



# STRATEGIKA

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Conflicts Of The Past As Lessons For The Present

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## HOW THE WAR IN UKRAINE ENDS

IN THIS ISSUE

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK • NIALL FERGUSON • RALPH PETERS

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## ABOUT THE POSTERS IN THIS ISSUE

Documenting the wartime viewpoints and diverse political sentiments of the twentieth century, the Hoover Institution Library & Archives Poster Collection has more than one hundred thousand posters from around the world and continues to grow. Thirty-three thousand are available online. Posters from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia/Soviet Union, and France predominate, though posters from more than eighty countries are included.

# Our Twenty-First Century Eighteenth-Century War

By Edward N. Luttwak

Every war must end, but no war need end quickly—neither world war makes it to the top ten in longevity. The nearest parallel to the Ukraine war—the Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648), fought between a smaller but more advanced nation, and the world-spanning Spanish Empire, the superpower of the age—persisted for eighty years because the Spanish kept losing, but there was so much ruination in that declining power.

In our own days, expeditionary wars fought against enemies far away who could hardly fire back, lasted for many years as the different war-ending theories promoted by fashionable generals were tried seriatim to no avail, till the day when evacuation was preferred even if utterly ignominious.

The eighteenth-century wars fought by rival European monarchs who could all converse in French with each other, were enviously admired in the bloody twentieth century, because they allowed much commerce and even tourism to persist—utterly unimaginable even in Napoleon’s wars, let alone the two world wars—and because they ended not in the utter exhaustion of the collapsing empires of 1918, nor in the infernal destructions of 1945, but instead by diplomatic arrangements politely negotiated in between card games and balls. The 1763 Treaty of Paris that ended the Seven Years’ War and French America, inadvertently opening the way for the American republic, was not drafted by the victorious British Prime Minister Lord Bute, but by his very good friend the French foreign minister Étienne-François de Stainville, duc de Choiseul, who solved the three-way puzzle left by the French defeat by paying off Spain with Louisiana, Britain with money-losing Canada, and regaining the profitable sugar islands for France, which still has them.

And instead of the winners charging the losers with incurable bellicosity as Versailles did with Germany, or stringing them up individually as war criminals, as in the ending of twentieth-century wars, eighteenth-century winners were more likely to console the losers just short of “better luck next time”—and in a century in which there was war every single year without exception from 1700 to 1800, if one war ended another necessarily started or at least persisted, allowing a “next time” soon enough.

By contrast, the ensuing nineteenth-century wars held no lessons at all for the twentieth century, which was equally bereft of a Napoleonic superman at the start and ample tropical lands easily conquered later on, while the Crimea expedition in the middle was mostly a counter-example of how not to wage war, and the Franco-Prussian war was just as sterile: all it proved was that there really was only one Helmuth von Moltke who could win wars by parsimonious force, unlike his homonymous nephew who lost a five-year war in its first five weeks; and that there really was only one Otto von Bismarck, who crowned his incomplete 1871 unification of German lands by refusing to complete it by unifying all Germans as the Italians were unified, lest the world combine to make a bigger Germany smaller.



Image credit: Poster Collection, BU 3, Hoover Institution Archives.

Clearly only the eighteenth-century precedents apply to the Ukraine War. Neither Putin nor Zelensky speaks French but neither needs it to converse in their Russian mother-tongue, and if they do not actually talk (Putin demurely said that he could not possibly be expected to negotiate with Kiev's drug addicts and neo-Nazis), their officials certainly can, and do so often.

When it comes to the persistence of commerce in war—the habit that Napoleon wanted to break with his *Blocus Continental* against British exports—every day Russian gas flows to the homes and factories of Ukraine on its way into Western Europe, with Ukraine transferring money to Russia every day, even as it attacks its faithful customer. And, Ukrainian wheat is now shipped past Russian navy vessels to reach the hungry Middle East, after a negotiation unthinkable in twentieth-century wars, or in Napoleon's either.

In Russia, sanctions have certainly diminished easy access to imported luxuries in local franchised shops, but they still arrive via Turkey at a slight premium . . . or discount depending on the previous Moscow markup. All over Russia the sanctions have been felt in all sorts of ways because the country was actually more internationalized than anyone realized, including Putin no doubt (arriving in Tomsk at 0600 one winter morning at a temperature of minus infinity, the one place to eat was McDonalds).

