

HOOVER DIGEST

RESEARCH + OPINION ON PUBLIC POLICY

SUMMER 2021 NO. 3

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ON THE COVER

Julie Helen Heyneman, a daughter of San Francisco, sailed for Europe in 1891 to immerse herself in art. Heyneman would live a full life in pursuit of her passion—as painter, teacher, and writer—but for a brief period during the terrible Great War, she also shone as a humanitarian. In 1916, a world away from San Francisco, she founded a place in London called California House as a refuge for disabled Belgian soldiers. Her example helped the public understand—and prepare for—the needs of wounded warriors. **See story, Page 224.**



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Summer 2021

HOOVER DIGEST

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

THE ECONOMY

The Twilight of Human Rights?

Today's deepest challenge to the values of the West comes from China, which is moving to sweep away the very idea of individual rights.

By Charles Hill

The idea of "human rights" is modern. Humanity's history only recently has recognized the need for such a category, and a concomitant need to explain what the category covers and where it comes from.

Through most of the twentieth century, and now in the twenty-first to a considerable extent, there has been a structural dichotomy between two regimes: the largely autocratic kind, which declare human rights to be material in content: food, clothing, and shelter; and open societies which, while agreeing to material needs, have given most political weight to ideals of freedom and justice. All through the Cold War decades the centralized, one-party regimes of "the East" stressed material necessities while "the West" valorized political considerations. That dichotomy no longer prevails, but the concept and its practices as actually carried out have shown "human rights" as continuing to evolve ever more into "an American thing."

***Charles Hill** (1936–2021) was a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-chair of Hoover's Herbert and Jane Dwight Working Group on the Middle East and the Islamic World. He was a longtime lecturer in International Studies at Yale University and Yale's Brady-Johnson Distinguished Fellow in Grand Strategy.*

The United States has become the heir, the manager, and the defender of human rights as a global imperative. The modern history of the idea and its implementation has followed a winding path, but its major milestones can be located over the past four hundred to five hundred years as marking the road to a project, or pillar, of world order in the most consequential sense. These might reveal, significantly yet sparingly, a trajectory of global-scale change increasingly moving toward an American-defined contribution to universal betterment for all nations and people.

Among these achievements would be the Mayflower Compact of 1620; Roger Williams's Rhode Island idea of liberty of conscience; New England's perception of a "natural law" for man created in God's image and therefore prior to and above the state; and Jonathan Edwards's 1741 sermon "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," which would be interpreted as the foundation stone for each individual's decisions on the greatest issues of the human condition—a turning point later referred to as "the first American Revolution."

When colonial New England congregational meeting houses began to evolve into town meeting halls, a new political consciousness began to take hold. By a process which today might be called "reverse engineering" it could be argued that if a) an individual person was God-created, then b) all persons in at least one important sense must be regarded as equal. Equality would require a political system of democracy, which in return would be legitimized theologically. This inevitable circularity produced an awareness that in a world of irrefutable diversity the only irreducible basis for equality would be "the soul." No two people could ever be considered "equal" except in the recognition that every soul had to be equal to all other souls. Here, as in other dimensions of political life, a theological concept can be located as the origin of a later political imperative.

This, in an "obvious" extrapolation, would be transformed into the doctrine of "the equality of the states" (as the former United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros Ghali would repeatedly affirm, "a profound doctrine"). As with individuals, so also with states: an undeniable differentiation of each "to all" of the collective would be, in judicial terms, overridden by the need to make everyone, in some sense, equal.

HOW STATES FIT IN

Much of the modern history of the international diplomatic system can be explained as a self-organizing effort to gain acceptance of a fundamental duality: that each state is a basic and individual unit of world affairs, yet

WHICH FUTURE? Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian leader Vladimir Putin tour the Kremlin. Human rights, from Beijing's point of view, are alien and unsuited for present and future times. [Russian Presidential Press and Information Office]

that taken together, all states in the international system are conceived in some sense as universal. Thus we accept "the universality of human rights." The simplicity of this recognition is founded upon a complex intellectual and political accommodation. The achievement of this process across the past two or more centuries should be regarded with admiration by all decision makers of the world order. To put it more directly, the essence of human rights is to be found in the universality of that concept and its actualization, and universality itself is a quality that must be studied, understood, and strengthened. The international state system and the world order which is its product is comprised of a complex of structures and ideas which must be understood and administered as a coherent totality.

Human rights have been recognized at least semi-formally and partially in established international system agreements. The 1973 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—CSCE—in Geneva, led to the Helsinki Accords of 1975, a bitter political struggle that was complicated and fraught by linking the acceptance of concepts of freedom of thought, of conscience, and of religion to a parallel diplomatic recognition of Soviet influence in accordance with what Moscow regarded as the national borders of Eastern European countries, all of which were in the USSR's "sphere of influence."

China is convinced of the superiority of its one-party regime and of the West's inevitable loss of world leadership.

In the same context, and under the United Nations Charter charge to the UN organization to promote and encourage respect "for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all," the UN Human Rights Council's neglect and mismanagement of these responsibilities led the United States to withdraw from the council in 2018, citing its failure to produce reforms and to oppose human rights abusers discriminating against Israel. As the American ambassador to the council, Kelly Craft, stated, the council had become "a haven for despots and dictators, hostile to Israel, and ineffectual on the human rights crises."

DEFINING RIGHTS

The definition of human rights in our time has somehow been understood or assumed, yet never quite clearly spelled out. The example of Hannah Arendt is more than relevant to the need for clarification and simplicity, as her thoughts, decisions, and commitments go to the heart of the matter. Arendt left Germany and Europe for the United States to escape the impending Nazi movement toward further genocidal actions. Two critical concepts are exemplified by her career as a political philosopher and intellectual model: her condition as "stateless" and her perception of "the banality of evil."

Through the experience of her own years as a stateless person, Arendt understood the necessity for a state entity that would declare and defend the equality of all its people. The logic that would follow would then require an open political system, that is, democracy, that would give each person an equal voting right. And in turn, this would create an imperative for a free, responsible, and open legal system—the "rule of law"—for law enforcement and judicial administration.

There then appears, almost as a matter of course, a "ladder" of politically recognized and/or politically active categories: from the soul to the person to the state to a national or ethnic culture giving political power beyond the state to a larger entity, e.g., the Uighur Autonomous Region, to an even larger yet coherent collective such as Tibet or Mongolia.

This achievement must be assessed anew as individual states may be observed as gathering—for various reasons—into "spheres of influence." There is a China sphere, a Russia sphere, an India sphere, an Iran sphere, and in various forms a Japan, Saudi, and other such spheres. This emergence of a sphere-of-influence era is, as they say in Silicon Valley, very nontrivial, as two differing developments are coming into effect and must be neutralized or managed.

The first development is that although there is a doctrine of "the equality of states," there is no doctrine to recognize an equality of *spheres*. A second, related, development is that the international state system's concept of universality will not automatically attach itself to an "age of spheres of influence"—yet these two attributes, equality and universality, will be indispensable to the successful working of the world order as we know it now.

With such diversity, can there be anything approaching universal rights? Yes, if the international significance given to CSCE and the Helsinki Accords is recognized for the forward-looking measures originally attached to them. The specific language will be contested, but it can be legitimate to claim legitimacy for a short lineup of universal rights on the foundation stones of freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, of conscience, and of political action within a nation-state system of the rule of law—all understood to be available to "the people" under reasonable conditions and requirements. This amounts to the first ever achievement of a true world order of universal reach.

The United States has become the heir, the manager, and the defender of human rights as a global imperative.

IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES

Thus we arrive at a turning point in contemporary history. From President Xi Jinping's "thought" and other Chinese documents, it is clear that leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are convinced of the superiority of their one-party regime and of the West's and America's decline and inevitable loss of world leadership. China in nearly every dimension is prepared

or preparing to supplant the United States in the pre-eminent role. This, in Beijing's terms, is a certainty and already well under way.

The US State Department has officially described the world situation:

> Awareness has been growing in the US—and in nations around the world—that the Chinese Communist Party has triggered a new era of great-power competition. . . . American statecraft depends on grasping the mounting challenge that the PRC poses to free and sovereign nation-states and to the free, open, and rules-based international order that is essential to their security, stability, and prosperity.

Official PRC documents have described the present situation in hundred-year terms, beginning with the formation of the Chinese Communist Party in the May Fourth Movement (1917–21). This, in PRC terminology, is an "objective" reality that is now coming to fruition and will end the era of "White" Western dominance of the international state system.

The key to this global transformation will turn on "universal" human rights. These, from Beijing's point of view, are alien and unsuited for present and future times. Xi Jinping's "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," that is, a world led by autocratic, undemocratic regimes, is said to be the wave of the future, a wave about to break on the shores of the West.

This contest already has begun in the matter of human rights: are they "Western," or are they truly universal in some fundamental way? ◘

Charles Hill: Grand Strategist

The late Hoover fellow was a genius at weaving "giant ideas" into analyses of the problems, and the promise, of the world.

By Harrison Smith

Hoover research fellow Charles Hill, a Cold War diplomat who advised two secretaries of state and the head of the United Nations before reinventing himself as a university professor, founding Yale's influential Grand Strategy program to connect history and literature to the study of statecraft, died March 27 at a hospital in New Haven, Connecticut. He was 84.

Laconic and soft-spoken, Hill spent nearly his entire government career working behind the scenes, avoiding photo ops while serving as a speechwriter and aide to secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George P. Shultz. He was later a policy consultant to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the secretary-general of the United Nations, during a tumultuous period in the 1990s that included the breakup of Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda and civil war in Somalia.

"Attention isn't something that's very interesting to me. It seems to use a lot of time that could be spent on something else," he told the *Hartford Courant* in 2006. "Ronald Reagan had a plaque on his desk which read, 'There's no limit to what you accomplish, as long as you don't care who gets the credit.'"

Harrison Smith** is an obituary writer for the **Washington Post.

A self-described "Edmund Burke conservative," Hill championed what he described as the liberal world order, arguing in recent years that Islamism posed a global threat and that the United States "has to stand for democracy."

Hill started out in the Foreign Service, with postings in Europe, East Asia, and South Vietnam, where he was a speechwriter for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. He later advised Bunker on the Panama Canal treaty negotiations and, in 1974, began working for Kissinger as a speechwriter.

"He reviewed almost everything I wrote," Kissinger said in a phone interview. "What made him effective was his thoughtfulness, his unselfishness, his dedication to ideas, his understanding of human beings." Hill, he added, possessed an "acute judgment" on issues ranging from the evolution of China to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which he increasingly focused on during the Carter administration.

Hill served as political counselor for the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, director of Arab-Israeli affairs, and deputy assistant secretary of state for the Middle East. In 1985, he was named executive aide to George Shultz, a post that made him chief of staff to Reagan's top diplomat during a period that included nuclear weapons negotiations with the Soviet Union and efforts to start a dialogue with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

In part, "his influence lay in his quite extraordinary, relentless note-taking," said his former student Molly Worthen, author of *The Man on Whom Nothing Was Lost,* a 2006 biography of Hill. He produced about twenty thousand pages of notes—chronicling everything from a religious ceremony in Fiji to comments that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, made at dinner—resulting in documents that shaped policy discussions.

"The international world of states and their modern system is a literary realm."

"I don't think there was anyone that Shultz trusted more," Worthen said.

After George H. W. Bush took office as president, Hill resigned from the Foreign Service and helped Shultz write his 1993 memoir, *Turmoil and Triumph*. Three years later he began teaching full-time at Yale, where he was best known for Studies in Grand Strategy, a yearlong course he created in 2000 with historians John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Kennedy. Loosely modeled after a class at the Naval War College in Rhode Island, the course examined large-scale issues of statecraft and social change while drawing on classic works of history and literature.

WORLDLY WISE: Charles Hill's class was a forum "to talk about giant ideas and not simply make foreign affairs a matter for the technocrats." [Eric Dietrich—US Navy]

"The international world of states and their modern system is a literary realm; it is where the greatest issues of the human condition are played out," he wrote in a 2010 book, *Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order,* which examined the development of the modern state with help from works by Homer, Thucydides, Franz Kafka, and Salman Rushdie.

Hill came to embody the Grand Strategy course, which was credited with inspiring similar classes at schools including Duke and the University of Texas. Addressing students by their last names, holding open-door office hours each week, Hill developed a devoted following among undergraduates.

"Charlie's criticism of the Clinton administration was always that it was a bunch of very, very smart wonks who can't see the forest for the trees," Worthen said. Hill and his colleagues "were reasserting the need to talk about giant ideas and not simply make foreign affairs a matter for the

technocrats," Worthen said. "And then 9/11 happened. I was an undergraduate then, and we were so hungry for someone to explain it to us."

Morton Charles Hill was born in Bridgeton, New Jersey, on April 28, 1936. His father was a dentist, his mother a homemaker. He received a bachelor's degree from Brown University in 1957 and studied at the University of Pennsylvania, where he graduated from law school in 1960 and earned a master's degree in American studies in 1961, shortly before joining the Foreign Service.

"I don't think there was anyone that Shultz trusted more."

In an interview, his colleague Gaddis said Hill focused on literature even more than his Grand Strategy partners, believing that great books offered "a kind of inner vision of how people's emotions or minds are working."

"Yale administrators didn't know what to do with him, where to put him," Gaddis added. "He existed outside of departmental structures. More significantly, he existed outside of specialties. I would say his specialty was finding linkages between specialties. It's the opposite of siloing, looking for connections across disciplinary boundaries. And of course, there is almost nobody else around at Yale who does that now." ■

Available from the Hoover Institution Press is ***The Weaver's Lost Art,*** *by Charles Hill. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.*

Exposing the Kleptocrats

Ten steps to **combat the mega-corruption** that saps national wealth and smothers democracy.

By Larry Diamond

Beyond the moral imperative, there is an overriding reason to make the battle against kleptocracy a global priority. It would help revive democratic progress in the world.

Just as widespread corruption threatens the legitimacy of democratic rule, its rot undermines autocracies as well. Predatory corruption is the soft underbelly of authoritarian rule. If these dictators' pillaging of their countries were revealed and internationally prosecuted, the domestic and international support base for their rule would begin to unravel.

Key points

» Corruption threatens the legitimacy of democratic rule.

» Fighting kleptocracy means closing the loopholes that allow funds to be illicitly transferred, hidden, and used.

» A new anticorruption court could pursue reforms in countries where the rule of law is weak.

***Larry Diamond** is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the chair of a new Hoover research initiative, China's Global Sharp Power Project. He is also a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University, where he is a professor by courtesy of political science and sociology. His latest book is **Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency** (Penguin, 2019).*

The most important condition for fighting kleptocracy is political will. Kleptocracy is not just megacorruption; it is the movement and laundering of stolen money across national borders. Kleptocracy thrives not just because the legal and political systems in the countries of origin are debased but because powerful interests in the world's wealthy democracies—including bankers, real estate brokers, accountants, lawyers, wealth managers, and public relations agents, not to mention American state governments—want to



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

cash in on this debasement. This complicity is degrading and endangering our democracies.

The path to reform is not mysterious. It requires closing the loopholes that permit international criminal actors—whether drug lords, terrorists, or corrupt politicians—first, to place their illicit funds in legitimate banks and businesses in the West, using front individuals, anonymous companies, and sophisticated lawyers; second, to layer the money, concealing its origins by transferring it "through multiple bank secrecy jurisdictions" or anonymous shell companies, trusts, and limited partnerships; and third, to circulate the illicit money in the bloodstream of the legitimate economy through the purchase of assets like real estate. When a former Ukrainian prime minister buys a $5 million home in Marin County, for example, that should be a red flag.

A ten-step program can close loopholes in the US legal system, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, and generate broader momentum for an international war on kleptocracy. While I offer these steps with the United States in mind, they invoke general principles that all liberal democracies should rally behind. (Many of these reforms are drawn from the superb work of the Kleptocracy Initiative.)

» **End anonymous shell companies.** Federal law should require the real ownership of all US companies and trusts to be disclosed and listed in a register, which would be accessible at least to law enforcement agencies and ideally to the public (as is done in the United Kingdom). Deception by owners or agents to mask real ownership should meet with serious civil or criminal penalties. Moreover, the United States should encourage other states to adopt similar laws requiring full transparency in business ownership.

» **End anonymous real estate purchases.** Washington should require all real estate purchases in the United States to reveal the true owner behind the purchase. Real estate agents, lawyers, and other professionals and firms involved in these transactions should have to undertake serious due diligence to verify the true identity of the purchaser, with biting penalties for negligence or deliberate noncompliance. And a new law should forbid any US government agency (especially those conducting sensitive work) from leasing office space from unknown owners or from any owner or business linked to an authoritarian or corrupt government.

» **Modernize and strengthen the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).** We should close the loophole that enables many agents for foreign principals to simply register under less onerous reporting requirements as lobbyists. We need an integrated system for reporting all lobbying and public relations advocacy on behalf of foreign interests. This line of work has exploded in recent years, with an estimated one thousand US lobbyists working for

foreign principals, but almost no one is ever prosecuted for noncompliance with the law. The US Justice Department has a staff of only eight people working to enforce FARA; the department needs more staff, more investigative powers, and more painful civil or criminal penalties for violations.

» **Strengthen prohibitions and monitoring of political contributions by foreign actors.** Foreign political and campaign contributions are forbidden in the United States (except by permanent residents), but only comprehensively at the federal level, and some foreign contributions could be filtering in through donations made by lobbyists and agents for foreign actors. Foreign contributions to all candidates and political campaigns, at every level of government, should be prohibited in the United States, and all political contributions by foreign agents should be monitored by a well-staffed federal agency. Other democracies around the world should also ban foreign financial contributions to their political parties and campaigns.

» **Ban former US officials and members of Congress from lobbying for or representing foreign governments.** Soon after entering the White House in January 2017, President Trump signed an executive order restricting the future lobbying activities of his political appointees and banning them for life from lobbying for foreign governments or political parties. This lifetime ban should be embedded in law and extended to retired members of Congress as well. And the Justice Department should maintain a list of foreign businesses, foundations, and organizations that, because of links to their authoritarian governments, are also off-limits for representation by former



US officials. We may even want to go further: do we really want to allow some future retired American official or member of Congress to work for a company effectively controlled by the Kremlin or the Chinese Communist Party?

» **Modernize the anti-money-laundering system.** The current US system has a key flaw: it relies on someone to report suspicious activity, rather than empowering the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to conduct its own investigations. As a result, money launderers "face a less than 5 percent risk of conviction" in the United States, according to the Financial Action Task Force, an independent intergovernmental body that fights money laundering. We need a robustly funded and staffed watchdog mechanism that applies to financial institutions as well as to the enablers of money laundering—lawyers, investment advisers, real estate agents, and so on. In addition, the United States should adopt something like Britain's landmark 2017 legislation, which

holds that if a foreign person with links to crime or public wealth in his home country makes an extravagant purchase (for example, property or jewels) that seems to be beyond his explainable means, law enforcement agencies can investigate the source of the money. If the source is found to be corrupt or the individual cannot account for his or her wealth, the assets can be seized.

» **Increase the resources that the United States and other rule-of-law states devote to monitoring, investigating, and prosecuting grand corruption and money laundering.** This should include greater cooperation among various national intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify illicit funds and property and track and disrupt money laundering.

» **Strengthen cooperation among democracies in fighting kleptocracy and ending "golden visas."** Because Russian kleptocracy represents such a serious common threat, NATO is a logical forum for the Western democracies to share intelligence, upgrade and harmonize their laws and strategies, and cooperate in tracking, sanctioning, and apprehending suspects. This will prevent kleptocrats from obscuring their wealth by playing off one jurisdiction against another. More must be done to call out countries with lax enforcement and help them plug loopholes, perhaps through a new State Department office to coordinate US anti-kleptocracy efforts. One especially high priority for standardizing these rules should be closing down the racket in securing residency and citizenship abroad; it is far too easy for the rich to buy a pathway to citizenship in major democracies such as the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia—and it is easier still in small EU countries that give kleptocrats a gateway to the rest of the European Union.

» **Raise public awareness about kleptocracy in Russia and other offending states.** The people of Russia—and other deeply corrupt states—deserve to know exactly who is pillaging their wealth, laundering it, and extravagantly investing it abroad. The Kleptocracy Initiative recommends establishing a Fund for the Russian People, into which seized assets could be deposited until such time as they could be returned to "a state governed by the rule of law." But why not create such a fund—and publicize the details of known cases of money laundering and asset seizures—for all of the world's leading kleptocracies? And why not offer fast-track asylum and financial rewards to whistleblowers from all countries who expose colossal government corruption that is laundered through the United States and other advanced democracies?

» **Increase international support for investigative journalism, NGOs, and official institutions working to monitor and control corruption around the world.** The best lines of defense against kleptocracy are usually found within the countries where it originates. This demands more than rewards for a few daring whistleblowers.

We need to do much more to support the front-line defenders of the global rule of law. Courageous journalists are working at great risk to expose grand corruption and increase government accountability in their troubled countries. NGOs like the local chapters of Transparency International are

lobbying to plug loopholes in monitoring and reporting, establish effective freedom-of-information laws, and give anticorruption agencies more power, resources, and autonomy. In many corrupt, low-grade democracies, dedicated civil servants and even some political appointees are trying against great odds to strengthen their countries' institutions to fight endemic corruption. All these efforts need our financial and technical support—as well as our diplomatic backing, to help spare brave anticorruption activists from arrest and assault. A prime example of the kind of global effort that merits support from democracy-promotion foundations and private philanthropies is the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, which broke the Panama Papers story and now draws together more than two hundred and twenty investigative journalists and more than one hundred media organizations from some eighty countries to collaborate on in-depth investigative stories.

These ten steps constitute an ambitious but feasible agenda for a serious assault on global kleptocracy. We might reach for one more distant star in the future: US District Court judge Mark Wolf has proposed establishing an international anticorruption court with a global role similar to that of the International Criminal Court. Where national judicial systems are capable of investigating and prosecuting grand corruption, they would continue to do so. But in countries whose judicial systems are too weak, politicized, or corrupt to act, the new court could step in. Such a court might not only punish global corruption but help return its rotten fruit back to the country of origin once a more transparent government was in place. Today, the concept is no more than a gleam in the eye of some farsighted international lawyers. But many innovations have started audaciously. Quoting a line often attributed to Nelson Mandela, Judge Wolf says, "It's always impossible until it happens." ◘

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Courage, not Cancellation

Free speech means citizens are willing both to question and to be questioned.

By Peter Berkowitz

Liberal democracy—grounded in the "inalienable" rights all human beings share—protects, and is protected by, free speech. Good laws alone, though, cannot keep speech free. Also necessary is a public culture that promotes an accurate understanding of free speech and fosters the virtues that undergird it. The breakdown in the United States of that public culture, particularly among the nation's progressive elites, is of pressing concern.

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." The Supreme Court interprets this provision to require a broad though not absolute prohibition on government regulation of expression. Even among liberal democracies, Americans enjoy an unusually extended sphere in which they can speak their minds. Expression is subject to a few specified legal limitations, including incitement to imminent lawless action, true threats, classified information, and slander and libel. This, however, leaves abundant room in which citizens can

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readily encounter unorthodox, dissenting, and, yes, deeply disagreeable opinions.

While government always poses a major threat to free speech, it never represents the sole danger. Today, apprehensions about Big Tech regulation—subtle and surreptitious as well as brazen and heavy-handed—of social network and consumer platforms command center stage. Meanwhile, old nemeses of free speech—inherited authority, social pressure, and public opinion—show little sign of abating.

Because of the new and old threats, practicing free speech requires, as always, moral virtue: courage to present one's views accurately and subject them to public scrutiny, patience to consider alternative arguments, and self-control to tolerate fellow citizens' seemingly wrong-headed and ill-conceived notions. Free speech also needs intellectual virtue. To benefit from the give-and-take that energizes a free society, we must examine our own ideas' vulnerabilities. That difficult process depends on restating accurately, interpreting reasonably, and looking for the kernel—or more—of truth in opinions and positions that we are inclined to oppose.

A FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND

In "The Campaign to Cancel Wokeness," *New York Times* columnist Michelle Goldberg attempts to defend free speech by exposing conservative hypocrisy. Because of the propensity to protect one's own speech while curtailing that of the other camp, Goldberg could have performed a service by holding conservatives to a standard they profess. She missed the opportunity, as do many progressives, by conflating criticism and cancellation.

Principled defenses of liberty of thought and discussion from the left would be particularly welcome in the *New York Times*. Alas, the venerable institution has proved a fair-weather friend of free speech. In spring 2020, for example, many staff members revolted and management forced out opinion editor James Bennet because the newspaper published an op-ed by Senator Tom Cotton arguing—consistent with the views of about half of Americans—that the president should use his authority to direct the military to respond to violent rioting in American cities. Earlier this year, the *Times* demanded the departure of science and health reporter Donald McNeil after more than forty years at the newspaper. His principal offense?

Extreme positions, such as those taken by critical race theory, are absolutely fair game.

In the process of answering a student's question about a notorious racial slur, McNeil uttered it himself.

Goldberg, though, does not rise to the moment by providing a ringing endorsement of a public sphere that welcomes opinions from right and left. Instead, she provides a textbook case of the failure to understand the principles of free speech, and to exercise the moral and intellectual virtues that bring benefits from it.

Conservatives "don't like cancel culture," writes Goldberg, yet they pursue, she charges, "an ironic quest to cancel the promotion of critical race theory in public forums." Her accusation betrays a rudimentary misunderstanding of cancel culture, which involves the shaming, ostracism, and silencing of individuals and companies for expressing disfavored opinions. In contrast, conservative criticism of critical race theory (CRT) and opposition to using government organs to promote its controversial claims about race and justice are perfectly legitimate activities in a free society.

Americans enjoy an unusually extended sphere where they can speak their minds.

NO MERE THEORY

CRT is not merely an academic theory. In their 2011 book, *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction,* law professors Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado—Goldberg cites Delgado as "a key figure in the movement"—stress that CRT is simultaneously a form of activism grounded in a radical perspective that "questions the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law."

Such extreme positions are an integral part of the public debate; canceling those that propound them would be unconscionable. Yet there are excellent reasons to criticize CRT ideas and counter efforts by activists to promulgate CRT views through government training sessions and school curricula. These include CRT's blurring of scholarship and politics, its incoherent rejection of principles of freedom and equality bound up with the Enlightenment on which it covertly relies, and its failure to grasp accurately and present fairly America's founding principles and constitutional traditions.

In the conservative critique of CRT ideas and opposition to entrenching its doctrines as the nation's official public philosophy, nevertheless, Goldberg

sees only "outright government censorship" and "attempts to suppress an entire intellectual movement." Her evidence shows nothing of the kind.

Last September, Goldberg writes,

> Donald Trump's Office of Management and Budget ordered federal agencies to "begin to identify all contracts or other agency spending related to any training on 'critical race theory,' " which it described as "un-American propaganda."

The First Amendment, however, does not guarantee a right to have the federal government propound your preferred critique of America.

British conservatives, Goldberg argues, are just as bad as American conservatives. Again, her reporting misleads. A month after the Trump OMB directive, according to Goldberg, "the conservative government in Britain declared some uses of critical race theory in education illegal." Indeed, Tory equalities minister Kemi Badenoch indicated in a parliamentary debate that it would be illegal to use CRT for propaganda purposes. The very words that Goldberg quotes show that Badenoch was opposing indoctrination, the teaching of a radical theory about racial justice as if it were the last word about race and justice. The *Guardian,* a left-wing British newspaper, emphasized that Badenoch argued not for the exclusion of views but for schools to remain "politically impartial."

The First Amendment doesn't guarantee a right to have the federal government propound your preferred critique of America.

