

Demographics, Wealth, and Global Imbalances in the Twenty-First Century


Adrien Auclert, Hannes Malmberg, Frédéric Martenet and Matthew Rognlie

Hoover Economic Policy Working Group, March 2021

The world population is aging...

▶ 65+


▶ World



...wealth-to-GDP ratios are increasing...


▶ National Wealth

▶ SCF vs WID




*IND: National rather than Private Wealth. Source: World Inequality Database (WID)

...rates of return on wealth are falling ...



...and “global imbalances” are rising



Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Penn World Table (PWT) 9.1

How will demographics shape these trends in the 21st century?

- Broad agreement that demographics has contributed to historical trends in W/Y , NFA imbalances, and real returns (r)
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- Going forward, hypothesis that these trends might revert, centered on the savings rate in an aged population:

*“While a large population cohort that is saving for retirement puts upward pressure on the total savings rate, **a large elderly cohort may push down aggregate savings** by running down accumulated wealth.”*

[Lane 2020]

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[Lane 2020]

“asset market meltdown” hypothesis [Poterba 2001]

“great demographic reversal” hypothesis [Goodhart-Pradhan 2020]

This paper: a sufficient statistic approach to this question


In a baseline multi-country GE OLG model, the effect of demographic change on r , W/Y and NFA depends **only** on:

1. cross-sectional age profiles of asset accumulation, labor income, and consumption
2. demographic projections
3. the elasticity of intertemporal substitution $1/\sigma$
4. the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor η

This provides a framework for measurement, which we implement

Quantitative conclusions are robust to many plausible extensions of this baseline model


Baseline model in one picture



Slope of asset supply $\bar{\epsilon}_s$: depends on η and observables

Slope of asset demand $\bar{\epsilon}_d$: depends on σ and observables (new!)


Baseline model in one picture



Shift in asset demand $\bar{\Delta}^{comp}$: observable from composition (new!)


Large and positive in the data.

Baseline model in one picture




$$\Delta r \approx -\frac{\bar{\Delta}^{comp}}{\bar{\epsilon}_s + \bar{\epsilon}_d} < 0, \quad \Delta \left(\frac{\bar{W}}{Y} \right) \approx \frac{\bar{\epsilon}_s}{\bar{\epsilon}_s + \bar{\epsilon}_d} \bar{\Delta}^{comp} > 0$$

Baseline model in one picture




Country-specific shifts Δ^{comp} large and heterogeneous in data

Baseline model in one picture



$$\Delta \left(\frac{NFA}{Y} \right) \approx \Delta^{comp} - \bar{\Delta}^{comp}$$

Baseline model in one picture



$\Rightarrow r$ always falls, W/Y always rises, large global imbalances

A bridge between reduced-form and structural approaches

- Existing literature follows two broad approaches:
 1. **Reduced-form**, based on shift-share exercises
 - Projected asset demand [Poterba 2001, Mankiw-Weil 1989], projected savings rates [Summers-Carroll 1987, Auerbach-Kotlikoff 1990...]
 - Projected labor supply [Cutler et al 1990], demographic dividend literature [Bloom-Canning-Sevilla 2003...]

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2. **Structural**, based on fully specified GE OLG models

- Demographics and **wealth** + social security [Auerbach Kotlikoff 1987, İmrohoroğlu-İmrohoroğlu-Joines 1995, De Nardi-İmrohoroğlu-Sargent 2001, Abel 2003, Geanakoplos-Magill-Quinzii 2004, Kitao 2014...]
- Demographics and **capital flows** [Henriksen 2002, Börsch-Supan-Ludwig-Winter 2006, Domeij-Flodén 2006, Krueger-Ludwig 2007, Backus-Cooley-Henriksen 2014, Bárány-Coeurdacier-Guibaud 2019...]
- Demographics and **interest rates** [Carvalho-Ferrero-Necchio 2016, Gagnon-Johannsen-Lopez Salido 2016, Eggertsson-Mehrotra-Robbins 2019, Lisack-Sajedi-Thwaites 2017, Jones 2018, Papetti 2019, Rachel-Summers 2019...]

