Discussion of "Aggregate Implications of Barriers to Female Entrepreneurship"

Erik Hurst Fall 2022

Overview

- Question: How do barriers to "occupational choice" for women (in this case barriers to "entrepreneurship" and labor force participation) affect aggregate productivity and welfare in India?
- Answer: Barriers to entrepreneurship for women reduce overall productivity and welfare. Provides economic rational for removing barriers.
- Key additional insight: Removing barriers for women entrepreneurs can dramatically increase the well-being of women who are not entrepreneurs.
- Very interesting paper!

Part 1: Big Picture Overview

- Discrimination in the labor market: Conditional on human capital, women are paid less than their marginal product. [Can differ by occupation/sector]
- **Discrimination in human capital**: Women may face explicit barriers to accumulating skills lowering their marginal product in an occupation. [Can differ by occupation.]
- **Different social norms**: Nudge women away from getting human capital in certain occupations or working in certain occupations. [Can differ by occupation.]
- Different preferences/productivity for working in the home sector.
- Different preferences for working in different occupations. [Differ by occupation.]
- **Different innate endowments**: i.e., Some occupations require more "brawn" and biologically men may be endowed with more brawn. [Can differ by occupation.]

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Distinguishing between *preferences*, *productivity*, and *discrimination* is important for conducting various policy counterfactuals and computing welfare analysis.

- Suppose women <u>prefer</u> not to work in occupation j. [i.e., work of Claudia Goldin on preferences for hours flexibility, etc.]
- All else equal, there will be less women working in occupation *j*.
- If we have policies that force women into occupation *j*, that would be welfare reducing (all else equal).
- If we subsidize women moving into occupation *j*, the welfare effects may be mixed.

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- All else equal, there will be less women working in occupation *j*.
- If we have policies that force/subsidize women into occupation *j*, there could be a reduction in welfare/utility. Women may not have the human capital required in these occupations.
- Policy response should be to reduce the barriers to human capital accumulation in *j*.

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- Distinguishing between *preferences*, *productivity*, and *discrimination* is hard.
- All three forces can lead to women being underrepresented in occupation *j*.
- However, the covariance between *occupational wage gaps* and o*ccupational quantity gaps* may be useful in distinguishing between preferences and productivity/ discrimination (given some assumptions).
- Hsieh, Hurst, Klenow, and Jones (HHKJ) show that with some assumptions, discrimination in labor market for occupation *j* can lead women to be underrepresented in occupation *j* but have the *same wage gap* in *j* (relative to other occupations).
- HHKJ show that with some assumptions, preference gaps in occupation *j* can lead women to be underrepresented in occupation *j* but have a *smaller wage gap* in *j*.

Part 2: Gender Differences in this Paper

Individual Decisions

- Individuals choose:
 - Whether or not to work.
 - If work, then choose whether to be an "worker" or "entrepreneur".
 - If an "entrepreneur", then choose whether to own business in the informal or formal sector.
 - If an "entrepreneur" in a sector, also choose industry for business.
- Sectors (informal vs. formal) differ in their cost of starting a business, their tax liability, and their scalability.
- Industries ("occupations"?) in the quantitative model are manufacturing, agriculture, and services.

Individual Heterogeneity

- What defines an individual?
 - Their gender (g)
 - Their entrepreneurial productivity (x) drawn from a known distribution
 - Their disutility of working (η) drawn from a known distribution
 - Their (relative) industry specific entrepreneurial productivity (ε) drawn from a Frechet distribution.
- The first three are known when the individual makes their choice to stay at home, whether to work as a wage worker, or whether to become an entrepreneur in the informal or formal sectors.
- After the above decisions, entrepreneurs draw their industry specific entrepreneurial productivity and start business in a given industry.

What Differs Between Men and Women?

- <u>Potential Preference Differences</u>
 - Differential preferences for the *home sector*.
- Potential Discrimination/Social Norm Differences for Entrepreneurs
 - Differential costs of hiring workers in the informal and formal sectors.
 - Differential fixed costs of starting a business in both informal and formal sectors.
- Potential Productivity Differences
 - Women and men <u>workers</u> (not entrepreneurs) can differ exogenously in their *average productivity* in each sector/industry.
 - Differential <u>shape</u> of the Frechet distributions from which industry productivities (for entrepreneurs) are drawn. [Impose same means; *empirically estimate shapes* to be the same]

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What is the **Same** Between Men and Women?