Goldberg also deplores developments in France. She cites a *Times* colleague: "French politicians, high-profile intellectuals, and journalists are warning that progressive American ideas—specifically on race, gender, postcolonialism—are undermining their society." But a warning is not censorship. Here, it is a routine exercise of free speech.

Goldberg rightly criticizes misguided conservative proposals in several US states to ban the teaching of CRT. But she overlooks or ignores news that doesn't fit her narrative. While highlighting a pair of bills introduced by an Arkansas legislator banning the teaching of CRT ideas, she omits that on February 9—more than two weeks before her column appeared—an Arkansas legislative panel rejected the proposal. State education secretary Johnny Key, a Republican, explained that curricular matters are "best left to the local elected boards and administrators and educators."

Goldberg's interest in protecting free speech is laudable. But in falsely accusing conservatives of undertaking a concerted international campaign to censor CRT, she conflates criticism and cancellation, misrepresents conservative ideas and actions, and assumes that there is only one way to uphold racial justice.

An effective defense of free speech must embody the principles, and exercise the virtues, of free speech. ◘



We Are the Builders

Politicians will not "build back better" with yet more vast packages of ineffective centralized programs. They must learn what communities want and need—and let *them* fulfill those wants and needs.

By Raghuram G. Rajan

President Biden wants to "build back better" after the pandemic. It's a widely shared goal. But what exactly does it mean, and how should we do it?

Clearly, we should build back with more equality of opportunity. Many communities in the United States and elsewhere in the developed world would not look out of place in a poor country: decrepit schools, crumbling infrastructure, and rising levels of social dysfunction, including crime and substance abuse. These communities have

Key points

» Local challenges should be addressed, first and foremost, by local residents.

» The aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic presents opportunities to rethink local economies.

» Developed countries are seeking solutions to problems that have hitherto seemed hopeless.

» Successful initiatives could be shared with other communities seeking projects of their own.

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shrunk as people with opportunities elsewhere have left, leaving everyone else in an even thicker miasma of hopelessness. Some of these communities have been disadvantaged for a long time, having been hammered by a previous wave of trade- or technology-induced joblessness. Others have fallen behind more recently, albeit for similar reasons.

But technology and trade have also created new possibilities for economic activity in these communities, and thus the potential for economic revival. The COVID-19 pandemic forced many to work from home and connect with colleagues via the Internet, greatly reducing any stigma previously associated with this arrangement. In the months to come, many firms will offer their employees the option of coming to the office only when necessary.

In such cases, a worker's home need not be in the same county, or even the same state, as his office. As skilled workers in cities search for cheaper, less congested places to raise a family, some may want to return to their roots—to places they left long ago. And with in-person business meetings becoming more dispensable, entire firms also may relocate. These trends will boost demand for local goods and services, creating more local jobs.

"One size fits all" programs born in a national or state capital cannot tackle local challenges.

Technology not only helps to spread economic activity geographically but also can connect remote areas to markets everywhere. As Adam Davidson points out in his book *The Passion Economy: The New Rules for Thriving in the Twenty-First Century,* online platforms allow small enterprises to advertise niche products globally and enable specialized potential buyers to find them. For example, the Wengerds, an Amish family in Ohio, have built a flourishing business selling state-of-the-art horse-drawn farm equipment—a niche market if ever there was one—to other Amish farms across the United States.

Not every community can flourish even under these changed circumstances. Years of underinvestment in infrastructure, including broadband, parks, and schools, may render some communities unattractive to well-paid professionals and their families. High levels of crime and substance abuse could keep businesses away. And local workers may need retraining for new skilled jobs. Communities may need to change to attract economic activity, but how do they do so without more economic activity in the first place?

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

The tempting but wrong answer is to centralize the solution. Massive one-size-fits-all programs devised in a national or state capital cannot tackle a local community's specific challenges. For one community, the biggest problem may be the absence of fast and affordable access to transportation networks; for another, it may be the lack of safe outlets for youthful energy. A community's inhabitants are in the best position to understand the most pressing needs.

Grant competitions could pay for innovative community projects.

The answer certainly includes more outside funding, including further tax subsidies to encourage investment in "opportunity zones." But that is not enough. Without a committed local leadership devising plans to address specific local challenges, and an engaged community to aid and monitor their work, funds are more likely to be wasted than not. Unfortunately, years of hopelessness can exhaust a community's leadership and leave its members apathetic.



What could induce change? One possibility is for the national or state government (or philanthropic institutions) to create grant competitions to fund groups with innovative proposals for projects in their communities. Ideally, a project would have the backing of the official community leadership (such as the mayor's office), but that need not be essential if it can proceed without their support.

The extent of proposed community involvement and engagement in the project would, however, be an important criterion for funding. So, for example, a public garden created and maintained by the community would be preferred to a contractor-built park. Stronger community leadership and broader local engagement should be important legacies of funded proposals.

Project leaders would also be given access to professional consultants, who could help remedy weaknesses in the proposal, as well as to leaders of similar projects elsewhere so that ad hoc support groups emerge. Not all proposals would be funded, of course, but the process of private citizens coming together to devise a project can create the kernel of a new local leadership if the current one is asleep at the wheel. If the grant competition can revive or generate broader local energy, it will have worked.

Moreover, unsuccessful applicants could resubmit their project proposals in subsequent competitions after addressing earlier weaknesses, thereby sustaining the enthusiasm the initial proposal engendered. Finally, the lessons from successful initiatives could be shared with other communities seeking projects of their own, with the aim of establishing a learning network that could share ideas, expertise, best practices, and common pitfalls.

This is not idle theorizing. Developed countries like Canada have been creating such networks to encourage bottom-up remedies to local problems that have hitherto defied solutions.

Developed countries are spending enormous amounts of money in an attempt to recover from the pandemic. It would be a shame if this were wasted on old and tired schemes that have rarely worked. The money should go to those who desperately need new opportunities and know how to create them. That may be one of our best hopes for building back better. H



The Shape of Recovery

The second half of this year is likely to bring a surge in pent-up demand, especially in high-value service industries.

By Michael Spence

The rollout of COVID-19 vaccines in many advanced economies has set the stage for rapid recovery in the second half of this year and into 2022. Although growth in digital and digitally enabled sectors will level out somewhat, high-employment service industries will ride a wave of pent-up demand.

COVID-19 vaccination programs gained momentum as production capacity ramped up, and as disorganized and tentative distribution and administration procedures were replaced by more robust systems. A task of such size will surely encounter additional bumps along the road. But it is now reasonable to expect that vaccines will have been made available to most people in North America by summer and to most Europeans by early fall.

As of March 15, Israel had administered more than a hundred doses per hundred people, compared to thirty-eight in the United Kingdom, thirty-six in Chile, thirty-two in the United States, and eleven in the European Union—and those numbers would rise fast. The rates have been relatively lower in Asia and

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the Pacific, but these countries already largely contained the virus without mass vaccination programs and their economies since experienced a rapid recovery.

At the same time, lower-income countries in several continents were lagging, pointing to the need for a more ambitious international effort to provide them with vaccines. As many have noted, in our interconnected world, no one is safe until everyone is safe.

Assuming that vaccination continues to pick up globally, we should see a partial but sharp reversal of the K-shaped growth patterns that have emerged in pandemic-hit economies.

Specifically, growth in high-flying digital and digitally enabled sectors will subside, but not dramatically, because the forced adoption of their services will be tempered by the resumption of in-person activities. At the same time, the sectors that were partly or completely shut down will revive. Major service sectors like retail, hospitality, entertainment, sports, and travel will fully reopen for an eager public. Industries such as cruise lines will probably institute their own version of a vaccination certificate, with sales rebounding once customers are confident about safety.

All told, this return to previously closed consumption patterns, turbocharged by pent-up demand, will produce a burst of growth in depressed sectors, leading to improved economic performance overall. Unemployment will almost certainly fall, even if permanent changes in living and work patterns reduce employment in some areas. (For example, hybrid work models that lock in pandemic-era remote workplaces may reduce demand for restaurants in city centers.)

To be sure, while massive government programs have buffered the economic shock of the pandemic, hard-hit sectors have nonetheless faced significant losses. Between these transitory reductions on the supply side and the predictable surge in demand, a temporary bout of inflation is possible and perhaps likely. But that is no cause for great concern.

People who are vaccinated and willing to travel will still have to be acceptable to the destination country.

Financial markets are already anticipating these trends. After struggling before the pandemic and being hammered in the early stages of the contraction, many value stocks are staging a comeback. While value stocks will continue to hover above their previous doldrums, digital growth stocks will benefit from the powerful long-term trend toward incremental value creation via intangible assets.

PROTECTED: A Palestinian man is inoculated against COVID-19 at a clinic in the West Bank city of Jenin. Israel is among the countries that pushed ahead with mass vaccinations against the disease. [Raneen Sawafta—Reuters]

One matter of considerable importance is international travel. Businesses can function on digital platforms for a while, but eventually in-person contact will become essential. Moreover, many economies are heavily dependent on travel and especially tourism, which accounts for 10–11 percent of GDP in Spain and Italy and as much as 18 percent of GDP in Greece (and probably more if one counts multipliers).

Compared to many other sectors, travel faces additional headwinds, because it is nonlocal. The rapid recovery pattern that local service industries can expect once the virus is under control does not strictly apply to travel, especially at the international level. To allow for more travel between countries, both—origin and destination—will need to have made progress in vaccinating their populations and containing the virus. Those who are vaccinated and willing to travel will have to be acceptable to the destination country, perhaps by presenting some kind of certification or vaccine passport.

Complicating matters further, international travel is subject to multi-jurisdictional and somewhat uncoordinated regulation. This, together with

imperfect cross-border knowledge about external conditions, will make adjusting to new realities more difficult.

The trajectory of vaccination indicates that the global rollout will take considerably longer than the programs in advanced economies. The hope is that once these first movers are done, their leaders will turn their attention to bolstering international cooperation and accelerating vaccine production and deployment in developing countries and some emerging markets.

By that point, the advanced economies will be experiencing a brisk recovery, like China and the other Asian economies that contained the virus early on. The return of high-employment service sectors will fuel a broad-based comeback, producing market shifts in relative value across sectors. Schools will resume full in-person learning, armed with complementary digital tools that may enhance the curriculum and provide resilience for the next shock.

In an interconnected world, no one is safe until everyone is safe.

In the second half of 2021 and into 2022, the K-shaped dynamic of the pandemic economy will give way to a multi-speed recovery, with the traditional high-contact sectors taking the lead. The two lingering areas of uncertainty for health and economic outcomes are the pace of the vaccine rollout in the developing world and international cooperation to accelerate the restoration of cross-border travel. But with forward-looking leadership, both issues should be fully manageable. ◘

Available from the Hoover Institution Press is ***Choose Economic Freedom: Enduring Policy Lessons from the 1970s and 1980s,*** *by George P. Shultz and John B. Taylor. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.*

Borrowed Time

The United States was already on a dangerous debt binge even before the pandemic. More reckless spending will overwhelm investment, growth, and job creation.

By George P. Shultz, John F. Cogan, and John B. Taylor

Many in Washington seem to think that the federal government can spend a limitless amount of money without any harmful economic consequences. They are wrong. Excessive federal spending is creating grave economic and national security risks. America's fiscal recklessness must stop.

Key points

» Profligate government spending always has damaging consequences.

» Previous periods of excessive debt have been followed by sharp increases in inflation, rapidly rising interest rates, and financial crises.

» The US government's careless spending is jeopardizing a critical asset. The borrowing well will dry up sooner or later.

» In fiscal year 2020, the national debt rose to 100 percent of national income.

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[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

The COVID-19 crisis provided the latest impetus for government spending, even to the point of steering the American mindset toward socialism—a doctrine that has always harmed people's well-being. But some say there is no need to worry about excessive spending. After all, they argue, record-low interest rates apparently show no sign of increasing. The economy was humming along just fine until the pandemic hit, and will no

doubt rebound strongly afterward. And is there even a whiff of inflation in the air?

Such thinking is dangerously shortsighted. The fundamental laws of economics have not been repealed. As one of us (John Cogan) demonstrated in his book *The High Cost of Good Intentions* (Stanford University Press, 2017), profligate government spending invariably has damaging consequences.

High and rising US national debt will eventually crowd out private investment, thereby slowing economic growth and job creation. The Federal Reserve's continued accommodation of deficit spending will inevitably lead to rising inflation. Financial markets will become more prone to turmoil, increasing the chance of another big economic downturn.

Since the New Deal, deficit spending has become a way of life in Washington.

Financial markets' relative calm and low consumer-price inflation are no cause for comfort. Previous periods of sharp increases in inflation, rapidly rising interest rates, and financial crises have followed periods of excessive debt like a sudden wind, without warning.

George Shultz and John Taylor's book *Choose Economic Freedom* (Hoover Institution Press, 2020) shows that economic indicators in the United States gave no hint in the late 1960s of the subsequent rapid rise in inflation and interest rates in the early 1970s. Likewise, financial markets during the years immediately preceding the 2007–9 Great Recession provided little indication of the calamity that would ensue.

So, what should today's US policy makers do? Higher tax rates are not the answer. Even before the pandemic, every federal tax rate would have had to be increased by one-third to finance the current level of federal spending without adding to the national debt. Such an increase would have harmful effects—similar to those of mounting public debt—on economic growth and job creation.

Congress may be tempted to reduce defense spending to help close the deficit, as it often has in the past. But these previous efforts demonstrably failed. Rather than reduce the budget deficit, Congress instead used the savings from lower defense outlays to finance additional domestic spending.

Unless policy makers abandon their misguided beliefs about budget deficits, cutting defense spending now would produce the same result. More important, it would be a grave strategic mistake, weakening US national security and emboldening the country's foreign adversaries—particularly

now that China is flexing its muscles in Asia and investing heavily in its military.

Throughout US history, the federal government's ability to borrow during times of international crisis has proven to be an invaluable national security asset. Two hundred years ago, the ability to borrow was instrumental in America maintaining its independence from Britain. During the Civil War, it was crucial to preserving the Union. And it proved decisive in defeating totalitarian regimes in the two world wars of the twentieth century.

The US government's careless spending is jeopardizing this asset. If the country continues along its current fiscal path, the federal government's borrowing well will eventually dry up. When it does, America will be far less able to counter national security threats. As hostile foreign governments and terrorist organizations recognize this, the world will become a far more dangerous place.

US policy makers' mistaken belief that deficits and debt don't matter is the sad culmination of a long downward slide in fiscal responsibility. From 1789 to the 1930s, the federal government adhered to a balanced-budget norm, incurring fiscal deficits during wartime and economic recessions, and running modest surpluses during good times to pay down this debt. This prudent management of the federal finances was instrumental in establishing America's strong position in world financial markets.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal broke this norm, and deficit spending has since become a way of life in Washington, with the federal government outspending its available revenues in sixty-three of the years since the end of World War II. At first, elected officials were deeply concerned about the adverse consequences of their excess spending. But over time, this anxiety lessened. Annual deficits grew so large that by the mid-1970s the US national debt was growing faster than national income.

High national debt will eventually crowd out private investment, slowing growth and job creation.

During the past decade, any remaining fiscal concerns among either Democrats or Republicans have seemingly vanished. Freed from a belief that rising deficits and debt are harmful, policy makers unleashed a torrent of new spending. By fiscal year 2019, the federal government was spending $1 trillion per year more in inflation-adjusted terms than it had a dozen years earlier. In fiscal year 2020, the federal government added nearly $2 trillion more in new spending in response to the pandemic, raising the national debt

to 100 percent of national income. This year huge amounts of new spending appear to be on the way.

The momentum toward more spending and exploding debt may appear unstoppable. But sooner or later, people will look at the facts, see the destructive path fiscal policy is on, and recognize that they and the US economy will be better off with a different approach. At that point, America's democratic system will say the expenditure growth must stop.



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How to Kill Opportunity

There's no doubt: the minimum wage deprives low-skilled workers—especially young people—of an essential foothold on the job market.

By David R. Henderson

"The Right Minimum Wage: $0.00." That was the title of a 1987 editorial in a major American newspaper. The editorial stated: "There's a virtual consensus among economists that the minimum wage is an idea whose time has passed. Raising the minimum wage would price working poor people out of the job market." You might expect the *Wall Street Journal* editors to have written something like that. But they didn't. The article did appear, though, in a prominent New York newspaper. Which one? The *New York Times*.

In a 1970 economics textbook, a famous Nobel Prize–winning economist wrote of 1970's minimum wage rate of $1.60, "What good does it do a black youth to know that an employer must pay him $1.60 per hour if the fact that he must be paid that amount is what keeps him from getting the job?" Who wrote that? It must have been free-marketer Milton Friedman, right? Wrong. The author of that statement was liberal economist Paul Samuelson.

Among non-economists and politicians, the minimum wage is one of the most misunderstood issues in economic policy. President Biden and almost

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all Democrats and some Republicans in Congress advocate increasing the federal minimum wage from its current level of $7.25 an hour to $15 an hour over four years. They argue that many of the workers earning between $7.25 and $15 will get a raise in hourly wage. That's true. But what they don't tell you, and what many of them probably don't know, is that many workers in that wage range will suffer a huge drop in wages—from whatever they're earning down to zero. Other low-wage workers will stay employed but will work fewer hours a week. Many low-wage workers will find that their nonwage benefits will fall and that employers will work them harder. Why all those effects? Because an increase in the minimum wage doesn't magically make workers more productive. A minimum wage of $15 an hour will exceed the productivity of many low-wage workers.

Among non-economists and politicians, the minimum wage is one of the most misunderstood issues in economic policy.

THE SECRET OF PRODUCTIVITY

The reason some workers earn low wages is not that employers are greedy exploiters. If exploitation were enough to explain low wages, then why would employers ever pay anyone over $7.25 an hour? Wages are what they are because they reflect two things: (1) workers' productivity and (2) competition among employers.

Employers don't hire workers as a favor. Instead, employers hire workers to make money. They hire people only if the wage and other components of compensation they pay are less than or equal to the value of the worker's productivity. If an employer pays $10 an hour to someone whose productivity is $15 an hour, that situation won't last long. A competing employer will offer, say, $12 an hour to lure the worker away from his current job. And then another employer will compete by offering $13 an hour. Competition among employers, not government wage-setting, is what protects workers from exploitation.

We all understand that fact when we see discussions on ESPN about why one football player makes $20 million a year and another makes "only" $10 million a year. Everyone recognizes the twin facts of player productivity and competition among NFL teams. The same principles, but with much lower wages, apply to competition among employers for relatively low-skilled employees.

Open up almost any economics textbook that discusses the minimum wage and you're likely to see a demand-and-supply graph showing that the minimum wage prices some low-wage workers out of the market. For textbooks published in the past twenty years, though, you might also find a statement that although some workers will lose their jobs, there's controversy among economists about how many jobs will be lost. According to the textbook writers, some economists think the number will be large and others think it will be small or even imperceptible. You could easily conclude that there's no longer a consensus among economists that an increase in the minimum wage would cause much job loss.

But that conclusion would be wrong. UC-Irvine economist David Neumark and Peter Shirley, an economist with the West Virginia legislature's Joint Committee on Government and Finance, showed that in a January 2021 study published by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Neumark is one of the leading scholars on the economic effects of minimum wages.

Neumark and Shirley chose a clever methodology. They read every published study of the effects of the minimum wage on employment in the United States that was done between 1992 and the present. They identified for each study the core estimates of the effect of minimum wages on employment. When that was difficult to do, they contacted the studies' authors to ask them what they regarded as their bottom-line estimates. Sixty-six studies met their criteria and these criteria had nothing to do with the size or direction of the estimates.

Here's what they found. The vast majority of studies, 79.3 percent, found that a higher minimum wage led to less employment. A majority of the studies, 55.4 percent, found that the negative effect of a higher minimum wage on employment was significant at the 10 percent level. Translation: for those studies, the probability that there was a negative effect on jobs was 90 percent. Almost half the studies, 47.9 percent, found a negative effect on jobs at the 5 percent confidence level. For those studies, in other words, the probability that there was a negative effect on jobs was 95 percent.

A higher wage doesn't magically make workers more productive. A minimum wage of $15 an hour will exceed the productivity of many low-wage workers.

Moreover, found Neumark and Shirley, the evidence "of negative employment effects is stronger for teens and young adults, and more so for the less educated." They concluded that the commonly heard refrain that minimum wages don't destroy jobs "requires discarding or ignoring most of the evidence."

Moreover, virtually all the studies of the effects of minimum wages in the United States have considered increases in the minimum wage of between 10 and 20 percent. The US government has never raised the minimum wage by anything close to the 107 percent envisioned in the increase from $7.25 to $15.

SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Why does that matter? Because the higher the increase as a percent of the existing minimum wage, the more certain we economists are that it will hurt job opportunities for unskilled workers. We are sure of that because of the law of demand, which says that for any good or service, the higher the price, the less is demanded. That applies whether we're talking about iPhones, skateboards, or labor. So raise that price a lot, and the amount demanded falls more than it would fall if you raised it a little. And what employers don't demand, willing workers can't supply.

The effect of the $15 minimum wage would vary a lot from state to state. In New York in 2019, the median hourly wage was $22.44 and the average hourly wage was $30.76. So a $15 minimum would affect a fairly small percent of New York's labor force. In Alabama, by contrast, the median hourly wage in 2019 was only $16.73 and the average was only $21.60. So the $15 minimum in Alabama could hurt a much greater percent of the labor force.

The University of Chicago's Booth School has an Initiative on Global Markets (IGM) that occasionally surveys US economists on policy issues. Possibly because of the surveyors' understanding that the $15 minimum wage would hurt some states more than others, the IGM recently made the following statement and asked forty-three economists to agree or disagree: "A federal minimum wage of $15 per hour would lower employment for low-wage workers in many states." Unfortunately, the question did not specify what is meant by "many." Is it ten, twenty, thirty? Some economists surveyed pointed out that ambiguity. That ambiguity could explain why a number of the economists answered that they were uncertain. But of those who agreed or disagreed, nineteen agreed that it would cause job loss in many states and only six disagreed.

One economist who disagreed, Richard Thaler of the University of Chicago, gave as his explanation this sentence: "The literature suggests minimal

effects on employment." No, it doesn't. As noted earlier, the federal government has never tried to raise the minimum wage by such a large amount and so there is no scholarly literature on such an increase. Would Thaler say that if putting a cat in the oven at a temperature of 72.5 degrees Fahrenheit doesn't hurt the cat, then putting a cat in the oven at 150 degrees wouldn't hurt the cat either?

While few economists have actually estimated the effects of such a large increase in the minimum wage, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) presented its economists' estimate earlier this month. According to the CBO, the increase would reduce US employment by 0.9 percent. That might not sound like much, but 0.9 percent translates into 1.4 million workers put out of work.

But wouldn't the increase in the minimum wage also increase wages for a lot of workers who keep their jobs? Yes, it would, and the CBO estimates that although the workers who lose their jobs would lose income, their loss over the years from 2021 to 2031 would be "only" 34 percent of the gain to the workers who gained wages.

The common refrain that minimum wages don't destroy jobs "requires discarding or ignoring most of the evidence."

But the gain in wages is not an unalloyed benefit to those who gain. The reason is that, as noted above, an increase in wage rates doesn't automatically make workers more productive. So employers, looking for ways to avoid paying more to workers than their productivity is worth, would search out other ways of compensating. They might cut nonwage benefits, work the employees harder, or reduce training, to name three.

Interestingly, on its website in 2006, when Congress was considering an increase in the federal minimum wage, the Economic Policy Institute, an organization funded partly by labor unions, admitted the last two of these three. It stated, "employers may be able to absorb some of the costs of a wage increase through higher productivity, lower recruiting and training costs, decreased absenteeism, and increased worker morale." How would an employer make his workers more productive and reduce absenteeism? Probably by working the employees harder and firing those who miss work. How would he reduce training costs? By providing less training.

In an article in the winter 2021 issue of the *Journal of Economic Perspectives,* UC–San Diego economist Jeffrey Clemens noted a negative correlation

between minimum wages and employer-provided health insurance. In the workplace as in the rest of the world, there's no free lunch.

AN EARLY LESSON

The late economist Walter Williams has written about how, as a teenager, he learned many skills on the job that made him more productive and ultimately higher paid. I wrote recently that he could get those early jobs because the minimum wage was so low. Low-paid jobs are often crucial for black youths and other youths who need to build their work skills and work histories. These skills might be as simple as learning to show up on time.

In 1967, when I was sixteen, I worked in a kitchen at a summer resort in Minaki, Ontario. The minimum wage at the time was $1 an hour and I was paid, if I recall correctly, $1.25 an hour. For the first three days of the job, I showed up about twenty minutes late. On the third day, the chef told me that if I was late the fourth day, I shouldn't bother showing up because I would be fired. I was never late again. I learned the "skill" of punctuality.

We adults take such things for granted. Kids don't. Raise the minimum wage enough and a whole lot of young people won't learn the basics, or won't learn them until later in life. That would be tragic. ◘

***Special to the* Hoover Digest.**



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The High Road

The US-China rivalry represents, above all, a difference in values. The United States' strength springs from its support for an open, multilateral world order.

By Elizabeth Economy

China's leaders seek to reclaim Chinese centrality on the global stage by asserting sovereignty over contested territory; replacing the United States as the pre-eminent power in the Indo-Pacific; embedding Chinese economic, security, technological, and political preferences throughout the rest of the world; and shaping norms, values, and standards in international institutions to reflect Chinese preferences. In such a world, political and economic choice globally will be constrained, and US economic and security interests will be compromised.

For almost a decade, Chinese leaders have made substantial progress toward their objectives. Their success is a function of the leverage of the Chinese market, growing military

Key points

» China is pursuing a significantly transformed international system.

» Xi Jinping envisions China as the pre-eminent power in Asia, and is building military power to realize that vision.

» China uses the leverage of its market to coerce others to align their views with those of Beijing.

» The United States should forge new relationships with the world's developing economies while strengthening ties with its allies.

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prowess, long-term strategic planning, strong state capacity, and a multi-actor, multi-domain strategy. At the same time, Beijing's pursuit of narrow self-interest and reliance on coercive tactics have engendered popular backlashes in many countries and rendered it incapable of exerting true global leadership. These vulnerabilities afford the United States a new opportunity to present and gain broad support for an alternative vision of the twenty-first-century world order.

The United States should begin by reframing the US-China competition away from the narrative of a bilateral rivalry to one rooted in values. It should also reassert its presence in global and regional institutions, coordinate with allies and partners, pursue its own multi-actor, multi-domain strategy, and develop a national consensus around American political and economic renewal. These are the building blocks of US competitiveness. Beyond these steps, however, Washington needs a bold strategic initiative that engages the larger international community, is rooted in US values, and gives life to its strategic vision.

CHINA'S STRATEGIC VISION

Chinese leaders offer a new vision of world order rooted in concepts such as "the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation," a "community of shared destiny," a "new relationship among major powers," and a "China model." Once the rhetoric is stripped away, their vision translates into a significantly transformed international system. The United States is no longer the global hegemon with a powerful network of alliances that reinforces much of the current rules-based order. Instead, a reunified and resurgent China is on par with, or even more powerful than, the United States. And the international community and institutions reflect Chinese values and policy preferences.

At the heart of the Chinese leadership's vision is the reunification of China itself. Chinese leaders are particularly focused on maintaining control within their own border regions, including Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong, and asserting control over areas they consider core interests, such as Taiwan and a vast swath of the South China Sea. China also has territorial disputes with its neighbors, including India, Japan, Nepal, Bhutan, and South Korea, that it wants resolved in its favor. Several of these disputes flared up over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, as China sought to gain advantage while the rest of the world was distracted.