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- **This paper** bridges the gap between both

1. Baseline environment

Environment: demographics, production, and government

OLG model, demographic change + multiple countries facing $\{r_t\}$

Demographics (drop country subscripts)

- Exogenous, **time-varying sequence of births** N_{0t}
- Exogenous, constant sequence of mortality rates ϕ_j ▶ Mortality contrib.
- No migration

Production

- Aggregate production function with capital and effective labor
- Constant growth rate of labor-augmenting technology γ
- Perfect competition, free capital adjustment

Government

- Flow budget constraint

$$G_t + w_t \sum_{j=0}^T N_{jt} \mathbb{E} tr_j + (1 + r_t) B_t = \tau w_t \sum_{j=0}^T N_{jt} \mathbb{E} \ell_j + B_{t+1},$$

- Balances budget over time by adjusting G_t and B_{t+1} , not τ_t or tr_{jt} 10

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Problem for **heterogeneous agents** of cohort k (age $j \equiv t - k$)

$$\begin{aligned} \max \mathbb{E}_k & \left[\sum_j (\beta^j \times \psi_j \times \Phi_j) \frac{c_{jt}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right] \\ \text{s.t. } c_{jt} + a_{j+1,t+1} & \leq w_t \left((1-\tau)\ell(z_j) + tr(z^j) \right) + \frac{(1+r_t)a_{j,t}}{\phi_j} \\ a_{j+1,t+1} & \geq -\underline{a} \end{aligned}$$

- $\beta^j \psi_j \Phi_j$: discounting \times **utility shifter** \times survival prob ($\prod_j \phi_j$)
- a_{jt} : annuity holdings
- $\ell(z_t)$: risky labor supply driven by **arbitrary stochastic process** z_t
- $\tau, tr(z^j)$: taxes and **(state-contingent) government transfers**

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Equilibrium

Given demographics and policy, in an integrated world equilibrium:

- Households optimize
- Firms optimize
- Global asset markets clear (with GDP weights $\omega_t^c \equiv \frac{Y_t^c}{Y_t}$)

$$\sum_c \omega_t^c \frac{W_t^c}{Y_t^c} = \sum_c \omega_t^c \left(\frac{K_t^c}{Y_t^c} + \frac{B_t^c}{Y_t^c} \right) \quad \forall t$$

Next consider two cases, each with countries facing a constant γ

1. Small country aging alone, world at steady state $\rightarrow r$ constant
2. Many countries aging together, converging to a s.s. with r_{LR}

Compositional effects as sufficient statistics

Proposition

The wealth-to-GDP ratio of a small country aging alone with constant r and γ follows

$$\frac{W_t}{Y_t} \propto \frac{\sum_j \pi_{jt} a_{j0}}{\sum_j \pi_{jt} h_{j0}}$$

where $a_{j0} \equiv \mathbb{E}a_{j,0}$ and $h_{j0} = \mathbb{E}w_0 \ell_{j,0}$ are average initial asset holdings and pretax labor income by age.

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\Rightarrow G.E. demographic impact over time is $\Delta r = 0$, and

$$\Delta \left(\frac{W_t}{Y_t} \right) = \Delta \left(\frac{NFA_t}{Y_t} \right) = \Delta_t^{comp} \equiv \frac{\sum_j \pi_{jt} a_{j0}}{\sum_j \pi_{jt} h_{j0}} - \frac{\sum_j \pi_{j0} a_{j0}}{\sum_j \pi_{j0} h_{j0}}$$

measurable from demographic projections and hh. surveys

Why? Demographics do not affect (normalized) individual decisions

Long-run wealth and rate of return adjustment

Proposition

In world equilibrium, the long-run change in r and W/Y satisfy

$$r_{LR} - r_0 \simeq -\frac{1}{\bar{\epsilon}^d + \bar{\epsilon}^s} \bar{\Delta}_{LR}^{comp}$$
$$\sum_c \omega^c \left[\left(\frac{W^c}{Y^c} \right)_{LR} - \left(\frac{W^c}{Y^c} \right)_0 \right] \simeq \frac{\bar{\epsilon}^s}{\bar{\epsilon}^s + \bar{\epsilon}^d} \bar{\Delta}_{LR}^{comp}$$

