TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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ABOUT THE POSTERS IN THIS ISSUE
Documenting the wartime viewpoints and diverse political sentiments of the twentieth century, the Hoover Institution Library & Archives Poster Collection has more than one hundred thousand posters from around the world and continues to grow. Thirty-three thousand are available online. Posters from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia/Soviet Union, and France predominate, though posters from more than eighty countries are included.
Deterrence, Air Defense, and Munitions Production in a New Missile Age

By Thomas Karako

The war in Ukraine has decisively confirmed the arrival of a new missile age. This era is characterized by a surge in the global supply and demand signals for both missile-based delivery systems and the means to counter them. In addition to the morale of the Ukrainian people and intelligence for targeting support, it is a conflict defined by the mass use of precision fires. The threat of Ukrainian air defenses has impeded the free rein of Russian air forces, and thousands of Russian missiles have done the same to Ukraine. All of this occurs under a nuclear shadow and continued Russian nuclear saber-rattling. How well the threats of nonnuclear air and missile attack are handled will shape the prospects of future nuclear proliferation.

This conflict’s primacy of long-range standoff weapons—missiles of all stripes—confirms a much longer trend. Decades ago, the primitive guidance of Scuds led to them being categorized as a boutique or terror weapon, rather than one with military effect. No more. The diffusion of precision guidance—and advanced intelligence and targeting systems—have made them effective and indispensable. Russia has pounded Ukraine for months with precision missile fires—the largest volume of ordnance in Europe since World War II—exacting a heavy toll on economic infrastructure, military forces, and population, even as it has failed at combined arms and many ground assaults. Iran, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have used precision missiles extensively in regional conflicts. As Assistant Secretary of Defense John Plumb testified in May, “Offensive missiles are increasingly weapons of choice for Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, for use in conflict and to coerce and intimidate their neighbors both in peacetime and crisis.”

Precision-guided standoff missiles and drones have also proven decisive for Ukraine. High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers—which deliver Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rounds (GMLRS)—have been especially effective. Just eighteen launchers have delivered punishing effects on Russian forces. Antiship missiles like the Ukrainian-built “Neptune” have placed Russian ships at risk, most notably sinking the Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, on April 14, 2022. While commentators argue about supplying Ukraine with longer-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), it is clear that even short-range precision fires, enabled by advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, have considerably shaped the course of the war.

The United States has been slow to take these lessons to heart. For decades, the U.S. and other countries took air superiority for granted as a kind of birthright. Investments in air and missile defense are not
commensurate with the increasing density of Chinese ballistic missiles in the Indo-Pacific, or the potential for long-range cruise missile attacks against the mainland United States.

Warnings against this hubris came many times over the years, in the form of drone- and missile-centric wars in Nagorno-Karabakh, the 2014 attack on Crimea, the missile attacks on the Saudi and Emirati oil fields in 2019, and Iran’s 2020 ballistic missile attack against U.S. forces in Iraq. So confident were U.S. policymakers in their focus on counterterrorism and rogue states that by 2012 the U.S. Army had largely divested its regular force of short-range air defenses. Only a few years later, the Army reversed course, and in 2016 made air and missile defense one of its top five modernization priorities. The U.S. military has been scrambling to acquire capable defenses against both drones and cruise missile defenses. Important new capability will arrive in the coming years, but playing catch-up will take time.

Air defense cannot win a war, but its absence can lose one rather quickly. The past neglect explains why much of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine has been older weapons: the Army is stretched thin on more modern air and missile defenses. Systems sent include thousands of Stingers—of Afghanistan fame in its war against the U.S.S.R.—both man-portable and those launched from Avengers, some of which were produced decades ago. Another item, pulled from an early drawdown, was a Cold War–era S-300 surreptitiously relocated to Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. Long-retired HAWK launchers, out of service for the U.S. Army since the mid-1990s, were also sent. Two batteries of NASAMS cruise missile defenses—a Norwegian system primarily operated by the United States only in the national capital region, has also been used to great effect. Finally, in a major gesture of political support, the United States is now sending their premier air defense system, Patriot, but only one out of 60 or so batteries. All this may sound like a lot, but their capacity is dwarfed by the numbers of offensive Russian missiles, and as a result their interceptors are being expended at fantastic rates.