Chinese President Xi Jinping also envisions China as the pre-eminent power in Asia. China is establishing a network of regional economic and security arrangements that exclude the United States (some by the choice of



STEADY COURSE: The Chinese guided-missile destroyer Xi'an joins the Rim of the Pacific Exercise around the Hawaiian islands in 2016. The warship was one of five Chinese vessels to participate that year. Even amid US-China competition, there are opportunities to keep the door open to cooperation with China in areas such as climate change, pandemics, and global disasters. [US Navy]

the United States itself). In addition, China is rapidly developing the military capabilities necessary to realize its sovereignty objectives with regard to the South China Sea and Taiwan.

Beyond its own backyard, China is embedding its technologies, goods, and values throughout the world via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its offshoot, the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR is the infrastructure of the twenty-first century: the BeiDou satellite system, Huawei Marine fiber optic cables, e-commerce, and, on the horizon, China's digital currency and electronic payment system, which is currently being piloted domestically in preparation for a fuller rollout by the 2022 Olympics. China's Health Silk Road (HSR) includes the provision of Chinese-constructed hospitals, tracking systems, doctors, medical devices, and traditional Chinese medicine. China's vaccine diplomacy has also become a central element of its HSR. Finally, Beijing maintains an extensive, well-funded program of student,

journalist, and military officer education and training opportunities in China for citizens from Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—including ten thousand full scholarships for students from BRI countries.

As US and other international actors have experienced, China increasingly uses the leverage of its market to coerce others to align their views with those of China. While traditionally this coercion has been reserved for issues China deems "core" interests, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea, Chinese red lines have proliferated over the past year. Beijing expelled *Wall Street Journal* reporters in retaliation for an op-ed titled "China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia," threatened countries' market access in China if they barred Huawei 5G technology, and launched a boycott against Australian goods after the country called for an inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.

China's market leverage also provides it the wherewithal to pursue programs such as the Confucius Institutes and Thousand Talents Program—which it is rebooting in 2021 to accelerate the process of drawing foreign scientific talent to China—that take advantage of the openness of other countries to advance Beijing's economic interests and political narrative. And even as China pursues technological self-reliance, Xi seeks to use the country's market to deepen foreign companies' reliance on it, asserting: "We will enhance the global value chain's dependence on China and develop powerful retaliation and deterrence capabilities against supply cutoffs by foreign parties."

Finally, China's strategy involves transforming global governance institutions by reforming norms and values around human rights and Internet governance, setting technology standards, and weaving the BRI into the mission of more than two dozen UN agencies and programs. In the Fourteenth Five Year Plan, Chinese officials signaled particular interest in shaping norms around the Arctic and Antarctica, maritime governance, and space.

PROCESS AND PROGRESS

Chinese leaders advance bold long-term initiatives with targets and timetables, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, reunification with Taiwan, and China Standards 2035. They mobilize and coordinate significant human and financial resources from all sectors of the Chinese government, military, business, and society to realize those objectives. And they reinforce a single initiative in multiple domains.

For example, in their pursuit of becoming the world's leading innovation and technology power, Chinese leaders set targets and timetables for controlling domestic and then global market share in a wide range of technologies, rally both private and state-owned firms to realize the objectives, protect

BE PREPARED: Sailors aboard the Chinese vessel Xi'an are welcomed to the 2019 Russian Navy Day Parade in St. Petersburg. President Xi envisions China as the pre-eminent power in Asia, and China is rapidly developing the military capabilities to realize its sovereignty objectives regarding the South China Sea and Taiwan. [Alexander Demianchuk—TASS via ZUMA Press]

Chinese firms with programs such as Made in China 2025, subsidize the deployment of Chinese technology through the Digital Silk Road, place Chinese citizens at the head of international standard-setting bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union, and flood those bodies with large Chinese delegations and scores of proposals.

The Chinese government is also highly opportunistic: for example, when China headed Interpol, it proposed that China upgrade the organization's telecommunications infrastructure; it linked a free-trade deal with the Faroe Islands with acceptance of Huawei 5G technology; and it implicitly threatened to ban German cars if Germany banned Huawei.

Over the past several years, Beijing has made progress on a number of its strategic objectives:

» It has realized its **sovereignty claim over Hong Kong** through the imposition of the National Security Law and expanded its military capabilities and presence in the South China Sea.

» It also has withstood international opprobrium and targeted economic sanctions for its **violations of human rights in Xinjiang,** and it has successfully mobilized developing economies, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, to support its stance on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea.

» Its **trade initiative,** RCEP, elevates its economic position within the Indo-Pacific.

» The BRI has laid the foundation for **Chinese technology** to provide much of the world's next-generation telecommunications, financial, and health infrastructure.

» Chinese **dominance in UN technology-standard-setting bodies** and capacity-building on Internet governance are reinforcing acceptance of both Chinese technology and the more repressive norms and values it enables.

Yet China's actions have also created new challenges:

» China's assertiveness and coercive tactics have contributed to **popular backlashes** that threaten its larger strategic objectives. Polls in 2020 and 2021 suggest that citizens in many developed and developing economies do not trust Xi Jinping or China and favor Japanese, EU, or US leadership over that of China.

» Rather than undermine the US role in the Asia-Pacific, Chinese actions have **strengthened US relations** with members of the Quad and other Asian partners, such as Vietnam. And the EU has stepped up to enhance its political and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific.

» Significant solidarity among advanced democracies has emerged to protest Chinese policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, to call for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19, and to ban or limit Huawei 5G technology. And countries are increasingly **scrutinizing and defending against Chinese behavior** that attempts to subvert the principles of international institutions.

» **The absolute number of Confucius Institutes has declined** over the past few years to just over five hundred—far short of Beijing's target of one thousand worldwide by 2020.

» **The Belt and Road has become increasingly bumpy.** Approximately 60 percent of BRI projects have been "somewhat" or "seriously" affected by the coronavirus pandemic; and several European members of China's 17+1 BRI construct are considering exiting the arrangement.

THE AMERICAN ADVANTAGE

The Biden administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance established a useful set of basic parameters for US strategy in the

twenty-first century: protecting the underlying political and economic strengths of the United States, promoting a favorable distribution of power, and leading and sustaining a stable and open international system underwritten by our allies, partners, and multilateral institutions that is capable of meeting the challenges of this century—cyber, climate, corruption, and digital authoritarianism. To realize this future, however, will require the United States not only to lead with a strong vision but also to operate with a new degree of humility and partnership.

First, the United States must account for shifting structural realities. By 2030, or perhaps earlier, the size of China's economy will likely surpass that of the United States. China's population already exceeds that of the United States by more than four times, providing it a distinct advantage in human capital, whether for advancing innovation, growing a domestic market, or enhancing global political outreach. And within the Asia-Pacific region, China claims a distinct military advantage simply by virtue of geography. These factors will require greater reliance on allies and partners.

The United States should reframe the US-China competition away from the narrative of a bilateral rivalry to one rooted in values.

Second, the United States needs to integrate American values and ambitions at home with its leadership abroad, while acknowledging that some of these values are still aspirational. These values include a commitment to inclusion and equality, free trade and economic opportunity, innovation and sustainability, openness, human dignity, and the rule of law. Many of these aims are already embedded but not fully realized in the current rules-based order. Operating from such a framework enables the United States to assert a positive and proactive message of leadership that resonates both domestically and internationally.

Third, and related, the United States should make clear that the central challenge China poses is a value- and norm-based one and not, as is often asserted, one defined by a rising power versus an established power. When competition is framed in a bilateral US-China context, China gains an important advantage. Every issue is elevated into a signal of relative power and influence; and as the rising power, any relative Chinese gain becomes a win. A framework that embraces values and norms also is more likely to engage US allies and partners. Conflict in the South China Sea becomes a normative challenge by China to freedom of navigation and international law

rather than a competition for military dominance between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific. It is a challenge that speaks not only to the United States but also to the 168 nations who are already party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Fourth, as many in the US policy-making community have acknowledged, the United States needs to retool at home. The polarized American polity and chaotic response of the US government to the pandemic tarnished the United States' image and contributed to the impression of US decline.

Beyond its own backyard, China is embedding its technologies, goods, and values throughout the world.

Before taking office, Biden administration National Security Council officials Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi argued that the United States would need to rebuild and rethink the relationship between the state and the market in ways that addressed inequality, sustained growth, and ensured competitiveness with China. The United States needs the same clear objectives and targets for realizing these goals that it adopts for ensuring military preparedness.

Fifth, the United States must re-engage broadly and deeply in regional and global organizations. These organizations are a central battleground in ensuring a "stable and open" international system that reflects US interests and priorities. The Biden administration has already rejoined a number of multilateral agreements and organizations and made clear its intention to seize back the initiative in areas such as human rights, climate change, and technology. However, it must also remain attuned to new Chinese priorities.

China's recently released Fourteenth Five Year Plan (2021–2025), for example, highlighted several priority areas for deeper Chinese engagement in regional and global governance: the Arctic and Antarctica, maritime governance, regional free trade, and space. The United States should be prepared for significant new Chinese initiatives in these arenas and should ensure that it can operate from a position of relative strength, for example, by developing a tightly coordinated strategy with allies around Arctic and space governance.

The Chinese government is highly opportunistic.

Sixth, the United States and its allies and partners should create informal working groups, perhaps within the context of the OECD, to coordinate

and advance shared norms and values as well as to defend against Chinese coercion. In particular, many US analysts have underscored the need for such cooperation in setting joint technology standards. Developing consensus candidates for leadership positions in international institutions, ensuring strong representation by democracies in such bodies, and addressing larger issues of institutional reform, for example, in the WHO and WTO, should also be priority areas for policy coordination. And aligning a policy approach to address ongoing Chinese human rights abuses particularly in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong is essential.

A democratic alliance could also cooperate to combat China's coercive economic policies. While campaigns to buy Taiwanese pineapples and Australian wine in the face of Chinese boycotts are important signals of allied cohesion, stronger steps are necessary. In cases where China boycotts goods from countries on political grounds, an alliance network could simultaneously boycott or impose tariffs on Chinese goods. Similarly, when China threatens loss of market access for industries, such as hotels and airlines, other countries should respond by threatening to take away Chinese airlines' or hotels' access to their markets. Reciprocity signals to China that other countries are prepared to respond with more than rhetorical condemnation and levels the playing field for future negotiation.

China should not achieve an advantage simply because it shows up and listens and the United States does not.

The United States should also encourage deeper European security engagement in Asia. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has called for NATO to play a larger role in the Asia-Pacific region, coordinating with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea to support global rules and set norms and standards in space and cyberspace in the face of destabilizing Chinese behavior. Europe could take part in conversations the Quad is pursuing around supply chain resiliency, the pandemic, and disinformation campaigns as well. Also, a stronger Europe-Asia security partnership could play a crucial role in bolstering Taiwan's security.

Seventh, for the United States to ensure a world order that reflects its values and normative preferences—and not those of China—and to meet the challenges of this century requires more than simply cooperation with its traditional allies and partners. It requires forging a new relationship with the world's developing economies that is rooted in new economic opportunities

for those countries, is imbued with US values, and is directed toward meeting the global challenges outlined in the administration's guidance.

The breadth and depth of China's engagement with developing economies, particularly in Africa and the Middle East but also Latin America and Southeast Asia, has provided China with fertile ground for its values, technologies, and policy preferences to take hold. And it is forging closer military ties with many of these countries as well. Yet there is an opportunity in many cases to change this dynamic.

To begin with, the United States should adopt a more inclusive diplomatic framework and engage a broader range of countries in thinking through how best to advance a common strategy on cybersecurity and governance, climate, corruption, and digital authoritarianism. China should not achieve an advantage simply because it shows up and listens and the United States does not.

In consultation with the developing economies, the United States and other large market democracies, such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia, should also pursue a significant new development initiative—for example, a sustainable and smart cities program in twenty-five to thirty developing countries. Such an initiative would leverage US strengths and those of its democratic allies and address the broader global imperatives identified by the Biden administration. It would involve political and economic capacity building around the rule of law, transparency, sustainability, and innovation and would engage not only governments but also the private sector, civil society, and international institutions.

The United States must lead not only with a strong vision but also with a new degree of humility and partnership.

While much of a new development effort would require new financial support, the United States and its partners could also leverage current initiatives to establish resilient supply chains. As multinationals diversify part of their supply chains away from China to develop regional manufacturing and distribution centers, for example, these new investment opportunities could become part of this new development initiative. Development agencies and NGOs, such as the Asia Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies, that support grass-roots programs on the rule of law, sustainability, and technological innovation could also play an important role. They are a force multiplier for democratic values and should be part of a considered US and allied strategy.

And at the same time, the United States and its allies could reinforce the political, environmental, and technological standards in UN agencies and standard-setting bodies. Creating a new path to engage the developing world is essential to US competitiveness with China, not to mention the future well-being of the international system.

Finally, even as the bilateral US-China relationship remains overwhelmingly competitive, the United States should keep the door open to cooperation with China. There is legitimate space to elevate the world's capacity to respond to climate change, pandemics, and global disasters through US-China cooperation. Reconstituting a bilateral dialogue that supports discussion and negotiation on singular, targeted issues of mutual concern, such as visas or maritime safety, would also be beneficial. And supporting civil society exchanges, such as the Fulbright program and Peace Corps, that offer the opportunity to share US perspectives and values, has little downside for the United States and significant potential upside. ◘

Special to the* Hoover Digest. *Adapted from testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 17, 2021.

Better Footing

How to grapple with Chinese ambitions—military, economic, and ideological.

By H. R. McMaster

> If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.
>
> *—President Harry S. Truman, March 12, 1947*

For too long the United States clung to the assumption that China, having been welcomed into the international system based on our desire for cooperation and engagement, would play by the rules and, as China prospered, its leaders would liberalize its economy and its form of governance. The 2017 National Security Strategy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Key points

» Some are calling for warmer relations with China as an end in itself.

» The Chinese Communist Party's actions are manifestations of its leaders' fears, aspirations, and ideology—not of tensions with the United States.

» China actively promotes the false idea that the United States is trying to keep China down.

» Resisting Beijing will require a high degree of international cooperation. Washington must foster this.

H. R. McMaster *(US Army, Ret.), a former national security adviser, is the Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of Hoover's working groups on military history and Islamism and the international order. He is also a participant in Hoover's Human Prosperity Project, the Bernard and Susan Liautaud Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, and a lecturer at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business. His latest book is* ***Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World*** *(Harper, 2020).*

administered a corrective to that false assumption, recognized the need for transparent competition with the aggressive policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and effected what may be the most significant shift in US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

If any doubt lingered concerning the Chinese Communist Party's intention to extend and tighten its exclusive grip on power internally and achieve "national rejuvenation" at the expense of other nations externally, the party's actions amid a global pandemic should have removed them.

Communist leaders continued to speak the language of cooperation and global governance while repressing human freedom, exporting their authoritarian-mercantilist model, and subverting international organizations. Chairman Xi Jinping speaks of "rule of law" while he interns millions of people in concentration camps and wages a campaign of cultural genocide against the Uighur population in Xinjiang. He vows carbon neutrality by 2060 while China continues to build scores of coal-fired plants globally per year.

He gives speeches on free trade while engaging in economic aggression, forced labor, economic coercion, and unfair trade and economic practices. He suggests a "community of common destiny" while fostering servile relationships with countries vulnerable to his military or economic intimidation. The Chinese Communist Party's Orwellian reversal of the truth matters to Americans because the party is not only strengthening an internal system that stifles human freedom and extends its authoritarian control; it is also exporting that model and advocating for the development of new rules and a new international order that would make the world less free, less prosperous, and less safe.

Despite an undeniable record of aggression and the dangers that the CCP poses for international security and prosperity, some continue to call for warmer relations with China as an end in itself. Although more countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and India have joined the United States and Australia in specific defensive measures such as banning the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei from developing 5G communications networks, others appear unconvinced that it is dangerous to surrender their data to China. As the United States declared the CCP's attacks on Uighurs a genocide, the European Union agreed in principle to a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China that diverted attention away from China's atrocities in exchange for vague promises to adhere to international standards it has consistently ignored since gaining admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001.

Although the Biden administration did not remove Trump administration–imposed tariffs, it re-entered international organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Human Rights Council without demanding

conditions that might have made it more difficult for China to subvert those organizations. The US government acted to prevent investment in Chinese companies connected to the People's Liberation Army, but Wall Street and other international investors are pouring money into Chinese equities, undaunted by the party's increasing intervention in the private sector or the fact that the companies in which they are investing must, by law, act as extensions of the party.

Chinese Communist leaders are likely recalling the quotation attributed to Vladimir Lenin as they watch China overtake the United States as the top destination for new foreign direct investment: "The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them."

TWO MISUNDERSTANDINGS

Two fundamental misunderstandings about the nature of the high-stakes competition with China have stunted the collective response. It is vital that US diplomatic efforts correct them.

The first misunderstanding is that Chinese aggression is the result of US-China tensions or is a reaction to the Trump administration's description of China as a rival in the December 2017 National Security Strategy and the Defense Strategy that stemmed from it. This misunderstanding derives from the conceit that the CCP has no volition except in reaction to the United States. But even the most cursory survey of recent actions reveals that the United States did not cause Chinese aggression and that China's promotion of its authoritarian mercantilist model poses a threat to international security and prosperity.

Consider the party's deliberate suppression of information about the COVID-19 outbreak, the persecution of doctors and journalists who tried to warn the world, and the subversion of the WHO as it excluded Taiwan from that organization and stifled Taiwan's instructive example of how to contain the virus. The CCP has added insult to injury by using diplomacy to obscure China's responsibility for the pandemic and portray its response as superior and magnanimous. The party directed massive cyberattacks globally on medical research facilities amid the pandemic. In an effort to "kill one to warn one hundred," China inflicted economic punishment on Australia for having the temerity to propose an inquiry into the origins of the virus.

Meanwhile, the party raced to perfect its technologically enabled police state and extend its repression into Hong Kong. Xi Jinping even boasted of his intention to expand concentration camps in Xinjiang and extolled the virtues of slave labor. As the party expelled more international reporters and imprisoned more Hong Kong rights activists, Xi announced that he would continue to use hostage taking, such as the unlawful jailing of Canadians Michael

CONTESTED SPACE: Chinese tank crewmen listen to a reviewer at Shenyang training base. China is using its growing military capability to intimidate countries and restrict access for US forces. It has already embarked on efforts to push American forces out of the Indo-Pacific. [Alamy]

Spavor and Michael Kovrig, to coerce others to submit to Chinese demands and support the CCP's worldview and violent self-conception as a one-party nation with no room for ethnic plurality except on its own rigid terms.

Meanwhile, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) bludgeoned Indian soldiers to death along the Himalayan frontier, rammed vessels in the South China Sea, gave its coast guard permission to fire on vessels that do not recognize its baseless claims of control over that strategic maritime area, threatened Japan's Senkakus, and menaced Taiwan with its aircraft and naval vessels.

It is past time to jettison the narcissistic belief that the United States caused Chinese aggression and recognize the party's actions as manifestations of its leaders' fears, aspirations, and ideology. President Biden and his diplomats might make clear to their counterparts abroad that the choice they face is not one between Washington and Beijing. The choice is between sovereignty and servitude.

The second misunderstanding is that competition with China is dangerous or even irresponsible because of a "Thucydides trap," a term coined to express the likelihood of conflict between a rising power (China) and a status

quo power (the United States). The party promotes this false dilemma, portraying efforts to defend against its aggression as simply the United States trying to keep China and its people down. This trope not only provides cover for the party's aggression but rationalizes the views of those who prefer passive accommodation to competition as they pursue short-term profits.

But the way to avoid stepping into the trap of destructive war is to gravitate toward neither confrontation nor passive accommodation. Transparent competition as described in the recently declassified Indo-Pacific Strategy is the best way to prevent unnecessary escalation and enable rather than foreclose on cooperation with China.

STRENGTHS

If American diplomats correct those misunderstandings and US leaders resolve to compete alongside like-minded partners, it is possible to turn what the Chinese Communist Party views as America's weaknesses (such as democratic governance, freedom of speech, and rule of law) into competitive advantages. Competing might also generate confidence in those principles that distinguish free and open societies from the closed, authoritarian system China promotes. It is not just an exercise in altruism to help those abroad who are promoting what Americans regard as inalienable rights and strengthening institutions vital to representative governance. It is one of the best ways to counter China's strategic ambitions.

There is much room for improvement in the effort to prevent China from using the open nature of free market economies to gain technological advantage, perfect its surveillance police state, and promote its authoritarian capitalist model. The integrated nature of the Chinese Communist Party's military and economic strategies is what makes it particularly dangerous to the United States and other free and open societies. For example, many universities, research labs, and companies in countries that value the rule of law and individual rights are unwitting accomplices in the CCP's use of technology to repress its people and improve the capabilities of China's military. What is needed is an international commitment to do no harm through research, investment, trade, or other economic relationships with Chinese companies that must act as extensions of the CCP in three areas:

China is shaping a new international order that would make the world less free, less prosperous, and less safe.

» **Technology:** Do not engage in trade or investment relationships that transfer sensitive technology and allow the PLA and the CCP to gain advantage militarily or obtain an unfair advantage in the emerging data-driven global economy.

» **Investment:** Do not invest in Chinese companies or do business in China in a way that helps the party stifle human freedom and perfect its technologically enabled police state.

» **Intellectual property:** Do not transfer intellectual property and compromise the long-term viability of companies in exchange for short-term profits associated with access to the Chinese market.

The US government will continue to play an important role in this competition, but companies and shareholders must recognize what is at stake and make decisions consistent with long-term interests. Governments can help companies insulate themselves from the coercive power of the CCP. For example, fast-tracking visas for Chinese employees of US companies and their families if they are the objects of party coercion would help companies stand up to Beijing while protecting their people.

America was, and remains, a force for good in the world.

Tougher screening for Chinese firms listed on US, European, and Japanese capital markets as well as scrutiny of US investment in Chinese companies would complement the improved review process for Chinese investment in US companies. Many Chinese companies directly or indirectly involved in domestic human rights abuses, development of advanced defense capabilities, and violation of international treaties are listed on American stock exchanges or benefit from US investment while failing to meet transparency and reporting requirements.

The Biden administration must continue to expand on the important work that the intelligence agencies and Departments of State, Defense, and Justice have done to counter the CCP's sustained campaign of industrial espionage while recognizing that defensive measures will prove inadequate. Prevailing in the tech competition will require more investment in basic and applied research as well as stronger cooperation across the public and private sectors of like-minded liberal democracies. For important emerging technologies such as those associated with quantum computing or artificial intelligence, the private sector should seek new partnerships with countries that share commitments to the free market, representative government, and the rule of law.

Other arenas of competition that require a high degree of international cooperation include China's effort to control critical supply chains, financial

technology, digital currency and electronic payments, and global Internet privacy and data standards. The Communist Party's efforts to gain preponderant influence over global logistics infrastructure through strategic investments and debt traps as well as subsidies for 5G communications infrastructure require multinational cooperation and economic statecraft. Governments of free market economies must work together and within international organizations to ensure access to critical commodities and products such as rare-earth metals and computer chips, enforce reciprocal trade practices, and demand recompense for China's unfair advantages such as state support for companies like Huawei.

SECURITY AND EDUCATION

Transparent competition with China requires a strong defense to convince the Chinese Communist Party and China's army that they cannot accomplish objectives in the Indo-Pacific region with force. China is using its growing military capability to intimidate countries and restrict access for US forces. It has already embarked on efforts to push American forces out as the first step in establishing hegemonic influence across the Indo-Pacific analogous to the tributary system of the Qing dynasty. The 2018 National Defense Strategy identified eight critical areas for modernization that remain valid and relevant. Those priorities require sustained, predictable investment.

Perhaps most important, it is difficult to overstate the need for forward-positioned joint forces to assure allies and deter adversaries. Both China and Russia have developed anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities to restrict US and allied freedom of movement and action. Forward-positioned, capable joint forces of sufficient size transform what adversaries would like to declare denied space into contested space while ensuring that if conflict should occur, we do not have to pay the high price of readmission.

Chinese aggression is not the result of US-China tensions.

Competition does not foreclose on cooperation. If the United States and like-minded liberal democracies convince Chinese leaders that their campaign of co-option, coercion, and concealment is not working, Beijing may conclude that it can have enough of its dream without trespassing on the security, sovereignty, and prosperity of other nations' citizens. But it will be important to avoid compromises based on false promises of cooperation in areas such as climate change or North Korea's nuclear program. Watching what Beijing does rather than believing what it says is a best practice.

Perhaps most important, the United States must possess the confidence to sustain a foreign policy based on the recognition that American security and prosperity at home depend on engagement abroad. Clearly there is work to do at home to overcome the traumas of a pandemic, an economic recession, social divisions, vitriolic partisanship, and the destructive interaction among identity politics, critical race theory, bigotry, and racism. But our effort to overcome those traumas should not encourage disengagement from challenges abroad. Introspection should help clarify what Americans stand for and what Americans must defend: individual liberty, the rule of law, freedom of expression, democratic governance, tolerance, and opportunity for all. Schools can rekindle in our youth an understanding of our history that includes not only the contradictions and imperfections in our experiment in democracy but also the great promise of America and its role as a force for good in the world. We might remember the philosopher Richard Rorty's observation that "national pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement."

Finally, education may create another way to strengthen our national defense and our ability to overcome China's threat to our security and prosperity. It may be time for an initiative similar to the National Defense Education Act, passed in 1958 in response to the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik. Educated citizens start new businesses, create medical breakthroughs like vaccines, ensure the technological prowess of our armed forces, and solve interconnected problems like climate change and energy, food, and water security. Educated citizens learn languages and connect with other societies, foster strategic empathy, and promote peace.

And educated citizens appreciate the great gifts of our free and open society as well as what we must do together to defend our nation and improve it. ◘

Special to the* Hoover Digest. *Adapted from testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 2, 2021.



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Taiwan as Trigger

American presidents come and go, but Beijing has never once taken its eyes off Taiwan, or ceased demanding it.

By Niall Ferguson

In a famous essay, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin borrowed a distinction from the ancient Greek poet Archilochus: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing."

"There exists," wrote Berlin, "a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to . . . a single, universal, organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance"—the hedgehogs—"and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory"—the foxes.

Key points

» Taiwan remains Beijing's top priority.

» The ambiguity of the United States' attitude toward Taiwan, especially the security guarantee, remains intolerable to China.

» The US commitment to Taiwan has grown verbally stronger even as it has become militarily weaker.

» Losing—or not even fighting for—Taiwan would be seen all over Asia as the end of American predominance in the region.

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Berlin was talking about writers. But the same distinction can be drawn in the realm of great-power politics. Today, there are two superpowers in the world, the United States and China. The former is a fox. American foreign policy is, to borrow Berlin's terms, "scattered or diffused, moving on many levels." China, by contrast, is a hedgehog: it relates everything to "one unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes self-contradictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary inner vision."

Fifty years ago this July, the arch-fox of American diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, flew to Beijing on a secret mission that would fundamentally alter the global balance of power. The strategic backdrop was the administration of Richard Nixon's struggle to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War with its honor and credibility so far as possible intact. The domestic context was dissension more profound and violent than anything we have seen in the past year. In March 1971, Lieutenant William Calley was found guilty of twenty-two murders in the My Lai massacre. In April, half a million people marched through Washington to protest the war in Vietnam. In June, the *New York Times* began publishing the Pentagon Papers.

No matter what other issues Kissinger raised, Zhou steered the conversation back to Taiwan, "the only question between us two."

Kissinger's meetings with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, were perhaps the most momentous of his career. As a fox, the US national security adviser had multiple objectives. The principal goal was to secure a public Chinese invitation for his boss, Nixon, to visit Beijing the following year.