But unlike China, which must choose between fighting and eating protein—some 90% of its chicken, pork, and beef is raised on imported cereals plus some 150 million metric tons of soya per annum from U.S. and Canadian Pacific ports, or the Atlantic ports of Brazil and Argentina that would be an ocean too far for China-bound vessel—Russia produces all its own staple foods and can therefore fight *and* eat indefinitely, and neither does it import any energy as China must.

In other words, just as Russian propaganda has claimed from day one, the sanctions cannot stop the war materially, even if they played a large role in the flight of tens of thousands of elite Russians, once again diminishing the human capital of the largest European nation, as the Bolsheviks and Civil War did a century ago, and the opening of borders did again a generation ago.

It is a problem that the sanctions, which end the war by stopping Russia, might cause defections from the Western camp if the winter happens to be unusually cold, a subject on which Angela Merkel—so enthusiastically applauded for closing nuclear power stations and preferring Russian piped gas over American and Qatari liquified gas—has remained strangely silent.

As for tourism, after a cascade of announced restrictions on Russian tourists, on August 24 the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex announced that a total of 998,085 Russian citizens had legally entered the European Union through land border crossing-points from the beginning of the war to August 22, with more arriving by air via Istanbul, Budapest, and central Asian airports. Other Russians have continued to holiday in the Maldives and Seychelles via Dubai, on the sound eighteenth-century principle that a war should not prevent gentlemen from taking the waters, or diving into them in this case.

The confiscation of yachts from several Russians accused of proximity to Putin generated quite a bit of *schadenfreude* income to the yacht-less everywhere in the early summer, but did not deprive a great many other Russians from the use of their bedsitters, apartments, houses, palaces, and chateaux all over Europe—and there many of them are to be found as of this August writing.

In other words: this war will not end because of Russian suffering: it is not the hunger siege of Leningrad, but more like Moscow's mosquitos that are surprisingly energetic biters.

So how can the war end? Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ (Herakleitos of Ephesus, Fragment 53): "War is the father of *all* things"—hence, necessarily, even of peace, by itself exhausting the material resources and manpower necessary to keep fighting, and thereby inducing the acceptance of lesser outcomes—even capitulation—as the costs of better outcomes keeps rising.

The other kind of war termination—the kind that is peddled to innocent students in "conflict-resolution" classes, the kind that gains international applause and Nobel Peace prizes, war-ending not obtained by

exhaustive war but by the benevolent intervention of third parties—can never yield peace, only a frozen war as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the perpetual imminence of renewed war dissuades construction and the return of workers from Germany.

As for peace achieved by the exhaustion of resources—the most durable form of peace because deprivation is better remembered than other people’s deaths—of the two belligerents only Ukraine can run out of material resources.

But now it cannot, because the United States has seemingly added Ukraine’s sustainment to its other entitlement programs along with whatever contribution the British and northern European countries care to make, and the relative pittance given by the largest countries France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Still less can material deprivation force Russia to withdraw and desist because its population and economy are so little engaged in the war—from the start Putin insisted that it was not a national war warranting the mobilization of all national resources, but merely a “special” (=limited) military operation; accordingly, taxes are not expected to increase but for inflation-effects.

In the days of Herakleitos himself, war was the father of peace principally by killing off young warriors, forcing a relaxation of conflict till the next lot would grow to military age. It was that process that weakened Sparta’s strength as it ran out of life-time-trained Spartiates, with the Theban upstarts of master-tactician Epaminondas delivering the death blow at Leuctra in 371 BCE by killing 400 Spartiates out of 700 in all.

In the Second World War the Germans were clearly running out of men by the end when 16-year-olds served on anti-aircraft gun crews, and the *Volkssturm* conscripted up to age 60. Some 5.3 million died in uniform, including 900,000 men born outside Germany’s 1937 borders, both Austrians and *Volksdeutsche* conscripted by the SS, which never acquired the right to conscript in Germany itself. The ever-worsening manpower shortage even forced the SS to betray its most basic principle by recruiting non-Aryan troops, not only Vlasov’s Russian Liberation Army of 130,000 at its peak, but also SS Turkic, Indian (ex POWs), and Arab units recruited by the Palestinian Mufti Amin al-Husseini.