- $\bar{\epsilon}^d, \bar{\epsilon}^s$: average long-run asset demand and supply sensitivities
- ω_c : initial GDP weights

Long-run change in country NFAs

$$\left(\frac{NFA^c}{Y^c} \right)_{LR} \simeq \Delta_{comp}^c - \bar{\Delta}_{comp} + [(\epsilon^{c,d} + \epsilon^{c,s}) - (\bar{\epsilon}^d + \bar{\epsilon}^s)](r_{LR} - r_0)$$
$$\simeq \Delta_{comp}^c - \bar{\Delta}_{comp} \quad (\text{if } \epsilon_d, \epsilon_s \text{ are similar})$$

Sensitivities of asset supply and demand

- Assuming all countries have the same capital-labor substitution elasticity η ,

$$\bar{\epsilon}^s = \frac{\eta}{r_o + \delta} \overline{\left(\frac{K_o}{Y_o}\right)}$$

→ Measurable from observables and knowledge η

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Proposition

With no idiosyncratic risk, $\underline{a} = \infty$ and $r = \gamma = 0$, in each country:

$$\epsilon^d = \underbrace{\frac{C}{Y} \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma} \cdot \text{Var}(Age_c)}_{\text{substitution effect}} - \frac{W}{Y} \underbrace{(E[Age_a] - E[Age_c])}_{\text{income effect}}$$

→ Measurable from observables and knowledge of σ

2. Measurement and implications

- Calculate shift-share Δ_t^{comp} for US and 24 other countries
- Implementation:


$$\Delta_t^{comp} \equiv \frac{W_o}{Y_o} \left(\frac{\sum \pi_{jt} a_{jo}}{\sum \pi_{jt} h_{jo}} / \frac{\sum \pi_{jo} a_{jo}}{\sum \pi_{jo} h_{jo}} - 1 \right)$$

- Data:
 - π_{jt} : projections of age distributions over individuals
2019 UN World Population Prospects
 - a_{jo}, h_{jo} : age-wealth and labor income profiles in base year
For US: SCF, LIS/CPS, and Sabelhaus-Henriques Volz (2019)
 a_{jo} includes funded part of DB pensions
Household \rightarrow individual j by splitting wealth among adults in hh

Δ^{comp} in the United States: 1950-2100

► Base year


► Historical




Δ^{comp} in the United States: 1950-2100

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
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

Where do these large effects come from?





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


Where do these large effects come from?



- In paper: separate contribution of numerator and denominator
 - Going forward: W contributes $\sim 2/3$, Y contributes $\sim 1/3$
 - Historically demographic dividend pushed Y up, reversed in 2010

Globally large and heterogeneous Δ^{comp} by 2100



Supply sensitivity $\bar{\epsilon}_s = \frac{\eta}{r_o + \delta} \frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{Y}}$:

- $\eta \equiv$ substitutability between capital and labor
- Range of $\eta = 0.6 - 1.25$


[Oberfield and Raval, 2019; Karabarounis and Neiman, 2014]

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Demand sensitivity $\bar{\epsilon}_d = \frac{C}{Y} \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma} \cdot \text{Var}(Age_c) - \frac{W}{Y} (E[Age_d] - E[Age_c])$



- Can also compare to literature estimates, range 5–200
[Zoutman, 2018; Gagnon et al., 2019; Moll, Rachel and Restrepo, 2019; Eggertson et al., 2020; Jakobsen et al. 2020]