But Kissinger was also seeking Chinese help in getting America out of Vietnam, as well as hoping to exploit the Sino-Soviet split in a way that would put pressure on the Soviet Union, America's principal Cold War adversary, to slow down the nuclear arms race. In his opening remarks, Kissinger listed no fewer than six issues for discussion, including the raging conflict in South Asia that would culminate in the independence of Bangladesh.

Zhou's response was that of a hedgehog. He had just one issue: Taiwan. "If this crucial question is not solved," he told Kissinger at the outset, "then the whole question [of US-China relations] will be difficult to resolve."

To an extent that is striking to the modern-day reader of the transcripts of this and the subsequent meetings, Zhou's principal goal was to persuade Kissinger to agree to "recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government in China" and "Taiwan Province" as "an inalienable part of Chinese territory

which must be restored to the motherland," from which the United States must "withdraw all its armed forces and dismantle all its military installations." (Since the Communists' triumph in the Chinese civil war in 1949, the island of Taiwan had been the last outpost of the nationalist Kuomintang. And since the Korean War, the United States had defended its autonomy.)

With his eyes on so many prizes, Kissinger was prepared to make the key concessions the Chinese sought. "We are not advocating a 'two China' solution or a 'one China, one Taiwan' solution," he told Zhou. "As a student of history," he went on, "one's prediction would

have to be that the political evolution is likely to be in the direction which [the] prime minister . . . indicated to me." Moreover, "We can settle the major part of the military question within this term of the president if the war in Southeast Asia [i.e., Vietnam] is ended."

Asked by Zhou for his view of the Taiwanese independence movement, Kissinger dismissed it out of hand. No matter what other issues Kissinger raised—Vietnam, Korea, the Soviets—Zhou steered the conversation back to Taiwan, "the only question between us two." Would the United States recognize the People's Republic as the sole government of China and normalize diplomatic relations? Yes, after the 1972 election. Would Taiwan be expelled from the United Nations and its seat on the Security Council given to Beijing? Again, yes.

Fast forward half a century, and the same issue—Taiwan—remains Beijing's top priority. His-

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

tory did not evolve in quite the way Kissinger had foreseen. True, Nixon went to China as planned, Taiwan was booted out of the United Nations and, under President Jimmy Carter, the United States abrogated its 1954 mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. But the pro-Taiwan lobby in Congress was able to throw Taipei a lifeline in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act.

The act states that the United States will consider "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." It also commits the US government to "make available to Taiwan such defense articles and . . . services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity," as well as to "maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."

AN INTOLERABLE STATE

For the Chinese hedgehog, this ambiguity—whereby the United States does not recognize Taiwan as an independent state but at the same time underwrites its security and de facto autonomy—remains an intolerable state of affairs.

Yet the balance of power has been transformed since 1971—and much more profoundly than Kissinger could have foreseen. China fifty years ago was dirt poor: despite its huge population, its economy was a tiny fraction of US gross domestic product. This year, the International Monetary Fund projects that, in current dollar terms, Chinese GDP will be three-quarters of US GDP. On a purchasing power parity basis, China overtook the United States in 2017.

In the same time frame, Taiwan, too, has prospered. Not only has it emerged as one of Asia's most advanced economies, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company the world's top chip manufacturer. Taiwan has also become living proof that an ethnically Chinese people can thrive under democracy. The authoritarian regime that ran Taipei in the 1970s is a distant memory. Today, it is a shining example of how a free society can use technology to empower its citizens—which explains why its response to the COVID-19 pandemic was by any measure the most successful in the world.

As Harvard University's Graham Allison argued in his hugely influential book, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?,* China's economic rise—at first welcomed by American policy makers—was bound eventually to look like a threat to the United States. Conflicts between incumbent powers and rising powers have been a feature of world politics

since 431 BC, when it was the "growth in power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta" that led to war. The only surprising thing was that it took President Donald Trump, of all people, to waken Americans up to the threat posed by the growth in the power of the People's Republic.

Trump campaigned against China as a threat mainly to US manufacturing jobs. Once in the White House, he took his time before acting, but in 2018 began imposing tariffs on Chinese imports. Yet he could not prevent his preferred trade war from escalating rapidly into something more like Cold War II—a contest that was at once technological, ideological, and geopolitical. The foreign policy "blob" picked up the anti-China ball and ran with it. The public cheered them on, with anti-China sentiment surging among both Republicans and Democrats.

Taiwan has also become living proof that an ethnically Chinese people can thrive under democracy.

Trump himself may have been a hedgehog with a one-track mind: tariffs. But under Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, US policy soon reverted to its foxy norm. Pompeo threw every imaginable issue at Beijing, from the reliance of Huawei Technologies on imported semiconductors, to the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, to the murky origins of COVID-19 in Wuhan.

Inevitably, Taiwan was added to the list, but the increased arms sales and diplomatic contacts were not given top billing. When Richard Haass, the grand panjandrum of the Council on Foreign Relations, argued last year for ending "strategic ambiguity" and wholeheartedly committing the United States to upholding Taiwan's autonomy, no one in the Trump administration said, "Great idea!"

Yet when Pompeo met the director of the Communist Party office of foreign affairs, Yang Jiechi, in Hawaii last June, guess where the Chinese side began? "There is only one China in the world and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The one-China principle is the political foundation of China-US relations."

THE PATIENT HEDGEHOG

So successful was Trump in leading elite and popular opinion to a more anti-China stance that President Joe Biden had no alternative but to fall in line last year. The somewhat surprising outcome is that he is now leading an administration that is in many ways more hawkish than its predecessor.


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Trump was no Cold Warrior. According to former national security adviser John Bolton's memoir, the president liked to point to the tip of one of his Sharpies and say, "This is Taiwan," then point to the Resolute desk in the Oval Office and say, "This is China." "Taiwan is like two feet from China," Trump told one Republican senator. "We are eight thousand miles away. If they invade, there isn't a f—ing thing we can do about it."

Unlike others in his national security team, Trump cared little about human rights issues. On Hong Kong, he said: "I don't want to get involved," and, "We have human rights problems too." When President Xi Jinping informed him about the labor camps for the Muslim Uighurs of Xinjiang in western China, Trump essentially told him "No problemo." On the thirtieth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Trump asked: "Who cares about it? I'm trying to make a deal."

The Biden administration, by contrast, means what it says on such issues. In every statement since taking over as secretary of state, Antony Blinken has referred to China not only as a strategic rival but also as a violator of human rights. In January, he called China's treatment of the Uighurs "an effort to commit genocide" and pledged to continue Pompeo's policy of increasing US engagement with Taiwan. In February, he gave Yang an earful on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and even Myanmar, where China backs the recent military coup. Earlier this year, the administration imposed sanctions on Chinese officials it holds responsible for sweeping away Hong Kong's autonomy.

In his last *Foreign Affairs* magazine article before joining the administration as its Asia "czar," Kurt Campbell argued for "a conscious effort to deter Chinese adventurism. . . . This means investing in long-range conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, unmanned carrier-based strike aircraft and underwater vehicles, guided-missile submarines, and high-speed strike weapons." He added that Washington needs to work with other states to disperse US forces across Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean and "to reshore sensitive industries and pursue a 'managed decoupling' from China."

In many respects, the continuity with the Trump China strategy is startling. The trade war has not been ended, nor the tech war. Aside from actually meaning the human rights stuff, the only other big difference between

THE ONLY QUESTION: A Chinese propaganda poster from the late 1950s (opposite) shows mainland troops attacking US and Taiwanese forces over the slogan "We must liberate Taiwan." [Alamy]

ISLAND IN THE STREAM: A boy wearing a shirt imprinted with the flag of the Republic of China attends a patriotic recruiting event last year in Taipei, Taiwan. Beijing has always insisted that what it calls "Taiwan Province" is "an inalienable part of Chinese territory which must be restored to the motherland," in the words of Zhou Enlai. [Ceng Shou Yi—Sipa USA/Newscom]

Biden and Trump is the former's far stronger emphasis on the importance of allies in this process of deterring China—in particular, the so-called Quad the United States has formed with Australia, India, and Japan. As Blinken said in a keynote speech on March 3, for the United States "to engage China from a position of strength . . . requires working with allies and partners . . . because our combined weight is much harder for China to ignore."

This argument took concrete form when Campbell told the *Sydney Morning Herald* that the United States was "not going to leave Australia alone on the field" if Beijing continued its current economic squeeze on Canberra (retaliation for the Australian government's call for an independent inquiry into the origins of the pandemic). National security adviser Jake Sullivan has been singing from much the same hymnbook. Biden himself hosted a virtual summit for the Quad's heads of state on March 12.

The Chinese approach remains that of the hedgehog. Several years ago, I was told by one of Xi's economic advisers that bringing Taiwan back under

the mainland's control was his president's most cherished objective—and the reason he had secured an end to the informal rule that had confined previous Chinese presidents to two terms. It is for this reason, above all others, that Xi has presided over a huge expansion of China's land, sea, and air forces, including the land-based DF-21D missiles that could sink American aircraft carriers.

While America's multitasking foxes have been adding to their laundry list of grievances, the Chinese hedgehog has steadily been building its capacity to take over Taiwan. In the words of Tanner Greer, a journalist who writes knowledgably on Taiwanese security, the People's Liberation Army "has parity on just about every system the Taiwanese can field (or buy from us in the future), and for some systems they simply outclass the Taiwanese altogether." More important, China has created what's known as an "anti-access/area denial bubble" to keep US forces away from Taiwan. As Lonnie Henley of George Washington University pointed out in congressional testimony earlier this year, "if we can disable [China's integrated air defense system], we can win militarily. If not, we probably cannot."

As a student of history, to quote Kissinger, I see a very dangerous situation. The US commitment to Taiwan has grown verbally stronger even as it has become militarily weaker. When a commitment is said to be "rock solid" but in reality has the consistency of fine sand, there is a danger that both sides miscalculate.

THE PRESSURE OF TIME

I am not alone in worrying. Admiral Phil Davidson, the head of US forces in the Indo-Pacific, warned in February testimony before Congress that China could invade Taiwan by 2027. In March, my *Bloomberg Opinion* colleague Max Hastings noted that "Taiwan evokes the sort of sentiment among [the Chinese] people that Cuba did among Americans sixty years ago."

Admiral James Stavridis, also a *Bloomberg Opinion* columnist, has just published *2034: A Novel of the Next World War,* in which a surprise Chinese naval encirclement of Taiwan is one of the opening ploys of World War III. (The United States sustains such heavy naval losses that it is driven to nuke Zhanjiang, which leads in turn to the obliteration of San Diego and Galveston.) Perhaps the most questionable part of this scenario is its date, thirteen years hence. My Hoover colleague Misha Auslin has imagined a US-China naval war as soon as 2025.

In an important new study of the Taiwan question for the Council on Foreign Relations, Robert D. Blackwill and Philip Zelikow—veteran students and

practitioners of US foreign policy—lay out the four options they see for US policy, of which their preferred is the last:

> The United States should . . . rehearse—at least with Japan and Taiwan—a parallel plan to challenge any Chinese denial of international access to Taiwan and prepare, including with pre-positioned US supplies, including war reserve stocks, shipments of vitally needed supplies to help Taiwan defend itself. . . . The United States and its allies would credibly and visibly plan to react to the attack on their forces by breaking all financial relations with China, freezing or seizing Chinese assets.

Blackwill and Zelikow are right that the status quo is unsustainable. But there are three core problems with all arguments to make deterrence more persuasive. The first is that any steps to strengthen Taiwan's defenses will inevitably elicit an angry response from China, increasing the likelihood that the Cold War turns hot—especially if Japan is explicitly involved. The second problem is that such steps create a closing window of opportunity for China to act before the US upgrade of deterrence is complete. The third is the reluctance of the Taiwanese themselves to treat their national security with the same seriousness that Israelis take the survival of their state.

In many respects, Biden's continuity with the Trump China strategy is startling.

A meeting in Alaska last March of Blinken, Sullivan, Yang, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi—following hard on the heels of Blinken's visits to Japan and South Korea—was never likely to restart the process of Sino-American strategic dialogue that characterized the era of "Chimerica" under George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The days of "win-win" diplomacy are long gone.

During the opening exchanges before the media, Yang illustrated that hedgehogs not only have one big idea—they are also very prickly. The United States was being "condescending," he declared, in remarks that overshot the prescribed two minutes by a factor of eight; it would do better to address its own "deep seated" human rights problems, such as racism (a "long history of killing blacks"), rather than lecture China.

The question that remains is how quickly the Biden administration could find itself confronted with a Taiwan crisis, whether a light "quarantine," a full-scale blockade, or a surprise amphibious invasion. If Hastings is right, this would be the Cuban missile crisis of Cold War II, but with the roles

reversed, as the contested island is even further from the United States than Cuba is from Russia. If Stavridis is right, Taiwan would be more like Belgium in 1914 or Poland in 1939.

But I have another analogy in mind. Perhaps Taiwan will turn out to be to the American empire what Suez was to the British empire in 1956: the moment when the imperial lion is exposed as a paper tiger. When Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Prime Minister Anthony Eden joined forces with France and Israel to try to take it back by force. American opposition precipitated a run on the pound and British humiliation.

The US commitment to Taiwan has grown verbally stronger even as it has become militarily weaker.

I, for one, struggle to see the Biden administration responding to a Chinese attack on Taiwan with the combination of military force and financial sanctions envisaged by Blackwill and Zelikow. Sullivan has written eloquently of the need for a foreign policy that Middle America can get behind. Getting torched for Taipei does not seem to fit that bill.

As for Biden himself, would he really be willing to jeopardize the post-pandemic boom his economic policies are fueling for the sake of an island Kissinger was once prepared quietly to trade in pursuit of Cold War détente? Who would be hurt more by the financial crisis Blackwill and Zelikow imagine in the event of war for Taiwan: China, or the United States itself? One of the two superpowers has a current accounts deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP (Q2 2020) and a net international investment position of nearly minus-$14 trillion, and it's not China. The surname of the secretary of state would certainly be an irresistible temptation to headline writers if the United States blinked in what would be the fourth and biggest Taiwan crisis since 1954.

Yet think what that would mean. Losing in Vietnam five decades ago turned out not to matter much, other than to the unfortunate inhabitants of South Vietnam. There was barely any domino effect in Asia as a whole, aside from the human catastrophe of Cambodia. Yet losing—or not even fighting for—Taiwan would be seen all over Asia as the end of American predominance in the region we now call the "Indo-Pacific." It would confirm

Who would be hurt more in a financial crisis triggered by a war for Taiwan: China or the United States?

the long-standing hypothesis of China's return to primacy in Asia after two centuries of eclipse and "humiliation." It would mean a breach of the "first island chain" that Chinese strategists believe encircles them, as well as handing Beijing control of the microchip mecca that is TSMC (remember, semiconductors, not data, are the new oil). It would surely cause a run on the dollar and US Treasuries. It would be the American Suez.

"Taiwan evokes the sort of sentiment among [the Chinese] people that Cuba did among Americans sixty years ago."

The fox has had a good run. But the danger of foxy foreign policy is that you care about so many issues you risk losing focus. The hedgehog, by contrast, knows one big thing. That big thing may be that he who rules Taiwan rules the world. ■



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Freedom's Struggle

With China increasingly dominant, nations in the Indo-Pacific seek their own paths between socialism and capitalism.

By Michael R. Auslin

The world is about to witness a demonstration of whether an authoritarian state can take over a free society and keep it economically flourishing while individual rights are increasingly extinguished. If that sounds like a paradox, it is, given that the historical record includes no examples of such a transition to authoritarianism where, ultimately, economic growth and development continued while freedom languished. Indeed, despite appearances to the contrary, there is little evidence that wealthy or free countries are eager to adopt the repressive systems of illiberal powers.

Despite this, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is relentlessly pushing its laboratory experiment on Hong Kong, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has passed a draconian national security law, repudiating its promises to ensure the former colony's freedoms.

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The organs of CCP control have already been established in Hong Kong, and the law makes clear that any activities that Beijing considers to be secessionist, subversive, or terrorist will lead to prosecution. Pro-democracy activists have been arrested, including several attempting to escape to Taiwan; democracy leaders such as Jimmy Lai have been charged, chilling free expression. Offenses considered serious enough will be taken out of the Hong Kong legal system entirely and prosecuted under mainland law after transferral of the accused to Beijing. Tighter controls on foreign media and organizations as well will reduce the free flow of information in the territory; already

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

Hong Kong libraries are being stripped of books by authors the Communist regime in Beijing considers threatening.

How will the disappearance of Hong Kong's traditional freedoms, and the imposition of an authoritarian system of control, affect the territory's economic activity? What will remain of civil society in Hong Kong once the law is fully executed? In short, will Hong Kong retain any of the qualities of free life that marked it for so many decades?

IS MODERNIZATION A MIRAGE?

These are not academic questions, though as the world watches the disappearance of a free Hong Kong, they lead us to the broader issue of which socioeconomic system provides a better way of life, socialism or capitalism. Once discarded as a relic of the Cold War, presumed no longer to matter at the "end of history," the question of socialism versus capitalism has returned with a vengeance, almost solely because of China's rise.

The extraordinary growth of China since the "reform and opening up" era was launched by then–paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979 has been taken as the counterpart to the so-called "Washington Consensus." That neoliberal argument assumed that free market capitalism and globalization provide the most successful pathway to economic prosperity and individual freedom; its heyday was during the Reagan and Clinton administrations in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, the PRC's supporters claim that an illiberal political system can foster a more dynamic economic environment, leading to a better life for its citizens. Particularly since the 2008 global financial crisis—and more recently after the COVID-19 global pandemic that began in Wuhan, China—Beijing has touted the superiority of its approach, boasting that it avoided the meltdown after the collapse of America's subprime mortgage market and, in 2020, that it was better able to control the coronavirus outbreak and correspondingly suffered less social and economic disruption.

Until the coronavirus pandemic, the world was increasingly torn between the Western, liberal model and China's centralized Leninist model. The PRC's seemingly unstoppable rise from 1980 through 2015, when its stock market

faltered and macroeconomic growth began to level off, led many to assume that it indeed had found a better means of ensuring economic growth and social development than had the West. Within the space of a generation, China went through several stages of development, starting from near subsistence (especially in the countryside) to middle-income status around 2010. The 1980s and 1990s in particular witnessed an expansion of market-oriented mechanisms, starting in coastal special economic zones and expanding to major inland urban centers.

Since the PRC's political system was indelibly connected with the economic model, development also strengthened the state, especially once the CCP began to reassert Leninist-style control after the 2008 global financial crisis. Government stimulus packages and increased government control over the economy led to arguments that political freedom and free market capitalism were not necessary for robust economic growth. Rather, Chinese officials asserted that a less representative political structure run by trained technocrats would avoid the messiness inherent in democratic polities, achieving superior standards of living, not to mention better educational and scientific outcomes, as well as greater social stability. This last point was reiterated by Beijing in light of the summer 2020 civil disturbances that broke out across the United States.

Once discarded as a Cold War relic, the question of socialism versus capitalism has returned with a vengeance.

Such claims oversimplify the complicated patchwork that represents socioeconomic development in China, America, and the rest of the world. There are very few pure political and economic regimes, outside of academic theory. In the Indo-Pacific region in particular, just about every type of political and economic system coexists, making a complex tapestry that continues to evolve as states respond to internal needs and external conditions.

Democratic nations such as Japan and India adopted a form of state capitalism that gave a powerful role to national government in establishing a sphere of economic activity that lies somewhere between socialism and free market capitalism, yet the results have been very different in each. In Japan, a focus on export industries and manufacturing allowed it to become the world's second-largest economy for decades; India, however, found its neosocialist and autarkic economy falling further behind the rest of the world, until near collapse forced the adoption of economic reform in the early 1990s. Other Asian nations, such as South Korea, moved fitfully along

the road of both political and economic liberalization simultaneously in the 1980s, rapidly increasing per-capita GDP while giving birth to a freewheeling political system; Taiwan largely followed this route as well during the 1990s. The PRC, as is well known, opened up its southern coastal regions as special economic zones starting in the late 1970s, giving them freedoms and access to the global economy that other, interior regions did not share.

In short, there was and remains a spectrum of socioeconomic models throughout the Indo-Pacific, with most nations occupying positions somewhere short of either pure free market capitalism or socialism. Even North Korea, run by the despotic Kim family, has attempted to stabilize its economy by allowing private markets to operate.

In the Indo-Pacific region, just about every type of political and economic system coexists.

The broader question that this academic debate addresses is, what is the best balance of political freedom and economic openness? The Western modernization model, apotheosized in the Washington Consensus, presumes that political and economic liberalization go hand in hand. In particular, the post–World War II experience led policy makers in America and Europe to assume that economic liberalization and globalization would create increasingly strong middle classes that would demand political representation, thereby assuring ongoing political liberalization. A robust civil society would ensue once civil rights and individual freedom were protected by democratic regimes. Human prosperity would be best ensured by this virtuous cycle, a balanced liberalization among politics, economics, and civil society.

HUMAN RIGHTS DON'T MATTER

China's growth over the past three decades has fundamentally challenged the West's modernization thesis, yet its own experience shows the dangers in assuming that political repression can coexist beside economic vitality. As Richard McGregor points out in his book *The Party*, many of the dazzling Shanghai and Beijing skyscrapers that observers point to as proof that China has a market economy were actually built with state support. Conversely, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China make up a majority of the economy but account for the minority of profit. Skewed incentives are pervasive throughout the Chinese system, leading to malinvestment and its reverberations, such as massive ghost cities dotting the landscape or zombie SOEs that are protected by the CCP instead of being allowed to wither away.

To many observers, however, such inefficiencies are unimportant compared to the dramatic change in Chinese standards of living over the past generation. Once a developing nation of hundreds of millions of bicycle riders housed in squalid conditions, today's China appears to foreigners the exemplar of a modern society, with gleaming buildings, conspicuous displays of wealth, digital commerce, and a cosmopolitan lifestyle. Yet such surface manifestations of development cannot capture the enormous disparities in income that divide Chinese society, especially between the coastal and interior regions, nor do they account for the baneful effects of corruption and abuse of power by party officials, leading intelligentsia, and favored economic elites.

Perhaps most important, measurements of Chinese wealth, as imperfect as they are, ignore the question of individual rights and civil society. As noted by historian and Hoover senior fellow Frank Dikötter, the CCP has never been interested in sharing power with the people, even at the height of the reform era; sanguinary proof of this was provided by the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. While some level of civil society was allowed to develop after Mao, particularly during the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin eras, it was always tightly controlled, stunting the ways in which Chinese citizens of the post-Mao period could develop their personal interests or contacts with the outer world. Worse, since 2009, even the small sphere of personal and civic freedom allowed by the CCP has been eroded, especially after current general secretary Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012.

Perhaps more than Americans, Asians are sensitive to the limitations of grandiose schemes of utopian social planning.

The Communist Party is back in full control of Chinese society and state today, emphasizing Leninist ideology, and the country is under greater repression than at any time since Mao's reign of terror (excepting the brief, brutal suppression of the 1989 democracy movement).

As Chinese society turns inward on the orders of the CCP, and as the world watches it wither Hong Kong's democracy, the poverty of life under authoritarian rule will become more evident. Not only is China's economy continuing to slow (and will do so more dramatically thanks to the COVID-prompted recession), but the lives of its people are becoming narrower and more brittle. Rampant nationalism in China cannot detract from the manifest domestic dissatisfaction with the CCP and uncertainty over China's future.

The widely reported fact that most of China's elite hold foreign passports and own property abroad, along with the massive capital outflow since 2015, are harbingers of a more unstable future. And while the CCP has ensured that a much wider section of the population has benefited from economic growth than comparatively did under the Soviet Union, rising expectations for continued wealth production and commensurate freedom to pursue economic interests mean that continued sluggishness in the economy will lead to social friction, if not backlash. It is precisely to forestall such reaction that the CCP has re-emphasized socialist ideology and clamped down on civil society (while trying to root out corruption, at least by those opposed to Xi Jinping and his circle). Thus, a vicious circle ensues, further impoverishing both pocketbook and soul.

Many observers fail to account for the effects of corruption and abuse of power by Chinese party officials, leading intelligentsia, and favored economic elites.

CHINA IS NOT THE MODEL

The nations of the Indo-Pacific, as well as those around the world, are warily watching both China's travails and the equally serious troubles in the West, particularly the United States. Asia is suffering a democracy recession, as argued by Hoover senior fellow Larry Diamond, especially in Thailand and the Philippines, and there is little likelihood of either democracy or free market capitalism being adopted in Laos and Cambodia; communist Vietnam struggles with opening up its society to the global economy while maintaining strict control at home. Bangladesh, to take another example, has an uneasy mixed-market economy and is ranked as "partly free" by Freedom House because of its restrictions on the press and human rights issues. Myanmar (Burma), once a beacon of hope for the transition from military authoritarianism to representative democracy, has been mired in a reactionary turn under power broker (and Nobel Peace Prize winner) Aung San Suu Kyi. Other nations, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, are democracies grappling with growing Islamic fundamentalism. Most of these same Asian countries fear Beijing's growing power and aggression, and at the same time covet the aid and trade that have made China so powerful over the past few decades.

Yet despite the examples above, it is also the case that few countries are rushing to embrace the type of socialist authoritarianism offered by the

CCP. Moreover, democracy is firmly rooted in Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Rather than seeing the Chinese way as the only path forward, all nations in the region are searching for sustainable ways of achieving prosperity.

Perhaps an anecdote can help bring life to some of the more abstract issues under discussion. During nearly a third of a century of regular travel to the Indo-Pacific, including some four years living in Japan, I never heard Asians—whether scholars, journalists, business leaders, or the like—talk about China as their role model. They envied its economic growth, of course, and warily respected its increasing power, but none ever talked about wanting their country to become more like China. Rather, almost all wanted their country to become like Japan.

They understood that Japan's democracy could be sclerotic and that it had lost its commanding economic position after the 1990s, but they also hungered for its stable society, its undeniable developed economy, its excellent schools, and its green public spaces (which, to an American, seemed meager). Some few, like the Singaporeans, were quite content with their own free market capitalist system, even if it was married to a more controlled democracy. But the majority were far more interested in pursuing the Japanese model, even fully aware of the country's shortcomings.

China is under greater repression than at any time since Mao's reign of terror.

Prosperity, and its connection to socioeconomic and political systems, is perhaps far better understood in the Indo-Pacific region, given its recent history of decolonization, war, and nationalist movements, than in the United States, where no other alternative political or economic system has ever held sway. Perhaps more than Americans, Asians are sensitive to the limitations of grandiose schemes of utopian social planning and have only to remember Mao's Cultural Revolution or Pol Pot's genocide to shrink from the type of radicalism that is popular elsewhere. Whether informed by Buddhist compassion or Confucian humanism, much philosophizing in Asia is quite realistic and hardheaded.

Few have discovered the golden mean between individual freedom and social order, and most are comfortable with some level of socioeconomic restriction and political control in exchange for social stability and sustainable growth. Not all Asian nations have achieved such a balance, but their

citizens understand that fragile are the conditions that create prosperity, and what seems like the golden egg of authoritarian control and economic well-being is at best a double-edged sword, and at worst, a short-lived mirage. ◘

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Ethiopia Unravels

Fresh conflict in the Horn of Africa is more than a humanitarian crisis—it's **a blow to regional security and US interests.**

By Jendayi Frazer and Judd Devermont

It is a grave mistake to frame the Ethiopian conflict narrowly as a humanitarian and human rights problem. It is a regional crisis that threatens US security interests. The United States must work, foremost with African countries, to stop the fighting before it is too late.