As for the Red Army, it lost millions in defeat and pell-mell retreat in 1941 and then again in 1942, losing still more men on the offensive at the end. But in 1943 Russian generals no longer impatiently marched men over minefields instead of clearing them, nor sent them to attack without artillery support and tanks. By 1944 it was the Russian artillery that conquered battlefields by fire, and that is how Russia did not run out of men, even if its demography remained skewed for decades.

The allies were never in such straits because the British evacuated from Dunkirk more than two-thirds of their soldiers in 1940, then had many South Africans and Indians for their North African misadventures, and by late 1942 at El Alamein they had vastly superior artillery in lieu of infantry, with more of the same in Italy from 1943, when fresh Americans, the French Army’s Moroccan *Tirailleurs* and *Goumiers*, and the free Polish II Corps did most of the hard fighting.

So it was not until 1944 that the exhaustion of the British army’s appetite for fighting emerged in insistent demands for the massive aerial bombardments of any significant resistance, or at least energetic air support at every turn. Having started much later, most American servicemen were not even tired when the war ended, with total losses individually tragic but demographically unimportant, as was even more true of all later American fighting till now.

In Ukraine, so far there is no question of war-ending manpower losses. In spite of a declining population, the number of male Ukrainians that annually reach military age is at least 235,000 or 20,000 per month, while Ukrainian casualties, both killed or invalided out of action, have not exceeded 5,000 per month.


As for Russia, colorful stories that relate the use of mercenary units, the lucrative contracts offered to combat volunteers, and most recently, prison recruitment drives, are not true indicators of a manpower

shortage: every month more than 100,000 Russian males reach military age, while the monthly average of killed and invalided wounded are under 7,000.

So the stories reveal something else: Putin's refusal to declare war, mobilize the armed forces, and require conscripts to serve in combat, evidently in fear of the reaction of Russian civil society. Yes of course Russian civil society has been silent on the war, or near enough. But its silence is not the silence of the grave signifying nothing. It is a very eloquent silence: fight your war but leave our sons alone. Because Putin has heeded the tacit injunction, his war can continue well past this winter and the next . . .

Putin started the war on February 24 with an ultra-modern, high-speed, paralyzing *coup de main* based on the soundest principles of "hybrid warfare," which works beautifully in war games, as do its close U.S. siblings beloved by beribboned generals who never fought patriotic Europeans in arms. Having expected therefore to take Kiev in one day, and all Ukraine in three or four (that was, of course, the forecast of the CIA and DIA that partake of the same brew), Putin discovered he was wrong by week one if not before.

Because Putin did not stop then, he cannot stop now, so that we might be headed for another Seven Years' War. If so, we should fight it in true eighteenth-century fashion: with the most vigorous material support of Ukraine's war, and no sanctions at all on Russia, because they permit Russian retaliation that weakens our allies' resolve. And yes, it would be nice to find another Étienne-François de Stainville, duc de Choiseul to find an elegant way out of the war, perhaps by staging face-saving plebiscites, because to hope for Putin's fall is not a strategy.



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# War and Economics in Ukraine

By Niall Ferguson

Modern war is in many ways the continuation of economics by other means.

In a realist perspective, Russia would seem bound to prevail over Ukraine sooner or later. Its territory is 28 times larger; its population is 3.3 times larger; more importantly, its GDP is nine times larger. Western sanctions do not alter the fact that Russia still has significant (if reduced) revenue from exporting its gas and oil, whereas Ukraine is heavily dependent on Western economic and military assistance. Time might seem to be more on Russia's side than Ukraine's.

But Russia could still lose this war. Size is not everything. Thirteen American colonies vanquished the British Empire. North Vietnam defeated the United States. The Soviet Union could not win in Afghanistan. Empires decline and new nations break free.

The invader is at an inherent disadvantage in the face of a strong nationalist sentiment. Putin has inadvertently turned the formerly divided and disgruntled inhabitants of Ukraine into the Ukrainian people. And wars of national liberation against declining empires are more often successful than not. That is why there are few empires left.

One may debate whether the United States and the Soviet Union were empires between the 1940s and the 1980s (both denied it). What no one denies is that they waged a Cold War. That meant that World War III did not take place, but many proxy wars were fought in which one or more of the superpowers backed one or more sides in regional conflicts.