Changes in r and W/Y : 2016 to 2100

$$\Delta r \approx -\frac{\bar{\Delta}^{comp}}{\bar{\epsilon}^d + \bar{\epsilon}^s}$$

$$\Delta \left(\frac{W}{Y} \right) \approx \frac{\bar{\epsilon}^s}{\bar{\epsilon}^d + \bar{\epsilon}^s} \bar{\Delta}^{comp}$$

A. Change in world r

EIS

η	0.25	0.50	1.00
0.60	-3.17	-1.44	-0.69
1.00	-2.14	-1.18	-0.62
1.25	-1.78	-1.06	-0.59


B. Change in world W/Y

EIS

η	0.25	0.50	1.00
0.60	116	57	28
1.00	132	77	42
1.25	138	87	50

$$\Delta \left(\frac{NFA}{Y} \right) \approx \Delta^{comp} - \bar{\Delta}^{comp}$$


A. NFA projection




→ Data points to large global imbalances for the 21st century

$$\Delta \left(\frac{NFA}{Y} \right) \approx \Delta^{comp} - \bar{\Delta}^{comp}$$

A. NFA projection



B. Historical performance



→ Data points to large global imbalances for the 21st century

3. Quantitative model

Household problem becomes

$$\max \mathbb{E}_k \sum_j \beta^j \psi_{jt} \Phi_{jk} \left[\frac{c_{jt}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \Upsilon Z_t^{\nu-\sigma} (1-\phi_{jt}) \frac{(a_{jt})^{1-\nu}}{1-\nu} \right] \quad \nu \geq \sigma$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad c_{jt} + a_{jt} \leq w_t \left((1-\tau_t) \ell_{jt}(z_j) (1-\rho_{jt}) + tr_{jt}(z_j) \right) + (1+r_t) a_{j-1,t-1} + b_{jt}^r(z_j)$$
$$a_{jt} \geq -\bar{a} Z_t$$

- From annuities to bequests:
 - assets become bequests at death, distributed as $b_{jt}^r(z_j)$
- Time-variation in mortality Φ_{jk} , utility shifters ψ_{jt} from kids in household, labor supply ℓ_{jt} , retirement age ρ_{jt}
- Fiscal rule with adjustments in taxes and transfers, income process with intergenerational persistence
- Migration

Robustness of conclusions

- Assume $EIS=0.5$, $\eta = 1$

	Δr	$\Delta \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{Y}}$	$\Delta \frac{NFA^{USA}}{Y^{USA}}$	$\Delta \frac{NFA^{CHN}}{Y^{CHN}}$
Pure compositional analysis	-1.18	77	-23	59
Baseline social security	-1.13	56	-38	67
<i>Alternative assumptions</i>				
Only social security tax	0.47	1	32	-11
Only lower benefits	-1.68	99	-75	158

1. Multiple assets
2. Accounting for historical movements in US W/Y and r
3. Reconciling literature findings on r^* effects of demographics
4. Housing
5. Population aging and wealth inequality


4. Demographics and falling savings rates

- Possible to calculate shift-share for savings rate S/Y
 - Either directly from consumption profiles
 - Or using the budget constraint (our preferred approach)

$$S_t^{comp} \equiv \frac{1}{1 + g_t} \cdot \frac{g_t \sum_j \pi_{jt} a_{j0} + \sum_j \Delta \pi_{jt} a_{j0}}{\sum \pi_{jt} h_{j0}}$$

- g_t : Growth rate of real GDP
 - Use $\sum \pi_{jt} h_{j0}$ to calculate compositional effect on labor supply

Worldwide: decreasing S_t/Y_t everywhere



Declining r despite falling savings?

- Will dissaving of the old reverse the effects of demographics?
[Lane 2020, Goodhart and Pradhan 2020]
- Measured S_t^{comp} does decline
- **But:** r does not increase
- Why? Savings is misleading with declining pop. growth. In s.s.:

$$\frac{W}{Y} = \frac{1 + g S}{g Y}$$


With demographic change, S/Y falls but g falls by more!