Several months after the outbreak of fighting in the Tigray region, the continent's second-most-populous country is unraveling. Ethiopia had been a linchpin of stability for more than two decades, distinguishing itself as one of the largest peacekeeping contributors in the world and an engine of economic growth in East Africa. Its descent into horrific, unconscionable violence—in Tigray, as well as other parts of the country—threatens the broader region's security. It has undercut the effectiveness of Ethiopian forces in Somalia and South Sudan, and it has contributed to an armed border standoff with Sudan. If unresolved, it will impose steep costs on the international community as it struggles to manage the pandemic and complex crises elsewhere.

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It is imperative to take the following actions to end the war: build an international consensus, increase the pain for the conflict's belligerents, establish credible benchmarks, and support an African-led dialogue.

First, until there is consensus, the Ethiopian government will continue to deny there are impediments to humanitarian access. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's statement asking international partners to address the crisis in Tigray through action at the United Nations is a step in the right direction. US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, who assumed the UN Security Council presidency this month, has indicated that she intends to table the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia.

Over the past months, Security Council members sidelined discussions on Ethiopia, relegating them to the informal "any other business" (AOB) agenda items. The government of Ethiopia has benefited from this bureaucratic workaround because there is no public record of AOB topics, forestalling concrete action. The United States and the African council members—Kenya, Niger, and Tunisia—should insist on adding Ethiopia to the agenda. If the African governments stand firm, security council consensus can be forged and the international community finally will be able to tackle this crisis.

Africa's second-most-populous country is coming apart.

Second, international condemnation goes only so far. It won't change behavior, and the combatants will continue to rip the country apart short of real consequences. The international community has to increase the costs to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) for continuing the killing. The recent reports released by Amnesty and the Ethiopia Human Rights Commission detailing human rights abuses conducted by Eritrean forces should serve as the basis for sanctions on Eritrea. This measure, echoing an earlier sanction regime on Asmara for its support of Al-Shabaab and illegal deployment of troops in a neighboring country, will function as a warning to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. More importantly, the sanctions will serve as a pressure point to end the war, in part because Ethiopian operations in Tigray depend on Eritrean forces.

Third, the international community should pause the current International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt relief negotiations with Ethiopia and the US International Development Finance Corporation should suspend its up to $500 million loan in support of Ethio Telecom's privatization. There is no justification for a major financial boost when Addis Ababa is refusing to end the

FLEEING: Mibrak Esayus, who says her parents were killed by Eritrean soldiers, carries one of her five siblings to safety in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. Recent reports by humanitarian organizations that have detailed human rights abuses could serve as the basis for sanctions against Eritrea. [Baz Ratner—Reuters]

fighting and denying life-saving assistance to its people. Similarly, French, Emirati, Kenyan, and South African telecommunication companies may need to reconsider their bids to operate in Ethiopia until the conflict ends. Not only are there significant reputational risks involved, but it is hardly a sound investment when the government imposes communication blackouts to prosecute its war.

China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), all of which have substantial investments in and relations with Ethiopia, also should press the combatants to agree to a cease-fire. Saudi Arabia is especially important since it previously used its considerable financial largesse to facilitate rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The United States should not hesitate to expend political capital to nudge these governments into action.

Finally, it is critical to establish credible benchmarks to move forward. Humanitarian access is the responsibility of all governments, and it is

unacceptable to reward Addis Ababa for living up to a universal standard. In addition to the expulsion of Eritrean troops, the Ethiopians should agree to a "no fly zone" as a confidence-building measure. The government must accept an international mediator to resolve the dispute between the government and the TPLF that has metastasized into a regional crisis.

The African Union has appointed a Mauritanian diplomat to address the Ethiopia-Sudan border dispute, but AU chair (and Democratic Republic of the Congo president) Félix Tshisekedi needs to go a step further. In past conflicts, African leaders, including former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere and former South African presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, waded into the most intractable conflicts to hammer out workable peace deals. Tshisekedi, as well as Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, have discussed the conflict with Vice President Kamala Harris and President Biden, respectively, and they should seize the opportunity to show real leadership.

Ethiopians are a proud people who deserve better than to watch their country unravel while the international community stands by. While fighting continues in Tigray, security incidents are multiplying in other parts of the country and it is evident that the calamity in Tigray is only the most severe and acute example of the forces tearing Ethiopia apart. Achieving sustainable peace requires properly framing the conflict as born of Ethiopia's failed ethnic federalism model and its lack of inclusivity, resulting in a regional crisis threatening global security. Abiy should rise to the hallowed status conferred to him by the Nobel Peace Prize, working with the African Union and other nations to restore Ethiopia's former standing as a major contributor to Africa's progress. ■

Studying War No More

The Abraham Accords established at least a nascent Arab-Israeli amity. Now educational programs can nurture it.

By Peter Berkowitz

Last September, energetic Trump administration diplomacy brought Bahrain's foreign minister, the United Arab Emirates' foreign minister, and Israel's prime minister to the White House to sign and to celebrate the Abraham Accords. The agreements offer unprecedented opportunities for the parties to the accords, for the broader region, and for the international order. During the ensuing months, the focus has been on cooperation in national security and commerce. That's understandable. More attention now should be given to education initiatives, which can serve the shared interests of Abraham Accord nations by opening minds and hearts, promoting mutual understanding, and forging the lasting bonds that are among the long-term benefits reaped by those who learn together.

The Abraham Accords are not the first agreements establishing normal relations between Israel and Arab countries. The 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt brokered by President Jimmy Carter brought dramatic security gains to the Jewish state by removing the threat posed by the

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region's most populous country while restoring the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. The 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan—facilitated by the 1993 Oslo Accords signed by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization at a White House ceremony presided over by President Bill Clinton—formalized a long-standing working relationship between Jerusalem and Amman.

Advantageous as the 1979 and 1994 treaties have been to the signatories, the countries have not progressed beyond cold peace. While the formal agreements took war off the table, established embassies, and instituted regular diplomatic channels of communication, commerce remains limited and tourism in both directions, especially from Egypt and Jordan to Israel, is meager.

NO MERE TRUCE

The Abraham Accords are different. They normalized relations but did not need to end hostilities, since Israel was never at war with Bahrain or the UAE. At the same time, like the 1979 and 1994 peace treaties, the Abraham Accords are grounded in national security calculations. Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel have long shared a vital interest in countering the Islamic Republic of Iran's funding of terrorism, pursuit of nuclear weapons, and imperial ambitions. Indeed, the Abraham Accords build on years of behind-the-scenes security cooperation. But in contrast to Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the agreements with Bahrain and the UAE have unleashed a keen desire among the parties to cooperate in the commercial sphere and to visit one another's countries.

Educational outreach can open minds and hearts, promote mutual understanding, and forge lasting bonds.

The excitement is palpable. Governments eagerly prepared for the exchange of ambassadors and brought friendly relations out into the open. Entrepreneurs rushed in to invest and strike deals. Israel and Bahrain, and Israel and the UAE launched commercial air travel between their countries, and, notwithstanding the pandemic, tourists leapt at the opportunity.

Educators should build on the momentum. By bringing students and scholars together, cross-cultural education initiatives do more than serve the high purposes of transmitting knowledge, encouraging the search for truth, and cultivating independent minds. They also have far-reaching ancillary effects: fostering the exchange of outlooks and experiences, enriching appreciation of the complex interplay of tradition and common humanity in the

OUR SIDE: Sheikh Mohammed bin Maktoum bin Juma al-Maktoum, the chairman of UAE rugby, and Israeli player Gal Aviram pose with the Abraham Accord Friendship Cup trophy in March. The first such "peace match" was held in Dubai. Israel won the first game, 33–0, but the players then intermingled into mixed teams and played again. [Christopher Pike—Reuters]

formation of peoples and nations, and building networks of life-long friends and colleagues.

Israel and the UAE have taken the first steps to create what should become a variety of vibrant student-exchange programs. Much more can be done. Universities should establish visiting professorships to bring Israeli scholars to teach in the Gulf, and Bahraini and Emirati scholars to teach in Israel. And they should provide financial incentives to encourage faculty members to devise proposals for academic conferences that focus on issues of special interest to all three Middle East countries as well as to the United States—from desalination and the environment to comparative religion and religious freedom.

Universities, however, are not the only source of educational initiatives. In recent years, the United States has witnessed the growth of a new model rooted in the private sector. The new model revolves around seminar study

of classic books supplemented by a variety of guest speakers and cultural excursions. It gathers students—for a few days, a week, a month, or a summer—to explore big ideas with a small group of peers. Such programs encourage students to continue classroom discussions on walks, over meals, and late into the evening. Instead of disseminating a single approved set of policies, such programs create a community devoted to joint inquiry and the lively exchange of views based on shared respect for fundamental freedoms and basic rights.

Over the past decade and in the United States and Israel, I have been involved in several of these privately financed undertakings through the Tikvah Fund, the Hertog Foundation, the George W. Bush Presidential Center, and the Public Interest Fellowship. The model could easily be adapted for a variety of educational programs that brought together, say, twenty-five or so Bahrainis, Emiratis, Israelis, and Americans for intense study and leisurely conversation.

LIBERAL THINKERS

The first program might be called the Principles of Freedom Seminar. Intended for promising twentysomethings and thirtysomethings, it would draw participants from government, business, journalism, security, medicine, and the academy. It could be easily adapted to students of many ages, from high school to accomplished senior figures across many professions and disciplines. Its curriculum would consist of seminal works from the tradition of modern freedom, featuring renowned thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu, Smith, Madison, Burke, Tocqueville, and Mill. By setting aside the political controversies of the moment and instead focusing on pivotal writings on a topic of abiding importance, such a seminar would enable students to engage robustly while avoiding the most divisive issues. At the same time, thoughtful examination of the principles of modern freedom is bound to illuminate controversies students encounter in their own countries.

The second program could be named the Common Traditions Seminars (an approach developed by my friend and former colleague Andrew Doran). It, too, could be designed for students of quite different ages. Its point of departure is that Jews and Muslims as well as Christians share a common biblical heritage, and that great philosophers in all three traditions undertook enduring efforts in the Middle Ages to reconcile their faiths with the wisdom of Plato and Aristotle. The first half of the seminar would concentrate on biblical passages of surpassing importance to the three Abrahamic religions. The second half would explore influential arguments from the outstanding

medieval philosopher of each of the traditions: Al-Farabi, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas.

The third program might be titled the Law, Nation, and Faith Seminar. It would bring reporters, columnists, editorial writers, and editors together to undertake deep study of a select aspect of one of the large forces influencing regional politics. Journalists from the four countries would enhance one another's appreciation of the issues by sharing their experiences regarding, and perspectives on, matters of common concern. They would return home with ideas for stories, unexpected angles on familiar controversies, and a host of new contacts, sources, and colleagues.

Israel and the UAE have taken the first steps to create what should become a variety of vibrant student-exchange programs.

These three seminars—and variations that could follow—need not remain restricted to original Abraham Accords signatories. As soon as is practically possible, citizens from Sudan, Kosovo, and Morocco—which also recently normalized relations with Israel—should be invited to join. The same goes for Jordanians, Egyptians, and Palestinians. And why not reach out to the Republic of Cyprus, a vibrant democracy in the eastern Mediterranean eager to contribute to regional stability and prosperity? ◘



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George Shultz's Vision

The late statesman dreamed of eliminating the danger of nuclear weapons. His allies continue striving to make that dream a reality.

By William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn

For the past fifteen years, the three of us and a distinguished group of American and international former officials and experts have been deftly and passionately led by our late friend and colleague, George Shultz. Our mission: reversing the world's reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to

Key points

» Leaders must remind themselves of the incalculable risks of nuclear war.

» Nuclear materials must be secured to deter terrorism.

» Nuclear-armed nations must recommit to "fail safe" reviews and cooperate to preclude cyberattacks on nuclear assets.

» It is critical to maximize decision time during moments of extreme tension.

William J. Perry *is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University and a former US secretary of defense.* ***Henry A. Kissinger*** *is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. He served as secretary of state and national security adviser in the Nixon and Ford administrations.* ***Sam Nunn*** *is an Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.*

the world. Without a bold vision, practical actions toward that goal won't be perceived as fair or urgent. Without action, the vision won't be perceived as realistic or possible.

George led this charge with the tenacity of a US Marine and the wisdom of a man who had held four cabinet positions for two presidents, including secretary of state for Ronald Reagan. Reagan considered nuclear weapons to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." The president took that view and his most trusted advocate for it, George Shultz, to a summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1986.

Reagan and Gorbachev weren't able to agree at Reykjavik to get rid of all nuclear weapons. But they did succeed in turning the nuclear arms race on its head, initiating steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of missiles. Twenty years after Reykjavik, George and physicist Sidney Drell organized a small conference at the Hoover Institution to discuss what it would take to bring the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik to fruition. This effort led to a joint op-ed in the *Wall Street Journal* in January 2007, which has been our guide ever since.



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

During the weeks before George's death, each of us discussed with him the world's direction on nuclear arms. We shared our concerns that progress on reversing reliance on nuclear weapons is slowing. We discussed how technology, particularly cyber risks to early-warning and command-and-control systems, had introduced new dangers of mistaken use. We discussed the tensions and policy paralysis involving both Russia and China. Characteristically, George's approach was not to be discouraged, but instead to get back to work. In that spirit, we offer five points.

» **We need a bold policy to walk back from these increased perils.** This will require a united effort from Washington and US allies on a policy that reduces nuclear danger while maintaining our values and protecting our vital interests. Congress must organize itself to play a meaningful role.

» **Leaders of countries with nuclear weapons must recognize their responsibility to work together to prevent catastrophe.** For many decades, memories of a smoldering Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the fear generated by the Cuban missile crisis, informed and drove nuclear policy. As George told Congress three years ago, "I fear people have lost that sense of dread."

» **We must take action on practical steps that will reduce the risk of nuclear use today while making the vision possible.** Here, there are signs of progress. A few months ago, Presidents Biden and Vladimir Putin agreed to extend the New START Treaty for five years, ensuring that US and Russian nuclear forces remain limited, with verification and transparency. There is much more work to be done, including securing nuclear materials to prevent catastrophic terrorism.

» **Nuclear-armed states should commit to reviews of their command-and-control and early-warning systems.** These "fail safe" reviews would identify steps to strengthen protections against cyber threats and unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use of a nuclear weapon. These reviews should also include options for establishing agreements between nuclear powers precluding cyberattacks on nuclear command-and-control or early-warning assets.

» **Robust, accepted methods to maximize decision time during heightened tensions and extreme situations should be created.** This is especially important for times leaders fear they may be under threat of attack. This could become a common conceptual goal that connects both immediate and longer-term steps for managing instability and building mutual security.

George spoke passionately about how his children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren were the motivation for his extraordinary commitment

to nuclear threat reduction. He believed the life we leave to our descendants is the most important measure of the life we have led. George's friend Bishop William Swing has written that "at the end of time, the author of life will return to this created and loved Earth and demand accountability for what we did to enhance or destroy it." George Shultz loved this earth and he spent his life enhancing it.



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Getting It Right

The push for open borders ignores the hard questions. How to ask—and answer—them.

By Richard A. Epstein

Earlier this year, the Biden administration issued a "fact sheet" on his proposed US Citizenship Act, a comprehensive plan to expand pathways to citizenship and otherwise modernize and liberalize this nation's immigration system. It is very difficult to draw categorical conclusions about the many facets of immigration law. The passion on both sides of this issue suggests that finding a sensible middle position may be impossible. Even so, a measured and compromising approach is the best way forward on immigration reform, with its complex highways and byways.

One way to think about immigration reform is to compare the case for free and open immigration with the parallel case for free trade. Fierce opposition to free trade in part propelled Donald Trump to his 2016 presidential victory. Free trade did not take a central role in the 2020 election, in large part

Key points

» Immigration brings in new people whose presence changes the face of the nation. Sensible policies must follow.

» Open immigration under current conditions would bring great uncertainty. A measured expansion of immigration seems wiser.

» Some sanctions have to be imposed on illegal aliens if a system of legal immigration is to be maintained.

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because candidate Biden offered a similar sentiment to bolster trade union support. This was not merely campaign talk. President Biden recently issued a protective "buy American" statement, the objective of which is "to support manufacturers, businesses, and workers to ensure that our future is made in all of America by all of America's workers." A Biden executive order from January seeks to "use terms and conditions of federal financial assistance awards and federal procurements to maximize the use of goods, products, and materials produced in, and services offered in, the United States."

But the effort to turn the United States inward on matters of economic activity will force superior foreign products to be substituted with inferior domestic ones, making domestic production less efficient. These inefficiencies will have far-reaching consequences: raising prices and lowering wages across the board, weakening American exports, and inducing other nations to take retaliatory measures, which will further contract world trade. The passage of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff led to an implosion in international trade, an outcome no one would want today. But the political risk still remains.

The issue of free immigration is vastly more complex than the problem of free trade.

FACE THE CHALLENGE

As a general matter, no one thinks that the United States and other nations lack the power to exclude foreign individuals from entering and residing in their countries. But, as with free trade, there is a fierce debate over how that power to exclude should be exercised, leading to a series of difficult and hotly contended questions. Do we reunite families, when some members are abroad and others are in the United States? Do we allow entry into the United States for political refugees who have suffered under oppressive regimes? Do we reserve spots for individuals who bring special skills and talents to the United States? Do we make special allowances for "dreamers" who came illegally into the United States at a young age and have nowhere else to call home?

In all these cases, it is possible to offer a sympathetic justification for expanding the number of immigrants allowed to enter the United States. Indeed, American policy on immigration since the 1960s has become increasingly liberalized on exactly such grounds. Thus the percentage of foreign-born individuals in the United States has nearly tripled from about 4.8 percent in 1970 to 13.7 percent in 2018. The basic policy that lets individuals into the country is complemented by a back-end system of deportation of

STEADY STREAM: People wade the Rio Grande along the US-Mexico border from Ciudad Juárez last spring. In past waves of immigration, the cost of traveling to the United States operated as a sorting mechanism to bring more self-reliant individuals to US shores. At the same time, absorption of immigrants into society was made easier by the far smaller state and federal welfare operations of the time. [Chine Nouvelle/SIPA]

individuals who have entered under false pretenses, have given material support to terrorist actions in their own country, or who have committed serious crimes after their arrival to the United States.

Beyond the serious administrative difficulties of the current immigration system, it may be harder to support free immigration than free trade. Free trade is largely an economic story, with massive efficiency gains that can be spread broadly to offset much of the displacement it generates. Immigration, on the other hand, brings new persons into the United States, the presence of whom changes the face of the nation. Claims of excessive criminal conduct by immigrant populations, especially those intemperately made by Trump during his successful run for the presidency in 2016, are surely mistaken. Nonetheless, immigration poses heavy challenges in the areas of education, health care, and housing. The political composition of cities and states can change with a rise in immigrant power.

Often, these issues are dealt with by sensible policies that help immigrants integrate into the economic system, learn English, and participate more fully in society. Indeed, as the immigration debate rises to a fever pitch, Ilya Somin of the Scalia Law School at George Mason University has written a powerful book, *Free to Move*. Somin, against the grain, urges the United States to adopt an open-border policy on immigration, noting the enormous gains for immigrants who reach our shores and the major contributions immigrant populations have made toward overall welfare in the United States.

Somin's arguments help to strengthen the case for maintaining current levels of immigration and point towards some further liberalization of the system, starting with dreamers, who have already integrated themselves into American society. Nonetheless, I am uneasy about the more extreme position, which may be called open or free immigration.

Even the mass immigration into the United States from 1890 to 1914 was not entirely free, and it required the resolution of hard policy problems. For instance, immigrants had to be free of contagious diseases––and if these could not be eliminated during quarantine, shipping companies were obliged to return immigrants to their country of origin. That system, moreover, worked as well as it did in part because the private costs of immigration were sufficiently high. High costs operated as a sorting mechanism that tended to bring fitter and more self-reliant individuals to our shores. At the same time, the absorption of immigrants into society was made easier by the far smaller state and federal welfare operations of the time. This reduced the public costs of admitting new residents and left the task of supporting and integrating newly arrived individuals to successful private organizations like the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), founded in 1881.

Open immigration under current conditions would bring great uncertainty. Could the United States absorb several million Central American immigrants coming across the border through Mexico, especially if their arrival generated political unrest or brought risks of disease? Could an organized effort by third-party entrepreneurs to ferry thousands of impoverished individuals from Africa or Asia to our shores place burdens on this nation that it could not withstand? Would the same rules for deportation apply to such populations that are imposed today?

It is hard to deal with such issues by experimentation once an open immigration program is implemented, and easy to predict the massive backlash that would occur if post hoc restrictions were implemented legislatively. It seems better, then, to adopt safer policies that have a better chance of

leading to a measured expansion of immigration populations while offering humanitarian aid to regions in or near crisis.

SPEAK THE TRUTH

Candidly confronting illegal immigration is necessary. Some sanctions have to be imposed on illegal aliens if a system of legal immigration is to be maintained. In this regard it is instructive to note the recent trend to undermine the distinction between legal and illegal immigration for the sake of generating a more tolerant attitude towards illegal aliens. Take, for instance, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, passed during the Clinton administration, which deployed the term *undocumented immigrants* in place of *illegal aliens*. That verbal substitution creates the linguistic possibility that people could be both undocumented and legal, even though a legal illegal alien is an oxymoron.

More recently, both the Biden administration and liberal Supreme Court justices have preferred the term *noncitizen,* which covers a range of persons, including those who have never had or desired contact with the United States. The term leads to such linguistic oddities as *permanent noncitizen*. It is now commonly asserted that the term illegal alien is "disparaging," "derogatory," or "dehumanizing," and that a change from "alien" to "noncitizen" offers a way "to recognize the humanity of non-Americans," as urged by a long-time immigration law expert, Professor Kevin R. Johnson.

Unfortunately, these exaggerated claims undermine the very policies that could help expand legal immigration. Immigration policy requires many difficult judgments on the proper relationship between citizens and legal and illegal aliens. Truthful statements about illegal conduct should not be regarded as wholesale condemnation of any individual. Deliberate obfuscation will not move immigration reform forward for either the proponents or the opponents of expanded immigration. ◘

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Predators and Prey

Rising sexual violence in Europe—linked to young immigrant men—threatens women's hard-earned rights. It must not be ignored.

By Ayaan Hirsi Ali

We in the West are used to seeing women everywhere around us. We see them as colleagues in the office, sitting next to us on the bus, as patrons in restaurants, jogging on the streets, and working in shops. We are also seeing more women than ever in leadership positions as prime ministers, politicians, chancellors, directors, and bosses. Women born in the West in the 1990s onward take this as a given. They do not consider that walking to school or sitting in a cafe is a triumph of liberalism. But in some parts of Western cities and towns these days, you may notice something strange: there are simply no women around—or very few.

Walking in certain neighborhoods in Brussels, London, Paris, or Stockholm, you suddenly notice that only men are visible. The shop assistants, waiters, and patrons in cafes are all men. In parks nearby, it is only men and boys playing soccer. In the communal areas of apartment buildings, it is men talking, laughing, and smoking. On the continent to which millions of tourists

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travel each year to see the female body as an object of art or wearing the latest fashions, this seems a little strange. What happened to the women? Why are they no longer sitting at sidewalk cafes or chatting in the streets?

The answer is that some women have removed themselves from those neighborhoods, others have been hounded out, and still others are at home, out of sight. As more women erase themselves from public places in such neighborhoods, the few who remain are exposed, drawing the attention of men inhabiting the area. There is no formal segregation, but a feeling of discomfort and vulnerability is enough to make any woman walking alone shudder and think, "I won't come this way again."

Women in such areas are harassed out of the public square. Some men call out to them, "Hey, baby, give me your number," or "Nice ass," or "What are you doing here?" Whatever their age or appearance, if they are female and especially if they are alone, they get the same treatment. A persistent harasser might follow a woman up the street, touch her, and block her path. If a woman looks vulnerable, some men will go further: they pick her as a target, they encircle and intimidate her, groping her, pulling at her clothes, and occasionally doing worse.

The overwhelming majority of these young men come from countries where women are not regarded as equals, as they are in Europe.

Such incidents are becoming more common. Women and girls across Europe speak of being harassed walking to the shops, at school and university, in swimming pools, in nightclub bathrooms, in parks, at festivals, in parking lots. They say that local streets and public places are no longer safe. And their assailants have no shame about perpetrating their harassment in public.

Finding robust data about this phenomenon is notoriously difficult. My research assistants and I have spent two years combing through the available sources—crime statistics, court reports, police reports, government accounts, academic sources—and none of them offers a complete picture. We know that only a small fraction of women report being sexually assaulted after they have suffered it and even fewer report sexual harassment, which most women shrug off as being part of the course of their daily lives. Frustratingly, many of the relevant experiences of ordinary women rarely make it into the public domain, beyond isolated posts on social media.

In speaking to European women, however, I have come to see that the problem goes much deeper and wider than the stories that appear in the

news. Their testimony has convinced me that we are living through a quiet but significant erosion of women's rights in some neighborhoods in Europe. If this trend continues, it will affect more and more places in Europe; more and more streets will become unsafe for women. For now, these neighborhoods have two things in common: low income and a large number of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries.

A CHANGE FOR WOMEN IN EUROPE

As a Somali arriving in the Netherlands in 1992, I was shocked to see young women alone on public transport and in bars and restaurants. I had grown up knowing that to step outside the house without covering my head and body, or without a male relative to escort me, would make me a target for harassment and assault. But in Holland, women freely walked the streets at night without men to chaperone them, their hair uncovered, wearing whatever they pleased.

Of course, there were exceptions. There were assaults, rapes, and occasionally murders of women, even in Holland. But those cases were so exceptional that they made national news for weeks. As I acclimated to life in a Western city, I learned that the position of women there was radically different from what it was in the world I had come from. Today, two decades later, that can no longer be said with the same confidence. A growing number of European women are questioning their safety. Cases of rape, assault, groping, and sexual harassment in public places seem to have become more numerous.

Women are being harassed out of the European public square.

It is no secret—though it is considered impolite or politically incorrect to point it out—that the perpetrators are disproportionately young immigrant men from the Middle East, South Asia, and various parts of Africa. Often operating in groups, they are making it increasingly unsafe for women to venture into a growing number of neighborhoods in European cities.

It is a truism to say women have always suffered the threat of sexual violence. But for at least the past four decades in Europe, it was the exception, not the rule. In the 1990s, I assumed that developing countries would gradually become more like Europe. Back then, few people would have predicted that parts of Europe would begin to take on the attitudes and beliefs of cultures that explicitly downgrade women's rights. But I believe that is what is happening. We are witnessing a challenge to the rights that European women

once took for granted. I do not think it is coincidental that this challenge has followed a significant increase in immigration.

THE LATEST WAVE

Approximately three million people have arrived illegally in Europe since 2009, the majority of whom have applied for asylum. Roughly half arrived in 2015. Two-thirds of the newcomers were male. Eighty percent of asylum applicants were under the age of thirty-five. In the most recent years, a third were (or claimed to be) under eighteen.

The overwhelming majority of these young men have arrived from countries where women are not regarded as equals or near equals, as they are in Europe. In some of the countries of origin, for example, boys and girls are separated in the household from the age of seven. They are discouraged from mixing, and sex education is taboo. They come from a context that does not give equal rights to women and discourages them from working, remaining single, or following their own aspirations.

Of course, this is not an entirely new phenomenon. Migrants from the Muslim world have been settling in Western Europe since the early 1960s. However, those earlier periods of settlement were rarely associated in the public mind with violence against women. That was because few Europeans noticed the way women and girls were treated inside the immigrant families. People like me tried to shed light on the "honor" violence, female genital mutilation, and forced marriage to which many girls and women were subjected. But it was assumed that within a generation or two those cultural behaviors would go away as the liberties enjoyed by Western women spread to migrant communities. For too many women within those communities, that simply has not happened.