Right now, Ukraine is not only fighting for its freedom; it's a proxy for a U.S.-led effort to weaken Russia (and perhaps also to deter China from similar aggression). The Ukrainian war effort is sustainable only thanks to large-scale military and financial aid from the United States and its Anglosphere and European allies. At the same time, U.S.-instigated sanctions (especially technology export controls) are driving the Russian economy and military back into the late 20th century.

This is an asymmetric war in Cold War terms. The combined resources of the countries actively supporting Ukraine vastly exceed Russia's, while China has thus far offered minimal support to Russia.

If the U.S. further increased its supply of precision weaponry to Ukraine and added tanks to the mix, the Russian positions in Kherson, Luhansk, and Donetsk could probably be made unsustainable. Similarly, if the EU further increased its economic support for Ukraine, the risk of an inflationary crisis would recede.



Image credit: Poster Collection, CS 99, Hoover Institution Archives.

## POLL: How does the Ukrainian war end?

- Russia will absorb the Russian-speaking borderlands and accept an armistice.
- Russia will widen the war to other NATO countries, forcing a regional armistice.
- Russia will destroy the infrastructure of eastern Ukraine and declare victory.
- Ukraine will expel all Russians and regain all of Ukraine.
- The UN will establish a cease-fire and plebiscites for disputed areas.

There is a scenario in which the Russian position in Ukraine now unravels. This is a largely colonial army, its best battalions severely depleted by six months of highly destructive warfare, its ranks replenished by raw recruits from impoverished provinces east of the Urals. Its morale is low. Such armies can be brought to a tipping point if they encounter well-armed, well-organized, and well-motivated opponents. Defeat in land war is much less about killing enemy soldiers than getting them to surrender, flee, or desert.

The question in the scenario of a Russian collapse would be whether Putin was willing to risk direct NATO retaliation against Russia by resorting to tactical nuclear weapons or (an option less discussed but potentially more effective) strikes on Western satellites aimed at disrupting Ukrainian communications.

Because neither Washington nor Moscow wants to go head-to-head, I suspect Western assistance to Ukraine will continue at around the current level, ensuring that the war lasts not for just a few more months but for perhaps a year or more.

The war in Ukraine has now entered its seventh month. Most wars are shorter. Of 88 wars between states since 1816, nearly a quarter lasted less than two months and

38% between two and six months. Of the remaining 35, 12 were over within a further six months, seven lasted up to two years, 12 two to five years, and four more than five years.

In other words, a war that continues for six months has a roughly one-in-three chance of lasting no longer than a year in total, but an equal chance of lasting between two and five years. We should not forget the Korean War, the first “hot” war of Cold War I, which lasted three years and did not end with a conclusive peace agreement—merely an armistice.

In March, Ukraine’s armed forces defied almost everyone’s expectations by winning the Battle of Kyiv. Six months later, they have again surprised the so-called realists with their eastern counteroffensive. However, to win this war, Ukraine cannot afford to lose economic stability.

The Ukrainian army may appear to be winning as I write, but the Ukrainian economy is losing. As is typical in a war of this sort, the invaded country suffers a severe decline in output simply because productive land and assets are taken over by the enemy or destroyed. At the same time, one-third of Ukrainians have been displaced by the war; over 6.8 million have left the country and the rest are internally displaced. A large proportion have lost their jobs and homes.

Ukraine’s GDP shrank by 15.1% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2022. In the second, it shrank by 37%. The overall annual contraction of output will be around 33%, according to government estimates. Unemployment is at Great Depression levels. Inflation, which began the year at 10%, is now at 24% and rising.

If the U.S. and EU want to see a Ukrainian victory, they must step up their support immediately to reduce the Kyiv government’s budget deficit and help the central bank avoid runaway inflation.



If, on the other hand, they would privately prefer this war to just keep going—in the belief that Ukraine is “bleeding Russia dry”—they may be striking the optimal balance between military and economic assistance.



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He is the author of sixteen books, including *The Pity of War*, *The House of Rothschild*, *Empire, Civilization*, and *Kissinger, 1923–1968: The Idealist*, which won the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Prize. He is an award-making filmmaker, too, having won an international Emmy for his PBS series *The Ascent of Money*. In 2020 he joined Bloomberg Opinion as a columnist. In addition, he is the founder and managing director of Greenmantle LLC, a New York–based advisory firm, a co-founding board member of Ualá, a Latin American financial technology company, and a trustee of the New York Historical Society and the London-based Centre for Policy Studies. His book *The Square and the Tower* was published in the U.S. in 2018, and was a *New York Times* bestseller. A three-part television adaptation, *Niall Ferguson’s Networld*, aired on PBS in March 2020. His most recent book, *Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe*, was published by Penguin in May 2021.



