) brought back memories of party-army relations in the late 1980s before Tiananmen. At the same time, the new crop of PLA leaders elevated to the CMC represents the present and future PLA, possessing high levels of experience, training, and education, and thus professionalism. This article explores the implications of Jiang's gambit, analyzes the retirements of senior PLA leaders and the biographies of their replacements, and offers some predictions about the choice of defense minister and the future course of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-PLA relations.

The recent loss of Ming-class submarine Number 361 with all hands aboard and the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) medical system in the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cover-up threaten to further strain a Chinese party-army dynamic that was already undermined by the incomplete leadership transition of the 16th Party Congress. Yet, the evidence also suggests that Hu Jintao, despite the potential opening offered by the governance crisis over SARS, appears unwilling or unable to directly challenge Jiang Zemin's leadership at this point in time, portending more months of jockeying and ambiguity in the political arena and an unclear chain of command in the military realm.