My new book, *Prey*, came about because I was curious to investigate why women were retreating from the public space in some neighborhoods. My hunch was that women were ceding their access to public places in a trade-off for personal safety. That is what life is like for many women in Muslim-majority countries. It is also how many women in immigrant communities have continued to live in the West for the past five decades: they are confined to their homes for a significant part of their lives, and their outside movements are policed by a network of family and community members. It seemed logical to ask how far increasing numbers of men from societies where this dynamic between men and women exists might be imposing their norms on other women in their proximity.

In the years leading up to Europe's migrant crisis in 2015, I had noticed occasional reports of sexual assault in the media. Each instance had been

reported as an isolated, individual case. At first glance, they did not add up to a bigger picture. Generally, the assault involved a woman attacked by a stranger on her way home from a night out. It later transpired in some cases that the perpetrator was an immigrant, or maybe he had been born in Europe and lived in a poorly integrated immigrant community. But the cases did not seem numerous enough to constitute a pattern.

Beginning in late 2015, however, this changed. Reports of such sexual assaults, as well as rapes and cases of harassment, snowballed. As I looked further into the phenomenon, it became apparent to me that the escalation in the number of sex crimes was occurring in the Western European countries that had opened their borders to unprecedented numbers of migrants and asylum seekers from highly patriarchal, predominantly Muslim societies. In 2015 alone, close to two million people, mainly men, arrived in Western Europe from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, and other countries with large Muslim populations. However, the language differences among the various European societies and the parochialism of their media reporting meant that people in countries as geographically close as Sweden, Germany, France, and Austria did not appreciate that what was being reported by women in their country was also happening elsewhere.

Afraid of being called racist, some women even apologize for bringing their assailants to justice.

It is important to state unambiguously that there is no racial component to my argument. A certain proportion of men of all ethnicities will rape and harass women. According to the World Health Organization, 35 percent of women worldwide "have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence." But the rates are markedly lower in Europe than in other parts of the world. In some societies, men are brought up to respect women's physical autonomy, whereas in others predatory behavior is not proscribed with the same severity.

BEFORE YOU OBJECT . . .

Let me state this up front: being Muslim, or being an immigrant from the Muslim world, does not make you a threat to women. In numerous periods of upheaval, large-scale population movements have been associated with increases in sexual violence against women. It would be easy to fill an entire book with such gruesome episodes, and it would quickly become apparent that they occur in a wide variety of geographical and cultural settings.

Indeed, as I have said elsewhere, nothing that occurred after 2015 can remotely compare with the horrific campaign of rape waged against German women by the Red Army at the end of World War II.

The point of *Prey* is not to demonize migrant men from the Muslim world. Rather, it is to better understand the nature and significance of the sexual violence that has occurred in so many parts of Europe in the recent past. As I was researching for this book, the #MeToo movement shone a light on sexual abuse and exploitation in the upper echelons of North America. I found myself wondering why an equally bright light was not being shone on the often more serious crimes against women in lower-income neighborhoods in Europe.

Time and again in my career I have come across authorities and commentators—including self-described feminists—who are prepared to look the other way when it comes to the harassment and abuse of immigrant women at the hands of their own men. It now looks as if the same people are applying the same double standard when it comes to the harassment and abuse of native-born women. In some cases, I have even heard European victims of sexual assault make excuses for their attackers. Afraid of being called racist, these women strike an apologetic tone on behalf of those who assaulted them, some even apologizing for bringing them to justice.

Authorities understate the incidence of assaults and harassment of women. In the interest of political expediency, politicians play down the threat and encourage the police to do the same. Excuses are made for criminal behavior. Judges hand out light sentences to perpetrators. And the media self-censor their reporting—all in order, it is said, to avoid stoking racial and religious tensions or providing ammunition for right-wing populists.

Nothing so clearly distinguishes Western societies from Muslim societies today than the different ways they treat women.

This conspiracy of silence, or at least of understatement, has had predictable beneficiaries: none other than the right-wing populists such as the National Front (now National Rally) in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, and all the other parties whose core policy pledge is to restrict immigration, and particularly Muslim immigration.

I was once an asylum seeker. I am an immigrant twice over, first to the Netherlands, then to the United States. Fleeing to Holland helped me avoid a

forced marriage and gave me opportunities I would never have enjoyed had I remained in the Somali society into which I was born. So the last thing I want to see is more obstacles put in the way of those who seek to escape religious oppression, civil war, and economic collapse and to make better lives for themselves, taking advantage of the freedoms of the West. I wrote *Prey* not to help the proponents of closed borders but to persuade liberal Europeans that denial is a self-defeating strategy. If I can also persuade some populists to give integration a chance, so much the better.

Many authors have written about the clash of cultures between Islam and the West. They look at economics, demography, language, religion, values, and geopolitics. Some mention women's rights as an example. But I believe women deserve to be the central focus of discussion. For nothing else so clearly distinguishes Western societies from Muslim societies today than the different ways they treat women. In the book I therefore concentrate on how women's rights are being harmed by immigration from Muslim societies, what we can expect in the future if things continue as they are, and what we might do differently to avoid a dangerous backlash.

The media self-censor their reporting—in order, it is said, to avoid providing ammunition for right-wing populists.

The very idea of women being equal to men is a historical anomaly. It has appeared only in the West and only very recently. (The propaganda claims about sexual equality in communist regimes belied a reality that was quite different.) If we zoom out and consider the whole planet, we see that it is still only a fraction of women who have the wonderful rights and liberties that have been achieved in the West. But these rights are fragile and are at risk of being eroded by men who view independent women—women who enjoy the same rights as men—as prey.

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How Schools Can Turn the Page

At a time of countless programs for reform, Clint Bolick and Kate J. Hardiman champion reforms that will work.

By Jonathan Movroydis

Jonathan Movroydis: Justice Clint Bolick and education reform advocate Kate J. Hardiman, co-authors of the new book *Unshackled: Freeing America's K–12 Education System* (Hoover Institution Press, 2021), argue that the public school system is antiquated, misdirects resources, and fails to meet the needs of individual students. They call for a systemic, bottom-up reform of American education centered on what they call the "two Cs," choice and competition, and the "two Ds," deregulation and decentralization. They also explain that public schools' failure to adapt during the COVID-19 pandemic might be a catalyst for such reforms.

Please tell us about your backgrounds in education reform and the origins of this book.

Clint Bolick: My motivation to write *Unshackled* goes back quite far. I originally planned to be a schoolteacher, and during student teaching I realized

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the abysmal state of the public school system. This was forty years ago. Schools have only gotten worse since then. Thus, I decided to pursue education reform through a legal career rather than teaching. As a litigator, I defended school vouchers, starting in 1990 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where the first such program was established. I also defended Cleveland's school voucher program all the way to the US Supreme Court. Along the way, I became very radicalized. I saw how horrifically bad school conditions were for low-income students.

As a member of the Arizona Supreme Court, I have observed this issue from a different perspective. Pretty much every criminal defendant that we see is educationally disadvantaged. Of course, a quality education is foundational to individual prosperity. These experiences make me appreciate even more the systemic reform our country needs.

I had originally focused on private school choice options, which really only affect a handful of kids. When I met Kate Hardiman, we began to discuss the idea of a book that would lay out a comprehensive education reform plan, a bottom-up plan rather than a top-down plan, a plan that would really reimagine American public education across the board. There were no such books until ours. After talking about it for a while, we decided to collaborate, and Kate has been a very capable partner.

"This middleman is the school district, which has only grown and become more ossified over the past century."

Kate J. Hardiman: After graduating from the University of Notre Dame, I taught for two years in a Catholic school in Chicago, through the Alliance for Catholic Education. I had a fabulous experience teaching English and religion to high schoolers. Then, partially inspired by Clint and my mentor at Notre Dame, John Schoenig, I decided to pursue a law degree. I currently study at Georgetown Law School in the evening and work during the day for a constitutional litigation firm in Washington, DC. My plan is to become an advocate for reform in educational law and policy.

Movroydis: What do you believe is fundamentally broken about the American educational system?

Hardiman: One factor we really focus on in the book is the lack of flexibility within the educational system. School districts are too large and unable

READY, STEADY: Kindergartners practice social distancing as they return to their Los Angeles school in April for the first time in a year. Bolick and Hardiman argue that schools probably would have been able to respond better to families' needs during the COVID-19 pandemic had decisions been decentralized. [Genaro Molina—*Los Angeles Times*]

to adapt to changing circumstances. This has become even more evident during the COVID-19 crisis. Clint and I devoted a lot of time on this idea of eliminating bureaucratic middlemen. In education, this middleman is the school district, which has only grown and become more ossified over the past century.

Eliminating the bureaucratic middleman would benefit education in at least two major ways. First, it would free up about half of the current education budget. Those funds could be redirected toward students and teachers rather than being spent on bureaucracy. Second, eliminating the middleman of the school district would allow individual schools to regain their autonomy. Principals would once again have the power to hire and fire, the ability to implement a curriculum that best serves students and families (rather than a standardized curriculum from the state and district), and more flexibility.

During the COVID-19 crisis, it is likely that schools would have been able to respond better to the needs of families had the decision making been decentralized at the school level. Instead, schools and principals had to abide by district leaders, who often were making decisions for hundreds, even thousands of schools. (For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District has about 1,000 schools and 600,000 students.)

Bolick: We are essentially stuck with a nineteenth-century education system, and that's just breathtaking. If you were to transport from the late 1800s to today, you would recognize almost nothing else in society, but you would perfectly recognize the structure of our public school classrooms. Students are still learning in rows, for example. As Kate mentioned, it's really an ossified system that is very resistant to change.

Movroydis: Older Americans often tell us that they received a first-class public education when they were young. Is it just that the system has ossified, or have educational standards fallen?

Bolick: I think the answer to that is really both. In the 1940s and 1950s, most Americans were getting a very good education, and what today is ancient was still relatively modern at the time. In addition, to compare what we saw at that time to today is to witness the growth of special-interest influence over schools and a tremendous growth in bureaucracy. Teachers' salaries have remained fairly constant, but the amount of money that we spend on administration is just stupendous. Both of these influences really frustrate any sort of meaningful reform. Any type of technology, for example, that would increase the student-teacher ratio is fiercely opposed by unions, who want to keep as many teachers employed as they possibly can.

"Pretty much every criminal defendant that we see is educationally disadvantaged."

Hardiman: I agree completely. I would also add, just from the perspective of someone who has recently taught, schools are wired with a lot of technology. However, technology can only enrich a student's education if used properly. For example, a massive influx of television and computer screens can certainly supplement learning, but it can also be a huge distraction.

Movroydis: How are American schools falling behind, and which students are they failing?

Bolick: American schools in general are falling behind in math and science and are losing ground to our world competitors, most notably China. They're falling behind a number of countries that are not thought of as economic powerhouses. One of the statistics in the book that was most sobering to me is that the top 10 percent of American students in math and science are at the same level as the bottom 10 percent of students in Shanghai.

China is an existential threat to the United States. In this competition, our educational system remains adrift, and if we keep going down this path, China will absolutely clean our clocks in the years ahead. Among students in the United States, those who are performing most poorly are low-income children, particularly black and Hispanic children. Really nothing significant has improved since *Brown v. Board of Education* [1954], which is extremely depressing considering the amount of resources that we've pumped into urban school systems. The education gap between white and black students remains very significant and continues to grow wider.

"Teachers' salaries have remained fairly constant, but the amount of money that we spend on administration is just stupendous."

To this point, the solution to closing this gap has been with band-aids like affirmative action. The fact of the matter is that we are doing low-income kids a huge disservice by not providing them essential educational skills, to prepare them not only for higher education but also for basic jobs in our economy. It is very difficult to overstate the educational crisis in this country right now. Even most of the students whose parents consider them to be in the best schools in the country are really lagging well behind our international competitors.

Movroydis: How has the COVID-19 pandemic exposed and exacerbated problems of the educational system? Also, does this crisis present any opportunities for change?

Hardiman: I think one big opportunity is to give families more visibility into what their schools are doing and how they responded to a challenge like this. Some parents saw very quickly that their schools were not ready to adapt, and others were surprised and pleased at how quickly their schools were able to shift to a virtual environment.

The main trend is that parents are moving their children out of public school and into private schools, or what are now known as homeschooling pods. Those pods actually became a phenomenon after we finished the book, but in many ways they underscore what we argue should be the future of education: smaller class sizes, power decentralized from bureaucracies, and funding tailored to each student. Similarly, we advocate for states to promote ESAs—education savings accounts—where state funding follows the student to their educational provider of choice.

Bolick: I think a lot of people's eyes are open for the first time about the inflexible nature of the school system. I have taken to referring to COVID-19 and its impact on the schools as our Katrina moment. When Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, it physically destroyed the school system. Education had to be completely reimagined and rebuilt from scratch, which is exactly what we're calling for on a national scale in our book. New Orleans literally made every school in the district a charter school. The school system went from being one of the worst in the country to one of the best by virtue of changing the entire approach. I really hope that we're able to find the silver lining in this crisis and are willing to find comprehensive solutions that most people would have rejected out of hand only a year ago.

Movroydis: You explain in *Unshackled* that reforms should be geared primarily toward the education of students as opposed to the employment of teachers. With this end in mind, how do we attract the best people into the teaching profession?

Bolick: Kate and I believe that teaching should be a much better-paying profession than it is, but there are so many impediments to reaching this objective. First of all, regardless of performance, all teachers receive the exact same pay raises. Everyone knows who are the good and bad teachers. Under the current system, the good teachers cannot be differentially rewarded, and you can't get rid of the bad teachers. That fundamentally has to change. In order to ensure student success, we need a system in which teacher performance is measured and rewarded.

"Schools are wired with a lot of technology. However, technology can only enrich a student's education if used properly."

One of the major reforms that we propose is decentralizing and deregulating public schools so that each school is semiautonomous. This would enable schools to hire and fire their own teachers. They would also be able to set differential pay rates and provide educational offerings that are geared toward their student population. We believe that any single one of these educational reforms would catalyze educational improvement. If you add these reforms to the elimination or dramatic downsizing of school districts, we would free up substantial sums of money for classrooms. One of the statistics we point to in the book is that if the size of bureaucracy relative to the student population had remained the same over the past two decades, there would have been funds available to increase average teacher compensation by $12,000. Taken together, these reforms could restore teaching to the prized profession it should be.

"The top 10 percent of American students in math and science are at the same level as the bottom 10 percent of students in Shanghai."

Movroydis: In *Unshackled*, you advocate as the key elements of reform "the two Cs," expanding choice and competition, and "the two Ds," deregulation and decentralization. Do you believe any of these policies can be realistically achieved, and can teachers' unions and other special interests be persuaded to support them?

Hardiman: I would say that in a lot of places we are seeing these reforms. But what we've been missing until now is strong grassroots support. Obviously, the poor in the inner cities have wanted these reforms for many years, but I think now we're gaining more political capital, because there are more families demanding better options as a result of traditional public schools' failure to adapt during the outbreak of COVID-19. I also believe that we are experiencing a kind of Katrina moment and hope that it will be a catalyst for more reforms that we discuss in the book.

"I really hope that we're able to find the silver lining in this crisis."

Bolick: Certainly, the teachers' unions and the school district bureaucracies have a very uneasy alliance on many issues, because they both benefit from more public spending. The fact of the matter is that so much of the funds are absorbed by the central bureaucracy that we think that we may be able to

persuade teachers that their interests lie in more decentralization and deregulation. They will have not only greater resources at their disposal but also greater power to influence the allocation of those resources. That strategy has really never been tried, and I'm hoping that some of the folks who pick up our book will try to create nontraditional alliances with teachers. The whole point of our book is to empower the people who have the greatest stake in the outcome of the system: students, parents, teachers, and principals, primarily. If somehow that energy could be mobilized into an alliance toward education reform, I think we would see some groundbreaking change.

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

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A Republic, if You Can Teach It

A new effort to teach civics education holds real promise—if our hoary K–12 system can be persuaded to try it.

By Chester E. Finn Jr.

Bullish but far from sanguine is how I view the ambitious history-and-civics "roadmap" unveiled in March by the Educating for American Democracy (EAD) project. I welcomed the venture when it launched two years ago, have advised it via several of its committees and feedback sessions, have done a bit of backroom prodding and editing, and have encouraged my Fordham Institute colleagues to sign on as an institutional backer. One hopeful sign is the large number of such backers and endorsers and the wide range of views and priorities they represent. Another encouraging example of the project's wide appeal is the supportive editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* by six former US education secretaries, three from each party.

The backdrop to my own (and Fordham's) support is the appalling state of history and civics education in today's United States. Our own team is nearing completion of a comprehensive review of state standards for K–12 schooling in those two subjects. While I can't divulge any specifics, I can say with certainty that many states have bungled it via standards with thin-to-nonexistent

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content, huge gaps, and such a mishmash of formats that it's nearly impossible to picture teachers and curriculum developers actually following them.

Perhaps as revealed by the slipshod expectations for student learning signaled by their motley standards (albeit with some stellar exceptions), states mostly don't seem to care whether kids learn this material. Though most retain the obligatory high school US history course, and a fair number have a required course (often just a single semester) in civics or US government, rare is the state where schools' success in imparting this vitally important knowledge, skills, and dispositions to their pupils figures in their accountability plan. Often there are no statewide assessments or other outcome measures, and when there are, they seldom count. (Yes, students must pass the required courses, but that's teacher judgment.)

Maybe it wouldn't matter so much if adult Americans were well versed in their country's history, governing principles, system of government, and civic institutions—and if they took that knowledge to heart and acted in accord with it. But—I don't really need to write this sentence!—we have ample evidence, accumulating by the day and week, and faster with every passing month, that that just isn't so. Unless you haven't looked at any sort of screen or newspaper in the past few years, you're well acquainted with this meltdown and the havoc it is wreaking on so much that so many have long cherished about the United States.

Schools alone can't solve that problem, but what kids learn there can contribute to a much-needed solution. So the EAD team heroically undertook to develop a "roadmap" by which schools (and districts, states, etc.) can reinvigorate history and civics education.

Predictably, this was hard, as much of what divides Americans has its counterpart in K–12 social studies. "Action civics" versus "how a bill becomes a law." Skills versus knowledge. "1619" versus "1776." "Wars, presidents, and other great men" versus "the history of the oppressed and victimized." I could go on.

The EAD team strove to enlist a wide range of participants as they sought a middle ground. They also finessed the toughest questions by posing their entire new roadmap as a series of questions that kids should wrestle with and be able to answer rather than trying to prescribe answers to those questions. The questions are really good—and eighteen-year-olds who possess informed and thoughtful answers to them will be well prepared for citizenship in the American democracy. But the roadmap is a long way from an actual curriculum.

That's left to states, districts, schools, and teachers. The hard work lies ahead. The EAD team also had to finesse some of the stickiest "who does what" questions. They avoided telling states to build history and civics into

formal accountability structures for schools or students. They avoided prescribing the many enormous changes that will have to occur in teacher preparation. They sketched a very limited role for the federal government, though one that may bring its own culture wars—as, for example, NAEP frameworks for assessing these subjects get revised—and one that could metastasize in worrisome ways if some of EAD's friends on Capitol Hill get their way.

So there's no dreaded "national curriculum" here, at least not yet, and that avoids a lot of problems for the time being. But neither is there a curriculum here, much less an energy source to push and coordinate all the moving parts that need to move together.

Documents like this are, of necessity, predicated on so many individuals, organizations, and institutions changing their present practices. Perhaps most worrying, the changes sought by EAD cannot happen at scale without a skilled and well-educated teaching force that is dedicated to breadth and balance, equipped with a rich and robust curriculum, and capable of delivering it. The EAD team knows this, but nothing within their power will cause a seamless silken duvet to replace today's patchwork quilt. So this elegant roadmap and its many supporting documents and supporters become, inevitably, something of an aspirational exercise that starts a conversation, even as we know that getting K–12 education back into the business of citizen-making is a long-term enterprise. EAD supplies plenty of thoughtful advice to all concerned, yet today our K–12 system is ill-equipped to deliver on all those things.

That's why my admiration and bullishness for what the EAD team has achieved must be tempered by my shaky confidence that it will make the difference that American education needs.



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This Is No Time to Stumble

The Biden administration gets no honeymoon from **geopolitical dangers.**

By Victor Davis Hanson

What causes wars?

Innately aggressive cultures and governments, megalomania, and the desire for power, resources, and empire prompt nations to bully or attack others. Less rational Thucydidean motives such as fear and honor and perceptions of self-interest are not to be discounted, either. But what allows these preemptive or aggressive agendas to reify, to take shape, and to leave tens of thousands dead?

The less culpable target (and wars are rarely a matter of 50/50 culpability) also has a say in what causes wars. The invaded and assaulted sometimes overlooked or contextualized serial and mounting aggression. They displayed

Key points

» Deterrence is a key prerequisite for meaningful peace negotiations.

» War can be triggered by a lack of transparency on the part of potential enemies.

» If foreign powers infer that US foreign policy is mercurial, they will be tempted to calibrate it or exploit weaknesses.

» The Biden administration should resist broad deals with China and Iran that have no realistic chance of success.

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STRONGER PARTNERS: US military aircraft coordinate with NATO allies from other countries near Constanta, Romania, in April. Despite sometimes-tumultuous relations during the Trump administration, NATO is better funded, better armed, and a more fair contributor to the shared security effort.
[Jennifer Zima/501st Combat Support Wing, US Air Force]

military weakness or simple political ineptness that eroded deterrence. They failed to make defensive alliances with stronger nations or slashed defense investments that made the use of deterrent force impossible.

In sum, without deterrence and the clear potential in extremis to do an aggressor damage, there can be no meaningful peace negotiations, no "conflict resolution"—unless one believes a Hitler, Stalin, Mao, or Kim Il Sung can become a reasonable interlocutor across the peace table.

DANGEROUS AMBIGUITY

But there are also more subtle follies that can turn tensions into outright fighting. And they are relevant in the current global landscape as we go not just from one president to the next, but from a realist and tragic view of foreign policy to an idealist and therapeutic one.

One catalyst for war is a lack of transparency about the relative strengths and will of potential enemies.

If, even unwittingly, President Biden projects the image that the Pentagon is more concerned about ferreting out wayward internal enemies than in seeking unity by deterring aggressors, then belligerents such as China, North Korea, Iran, and others will probably—even if falsely and unwisely—wager that the United States will not or cannot react to provocations, as it has done in the past. And accordingly, they will be emboldened to provoke their neighbors with less worry about consequences.

Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 on the false assumption that Stalin had been too busy purging his military elite, starving his own people, or executing both rivals and friends. He certainly did all that and more. Yet despite Soviet cannibalism, Hitler was apparently unaware that the chaotic Russians could still field an army twice the size of his own. Stalin's tanks and artillery were just as or more deadly than Hitler's—and soon far more numerous than the assets of *blitzkrieg*. A spirited, defiant, and yes, united populace was determined to protect Mother Russia from the invader.

Wars are deterred when all the potential players know the relative strengths of each and the relative willingness to use such power in defense of a nation's interests. Lack of such knowledge leads to dangerous misjudgments. And war then becomes a grotesque foreordained laboratory experiment to confirm what should have been known in advance.

What were Argentina's generals or Saddam Hussein thinking when they provoked the United Kingdom or the United States during the Falklands War and first Gulf War? No doubt they assumed that their more powerful targets were too busy elsewhere, played out, or insufficiently concerned to react. A lot of damage and death followed in those two respective brief wars—and all to prove what should have been obvious.

Invaded and assaulted nations sometimes overlook or try to explain away signs of aggression.

Perhaps Buenos Aires had read one too many times of British parliamentarians referencing the "Malvinas" rather than the Falkland Islands. Or Saddam remembered too well the United States ambassador to Iraq naively voicing uninterest in 1990 "border" disputes between quarrelling Arab neighbors—perhaps in the manner of Dean Acheson's controversial speech in January 1950 to the effect that South Korea was probably not inside the US defensive orbit abroad, thus making a previously hesitant Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il Sung a little less hesitant.

Both Argentina and Iraq wrongly equated diplomatic naiveté and laxity with military unreadiness and weakness and paid the price in defeat.

DANGEROUS OVERREACH

The truth is that for the immediate future, the US economy and military remain the strongest in the world. What reassures our allies is not talk of new bipartisanship, internationalism, and tolerance, but quiet coupled with overwhelming power and a clear message to use it in defense of our interests.

During World War II some German and Japanese military grandees pointed out to their respective regimes that it was insanity to prompt a potential alliance among the British empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union, given their enemies' aggregate populations, collective GDP, global reach, and military potential. But too many in the deluded German and Japanese militaries instead judged British appeasement in the mid-1930s, American isolationism during the 1930s, and Russian collaboration from 1939 to 1941 as proof of weakness and timidity. Nothing is more dangerous than stronger powers, even inadvertently, sending signals that are interpreted as weakness by weaker powers.

Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 on the false assumption that Stalin was preoccupied and militarily weak.

Biden should not assume that former president Trump's gratuitous rough talk abroad was as dangerous as loud laxity. His predecessor never committed the felony of suggesting to a weaker Iran or China that their aggression would be contextualized or ignored. And his unpredictability probably bothered Beijing more than the predictable acquiescence and reassurance of the Obama years.

It is also dangerous to raise unwarranted expectations that a new round of negotiations, a new head of state, or a new climate of reconciliation can reformulate animosities and lead to landmark negotiations and peaceful resolutions to potential conflicts. If proper attitudes, goodwill, and eagerness for negotiations on the part of democracies could ensure peace, then the twentieth century could have skipped the 150 million people killed in conflicts and the League of Nations and the United Nations would now be deified for eliminating deadly wars.

The intifadas and Middle East wars are often the aftermath of unrealistic peace efforts to bridge differences that could not be bridged without the perceived humiliation of one or both parties. Thinking an enemy

will give concessions that it simply will not or cannot only inflames an aggressor.

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's felony was not just going to Munich with the intention of rewarding German aggression, or believing that he could trust a thug like Hitler, but also returning waving a piece of paper with boasts of "peace for our time" that deluded his own countrymen. In the end, both nations concluded that if a sure peace treaty had failed, then what was left but war?

The so-called comprehensive Peace of Nicias (421 BC) was supposed to ensure not just peace to end the first decade of the Peloponnesian War but also a grand fifty-year peace and de facto alliance of Sparta and Athens to resume their partnered leadership of the Greek world.

A mere modest armistice would have been a greater achievement. Instead, within months, both sides were scheming to use third parties to harm their respective "ally." And the massacre at Melos, the disaster at Sicily, and a near decade of brutal naval war in the Aegean lay ahead. Once grand, comprehensive, all-inclusive peace deals fail, both sides can see no alternative but war.

Biden must quietly apprise both friends and enemies of America's force and determination.

"Comprehensive" peace talks can be more dangerous than modest agreements to channel hatred in some way other than shooting. Biden should keep an eye on Iran and China and avoid the fantasies of some wide-ranging settlement that will be neither thorough nor a settlement.

UNFORCED ERRORS

Just as hazardous is to gratuitously attack the statecraft of one's predecessor. Such internecine sniping sends the message abroad that common ground will be found not among Americans but among America and its enemies—a surreal idea that America's enemies see as weakness to be leveraged.

Barack Obama made a career out of reassuring the world that George W. Bush and his pre-emptive wars were reckless and not to be repeated. His reward was the murderous ISIS caliphate, along with misadventures with Syria and in Libya. If we wonder why Vladimir Putin turned so ambitiously aggressive, it might have been that the foundations of Obama-Clinton "reset" were based on a false conclusion that Bush's modest pushback against Russian aggression was too provocative and would be mitigated in Putin's favor.