Image credit: Poster Collection, RU/SU 2224, Hoover Institution Archives.

## Disastrous Triumph, Triumphant Disaster?

By Ralph Peters

History-in-the-making delights in irony, confounding our expert analysis, surprising us with the obvious outcome we missed, and turning apparent victories into failures (or the reverse). So let us examine an alternative outcome for the current struggle in Ukraine that, while seeming to grant Russia's blood-drunken czar much of what he desires, enfeebles Russia irreparably, while stripping Ukraine of a fifth of its territory (including Crimea) but turning tomorrow's Ukraine into a robust, prospering, unified, fiercely patriotic, and unassailably democratic nation-state firmly embedded in Europe—and a Sparta on Europe's eastern marches.

To be clear, this writer's preferred outcome would be a whopping Ukrainian victory that reclaimed the Donbas and humiliated Vladimir Putin beyond rehabilitation (those Europeans who have warned against humiliating Putin are just the latest generation of Munich Conference alumni, though without Neville

Chamberlain's moral center). Yet, if the Ukrainian military does mount successful counteroffensives that threaten to erase Russia's costly gains, Putin will almost certainly employ at least one tactical nuclear weapon to freeze the situation . . . leaving his inept, bled-out military defeated, but Russia still occupying much of the Donbas and, perhaps, a land-bridge to Crimea.

So, for analytical purposes, let's assume a distasteful short-term outcome, with fetid Russian boots planted on eastern Ukraine's soil for years to come.

What will Putin have won? The result will echo Tacitus: "They make a desert and call it peace." The Russian military's enthusiasm for the destruction of civilian infrastructure and its brusque disregard for the lives and property even of those Ukrainians who had been well-disposed toward Russian ambitions will leave Putin with a devastated Donbas he cannot afford to rebuild; a shrunken local population embittered and ruined; a laughing-stock military; appalling casualty counts that will inevitably emerge; a continued Russia-wide brain-drain; and a Russian domestic population forced to forego economic advancement for decades to come as sanctions persist, alternative supplies of gas are secured, technology languishes, and once-eager Western firms hesitate to re-enter Russia, even should that be permitted.

Even if he "wins" for now, Putin has lost face around the world while alarming opponents, competitors, strategic partners, and sometime-allies alike with his demonstration of the fragility of the imperfect-but-functional global order that so long has shielded even wayward states. And it is unlikely that any military in the world will make Russian equipment its first choice for arms purchases for a long, long time—depriving Russia of vital income that had kept its defense industry alive, if—as we now know—incompetent.

Putin cannot afford to win, but he dare not lose. The great strategic gambler of our time has overplayed his hand maniacally. Nor is it merely figurative to say he cannot afford to win: It's economic reality. While Russia

would, in its venerable tradition, construct a few showpiece projects in the Donbas, Luhansk and Donets are destined to become black holes for a ruble bound to weaken in the future. And Moscow-funded projects will inevitably be gutted by corruption—which has arguably grown more pervasive during Putin’s reign than at any other point in Russia’s breathtakingly corrupt history (the czars and general secretaries, although employing corruption as a tool of statecraft and control, realized that it had to observe limits). With its industries long antiquated and now wrecked, the Donbas will be an economic (and security) quagmire from which Russia cannot escape without a change of government so profound that it’s impossible within Russian political culture—a public mentality hewn over a millennium, more by the axe than the icon (*pace* the late James Billington).

And Ukraine? Deprived of its quarrelsome easternmost provinces and their obsolescent industries, Ukraine would be more homogenous, more unified, more galvanized, and more unforgiving toward Russia than it has ever been. Western and, to an extent, central Ukraine are, after all, the “real” Ukraine—not only because Ukrainian has been the predominant language, but because five centuries of contact with, occupation by, and cultural sympathy with Europe, from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth through the Habsburg era, left indelible habits of mind, greater expectations, more-sophisticated preferences, a different public psychology, and even architecture that is anything but Russian. Lviv (Lvov, Lemberg) is closer in virtually every respect to Vienna than it is to Moscow.