- How does population aging affect wealth-output ratios, real interest rates, and capital flows?
- Use compositional effect Δ^{comp} as starting point for forecasts
- Δ^{comp} are **large** and **heterogeneous** in the data
- For the 21st century, our approach:
 - Refutes the asset market meltdown hypothesis: r definitively falls
 - Suggests the global savings glut has just begun


Thank you!

Additional slides


US Wealth-to-GDP from SCF vs World Inequality Database




Share of the population aged 65+



Countries by income group




National Wealth over GDP




- Baseline safe return r_t^{safe} is 10 year constant maturity interest rate minus HP-filtered PCE deflator
- Baseline total return is


$$r_t = \frac{(s_K Y - \delta K)_t + r_t^{safe} B_t}{W_t - NFA_t}$$

where $(s_K Y - \delta K)_t$ is net capital income






Contribution of mortality to aging since 1950



Contribution of mortality to aging in 21st century





- **Measuring age-labor income profiles** h_{jt}
 - Data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
 - h_{jt} is proportional to total labor income per person
 - In 2016: normalize aggregate effective labor per person

$$1 = L_{2016} = \sum_j \pi_{j,2016} h_{j,2016}$$


- In t : L_t grows as aggregate labor input from the BLS $\frac{L_t^{BLS}}{L_{2016}^{BLS}}$
- **Measuring age-wealth profiles** $a_{jt} = \frac{A_{jt}}{Y_t/L_t}$
 - Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
 - Provide net worth by age at the household level
 - A_{jt} is aggregate household net worth over total individuals
 - Divide by Y_t/L_t^{BLS} to obtain a_{jt}

- To first order:

$$\underbrace{\frac{W_t}{Y_t} - \frac{W_0}{Y_0}}_{\Delta_t} = \underbrace{\frac{\sum_i \pi_{it} a_{io}}{\sum_i \pi_{it} h_{io}} - \frac{\sum_i \pi_{io} a_{io}}{\sum_i \pi_{io} h_{io}}}_{\Delta_t^\pi} + \underbrace{\sum_i \pi_{io} (a_{it} - a_{io})}_{\Delta_t^a} - \underbrace{\sum_i \pi_{io} \frac{W_0}{Y_0} (h_{it} - h_{io})}_{\Delta_t^h} + \Delta_t^{er}$$



Δ^{comp} around the world in 2100

[◀ Back](#)

Change in W/Y: 1950 to 2016


Age-wealth profile (SCF)	Change in W/Y: 1950 to 2016													
	1974	1979	1986	1991	1994	1997	2000	2004	2007	2010	2013	2016	DH-t	DH-c
1989	71	72	74	74	73	72	74	71	70	67	67	68	98	83
1992	71	72	75	75	73	72	74	71	70	68	67	68	99	83
1995	76	77	79	79	78	77	79	76	75	72	72	73	103	88
1998	81	82	85	85	84	82	85	82	80	77	77	78	111	94
2001	82	83	86	85	84	83	85	82	81	78	78	78	111	95
2004	88	89	92	92	91	90	92	89	88	85	84	85	118	101
2007	91	92	95	95	94	93	95	92	91	87	87	88	123	105
2010	83	84	87	87	86	85	87	85	84	81	81	81	109	95
2013	87	88	91	91	90	89	91	88	87	84	84	84	115	100
2016	97	99	102	103	101	100	103	100	98	96	95	96	129	112
DH-t	101	102	106	106	105	104	107	104	102	99	99	100	132	116
DH-c	108	110	113	114	113	112	115	112	110	108	107	108	139	123

Age-labor income profile (LIS)