When Zelensky visited Washington in December 2022, he again reaffirmed his plea for air defenses, and there is no doubt of Ukraine’s need. In a press gaggle, he quipped that after the Patriot battery was delivered, he would then signal to the Biden administration that he needed more. But that seems unlikely. There are just not enough air defenses lying around. It is an unfortunate but unsurprising consequence of decades of taking air superiority for granted.

By spotlighting the costs of a munitions deficit, these events have been a wake-up call for the defense community, and in particular the world of defense acquisition. The 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategy documents seem to envision a “blunting” strategy to pursue deterrence by denial rather than deterrence by punishment, and to do so especially with nonnuclear means. These hard lessons must be heeded to deter aggression elsewhere in the world. China has been watching the Ukraine conflict as closely as anyone. They will learn from Russian failures and compensate for them in creating an advantageous position to attack Taiwan or other neighbors.

Now it is time to internalize the implications of this new missile age: an age of vulnerability to air and missile attack, a need for active defenses, and the demand signal for the thousands of munitions that would be expended in any major-power conflict. The United States’ overwhelming conventional overmatch through the 1990s and 2000s has allowed the military to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons to deter the next Putin. Without a renewal of conventional munitions stockpiles, and the air defenses needed to counter those of our adversaries, this posture will come increasingly under question.

The 200 or so Javelin anti-tank weapons President Trump sent to Ukraine were better than blankets, but both they and the aid provided by the Biden administration in the six months or so prior to the 2022 invasion were too little, too late. In retrospect, both administrations were engaging in business-as-usual “munitions minimalism,” delivering well short of what was necessary to deter Russian aggression. The question now is whether the United States is up to the task of becoming a new arsenal of democracy to correct those past habits. Can or will the United States radically increase its defense production rates soon enough to matter?
This discussion has been long in the making. The defense industrial base has been made in commercial industry’s image, with lean, minimal inventories and just-in-time supply chains optimized for peacetime and prioritizing unit cost over resilience and the capacity for victory. The apostle of munitions production has been Bill LaPlante, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, who has emphasized the need to reorient toward mass munitions production to anyone who will listen. To do so, the United States must break a risk-averse acquisition culture terrified of a future inspector general investigation into “building too many Tomahawks.” A reform of our foreign military sales process is also in order, with a preference for commonality over bespoke solutions, so that missiles and munitions can be traded among allies in a pinch. What a few years ago was an academic discussion about “the return of mass” has become a defense planning reality. The astonishing rates of fire by both sides in Ukraine has put all doubt aside.

Congress was initially slow to listen. This spring, it looked like the Biden administration’s Critical Munitions Fund might not be approved. When the annual defense authorization act was passed in December, one provision, Section 1244, included a multi-year procurement authority for tens and hundreds of thousands of antiship, antiair, and strike missiles, as well as artillery and air defense. An additional ten billion dollars was authorized for Taiwan alone, but much of that will not be delivered for years. A bipartisan consensus is emerging that the world cannot afford for the United States to run lean on munitions. The question now is whether Washington is willing to develop a new arsenal of democracy to correct it. Can or will the United States radically increase its defense production to rearm, at a rate fast enough to matter?

That which matters most, of course, is the capability of the United States and its allies to deter major conflict with China. If assistance to Ukraine has exhausted large stocks of munitions, a conflict with China would demand far more. To rebuild its arsenal and its capacity to be an arsenal of democracy, America should look and rely upon its alliance network, an asymmetric advantage that China and Russia lack. Allies in the Indo-Pacific have independently begun to wake up to the rise of China. Japan’s FY2023 budget includes building 1,000 Type 12 missiles later in the decade, alongside plans to acquire 500 Tomahawk missiles from the United States in the nearer term. Tokyo is also planning to double its defense budget from 1% to 2% of GDP. Australia, too, is under way with a substantially more ambitious national defense strategy. Canberra plans to acquire Tomahawks as well as multi-mission SM-6 missiles. Numerous other countries have been approved for HIMARS and GMLRS, and tens of billions of dollars of orders are now on backlog. What will it take to meet these orders? The Defense Department is already taking steps to double or triple our GMLRS production. Yet the workforce training and the supply chains cannot be turned on overnight. At some point, it may be too late.