A rump Ukraine also would enjoy tremendous goodwill from the West, along with generous aid, snowballing foreign investment (quite likely also from China), and the likelihood of full European-Union membership within a decade. While Putin and his successors struggle and fail to revivify his conquests, renewed Ukraine would gleam. And the real Russian ruling class, the *siloviki*, the security boys, would find their old contacts and sympathizers in Ukraine purged and, far worse, an economic and democratic success story on Russia’s southern border, a model whose quality of life would excite the envy of Russia’s citizenry (and if there is one emotion that is quintessentially Russian, it’s envy).

From the Holodomor, the great Soviet-decreed famine that starved millions of Ukrainians to death a century ago, to Putin’s latest invasion, Russia’s core “success” in Ukraine has been to define and strengthen Ukrainian identity over mounds of Ukrainian bodies.

If Putin’s wretched military does hold on to most of its current conquests, it will only ruin Russia’s already-fading prospects as a competitive power, while playing the bewildered midwife to the birth, at last, of a true Ukrainian nation.



**RALPH PETERS** is the author of thirty-four books, including works on strategy and security affairs, as well as best-selling, prize-winning novels. He has published more than a thousand columns, articles, and essays here and abroad. As a U.S. Army enlisted man and career officer, he served in infantry and military intelligence units before becoming a foreign area officer for the dying Soviet Union and the new Russia. As a soldier, journalist, and researcher, he has experience in more than seventy countries, covering various wars and trouble spots. His historical fiction won the American Library Association’s Boyd Award for Literary Excellence an unprecedented four times and also received the Herodotus Award and the Hammett Prize. Additionally, he was the 2015 recipient of the Goodpaster Award, presented each year to a distinguished American soldier-scholar. In 2017, he was selected for the U.S. Army’s Officer Candidate School Hall of Fame.

## Discussion Questions

1. How legitimate are Russia's historical claims to Ukraine?
2. Is Ukraine integrally a part of Europe, now or in the past?
3. Why do the Russian people seem to support the misadventure in Ukraine?
4. What are the chances that Putin will extend the war to NATO neighbors of Ukraine?
5. What are the risks of Ukraine using U.S. weapons to attack the Russian Black Sea fleet?

IN THE NEXT ISSUE  
U.S. Military Readiness



## Military History in Contemporary Conflict

As the very name of Hoover Institution attests, military history lies at the very core of our dedication to the study of “War, Revolution, and Peace.” Indeed, the precise mission statement of the Hoover Institution includes the following promise: “The overall mission of this Institution is, from its records, to recall the voice of experience against the making of war, and by the study of these records and their publication, to recall man’s endeavors to make and preserve peace, and to sustain for America the safeguards of the American way of life.” From its origins as a library and archive, the Hoover Institution has evolved into one of the foremost research centers in the world for policy formation and pragmatic analysis. It is with this tradition in mind, that the “Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict” has set its agenda—reaffirming the Hoover Institution’s dedication to historical research in light of contemporary challenges, and in particular, reinvigorating the national study of military history as an asset to foster and enhance our national security. By bringing together a diverse group of distinguished military historians, security analysts, and military veterans and practitioners, the working group seeks to examine the conflicts of the past as critical lessons for the present.

## Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict

The Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict examines how knowledge of past military operations can influence contemporary public policy decisions concerning current conflicts. The careful study of military history offers a way of analyzing modern war and peace that is often underappreciated in this age of technological determinism. Yet the result leads to a more in-depth and dispassionate understanding of contemporary wars, one that explains how particular military successes and failures of the past can be often germane, sometimes misunderstood, or occasionally irrelevant in the context of the present.

## *Strategika*

*Strategika* is a journal that analyzes ongoing issues of national security in light of conflicts of the past—the efforts of the Military History Working Group of historians, analysts, and military personnel focusing on military history and contemporary conflict. Our board of scholars shares no ideological consensus other than a general acknowledgment that human nature is largely unchanging. Consequently, the study of past wars can offer us tragic guidance about present conflicts—a preferable approach to the more popular therapeutic assumption that contemporary efforts to ensure the perfectibility of mankind eventually will lead to eternal peace. New technologies, methodologies, and protocols come and go; the larger tactical and strategic assumptions that guide them remain mostly the same—a fact discernable only through the study of history.



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