When a government loudly and boastfully expresses a new reset, a new paradigm, a new arrogance about solving problems, it risks blaming its own country rather than the foreign belligerent, and thereby can only encourage adventurism.

Joe Biden has billed his foreign policy team as a return of the "bipartisan" and "internationalist" breakthrough pros—in rebuke of his predecessor, in the manner that Donald Trump himself sometimes publicly trashed Obama's foreign policy, rather than just silently resetting and changing it.

In all these cases, foreign powers, friendly and hostile, infer not just that US foreign policy is mercurial but that they can calibrate and massage it to find either assistance or exploit weakness, in ways that otherwise would be difficult or unwise.

After all, if Biden sounds as if he hates Trump more than he hates the Iranians, why then would the Iranians not consider him the enemy of their enemy and now a friend to be used? Why would the world not see irrational hatred of Trump and his policies as a way to win exemption for their own behavior?

AN INVITATION TO RISK

Despite the animus toward Trump, nothing is broken abroad. NATO is better funded, better armed, and more fairly contributory to the shared cause. In the Middle East, pro-Western Arab and Muslim nations are now aligned with the United States to contain Iran and its appendages like the Assads in Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah, and West Bank Hamas. Iran, the font of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism in the Middle East, has been not merely sanctioned and isolated but broken and decimated by the pandemic and crashing oil prices.

It's also hazardous to gratuitously attack the statecraft of one's predecessor.

The reason that China despised the Trump administration was not, as it claimed, xenophobia, racism, or China bashing, but rather because Trump called out and exposed its decades of aggression and subversion, and its planned trajectory to global hegemony.

When the Biden team talks of re-entering the Iran deal without the Trump baggage, or wants a new relationship with China, this may well instead be interpreted by our enemies as rejecting deterrence, forgetting why the Trump administration held those two countries to account, and

inviting them again to take risks they otherwise might not be willing to take.

Biden would do better to quietly apprise both friends and enemies of America's force and determination. He should resist comprehensive deals with China and Iran that have no realistic chance of success, given their agendas. And he could claim Trump's successes as his own and continue their current trajectories, rather than court favor abroad by distancing himself from a largely successful foreign policy guided by former secretary of state Mike Pompeo.

Otherwise, the alternatives will become increasingly dangerous.

Tarnished Gold

Yesterday's state of limitless promise is today's state of smoke and mirrors—and broken promises.

By Peter Robinson

> If the Pilgrims had landed in California instead of back East, nobody would have bothered to discover the rest of the country.
>
> *—Ronald Reagan*

> Move to Texas.
>
> *—Pete Wilson, when asked his advice for a young Republican who wanted to go into California politics*

One snowy day when I was a kid in upstate New York, I came across a shoebox in the back of a closet that contained a perfectly preserved specimen of the California dream: a century-old sheaf of letters that a cousin had sent back to his parents after moving to Los Angeles. The cousin had described endless sunshine, vast citrus groves, and weather so temperate that the only snow he ever saw lay glistening on distant mountaintops. "Do not spend another winter back East," he had written. "Move to California!"

When I moved to California in the late 1980s, I found myself thinking often of my distant cousin. California struck me just the way it had struck him. The place seemed almost dreamlike, an ideal that had achieved reality,

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America's own land of milk and honey. My distant, long-dead cousin and me. As it happens, I see now, we bracketed the California dream. The state began to acquire its special place in American life about the time my cousin moved here—and to lose it about the time I arrived myself.

Notes from a once-golden state.

• • •

"What went wrong?" asks Pete Wilson, who served as the Republican governor of California during the 1990s. "Hell, what didn't?"

A native of the Midwest, Wilson moved to California in 1959. Seven years later, he began a political career during which he would spend four years in the assembly, a dozen years as mayor of San Diego, eight years in the US Senate, and eight years as governor. The California that kept voting for Wilson—he never lost a general election—possessed a functioning two-party system. As late as 1999, Wilson's final year as governor, the GOP remained competitive. Registered Republicans accounted for 36 percent of the California electorate. The GOP held 37 of the 80 seats in the state assembly, 15 of the 40 seats in the state senate, and 24 of California's 52 seats in the House of Representatives. Today? Registered Republicans account for just 24 percent of the California electorate. The GOP holds 19 of the 80 seats in the assembly, 9 of the 40 seats in the senate, and 11 of California's 53 seats in the House of Representatives. The two-party system has collapsed.

The place was almost dreamlike, America's own land of milk and honey.

Wilson names three causes.

The first: public employees' unions. In the 1970s, Governor Jerry Brown signed legislation giving collective-bargaining rights to public employees, including state employees. This expanded the power of organizations such as the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). "Jerry claimed it was just a minor change," says Wilson. "I said, 'The hell it is.' " Then, in 1988, Proposition 98 amended the state constitution, ensuring that each year a certain portion of the entire state budget—typically at least 40 percent—would go to public schools. This gave the California Teachers Association (CTA) a reliable source of income. Since then, the SEIU, the CTA, and other public employees' unions have built a political perpetual-motion machine. The unions back Democratic candidates. The Democrats, once in office,

BURNED-OVER DISTRICT: A charred Venus de Milo statue stands in the ruins of a house in Sonoma County in late 2017. The Sonoma Complex Fire, one of the worst in the region's history, burned more than 110,700 acres in Sonoma and Napa counties and took twenty-four lives. [Gibson Outdoor Photography—Alamy]

spend public money to the benefit of the unions. Then the unions back more Democratic candidates.

The second factor: changes in the state's economic base. Over the past several decades, the aerospace and energy industries, which tended to be centrist or Republican, surrendered their dominance of the California economy to an entirely new industry, Big Tech, which is totally woke. From staunch Republican business leaders such as David Packard to thorough liberals such as Mark Zuckerberg and Jack Dorsey—for the GOP, this was not progress.

The final factor: immigration. In just the past few decades, more than ten million immigrants have come to California, the majority from Mexico or Central America, many of those illegally. This huge inflow quickly placed the GOP in a bind—and note that it was a principled bind. The GOP sought to welcome legal immigration. "Hell, if you come here the right way, you're American, and we want your vote. It's as simple as that," says Wilson. At the same time, it insisted on opposing illegal immigration. "Illegals are overwhelmingly good people," Wilson says. "If I were a Mexican with a family to

support, I'd try to come here myself. But the federal government was failing to enforce the border and sticking the state with the bill."

When he ran for re-election as governor in 1994, Wilson supported Proposition 187, which would have denied illegal immigrants an array of services, including schooling. Again and again during the campaign, Wilson insisted that he was opposing only illegal behavior, not Hispanics themselves. "We even ran an ad showing men and women in uniform being sworn in as American citizens," Wilson says, "and most of them were Hispanic." It didn't work. Although Proposition 187 passed—a court would later set it aside—Hispanic support for the GOP plummeted. It has yet to recover.

Democrats in the pocket of the public employees' unions, an economy dominated by woke Big Tech, and immigration, much of it illegal, at such high levels that between 1970 and 2018 the Hispanic share of the population rose from 12 to 39 percent. "The Republican Party in California was never really defeated," Wilson says. "It just packed up and moved out." Texas, Arizona, Idaho, and half a dozen other states all now harbor a lot of good California Republicans who couldn't take it anymore.

• • •

Although busy running the San Francisco law firm that she founded, Harmeet Dhillon volunteers for the Republican Party, serving these days as a member of the Republican National Committee. She has a brisk, no-nonsense manner, and, since she's hardly one to waste her time on useless causes, I expected her to be able to present a plan for restoring the California GOP to competitive status. When I tell her that, she laughs. "If there were a professional code of ethics in politics, the first rule would be against telling Republicans they can turn California around any time soon," Dhillon says. "Right now, we're only a regional party."

In California, the two-party system has collapsed.

Only a regional party. The 11 out of California's 53 congressional districts that the GOP still holds bear her out. Almost all lie in the mountains of the north, where you might almost suppose you were in Idaho, or in the agricultural San Joaquin Valley, which looks a lot like agricultural Nebraska, or in the suburbs of Orange County and San Diego, which appear similar to the commuter towns of Arizona. To put it another way, the GOP remains competitive only where California resembles other places. Where the state

BLUE SKY DREAMS: A helicopter drops water east of Groveland, near Yosemite National Park, in March. Vast amounts of deadwood have accumulated in California's woodlands, enabling wildfires to become some of the biggest in state history. [Tracy Barbutes—ZUMA Press]

appears most distinctively itself, in the densely populated coastal belt that runs from the piers of San Francisco to the sound stages of Hollywood, the Republican Party holds not a single seat. In a lot of coastal California, for that matter, voters seldom see a Republican congressional candidate on the ballot. (Proposition 14, a 2010 ballot measure, mandated that the top two vote-getters in each primary would go on to compete in the general election, even if they were both members of the same party. The result? Contest after contest in which voters could choose only between two Democrats.)

Democrats empowered public-employee unions. Now they're beholden to them.

The recall of Democratic governor Gavin Newsom? Now that the organizers have gathered two million signatures, half a million more than needed, it appears that a recall election will indeed take place. Couldn't a Republican win? In a recall election eighteen years ago, after all, Republican Arnold

Schwarzenegger replaced Democratic governor Gray Davis. "Arnold had total name recognition and enough money to fund his own campaign," Dhillon says, again refusing to console me. "To succeed in this race a Republican is going to need $50 million. And if the Dems decide to try to save Newsom, they'll pour money into his campaign. Then the Republican will need $100 million." If a Republican capable of raising that kind of money intends to run, he has yet to say so.

"Why do I support the Republican Party?" Dhillon asks. "Because you can't live here and do nothing. But California is like an alcoholic. We're going to have to wait for it to hit rock bottom before it turns around. Until then we have to focus on the races we can win."

• • •

If the California GOP had designed the perfect candidate for Congress and the perfect district for him to contest, the candidate would have looked exactly like Mike Garcia, and the district would have looked exactly like the Twenty-Fifth. The son of Mexican immigrants, Garcia attended the Naval Academy, flew more than two dozen combat missions during the Iraq War, and then returned home to become an executive at Raytheon, one of the quintessential California aerospace companies. Still in his forties, Garcia is handsome, warm, and well-spoken in both English and Spanish. The Twenty-Fifth Congressional District, for its part, is the most Republican congressional district in Los Angeles County. It encompasses both agricultural towns of the kind that tend to support Republicans and suburbs such as Simi Valley, a place so congenial to Republicans that Ronald Reagan chose it as the site of his presidential library.

The GOP remains competitive only where California resembles other places.

"I went to the district to campaign with Mike," says Pete Wilson of Garcia's campaign for re-election last November. Garcia had first carried the district in a special election last May, after the Democratic incumbent had resigned as the result of a sex scandal. Garcia could carry the district comfortably in November, the GOP reasoned, if he simply held on to traditional Republicans while attracting the support of as little as one-third of the district's Hispanics. "Mike worked his ass off," says Wilson. "And then he ended the day by giving one of the best damn political speeches I've ever heard in my life."

Garcia did carry the district, but there was nothing comfortable about it. Out of almost 339,000 votes, his margin came to just 333, or less than one-tenth of 1 percent. Therewith the California GOP. It can put forward the perfect candidate in the perfect district—and still barely eke out a win.

• • •

"I'll be keeping an office in California," said one of the two friends who called in January to tell me they had decided to move to Texas, "but a lot of the dynamism in Silicon Valley has shifted to Austin." This was new. Over the past decade, I'd grown used to hearing friends of retirement age announce that they had decided to flee California's high taxes, but this friend was still in his twenties—and never mentioned taxes. Even for a tech entrepreneur, he said, California was now a place to leave behind. "Texas is just so much more welcoming to business."

The second friend offered another new reason—one I found still more unsettling. Although he had lived all his life in California, he explained, he had decided to depart for the sake of his conscience. "I used to be able to ignore the progressives who run the state," he said. "Not anymore." My friend cited the identity politics, the draconian COVID-19 lockdowns, and the trans agenda. (An example of the latter: a bill is now under consideration in the California state legislature that would require department stores to sell toys for boys and girls together, placing firetrucks and ballerina dresses in the same gender-neutral sales areas.) "Some of what goes on is just evil. I have to leave the state or I'd feel complicit."

"California is like an alcoholic. We're going to have to wait for it to hit rock bottom before it turns around."

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California's decline is easy enough to overstate, of course. Almost forty million people still choose to live here, and the economy remains so robust that if California were an independent nation, it would boast the fifth-biggest GDP on the planet. But the Golden State, the land of opportunity within the land of opportunity, the California of a large, contented middle class, good public schools, affordable housing, and an abundance of jobs—that California no longer exists. With 12 percent of the nation's population, California now has

one-third of the nation's welfare recipients and, on reasonable estimates, the same proportion of the nation's illegal immigrants. The surest index of the erosion in the quality of life here: last year, for only the second time in decades, more people moved out of the state than moved in.

Which brings me to last summer's wildfires.

As the wildfires burned—altogether they would claim more than four million acres—vast plumes covered much of the state in a haze. Then, in mid-September, the meteorological conditions shifted, drawing smoke up into the high atmosphere. In Northern California, the smoke obscured the sun. Communities from Napa to Palo Alto to Santa Cruz glowed for days on end with a weird coppery light—it reminded everyone of the light on Mars in the Matt Damon movie *The Martian*—while the sky itself shone a sulfuric yellow-brown.

A chain of causation ran through my mind. It came to me idly, but I had to conclude that there was something to it. First the collapse of the GOP had ceded to the Democratic Party complete control of the state government, including the entities responsible for forest management. Then the progressives who dominate the Democratic establishment had replaced traditional forest management with new, supposedly better environmental techniques—whereas state agencies used to subject some thirty thousand acres a year to controlled burns, those agencies now burn less than half that amount. With federal land-management agencies adopting similar techniques, vast quantities of undergrowth and deadwood had accumulated, enabling the wildfires to become some of the biggest in California history.

Watching the state grow more and more dysfunctional, I had always supposed there was one aspect of California that politics could never impair. Now I saw I was mistaken. Politics had even blotted out the beauty of the California sky.



Hope and Change in Indian Country?

President Biden's new interior secretary, Deb Haaland, has a chance to fix the system that leaves many of America's first people poor and powerless. But will she take it?

By Terry L. Anderson

Deb Haaland, a Native American, is now the secretary of the interior. The Department of the Interior houses the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the agency for relations with Indian tribes. Chief Justice John Marshall referred to these groups in 1832 as "domestic dependent nations." In that same decision, Marshall declared the relationship of Indians to the federal government "like that of a ward

Key points

» The new interior secretary has the power to oppose the racism behind federal Indian policy.

» Native American groups have resources that could provide much-needed revenues for themselves.

» Federal grants keep Indian groups beholden to Washington.

» Traditional indigenous economies were built on concepts of ownership and rule of law.

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to his guardian," making the secretary the guardian. The ward-guardian relationship became further entrenched in federal law when the Dawes Act of 1887 and the Burke Act of 1906 explicitly said Indian land was to be held in trust by the Department of the Interior and could not be released from trusteeship until the secretary of the interior—now Haaland—deems Indians to be "competent and capable."

Painting herself the same dark shade of green as her boss, President Biden, has won Secretary Haaland support from environmentalists, but this is not the leadership Native Americans need from her. As interior secretary, Haaland is in a position to oppose the explicit racism in federal Indian policy, for nothing is more racist than calling people wards and giving the government the authority to decide whether they are competent and capable. Will Haaland's policies acknowledge that Indians are "competent and capable" or will they continue holding them in colonial bondage?

Haaland can make changes in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) because she is the trustee of fifty-six million acres of Indian Country. (Throughout Indian Country the acronym BIA is taken to mean "bossing Indians around" by wrapping them in "white tape.")

INDEPENDENCE AND PROSPERITY

Start with Haaland's position on oil and gas development. She has consistently said she would "stop all oil and gas leasing on federal lands" and supports "a ban on fracking," while calling for "no new pipelines." Holding to these positions and moving the Biden administration's Green New Deal forward, however, would have major effects on reservations, especially those with significant energy potential. If Native Americans are competent and capable, and they are, theirs is the right to make decisions about oil and gas development on their lands.

The "ward and guardian" relationship has been entrenched in federal law since the late 1800s.

The Ute Tribe in southern Colorado illustrates what "competent and capable" Indians can do. Biden's January announcement of a freeze on oil and gas leasing on federal lands shook the tribe, which has obtained sovereignty "one barrel at a time." Because the BIA controls so much reservation land, the tribe feared the ban might apply to it. A letter from Luke Duncan, chairman of the Ute Indian Tribe Business Committee, called the freeze "a direct attack on our economy, sovereignty, and our

right to self-determination." Resource revenues from the tribe's oil and gas resources go into the Southern Ute Growth Fund, estimated to be worth $4 billion, making each of the 1,400 tribal members a millionaire. Needless to say, the Southern Ute are leery of a Native American interior secretary who supports Biden's green policies and says she wants to stop oil and gas leasing.

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

Fortunately, Biden responded quickly, saying tribes were exempt from the freeze. But even if this decision holds under Haaland's leadership of the BIA, it could hurt tribes such as the Ute, who have diversified their holdings to include wells in the Outer Continental Shelf under federal management.

On the other hand, the proposed Green New Deal would provide massive subsidies to wind and solar energy, both

LAND RICH: An oil rig operates on the Osage Reservation in Oklahoma. The Osage Nation, headquartered in Pawhuska, Oklahoma, has been pumping oil since its first well was drilled in 1897 and continues to pay quarterly royalty payments to many members. [Angel Wynn—Danita Delimont Photography]

of which are in abundant supply on many reservations. According to a 2018 study by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, tribal lands have 5 percent of the nation's solar energy potential and 9 percent of the wind energy potential. But whether these sources are tapped should be a decision left to the tribes.

TRADITIONAL STRENGTHS

Native Americans are the nation's poorest minority. Their poverty rates are as high as 25 percent and unemployment rates as high as 69 percent. Between 2013 and 2017, median income for reservation Native Americans was $29,097 and for all Native Americans (including those living off reservations) was $40,315. This compares to approximately $66,943 for all Americans, $41,361 for African-Americans, and $51,450 for Hispanics. To this add high rates of drug abuse, spousal abuse, and alcoholism.

Still, dangling carrots to the tribes in the form of grants from the federal government is not the solution to reservation poverty. As Bill Yellowtail, a former regional director of the Environmental Protection Agency under

President Obama, put it, "Dependency has become the reality of our daily existence. Worst of all, generation by generation it becomes what sociologists term learned helplessness—an internalized sense of no personal possibility, transmitted hereditarily and reinforced by recurring circumstances of hopelessness."

Haaland has the power to give tribes and their citizens more opportunities for self-determination. Her first challenge is to free tribes from dependency on the federal government. Virtually all public services—education, police protection, low-income housing, food subsidies, and infrastructure—are paid for through grants from the federal government. Hence, tribal governments, unlike cities, counties, and states, depend on grants rather than revenue to fund government services. If they are to have independent, vibrant economies, tribes will need revenue, not grants.

If Native Americans are competent and capable, and they are, theirs is the right to make decisions about oil and gas development.

Haaland can take an important lesson from the record of Charles Curtis, vice president under Herbert Hoover and the first person of color to hold that office. Curtis, from Kansas, was one-eighth Kaw Indian. As a senator, Curtis supported federal boarding schools and introduced the Curtis Act of 1898, aimed at weakening tribal relations and encouraging assimilation into white society. In a recent study, tribal scholars Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt explored the roots of Indian economic development and found that culture is part of the glue that "informs and legitimizes conceptions of self, of social and political organization, of how the world works, and of how the individual and group appropriately work in the world."

American Indians can rebuild their economies and culture by referring back to traditional indigenous economies that were built on concepts of ownership and rule of law, underpinned by cultures that rewarded entrepreneurship as well as stewardship. For example, when (not if) the Biden administration creates national monuments to protect Native American antiquities, as the Obama administration did, it could give management authority to tribes rather than the DOI. In its co-management agreement with the National Park Service, the Navajo Nation

"Bossing Indians around" is not a just approach, regardless of who takes it.

has already demonstrated that it is "competent and capable" of managing Canyon de Chelly National Monument in Arizona, for example.

Haaland can help tribes wean American Indians from dependency and find sources of revenue—even if that revenue comes from fossil fuels. This will require a much more specific approach than the green mantra the secretary professes, proclaiming herself a fierce voice "for all of us, our planet, and all of our protected land."

"Bossing Indians around" is not a just approach, regardless of who takes it. Haaland is in a position to right the long-running injustices toward indigenous people by promoting tribal sovereignty and individual liberty. Chief Joseph asked for exactly this in 1879 when he said, "Let me be a free man—free to travel, free to stop, free to trade where I choose, free to choose my own teacher, free to follow the religion of my fathers, free to think and talk and act for myself." Native Americans had these freedoms before European contact, and they thrived. Today Secretary Haaland is well placed to free American Indians from racism and wardship. H

If they are to have independent, vibrant economies, tribes need revenue, not grants.

Special to the **Hoover Digest.**



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The Road to Selfdom

To Matthew Crawford, author of *Why We Drive,* the open road symbolizes the vanishing realm of human autonomy and skill.

By Russ Roberts

***Russ Roberts,* EconTalk:** My guest is author Matthew Crawford. He is a senior fellow at the University of Virginia's Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture and author of *Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work*. His latest book is *Why We Drive: Toward a Philosophy of the Open Road,* which is an homage to driving and cars, but it's about a lot more than driving. It's a deep meditation on how we might think about our relationship to technology and regulation. Matthew, welcome to *EconTalk*.

Matthew Crawford: Thanks for having me, Russ.

Roberts: Let's start with the role of serendipity—in life and in driving. You're a fan of it. Tell me why and explain serendipity.

Crawford: Serendipity is something that happens when you don't have a plan, or things don't go according to plan. In particular, it's when things go

***Matthew Crawford** is a senior fellow at the University of Virginia's Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture. His most recent book is **Why We Drive: Toward a Philosophy of the Open Road** (William Morrow, 2020). **Russ Roberts** is the John and Jean De Nault Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution and participates in Hoover's Human Prosperity Project. He hosts the **EconTalk** podcast.*

well under those conditions. Part of the meaning is that there's some kind of risk involved, and it involves hope. My friend Garnette Cadogan wrote this beautiful essay about walking. He talks about stepping onto an urban sidewalk not knowing who or what you're going to encounter, and he says that serendipity is a secular way of speaking of grace. It's unearned favor.

I try to tie that to the experience of riding a motorcycle through the woods on a trail where you're not encountering other people, but the trail itself is so full of surprises that it takes total concentration. When I push the pace beyond my skill set and it goes well, I feel somehow enlarged—existentially energized.

So, the book begins with this hunch that somehow risk is bound up with humanizing possibilities.

AUTOMATION AND AUTONOMY

Roberts: A lot of our life is spent trying to reduce uncertainty. When I go out for an "exercise walk," I do a loop around my block. There's no serendipity except who else might be strolling. It's a dull, safe experience. I think it's a great metaphor for how we can think about our lives.

Many young people feel they need a plan, and I understand that. For some people, that's appropriate. If you want to be a doctor, you've got to start planning early; it's hard to get there. But for most of us, we're not sure what we want to be, and part of life is finding out what that is. And that serendipity part is enormous. It's a different way of seeing life—less as an algorithm to be executed and more as an adventure to be experienced.

Crawford: I like your last formulation: contrasting it with something more algorithmic. Of course, we're in the midst of this grand social undertaking of automation and rendering things algorithmically. One way to think of automation is that it's an attempt to eliminate those moments of openness or serendipity and replace them with machine-generated certainty. Usually, safety is invoked. There also seems to be a presumption that human beings are incompetent or not to be trusted. Certainly, in the driverless-car space, the refrain is that human beings are terrible drivers. It's hard not to agree with that, but there is a kind of consistent low regard for human capacities that seems to be operating there.

Roberts: If we're not careful, we'll meet those expectations. When I'm on the Beltway driving seventy miles an hour with thirty feet of space between me and cars around me, I do feel like I'm on a bit of an adventure. It amazes me that we don't kill ourselves every time we're out in that.

Crawford: It's extraordinary trust we extend to one another—a presumption of individual competence and paying attention.

When Tocqueville traveled around America as a Frenchman in the mid-nineteenth century, it struck him that Americans have this capacity to cooperate to achieve practical ends, maybe building a bridge or road. He thought it was these small-bore practical activities that require cooperation and coordination that served as a nursery of certain aspects of the democratic



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

personality. He thought these capacities were important for collective self-government.

That's interesting to think about if we're going to relieve ourselves of the burden of that kind of coordinated action on the road. Does that have any implications for the democratic character and possibly an atrophy of the social intelligence that we're exercising on the road without thinking about it?

Roberts: I think part of the reason we have the government that we have and the relationship with the state that we have—at least historically—is that it has something to do with American character and nature. Our willingness to give up control and autonomy to a nanny state, a wiser artificial intelligence, a wiser political class of experts—that's the underlying problem.

"In the driverless-car space, the refrain is that human beings are terrible drivers. . . . There is a kind of consistent low regard for human capacities."

I can't help but think about that incredible scene in the movie *Witness* when they build a barn in a day. The kind of community it takes—an Amish community in this case—to make that happen is a magnificent example of the kind of cooperation you're talking about. In this case, it's an ordered cooperation that's intended. On the road, it's even more beautiful in a way because it's not intended; it just emerges from our care and self-care and our trust and expectations of the people in other cars.

Crawford: Yes, we have this exquisite, finely evolved capacity to predict one another's behavior. Where it gets interesting is in this loop of reciprocal prediction where you stabilize your own behavior to make yourself more predictable to others.

To go back to Tocqueville, we have the ability to do just that without the supervision of the state or maybe some technology that does things for us. I think it's not always the state that's the eroding force of our social capacities, but a kind of supervisory technocratic regime.

Roberts: Driving is just one example. There are many other aspects of our lives that have this structure—this creeping paternalism.

Crawford: The paternalism these days proceeds under the banner of technological improvement. Driverless cars are one instance of this wider

pattern in our relationship to the material world in which the demands of skill and competence give way to a promise of safety and convenience. And there's a dispositional evolution wherein the safer we become, the more intolerable any remaining risk appears. Also, it makes us more susceptible to claims made on behalf of safety, which are not always in good faith. Safety becomes a lever of moral intimidation that can be used to arrest criticism of some program that might be pursuing something quite other than safety.

Roberts: Of course, sometimes it's well intended. We're in the middle of a pandemic: a perfect example of what you're talking about. All kinds of things are claimed to be justified because they save lives. But we don't live forever, so *extending* life is what we're really talking about. That's a good thing; I'm in favor of it. But I think there's a trade-off as to what we're willing to give up to extend our lives.

Crawford: Great point.

Roberts: A lot of your book deals with self-driving cars. I was seduced by the claims of the advocates. It was four or five years ago when they said: "This is coming. It's just a technical problem. We'll solve it in the next year or two, and we're going to save forty thousand lives a year in the United States and even more abroad." The idea that in my commute I can sit back, put on my headphones, read, work on my computer, have a drink—it's fantastic. What's wrong with that?

"It's not always the state that's the eroding force of our social capacities, but a kind of supervisory technocratic regime."

Crawford: I totally get the appeal. There are a few ways to approach this. One would be simply to note that this merely technical engineering problem has turned out to be a lot more challenging than they thought it was going to be even five years ago. So, the horizon when this is supposed to happen has been pushed back and back, and investors are starting to get skeptical.