And that is a bleak, all-too-possible future reality. In the days after the February 24 invasion of Ukraine, former prime minister of Japan Shinzo Abe declared, in a striking break from precedent, that Japan should explore a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States, like that of the United Kingdom. Kurt Campbell, the National Security Council’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, recently warned that American allies in that region threatened by China’s growing arsenal are considering developing nuclear weapons of their own. Similar warnings were recently made by the Saudis, long rumored to have a latent nuclear capability. President Biden himself has declared that the attempt to revive the Iran Deal is “dead.” Iran’s neighbors are preparing for what comes next.

At the end of the day, the possibility of deterrence through nonnuclear means also must not be taken for granted. Two decades of distraction come with a cost. For this reason, the challenges of the next decade will come against a backdrop of heightened nuclear risk. This new missile age is still very much a nuclear age. If conventional forces are not produced in sufficient quantities to resource a strategy of deterrence by denial, the need for deterrence by retaliation will become increasingly necessary. In that world, nuclear proliferation to allies like Japan, South Korea, and even Australia may be plausible, even necessary.

This does not have to happen. Ukraine has also shown that our conventional forces, including most prominently long-range fires and air and missile defense, can be a powerful means to tailor deterrence and reduce
rather than increase our reliance on nuclear weapons. This is an avenue that allows the United States to leverage its unique advantages with allies and partners. It will, however, take a concerted effort, and nothing less than a renewed commitment to arsenal building. But if conventional deterrence does not succeed with sufficient missile and munition production, the alternative path will be bleak. The next missile age could become a dark age.

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The odds of Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine remain low despite Putin brandishing the threat as he has done frequently in the past. Tactical nuclear strikes on Ukrainian military units or logistical centers will not suffice for Russia to prevail against an adversary as capable and determined as Ukraine, absent the collapse of NATO support. Nor are Russian units trained to operate in a nuclear environment. Even in the likely event that NATO would not reply with nuclear weapons, Russia crossing the nuclear threshold may galvanize a devastating NATO conventional response that would ensure Putin’s defeat in Ukraine, confounding the motivation for Putin to go nuclear in the first place. Putin reaps the maximum benefit and minimum risk of Russia’s considerable advantage in tactical nuclear weapons via nuclear blackmail, inspiring fear. Russia also has an array of conventional military options that could achieve as much or more on the battlefield than any plausible tactical nuclear strike.

Yet prudence forbids ruling out categorically the possibility that a combination of desperation and calculation may impel Putin to go nuclear. What then? The global consequences will depend largely on what NATO and the United States in particular choose to do and not to do. Every option on the spectrum entails significant costs, risks, and imponderables.

Any variation of the soft option—acquiescing or imposing more sanctions without significantly increasing the quality and quantity of military aid to Ukraine—likely will amplify the ominous ramifications of Russia using nuclear weapons. To begin with, it would almost guarantee more Russian nuclear blackmail beyond Ukraine, starting with the Baltics, then Poland, with the object of neutering NATO and decoupling NATO from the United States.

Any variation of the soft option also would trigger major negative domino effects in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. Those commentators who speculate that China would distance itself from Russia if it launched a tactical nuclear strike woefully underestimate the broadening and deepening cooperation between Xi Jinping and Putin, which they formalized in the Sino-Russian Pact announced on February 4, 2022. Putin’s imperial ambitions mesh nicely with Xi’s own implacable determination to have China displace the United States as the world’s preeminent power. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently warned that China is moving on a much faster timeline to take Taiwan. A soft response to Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine would accelerate that timeline.

Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States faced a perilous and deteriorating military position in East Asia. The Heritage Foundation’s “2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength” underscored the strong possibility that the United States could lose a war to China, rating our navy weak and our air force very weak. Although the domestic turmoil Xi unleashed with his draconian Covid lockdowns may stay China’s hand...
for the time being, any perception that Russia benefitted from crossing the nuclear threshold is more likely to lower rather than raise the inhibitions of Xi to coerce the surrender of Taiwan sooner rather than later. Even if Xi ultimately refrains from following through on a nuclear threat, a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine will boost the credibility of any Chinese bluff, making a less than stalwart Biden Administration even more reluctant to call it. Meanwhile, an insidious combination of a Russian nuclear attack, swelling Chinese belligerence, and the perception of diminishing U.S. reliability should the Biden Administration opt for a soft response likely will spur Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to become nuclear powers themselves.

The perception of a weak response to Russia using nuclear weapons will entail immediate and intense negative repercussions in the Middle East. The Iranians would almost certainly react by intensifying their strategy of nuclear blackmail against American allies in the region, and doubling down on their threats to annihilate Israel, giving Israel even more incentive to launch a preemptive attack to forestall an Iranian nuclear attack. Even if that danger does not materialize, Russia using nuclear weapons will accelerate the burgeoning nuclear arms race in the world’s most volatile region.

The antithesis of the soft option—NATO replying in kind to Putin’s use of nuclear weapons—is the least likely and perhaps even less desirable response than doing nothing. The danger of catastrophic escalation, the existence of effective but more limited conventional alternatives to Russia’s huge advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, and the less than implacable resolve of the Western European continental members of NATO and the Biden Administration render this option moot.

General David Petraeus’s more muscular version of various intermediate options between doing nothing and going nuclear offers by my reckoning the best practicable strategy for defeating Putin in Ukraine, bolstering the credibility of American power globally, and placing the burden on Putin to escalate the conflict between NATO and Russia to the nuclear level—a chilling scenario that probably would make even Putin at his most reckless flinch. Petraeus calls for “NATO—a collective—effort that would take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the battlefield of Ukraine and also in Crimea and every ship in the Black Sea Fleet.” Although not without significant risk of its own, the Petraeus option has the added virtue of requiring no American boots on the ground to achieve it. Making clear to Putin that using nuclear weapons would elicit such a devastating conventional military NATO response best enhances the chances of deterring Putin from doing it in the first place. Anything short of the Petraeus option or some combination of measures Admiral James Stavridis contemplates—among them delivering MiG-29 era fighter aircraft currently in the hands of the Poles or even American F-16s, or an aggressive cyberattack on Russia’s military capabilities—will only invite aggression on multiple fronts.

Whether or not Putin goes nuclear, any outcome of the conflict in Ukraine must at a minimum restore Ukraine’s borders prior to Russia’s invasion on February 24. Otherwise, Putin wins and the United States and

POLL: What happens if Russia detonates a nuclear bomb in Ukraine?

- There is no strategic value in using a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, so few consequences will follow.
- After the initial uproar, the world will learn that it was a Russian blunder and agree it will never be repeated.
- The reaction depends on whether Russia finds advantages in using a nuclear weapon.
- There will be an immediate devastating but conventional NATO response against Russian forces.
- Armageddon: The West will go to its highest alert ever, as it stares down Russia in a strategic nuclear showdown.
Ukraine lose, emboldening Russia, China, and Iran while demoralizing our allies. Although I wish I could say categorically that Putin has fatally underestimated Western strategic clarity and resolve, the jury is still out on that, considering the Biden Administration’s long record of signaling the contrary: spending much less than we need on national defense; prioritizing the White Whale of its Green agenda over the imperatives of traditional geopolitical rivalry, economic prosperity, and energy independence; and refusing to reverse its catastrophic de facto open border policy inimical to national sovereignty and the credibility of our pledges to respond vigilantly to threats thousands of miles from home. Nor do I find reassuring the re-emergence, after decades of hibernation, of a still small but growing and vocal segment of Republican Party eager to abandon America’s vital role as the world’s default power, heedless of the likely consequences. Nothing would give me greater pleasure that to have the Biden Administration, and the weak links of the Western Alliance—Germany and France—prove these concerns groundless. If not, international relations will enter the fast lane of the Autobahn to becoming more dangerous and Hobbesian, especially if Putin’s Russia uses nuclear weapons without serious consequences.