- Men and women have the same average latent productivity in entrepreneurship (both in mean and variance) across all sectors
 - Rules out potential human capital differences between men and women that can translate into entrepreneurship productivity.
 - If there are differences in human capital, counterfactuals would have to account for the costs of increasing human capital.
- Men and women have the same preferences for entrepreneurship.
 - Rules out that women may prefer flexibility or having higher risk aversion (with self employment offering less flexibility and more risk).
- Men and women have the same preferences for the formal vs. informal sector and the same preferences for being an entrepreneur/worker in various industries.

Some Data From India (2005)

Firm Type	Share of Firms	Firm Size	Fraction Female Emp
Informal, Male Owned	91.9%	3.0	21%
Informal, Female Owned	7.2%	2.8	58%
Formal, Male Owned	0.8%	67.7	25%
Formal, Female Owned	0.04%	76.6	48%

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 As point of reference, 36% of non-incorporated businesses are owned by women and 28% of incorporated businesses are owned by women in US in 2018.

Identification of Gender Specific Frictions: Part 1

 Different number of women business owners (relative to men) in informal and formal sectors [Helps pin down differential entry costs for women vs. men]

- Note 1: The gender difference in the number of "entrepreneurs" in the formal and informal sectors are loaded onto the gender difference in start up costs (all else equal).
- Note 2: Does not allow for gender differences in preferences or human capital associated with entrepreneurship.
- Note 3: The gender gap in start up costs is a key friction in the model (in 2005, women faced entry costs into the formal sector that were 55% higher then men).

Identification of Gender Specific Frictions: Part 2

- Ratio of avg firm size of female owned vs male owned firms [Helps pin down gender specific hiring barriers]
- Share of female workers in female owned firms (as compared to male owned firms) [Helps pin down gender specific hiring costs for women (vs male) employees]

- Note 1: All firm sizes differences by gender loaded onto differential hiring costs.
- Note 2: Does not allow for gender differences in preferences for business size.
- Note 3: Estimated differential hiring costs for women are large (particularly in the formal sector)

Identification of Gender Specific Frictions: Part 3

 Differential labor force participation rates between men and women [Helps pin down preferences for home sector between men and women]

- Note 1: This is similar to what we did in HHJK
- Note 2: Allows model to match exactly labor force participation rates between men and women. (Women's utility from the home sector in 2005 is 2.5 times higher than men).

Part 3: A Few Quick Comments to Guide Discussion

Comment 1

- Would be nice to allow for other potential mechanisms to explain gender differences in business formation:
 - Preference differences?
 - Human capital differences?
- Is there additional data that can be brought in to help discipline other forces?
 - Wage/earnings data can help (with some structure) See HHJK
 - Does data on hours worked exist?
 - What about data on schooling/major choice?
- Distinguishing between *barriers*, *preferences*, or *productivity* is essential for interpreting the counterfactuals. It is nice to show wedges are correlated with indices of women empowerment, but that that doesn't distinguish source of wedge.

Comment 2

- I found the data work on women entrepreneurs being more likely to hire women workers super interesting!
- *I would have liked more descriptive work on this in the paper.*
 - There is one regression showing that these patterns hold controlling for industry fixed effects.
 - I would have liked to see some of the underlying micro data by industry.
 - We know women are more likely to work in some industries/occupations than others (across the world).
 - Flushing out these facts can be a lasting contribution of the paper.

Comment 3

- *How should we think about barriers to formality more broadly?*
- Most men start businesses in the informal sector.
- How much would welfare increase if the barriers to formality were removed for men (and women)?
- Through the lens of the model, I would conjecture those gains would be larger than gains from only removing gender-specific barriers.

Part 4: Concluding Thoughts

Concluding Thoughts

- Super interesting paper on a very important topic!
- There are many potential causes of gender differences in business start up rates within a country.
- Focusing on additional costs needed to be paid by women business owners is a good place to start
- But, there may be gains to also thinking about human capital differences or differences in preferences.