Change in W/Y: 2016 to 2100

Age-wealth profile (SCF)	1989	106	107	110	111	111	110	112	109	107	105	103	102	123	117
	1992	89	89	92	92	92	92	93	90	88	86	84	83	104	98
	1995	102	103	105	106	107	106	107	105	102	100	98	97	118	113
	1998	98	99	101	102	102	101	103	100	98	96	93	93	115	109
	2001	97	98	100	101	101	100	101	99	96	94	92	91	113	107
	2004	115	116	119	120	120	119	120	118	115	113	111	110	133	127
	2007	115	116	119	119	120	119	120	117	115	113	110	109	133	127
	2010	113	114	117	118	119	118	120	117	115	113	111	110	131	125
	2013	121	122	125	126	127	126	127	125	122	120	118	117	140	133
	2016	143	145	149	151	151	150	152	149	147	144	142	141	165	159
	DH-t	128	130	133	134	135	134	136	133	130	128	125	124	148	142
	DH-c	146	148	152	154	155	154	156	153	150	148	145	144	169	162
		1974	1979	1986	1991	1994	1997	2000	2004	2007	2010	2013	2016	DH-t	DH-c
		Age-labor income profile (LIS)													


Low and high fertility scenarios




W/Y from shift-share in 2016 and in 2100




Percentage change in W/Y from shift-share



Shift-share at common age profiles (rescaled)



Shift-share at common demographic change



- Population evolves as

$$N_{jt} = (N_{j-1,t-1} + M_{j-1,t-1}) \phi_{j-1,t-1}$$

where

- N_{jt} denotes the numbers of individuals aged j in year t
 - $M_{j,t}$ is migration
 - $\phi_{j,t}$ are survival probabilities
- Total population is

$$N_t = \sum_j N_{jt}$$

- Population converges to a stationary distribution in the long run

- Let $c = c^P + nc^C$ be the total cons. of parent and children
- Assume flow utility function of a parent is

$$U(c^P, c^C) = u(c^P) + \lambda n^\varphi u(c^C)$$

- Utility maximization implies:

$$u'(c^P) = \lambda n^{\varphi-1} u'(c^C)$$

⇒ total value of having children

$$W(c) = u(c^P) + \lambda n^\varphi u(c^C) = \left(1 + \lambda^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} n^{\frac{\sigma+\varphi-1}{\sigma}}\right)^\sigma u(c)$$

- Hence $\psi_i = \left(1 + \lambda^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} n_i^{\frac{\sigma+\varphi-1}{\sigma}}\right)^\sigma$
 - Children raise the m.u.c. if $\lambda > 0$ and $\varphi > 1 - \sigma$
 - n_i comes from empirical distribution of children for parent aged i

- Retirement is phased at age T_t^r
- At age T_t^r , agents still work a fraction $\rho_t \in [0, 1]$ of total hours
- Retirement policy is therefore

$$\rho_{jt} = \mathbf{1}_{j < T_t^r} + \rho_t \mathbf{1}_{j = T_t^r}$$

- Effective labor supply is

$$L_t \equiv \sum_{j < T_t^r} \pi_{jt} \widetilde{h}_{jt} + \rho_t \pi_{T_t^r t} \widetilde{h}_{T_t^r t}$$

- Effective share of retirees is

$$\mu_t^{ret} \equiv (1 - \rho_t) \pi_{T_t^r t} + \sum_{j \geq T_t^r} \pi_{jt}$$

- Flow budget constraint

$$B_t + T_t = (1 + r_{t-1}) B_{t-1} + G_t$$

where B_t is debt, G_t are expenditures, T_t are net taxes

$$T_t = w_t N_t \left((\tau_t^{SS} + \tau_t (1 - \tau_t^{SS})) L_t - (1 - \tau_t) \bar{d}_t \mu_t^{ret} \right)$$