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Putin’s Nuclear Risk and Reward Calculation

By Jakub Grygiel

Moscow regularly engages in nuclear saber-rattling, and its battlefield problems in Ukraine have only increased the tempo and volume of Russian rhetorical reliance on nuclear weapons. Using nuclear weapons, even on a very limited, tactical level, is not cost-free, however. The global consequences in particular may be counterproductive for Russia.

Even though tactical nuclear weapons are meant to alter the dynamics on the battlefield—in this case, in Ukraine—their use by Russia targets the West as the primary audience. The tactical target is Ukraine and its forces, but the strategic audience is the West. Russia could launch a tactical nuclear weapon in order to block a Ukrainian offensive, to destroy an urban center, or even to simply signal the willingness of further escalation by exploding it over an uninhabited area far from the frontline. Regardless of the immediate target, the principal effect sought would be to demonstrate to the Western alliance that Russia was willing to use the “absolute weapon,” breaking an alleged international taboo, and above all threatening to escalate a local war on the eastern steppes of Europe into a wider conflagration with devastating consequences for the whole continent, if not more. The purpose of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be to terrorize the West, compelling it through the fear of further nuclear escalation to stop its military backing of Kyiv. Putin may be calculating that because of this fear, the West would cease the cautious but so far consistent and very effective logistical support of Ukrainian forces, letting Russian manpower and artillery achieve battlefield dominance.

Russia could be partially correct in such an assessment because the immediate benefit would likely be a disintegration of the superficial Western unity in support of Kyiv. In some European capitals (Berlin, Paris, Rome), while criticizing Putin for the use of nuclear weapons, a lot of voices on every side of the political spectrum will call for the end of hostilities, putting enormous pressure on Ukraine to end its military operations and to acquiesce to a diplomatic deal favorable to Moscow.

Furthermore, there would be a growing chorus of European critics blaming Russia’s use of nuclear weapons on the strongly pro-Ukrainian positions of countries like Poland and the U.S. that are the primary sources of arms for Kyiv, and thus that would be seen as responsible for the escalation of violence. Such a posture would satisfy two broad strategic approaches always present in Western capitals: one is the continued search for “strategic autonomy” (the French version) or more simply a deep skepticism toward the U.S.; and second is the dislike of Poland and other Central European countries that are seen in Germany and Italy as overly anti-Russian and thus an obstacle to efforts aiming at some sort of grand reconciliation with Moscow.

It is possible that the Western European response will differ if the Russians use a nuclear weapon over a Ukrainian city, causing thousands (or tens of thousands) of civilian casualties (as opposed, for instance, to using it on a
sparserly populated battlefield). In that case, there may be a popular moral opprobrium, spurred by decades of anti-nuclear movements. The outcome, however, may not be a firmer posture against Russia but a more generic call for some version of “nuclear zero,” targeting equally Russia and the U.S. (especially, again, in Germany and Italy where the anti-nuclear movements have been most successful). In either case, the end result will be that American nuclear presence in Europe (i.e., through nuclear sharing) will be politically more difficult.

The response to a Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons will likely be very different in Central Europe. Both because of a heightened sense of threat and because of Western European opposition to nuclear weapons, Poland will renew its requests to participate in nuclear sharing and to store tactical nuclear warheads on its territory. Moreover, as the pacifist pressures grow in Berlin, Central European capitals will increase their demands that Germany put its financial resources to aid them in defensive efforts as well as in helping another, likely larger, wave of Ukrainian refugees. This will exacerbate an already tense intra-European relationship.

