


Perspectives on U.S. Monetary Policy Tools and Instruments

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
- Fed's current primary policy tools and instruments:
 - Balance sheet
 - Fed funds rate
- My conclusions:
 - Balance sheet currently matters from liabilities side, not asset side
 - Fed funds rate control will become increasingly difficult as excess reserves shrink

Balance sheet: Fed holdings of securities (billions of \$)




Interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds

10 year Treasury yield



How do other central banks control short-term interest rate? Corridor system (ECB)

- Central bank offers to lend banks as much as they want at some fixed rate i_L
 - Banks won't pay more to borrow from someone else (i_L puts ceiling on interbank lending rates)
- Central bank offers to pay rate i_D on deposits with central bank
 - Banks won't lend for less to other banks (i_D puts floor on interbank rates)




ECB marginal lending rate (orange), rate paid on deposits (blue), and interest rate on loans between banks (gray).

Historical U.S. system

- Federal Reserve set discount rate at which banks could borrow from Fed
- But often this was a floor, not a ceiling on interbank loans!

FRED

— Interest Rates, Discount Rate for United States
— Effective Federal Funds Rate



Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions


Sources: Board of Governors, IMF



myf.red/g/lvc

Why was this a floor?

- Borrowing at discount window had nonpecuniary costs
 - Other banks would see my bank as weak
- Banks preferred to borrow fed funds from other banks at more than discount rate
- If supply of nonborrowed reserves decreased:
 - Banks forced to borrow more at discount window and incur more nonpecuniary costs
 - Increased the spread between fed funds and discount rate

Fed funds equilibrium (historical)






Current U.S. system

- Fed pays interest on excess reserves
- But this until recently was a ceiling, not a floor on fed funds rate!

In 2017 fed funds rate was fixed amount below IOER with end-of-month seasonal




Why wasn't IOER a floor?

- Fed fund lending was primarily by institutions that couldn't earn IOER (government sponsored enterprises, Federal Home Loan Banks)
- But why didn't banks that could earn IOER borrow infinite amounts from FHLBs at fed funds rate and drive FF to IOER with arbitrage?


- By borrowing fed funds, bank's total assets expand, exposing it to
 - Higher FDIC fees
 - Costs of meeting capital requirements
 - These are lower for foreign banks
 - But foreign bank costs higher last day of month due to Basel requirements
- Banks borrow fed funds up to point where IOER minus ff rate equals marginal nonpecuniary costs of balance-sheet

Fed funds equilibrium (2017)




- Money market funds, Federal Home Loan Banks can't earn IOER
- But can lend to Fed with reverse repos
- Alternatively could lend to private party with repo collateralized by Treasuries
- Reverse repo rate puts a floor under Treasury General Collateralized Finance rate

But IOER does not put a ceiling on GCF




As GCF moved above IOER, the IOER-FF gap vanished


GCF and IOER



fed funds and IOER




What changed? Drop in volume of fed funds lending



Source: <https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/fed%20funds> 21

Federal Home Loan Banks are finding better alternatives to lending fed funds




Source: FHLB end-of-quarter financial reports

http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofweb_userWeb/pageBuilder/fhlbank-financial-data-36

- What Fed policy tool is putting ceiling on interest rates currently?
- Huge volume of excess reserves may be one factor

Federal Reserve Liabilities (billions of \$)



Conclusions

- Size of balance sheet seems imprecise tool for controlling interest rates
- As reserve balances shrink, Fed control of short-term interest rate may become more difficult
- May want to shift focus from fed funds to another short-term rate
- May want to revive stigma-free discount window to get effective ceiling on short rates