- Government sets retirement policy $\{\rho_{jt}\}$ and follows fiscal rules

$$\tau_t^{SS} = \bar{\tau}^{SS} + \varphi^{SS} (B_t/Y_t - \bar{b})$$

$$\tau_t = \bar{\tau} + \varphi^T (B_t/Y_t - \bar{b})$$

$$\frac{G_t}{Y_t} = \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}} - \varphi^G (B_t/Y_t - \bar{b})$$

$$\bar{d}_t = \bar{d} - \varphi^d (B_t/Y_t - \bar{b})$$

where \bar{b} is the 2016 debt-to-GDP ratio

- Coefficients φ 's regulate the aggressiveness of the adjustment

Extension 1: other sources of asset supply

- In simple cases, alternative assets just add to supply
- Allow for
 - Markups μ , capitalized monopoly profits
 - Government bonds with long-run rule $\frac{B}{Y} = b(r)$
- Then

$$\frac{a(r, \theta)}{y(r)} = \frac{k(r)}{y(r)} + b(r) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mu}\right) \frac{1}{r - (n + \gamma)}$$


- θ directly affects both W and market cap. through discounting
- Extra terms on RHS affect elasticity of asset supply ϵ^S
 - Similar formula still determines dr

- Model housing by introducing Cobb-Douglas utility


$$\frac{1}{1-\sigma} (c^{1-\alpha_h} h^{\alpha_h})^{1-\sigma}$$

- All households rent to a REIT who owns
 - fixed supply of land L , equilibrium price P^L
 - stock of dwellings H , depreciating at δ^H , investment price = 1
 - $\beta = \frac{P^L L}{P^L L + H}$ is s.s. share of land
- Households invest in mutual fund that owns the REIT
- Housing supply in steady state adjusts so that


$$\frac{a(r, \theta)}{y(r)} = \frac{k(r)}{y(r)} + \frac{\alpha^h}{1-\alpha^h} \left(\frac{\beta}{r - (n + \gamma)} + \frac{1-\beta}{r + \delta^H} \right) \frac{\sum_i \pi_i(\theta) \frac{c_i(r, \theta)}{y(r)}}{\sum_i \pi_i(\theta) h_i}$$




Projected population growth rate






Projected population shares








Distribution of bequests received























Historical trends in wealth


- We'll use our model primarily for prospective counterfactuals
- But: can the model account for trends in wealth since 1960?
- Concurrent developments to demographics over the period:
 - Falling real rates
 - Falling productivity growth
- We feed the model with observed trends in r , γ , B and G

Historical trends in wealth

► Fert./Mort.

► Inputs

◀ Inputs




Historical trends in wealth


▶ Fert./Mort.

▶ Inputs


◀ Inputs




Demographics: population distributions




Demographics: population growth rates




Country	Parameters		$\frac{W}{Y}$		Δ^{comp}	
	β	Υ	Model	Data	Model	Data
AUS	0.99	0.78	5.09	5.09	1.32	1.32
CAN	0.96	2.34	4.63	4.63	1.14	1.14
CHN	0.95	4.63	4.20	4.20	2.81	2.81
DEU	0.95	3.41	3.64	3.64	0.89	0.89
ESP	1.00	0.00	5.33	5.33	1.64	1.55
FRA	0.98	1.68	4.85	4.85	1.31	1.31
GBR	0.97	2.15	5.35	5.35	1.49	1.49
IND	0.95	3.28	3.44	3.44	3.07	3.07
ITA	1.00	0.61	5.83	5.83	1.77	1.77
JPN	0.96	1.68	4.85	4.85	0.82	0.82
NLD	0.95	3.93	3.92	3.92	1.23	1.23
USA	0.97	1.82	4.38	4.38	1.13	1.13






Historical (data)




Predicted from demographics (model)











Note: Response of wealth to a reduction in the wealth tax. We replicate the model experiments of Jakobsen et al. (2020). The first (Couples DD) analyzes a reduction of the wealth tax from 2.2% to 1.2% on the top 1%. The second (Ceiling DD) analyzes the a reduction of 1.56 percentage points on the top 0.3%.









A. Net safety demand**B. Compositional effect**