



Financial Regulation: SVB and Beyond



Bank failures, 2001-23




Hoover Monetary Policy Conference: How to Get Back on Track?

May 12, 2023

SVB: An Outlier?

Bank failures, 2001-23




Jiang, Matvos, Piskorski, Seru 3/13/23

Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank
Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market
Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs?

Between the balance-sheets

US banks, aggregate balance-sheet, Q1 2022, \$trn

Total assets



Total liabilities




Total equity




0 6 12 18 24

Unrealized Losses




	Total	RMBS	Non-RMBS Security	Residential Mortgage	Other Loans
MTM Loss	2.2	1.0	0.3	0.6	0.3

Hedging?




Uninsured Leverage




Uninsured Leverage & Unrealized Losses

Flight risk v turbulence



Equity/Assets




A Solvency Run...

- ❑ When interest rate increases sufficiently, a “solvency run” is possible


- ❑ Banks at a higher risk of solvency run:
 - Lower initial capitalization (**Equity**)
 - **Higher uninsured leverage**
 - **More awake uninsured depositors**

Where are self-fulfilling solvency runs possible?

Number of Insolvent Banks



Aggregate Assets of Insolvent Banks (in Trillions)



What about Regulators?



Liquidity

Fed report on SVB “liquidity” appears 320 times, “solvency” once!



But liquidity issues addressed, and yet banks keep failing!

LOTS of liquid assets
Other liquidity interventions




Bad management!


Board of directors and management failed to manage their risks

What about Regulators?



INCONSISTENT REGULATORS



Beyond SVB?



Beyond SVB?



S&L Crisis (1980s)

“Gambling for Resurrection”


Now What?

Extended coverage to
uninsured depositors

Bank Term Funding Program

Mitigates short term risk...

...but losses remain.



What next in the short run?

Resolving the Banking Crisis

This Version: April 12, 2023 (with FAQs)

First Version: March 28, 2023

[Link to Current Draft](#)

Peter DeMarzo (Stanford), Erica Jiang (USC), Arvind Krishnamurthy (Stanford),
Gregor Matvos (Northwestern), Tomasz Piskorski (Columbia), Amit Seru (Stanford and
Hoover)

Summary

1. New economic conditions have led to insolvency concerns across the banking system.
2. There are too many banks in this situation to resolve with one-off solutions.
3. Government backstops and regulatory forbearance risk a repeat of the S&L crisis.
4. Requiring banks to promptly raise equity capital will both reduce fragility and provide a needed market test to identify truly insolvent banks.
5. The amount of private capital needed is in the range of \$190 to \$400 billion.

What about the long run?

“Careful Regulations to address **unprecedented** and **unanticipated** risks?”

Interest Rate Risk