In brief, instead of catalyzing a unified European response, a Russian use of nuclear weapons will deepen the divergent strategic postures in Europe—overall, a mildly positive outcome for Moscow, especially if the anti-nuclear, pacifist factions win the argument in Western European capitals.

But the picture is more mixed with the rest of the world. A Russian use of nuclear weapons is in fact likely to result in a much weaker support for Moscow from China and Iran (as well as states, such as India, that are sitting on the sidelines). These two states have in practice backed Russia, including by supplying it with weapons (e.g., Iranian drones, North Korean artillery shells probably with tacit Chinese approval), calculating that a Russian victory in Ukraine would continue to upend the existing international order (and conversely, that a Russian defeat would strengthen the West and allow the United States to focus exclusively on Asia). But a Russian use of nuclear weapons would elevate the risk of dragging Beijing and Teheran into a wider, potentially even nuclear, war that could directly affect their interests and their territories. In other words, these states fear entrapment by Russia and consequently will detach themselves from Moscow in the moment it uses a nuclear weapon.

Obviously, Putin may make a different calculation leading him to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He may privilege a divided West over Chinese support. Or he may think that his domestic base demands a punishing act against Ukraine, a nation that has been presented to Russians as inferior, perhaps non-existent, and certainly full of fascists. Or, in an act of desperation, he may order a nuclear attack in Ukraine for personal self-preservation, to forestall a military loss of a “special military operation” that was supposed to be short and glorious. But in the end the effects would likely be detrimental to Russia—both for its narrow objective of dominating Ukraine and for the wider goal of restoring Russian global grandeur.

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Discussion Questions

1. What sort of tactical nuclear weapons do Russia and the West possess?
2. How could a tactical nuclear weapon be used to advantage on a conventional battlefield?
3. To what degree do missile defenses systems offer any defense against tactical or intercontinental nuclear missiles?
4. Is it possible to fight a tactical nuclear war without escalating to strategic weapons and Armageddon?
5. What are the likely global consequences, if any, should Russia employ a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine?
IN THE NEXT ISSUE
NATO and Ukraine
Military History in Contemporary Conflict

As the very name of Hoover Institution attests, military history lies at the very core of our dedication to the study of “War, Revolution, and Peace.” Indeed, the precise mission statement of the Hoover Institution includes the following promise: “The overall mission of this Institution is, from its records, to recall the voice of experience against the making of war, and by the study of these records and their publication, to recall man’s endeavors to make and preserve peace, and to sustain for America the safeguards of the American way of life.” From its origins as a library and archive, the Hoover Institution has evolved into one of the foremost research centers in the world for policy formation and pragmatic analysis. It is with this tradition in mind, that the “Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict” has set its agenda—reaffirming the Hoover Institution’s dedication to historical research in light of contemporary challenges, and in particular, reinvigorating the national study of military history as an asset to foster and enhance our national security. By bringing together a diverse group of distinguished military historians, security analysts, and military veterans and practitioners, the working group seeks to examine the conflicts of the past as critical lessons for the present.

Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict

The Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict examines how knowledge of past military operations can influence contemporary public policy decisions concerning current conflicts. The careful study of military history offers a way of analyzing modern war and peace that is often underappreciated in this age of technological determinism. Yet the result leads to a more in-depth and dispassionate understanding of contemporary wars, one that explains how particular military successes and failures of the past can be often germane, sometimes misunderstood, or occasionally irrelevant in the context of the present.

Strategika

Strategika is a journal that analyzes ongoing issues of national security in light of conflicts of the past—the efforts of the Military History Working Group of historians, analysts, and military personnel focusing on military history and contemporary conflict. Our board of scholars shares no ideological consensus other than a general acknowledgment that human nature is largely unchanging. Consequently, the study of past wars can offer us tragic guidance about present conflicts—a preferable approach to the more popular therapeutic assumption that contemporary efforts to ensure the perfectibility of mankind eventually will lead to eternal peace. New technologies, methodologies, and protocols come and go; the larger tactical and strategic assumptions that guide them remain mostly the same—a fact discernable only through the study of history.

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