There's also the more general problem of automation where we're talking about the disruption in the labor force that's likely to happen. In about two-thirds of the states in the nation, for men without a college degree, the number one occupation is some form of driving: delivery, trucking, whatever. So, if this were to come to fruition, we're talking about a massive

dislocation in the labor market in precisely that demographic that is the sort of natural home of that middle-American radical who stands behind the populist kind of moment. You're talking about intensifying political tension in a big way.

Roberts: It's millions of people. The economist and my youthful self would be prone to say, "Oh, but they'll find new jobs. New technologies will spring up to replace the lost jobs. They'll get training. Their children will inherit a better world because they'll have new opportunities." And there's some truth to that. I still believe that—mostly—when I look at technological change and trade. But there are some people that are getting left behind.

There are other ways to cope with this socially other than to stop technological change. Do you think we should just think twice about it, or do you think we should stop it?

Crawford: I don't think the issue is even technology. There's a kind of techno-mysticism that talks as though all these things are inevitable. And there's the hand waving about we'll all be better off, and everyone will be retrained.

In fact, what you're talking about is very particular firms with huge lobbying presence in Washington, DC, arranging things to remake our infrastructure in ways that will result in massive new concentrations and transfers of wealth. That's not technology; it's political economy. I think we very easily confuse the two. Further, there's a kind of program of inducing such confusion. One element of that is this assertion of inevitability, which demoralizes any kind of political opposition. This idea of technological progress as an inevitable thing, it does a lot of work on behalf of whoever has the kind of relationships with government to bring about some vision and impose it on everybody else.

"The tech firms have now dropped the facade and are intervening in elections with perfect openness."

Roberts: That sounds pretty sinister.

Crawford: My book isn't an anti-technological screed. I am myself a technologist. But I do bring a jaundiced and cynical presumptive skepticism to the remaking of things in this quasi-compulsory way by Big Tech, which I think doesn't deserve the mantle of progress that we automatically grant to it. And people are waking up to this; it's no longer a presumptive thing we're

willing to extend to Big Tech. Especially in Europe, but here too, I think the honeymoon is over.

IN THE SURVEILLANCE ECONOMY

Roberts: We had Shoshana Zuboff on the program, and she was worried about Google. It's a bit like Google and these large tech companies are a repair person who comes into your house to fix your washing machine and says, "I'm not going to charge you, but I did take a lot of photographs of stuff in your house so I could learn what your preferences are, and I'll be sending you some ads for those things because I've learned something about you. And I sell these photos to companies that like that. Are you OK with that?" Actually, they don't even ask if you're OK with it; they just tell you it's a free repair, and you think it's great.

"Safety becomes a lever of moral intimidation."

So, the paradox is that Google is "free"—which is amazing, because I get incredible value from it in many ways—but they're selling stuff, just not directly. I'm the middleman. I'm the product they're selling. They're selling access to me. One part of me thinks: if I don't want to buy, I don't have to. What's the harm? Don't I want ads that are tailored to me?

Crawford: I learned a lot from Zuboff's book, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*. I sort of take that up in my book in a chapter titled, "If Google Built Cars." I'll just rehearse the basic logic she lays out. The cynics' dictum is: if you don't know what the product is, you're the product. But that's not quite right, by her account. What you are is a source of behavioral data, which is this raw material that is manufactured into a prediction product, which is then sold in this sort of open exchange in real time—she calls it a behavioral futures market.

The ideal in this surveillance economy is to be able to intervene in the very moment where your behavior is being analyzed in real time and you're susceptible to being nudged one way or another. And this happens beneath the threshold of awareness. She talks about all the subtle means of doing that. So, the question is: what if the economic logic of the Internet were to slip the bounds of the screen and start to order the physical environment—where you don't have the option of unplugging?

The best example is this idea of the smart city, where everything would be surveilled, and things like trash collection, police protection, deliveries, the allocation of scarce road surface at different times of day—all this would be managed by an urban operating system. And, presumably, Google would make the trains run on time because they're good at that. So, what's the downside? Well, you're talking about the city now being run not by a democratically elected city council, but by a cartel of tech firms using proprietary knowledge that is utterly obscure to you and inaccessible. You've lost any control over the institutions that you're living within. That doesn't sit very well with our liberal political tradition.

"What if the economic logic of the Internet were to slip the bounds of the screen and start to order the physical environment—where you don't have the option of unplugging?"

Roberts: My first thought is that a smart city compared to the ones most of us live in where the trash doesn't get picked up and traffic is hideous has a certain appeal to it. You could choose not to live there, in theory, which would be the equivalent of unplugging. But the goal would be to have every city be smart, because who would want to live in a dumb city?

And there are no traffic accidents in this Oz-like place. There's also no man behind the curtain. It's an algorithm that's moving the trains, cars, and groceries around. I don't have to go to the store if I don't want to; I can shop instantly. They even know when I'm out of stuff. It's an appealing vision. Tell me why we should be afraid of it—and I think maybe we should be.

Crawford: There's this great quote from Eric Schmidt, the former head of Google, that goes something like this: "People don't want Google to answer their questions; they want Google to tell them what to do before they even know they have a question." Google sort of becomes our trustee. As opposed to a utility answering questions, it's instead nudging and steering thought into channels that seem desirable to Google.

And it's not simply a profit motive. If that were the case, we'd be talking about just a cynical exploitation. But it's not that. If you look at Google's priorities in the realm of search, which is its core business, you see this quite paternal mentality of wanting to create a choice architecture. This is the nudge idea. It will be salutary and embody the right values. So, you're not just giving people what they think they want. You're giving people options—choices that are highly curated.

As we've seen, that curation is a highly political thing. The tech firms have now dropped the facade and are intervening in elections with perfect openness. It's breathtaking. The democratic pretense has been dropped. It's full-blown technocratic paternalism.

I think it's enraging people. It's feeding this sense that our institutions are out of control with this kind of expertise that feels empowered to simply take things in hand and suppress dissent or even try to manage the information environment in such a way that other possibilities don't even show up.

Roberts: Big Tech has so much profit that they can indulge in all kinds of things that have nothing to do with profit. And they do.

Crawford: They're states, right? A quasi-governmental entity.

Roberts: I'm a little uncomfortable saying that. But what do we do about it? The challenge is that the traditional methods of antitrust don't work very well. Big Tech apparently doesn't hurt consumers the way old-school monopolies did by jacking up prices. Google is still as cheap to me as it ever was—zero—but that's hiding the real price. Here's a quote from your book.

"Has anyone bothered to ask why the world's largest advertising firm, for that is what Google is, is making a massive investment in automobiles? By colonizing your commute, currently something you *do,* an actual *activity* in the tangible world that demands your attention, with yet another tether to the all-consuming logic of surveillance and profit, those precious fifty-two minutes of your attention are now available to be auctioned off to the highest bidder. The patterns of your movements through the world will be made available to those who wish to know you more intimately—for the sake of developing a deep, proprietary science of steering your behavior. Self-driving cars must be understood as one more escalation in the war to claim and monetize every moment of life that might otherwise offer a bit of private head space."

"I'm reminded of Hannah Arendt, who talked about social atomization as one of the preconditions for totalitarianism."

Should I be afraid of that? Is it scary that they're monetizing that? Don't I like it when Google knows I've got a plane reservation because they've read my e-mail, and they know I buy coffee because they've seen my Amazon orders and they tell me where the best coffee shop is?

Crawford: What we're talking about, even in the fairly benign version you've just articulated, is still a fundamentally different way of inhabiting the world. The source of unease about this is that somehow there's this benevolent entity surrounding me and presenting options that are optimized based on my previous behavior. It means that I'm a determinate thing that's known. Google knows me better than I know myself, because they have systematically looked at my past behavior and found patterns that I'm not even aware of. I start to be like a test particle in this sort of field of forces, being managed beyond the rim of my awareness. Doesn't that creep you out?

Roberts: Yes, it does. But your book stands at the barricades and says: stop! Your book says this is not a world we were made to live in, and we'll lose something precious when we're those particles being pushed around by behavioral incentives. I'm sympathetic to your view, because I'm something of a nineteenth-century person in a twenty-first-century world. How are you going to get other people to join you? I wonder if most people are on our side.

Crawford: This idea of being a test particle in a field of forces—a kind of determinately known entity—is a very lonely picture. I'm reminded of Hannah Arendt, who talked about social atomization as one of the preconditions for totalitarianism. And right now, with the pandemic, we're feeling a heightened atomization. It's almost a turbocharged version of the trajectory we've been on.

Arendt also talks about bureaucracy—rule by Nobody, as she puts it. It's the administrative state, but it's also all these commercial entities that order our lives in very far-reaching ways, but which you can't address. Yesterday I got my first bill after getting a new cell phone, and it's wildly different from what I agreed to in the store. So, the usual thing: I call and was on hold for an hour before giving up. It's this sense that there's no one you can grab hold of by the lapels and hold to account. She says that's the definition of tyranny: power that is not accountable and is not operating in your best interests. That experience is endemic in modern life—of interacting with bureaucracies that you can't even address. You can't get angry at the poor schmuck in the call center, right?

"Those precious fifty-two minutes of your attention are now available to be auctioned off to the highest bidder."

It's this feeling of being subject to rule by Nobody that Arendt suggests is the source of the simmering rage so many people feel. She was writing about

the protest movements of the 1960s, but we're living through a similar episode of rage now. And I think that this feeling of being subject to an arbitrary, unaccountable power that you cannot address is playing a significant role in this moment of rage.

So, that's an important part of what we're talking about with life being ordered by algorithmic firms that are utterly opaque.

The Man Who Wouldn't Be Canceled

The mob came for Laurence Fox, a brilliant British actor, after he made some mildly controversial remarks on the BBC. Refusing to apologize and vanish, Fox then launched a quixotic counterattack: a campaign for mayor of London.

By Peter Robinson

Peter Robinson, **Uncommon Knowledge:** Laurence Fox grew up in a theatrical family. His great-grandfather was a playwright and his grandfather was an agent. One uncle is the film and theater producer Robert Fox; another uncle is the actor Edward Fox. His father is the actor James Fox, and half a dozen siblings and cousins are also actors. Laurence Fox attended Harrow and the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art. Probably best known in the United States for playing Sergeant Hathaway on the television drama *Lewis,* Fox has enjoyed a varied career from a role in Robert Altman's classic movie *Gosford Park* to a role in a stage production of the Shaw classic, *Mrs. Warren's Profession*. And now, for reasons that he will attempt to persuade us are entirely

Laurence Fox, *an actor, ran unsuccessfully in May 2021 as the Reclaim Party's candidate for mayor of London.* ***Peter Robinson*** *is the editor of the* ***Hoover Digest,*** *the host of* ***Uncommon Knowledge,*** *and the Murdoch Distinguished Policy Fellow at the Hoover Institution.*

reasonable, Fox has given up acting for politics. He founded a new party, the Reclaim Party, and announced his candidacy for mayor of London. He then ran a full-page ad in British newspapers depicting Winston Churchill muzzled. The caption read: "Your London. Your freedom. Reclaim it." Laurence, please explain.

Laurence Fox: Yes, he has been muzzled. History can't speak back to those that wish to rewrite it or to remove the parts that are unpleasant for them. There's something very powerful about the idea of people putting up edifices to heroes and then people forgetting the heroic acts that they undertook and instead trying to rewrite it. We're living in a period of extreme censorship and extreme political correctness, and we're also living in an era of mask mandates. So, I thought: this covers several aspects of the entire freedom-of-speech debate, which is one of the reasons why we're in the situation we're in lockdown-wise in London. It's also one of the reasons we're where we are culturally in terms of revising our history in a way that's more palatable to others.

Robinson: The culture interfered in your life. In January 2020 you appeared on a television program called *Question Time,* a sort of highbrow celebrity talk show that's very popular in Britain. And by the time that program ended, your life had been turned upside down. What happened?

Fox: I'd written a sort of anti-censorship song called "The Distance," and I was promoting it up and down the country. Someone asked me if I'd like to go on *Question Time*. And I said, yeah, because you know as a family we used to watch it and shout at the television. A lot of families in the United Kingdom do. And I thought it'd be great and I'll go on and I'll say what no one else ever says on this program. And I went on and I did say what was going through my mind and seemingly through quite a lot of people's minds. And an audience member—who actually later turned out to be a BBC plant—told me that I wasn't really allowed an opinion because I was white-privileged. And I said: that's racist. Should we not be racist to each other? That's not a cool way of being in 2021. We've had the civil rights movement. So, I said that we're a very tolerant country, which we are. All the stats say it. I think we're just behind New Zealand and Canada in terms of welcoming and tolerance and interracial marriage and all this stuff. So, I just pointed out this factor and then it exploded.

And the actors' union, Equity, which I've never been a member of because I don't trust them as far as I could throw them, said it needs to be denounced.

So, they then went on a period of "burn the witch" for me, which was fun. I threatened to take them to court, and they had to swiftly retract their statements. But by that point I think the damage was done. You know, showbiz is a very temporary area. People are frightened for their incomes.

Robinson: You're all working from project to project.

Fox: And you're constantly unemployed, and you've got to have the right views. And my views were just clashing with showbiz, and with all the institutions now that are meant to be propping up our culture but are actually dragging it down. So, yeah, I was, as it's called, canceled. But I think *canceled* is the wrong word. I think it's *excommunicated* from the church of woke, which is a much more serious punishment, because canceled sounds fun, right? But no, it's an excommunication from a burgeoning religion. But they kind of gave me wings.

Robinson: So your agent dropped you. They staged a campaign against you. Twitter went wild. All of that. You could have fought back for a day or two and retired to the countryside for a year and waited for it to blow over. Not only did you dig in rhetorically, attacking right back on Twitter, you founded a political party. How do you go from a bumpy evening on *Question Time* to founding a political party?

Fox: Well, it's interesting actually and I can blame you Americans for a lot of this. I keep my eye on America much more than I do on England often, because I'm trying to see what's going to come our way. And I remember Victor Davis Hanson being very good on this. Ben Shapiro was also very good, and he said, do not apologize ever to them, because you're still going to get your head chopped off with a guillotine and it's still going to be the Terror. So, do not apologize and stand up for yourself as much as you can. And I sat there for possibly a period of months feeling very distraught, because it's my source of income, and also I love acting and I love art. I think art is incredible. And I just thought, right, I have to do something about this problem. And I wanted to start a movement. Essentially, it's a movement in a lot of ways, because it's based around an idea. It's not based around me, even though they try and make it about me. I was approached by Jeremy Hosking, who I call a rebalancer. He wants to rebalance things. He's saying, if a conversation is going too far in one direction, he would like to

"They then went on a period of 'burn the witch' for me, which was fun."

rebalance it in the other direction. He said, we'll start a political party. So, I hemmed and hawed about it, and then I thought, fine.

Robinson: Jeremy Hosking is fascinating man in all kinds of ways. But for purposes of this conversation, he's fabulously rich. So, he was able to underwrite this effort.

Fox: Yeah. He's worth hundreds of millions of pounds. He's a great guy. We argued about whether it should be a movement or a party. And in the end, we agreed that it would be a party. And actually, now I'm very grateful that we did agree it was a party. Because if you look at the way the government is heading off in one direction at the moment, it's great that we will have at least some of the teeth.

"Showbiz is a very temporary area. People are frightened for their incomes."

Robinson: Nick Tyrone wrote in *The Spectator,* "Here's the thing—if Laurence Fox is serious about politics, he should become a Tory." Why didn't you?

Fox: No, thank you. The thing about the Tories is that they'll talk a good game, always, but they just want to remain in power. And the thing about me is I don't want to be in power. I want the *idea* to be in power. And the idea is freedom of expression and the broadest possible debate. It's not really about me. I did speak to Tories.

Robinson: This is Nick Tyrone again in *The Spectator* about your running for mayor of London, of all places: "The actor's brand of anti-wokeness will play nowhere in the entire country worse than in its capital city."

Fox: That's why, that's the only reason, right? If you're going to hammer the things on the cathedral door, you've got to hammer them on the cathedral door. This is the moment. London is the cathedral of wokery—of identity-based moral supremacy. I thought: It doesn't matter if I lose; the only thing that matters is that I stand. That's the most important thing.

RECLAIMING FREEDOM

Robinson: This is you announcing your candidacy for mayor of London: "But importantly, I want to reclaim your freedom to speak, to be yourself, to be part of the national conversation, to cherish your history rather than rewrite

it. And to teach our children to be confident, not ashamed of who they are and where they come from." Britain is where the rights of the individual as against the state first emerge



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

and first take legal form from the Magna Carta on. How can it be that you ran for mayor of London, of all places, on freedom of speech?

Fox: In London, our institutions are now rising up against us. We have things like the National Trust saying that they will remove unpleasant statues. You've got [London mayor] Sadiq Khan saying he's done a commission of diversity in the public realm at the cost of a hundred million pounds to remove statues and rename streets. There's a road in Tottenham in North London called Black Boy Lane. And Black Boy Lane was not named after black boys but after the son of George I, I think, because he was very dark. So, we're having our history totally rewritten and our culture totally revised. Our language is being



abused by people who wish to serve a different narrative. So, London is no longer the cradle of freedom of speech. And the United Kingdom is no longer the cradle of freedom of speech, openly.

On one end of the discussion within any population, you've got 25 percent of people who are quite authoritarian. And on the other side, you've got 25 percent of people who are quite libertarian. But what we've done is we've sliced straight down the middle and we've removed the libertarian side of the argument: the freedom-loving, continual conversation of culture, which is wonderful. And we've just stopped it. So this 25 percent of authoritarian people want to shut down debate. They're biological denialists. They're misogynists as well, these people. It's just they're now very loud.

"I think* canceled *is the wrong word. I think it's* excommunicated *from the church of woke, which is a much more serious punishment."

I'm saying we do need to reclaim that half of the conversation again. It's not about me. It's about making the conversation balanced and sort of 52–48, like Brexit, so there's a big argument on both sides. That's a good thing. What you don't want is a 95–5 conversation, which is what we're ending up with here. I don't know if that makes sense, but that's how I feel.

Robinson: It makes striking sense.

Once again, from your announcement of your candidacy for mayor: "I want to reclaim your freedom. I want to reclaim your freedom to work when you want to work, where you want to work, and how you want to work, and remove all the obstacles that stand between you and rebuilding after these lockdowns. And I want to reclaim your freedom to move. To be with whoever you want to be with and when you want to be with them. Your fundamental human need to be together, in sickness and in health. And to never take that freedom away again. Nobody should say their last goodbyes to anybody on an iPad ever again."

Freedom of speech is one thing, but there you're campaigning against the lockdown. What's the connection?

Fox: The connection is the debate. It's this idea that if there had been a more balanced debate around this, then the lockdown may not have been considered as an option. Also, I think we're entering a period of reflection now where we can go with comparison analysis. I'm waiting for someone to give me any evidence that a lockdown is a good idea. What happened was

we stifled the debate very quickly and we politicized it very heavily to make goodies and baddies. And this is not how you have a solid political debate with people or within a family. I think lockdown is actually an exemplar of how bad decisions are made when debate is stifled.

If you shut an entire society down for a year, you're destabilizing democracy and destabilizing civilization. And I find that something that I have to stand up against. I'm not anti-lockdown because it's fashionable. I'm anti-lockdown because there's zero science behind it.

RECLAIMING BRITAIN

Robinson: Let me ask a new question in my continuing effort to sort out Laurence Fox. This is a quotation from your piece in the *Telegraph* announcing your candidacy: "Sadiq Khan and his nation-hating cronies have their jealous eyes out on our statues and institutions. Where does his desire to strip us of our history end? Surely Queen Victoria should be torn from her plinth in front of Buckingham Palace to be replaced with a monument to Greta Thunberg. Why are none of our politicians standing to defend us? I feel it's important to confess just how in love I am with these tiny island splotches we call home, and how immovable I am in that love."

Fox: Amen.

Robinson: If I want to be a little unfair, I'd say you sound almost like Nigel Farage, or like former Tory prime minister John Major, who famously called Britain the country of long shadows on cricket grounds and warm beer. You're young. You're an actor. You're cool. You ride motorbikes. You have tattoos and roll your own cigarettes. And here you are championing Winston Churchill and Queen Victoria. How do those two Laurence Foxes go together?

"I don't want to be in power. I want the idea to be in power."

Fox: I'm an artist. I love art and I love holding the mirror up to nature. And I love the idea that art is to push against cultural norms that we don't want to accept. And I find that art is no longer a place where one can do that. To me, politics is the only place where ideas can be discussed openly, really. That's what I find. I don't think I'm trying to sort of hark back to a bygone era of Britain, even though I think we should pay due deference to the sacrifices made by others. Because otherwise how can we be grateful to anybody? I

think modern Britain is shaped on those sacrifices, on the Churchills. Imagine Churchill on Twitter. Can you imagine what would have happened if they had asked in a Twitter poll whether we do the Battle of Britain? We would all be speaking German.

And the current queen is now being pushed by these crazy nut-job ideologues. She's thinking of hiring a diversity czar for the royal family. So she's going to have a woke party commissar in the royal family saying: "excuse me, ma'am, no, we don't say that anymore." I'm trying to say we do not need cultural commissars within our national institutions. The national institutions should reflect the nation. That's all I would say. I think that could sound old-fashioned, but I think it's normal.

THE WISDOM OF HUMILITY

Robinson: You have two sons and three dogs and a career to return to maybe at some point. But how's it going? As I understand it, you turned over most of your house to volunteers to print leaflets, edit videos, and so forth. Are you enjoying this? Or do you secretly say to yourself when you flop into bed exhausted after the twenty-seventh Zoom call of the day: "How could I have done this? What a mistake I made."

Fox: Not at all. I feel absolutely free for the first time ever. And I know this because a friend of mine is in the process of being totally canceled and excommunicated at the moment. And he's struggling so much with whether to fight back or try to apologize. He said to me: "How can this just be so natural to you?" And it's because I'm free. I've been released from my shackles of having to fit into the establishment version of what art is or showbiz or any of that is. And my only requirement of myself is to say that this is the truth as I observe it. I stand by others' right to question my truth, to question my view. I just think that's pure freedom. In the same way as a motorbike is pure freedom. But here, we're talking about the preservation of an idea. And that freedom has never been one generation from being extinct. We don't pass it on in the bloodstream. I believe that this is my responsibility. So, it doesn't really matter what I feel like when I go to bed at night. What I feel like when I go to bed at

"If you're going to hammer the things on the cathedral door, you've got to hammer them on the cathedral door. . . . London is the cathedral of wokery—of identity-based moral supremacy."

night is that I need to watch at least half an hour of *Modern Family* with the kids tomorrow night so that they know I still love them.

Robinson: I sort of half thought you said that if the votes are disappointing on May 6, on May 7 you're going to start reading scripts again. But you're not saying that at all.

Fox: No. Look, we have to be honest with each other and it brings tears to my eyes to admit this. To take on wokery in the cathedral of wokery is possibly not going to be my first political victory. I've accepted that, but I've decided that I'll win anyway. As long as I put forth a good showing for those who care about freedom and liberty and the ability to express themselves, that's all I care about.

"If you shut an entire society down for a year, you're destabilizing democracy and destabilizing civilization."

This is not a project that's going to take two years. It's a project that will take twenty. As Jeremy Hosking said to me: you lose, you lose, you lose, you lose, you lose, you lose, you win.

Robinson: There's a passage that you're very fond of quoting from "East Coker," one of the *Four Quartets* by T. S. Eliot. This is poetry that he worked on during World War II. He says that the only wisdom we can hope to acquire is the wisdom of humility. But it's also about the newness of the present. Why does that passage—humility before the history of Britain and an awareness of the new attitude required in the present—matter to you? Is it personal? Is it political?

Fox: I think it's just life based in the same way that Psalm 139 really matters to me. But I think it's his use of the word *limited,* when he says there is limited value in the knowledge derived from experience. I think that's so wonderful, because he's trying to bridge the gap between history and the present. He's trying to say he wants to permit people to make their own path through life, and at the same time understanding that there is a path they've come from. Eliot is very obsessed with time as a writer. And he probably did more to break down time for a sort of thicko like me than most people could have done through poetry.

Robinson: Would you end this conversation by reading that passage from "East Coker"?

Fox: Sure. "There is, it seems to us, at best, only a limited value in the knowledge derived from experience. The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies. For the pattern is new in every moment and every moment is a new and shocking valuation of all we have been. Do not let me hear of the wisdom of old men, but rather of their folly, their fear of fear and frenzy, their fear of possession, of belonging to another, or to others, or to God. The only wisdom we can hope to acquire is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless." Oh god, he's good, isn't he?

"I love the idea that art is to push against cultural norms that we don't want to accept."

Robinson: Laurence Fox: actor-candidate for mayor of London and surely the only political figure on the planet who quotes T. S. Eliot. Thank you.

Fox: My pleasure. Thank you, Peter.

"Turning People into Americans"

Hoover fellow Niall Ferguson is optimistic that future immigrants will find their "kaleidoscopic identity" within the American experiment, just as so many others have done. Including him.

By Chris Walsh and William McKenzie

Bush Center: Let's start with this broad question: How do you define "we the people"?

Niall Ferguson: The answer must be the adult citizens of the United States. That's what's meant. And I underline *citizens* because citizenship is fundamental to the idea of a republic. "We the people" can't include people who are noncitizens, but it can include citizens abroad. The fundamental notion of a republic is inseparable from the notion of citizenship. And there must be a consensus about who is a citizen, as well as a formal legal definition.

Bush Center: How, then, do you create a common narrative in democracies that have a diverse population?

Niall Ferguson *is the Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he is chairman of the History Working Group and participates in the Human Prosperity Project and Hoover's task forces on military history and national security. He is also a senior fellow of the Center for European Studies, Harvard.* ***Chris Walsh*** *is the senior program manager in the Human Freedom Initiative at the George W. Bush Institute.* ***William McKenzie*** *is the senior editorial adviser at the Bush Institute.*

Ferguson: We know the answer to that. It's called American history. And what's remarkable about the history of the United States is that this problem has been solved again and again, even in defiance of critics and skeptics who said it couldn't be.

In the nineteenth century, the republic saw great influxes of people who were not from the English-speaking countries of Great Britain and Ireland. That might have posed a challenge, considering how deeply rooted the culture of the United States was in British culture and thinking. But despite all the fears that people had, especially in the late nineteenth century, about immigrants from Poland or southern Italy or Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, the assimilation of those different groups into the body politic was hugely successful.

"Get people into the economy, get them working, get their kids educated, and then you will find that assimilation happens more or less by itself."

That's continued to be true in the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Again, there's been skepticism. But the United States has an amazing track record of turning people into Americans, no matter where they have come from. And the wider the geographical net has been cast, the more the system has continued to work.

Now, you used the word *narrative*. I prefer *history*. We're really talking here about a historically formed idea of what it is to be American, that defines our identity, not in terms of color, creed, or country of origin, but in terms of an oath to the Constitution.

Identity is constructed in the American case so that anybody can become an American. I became an American a couple of years ago, so I've been through this fascinating transformation. As I stood in a rather large and superannuated cinema in Oakland, California, I looked around and there were people from all over the world. The largest single group were, in fact, Chinese. And we all went through the same transformation into Americans.

People born in the United States who don't go through this process take much of it for granted. They don't realize the magic that is almost unique to the United States, that you can become an American.

Those of us who have become Americans through naturalization actually have a better handle on the peculiar history of American citizenship. And I do wish that civics hadn't withered as it has withered in our education system. If it hadn't, maybe native-born Americans would understand this better.

Bush Center: If you could, talk about the thought process you went through in moving from being a son of Scotland and a British citizen to an American.

Ferguson: Because of a nice arrangement that exists between the United States and the United Kingdom, I didn't have to give up my British citizenship. So, I'm both British and American, which is a great combination, reflecting our common origins.

I didn't need to become an American citizen. I could have stayed as a British citizen with a green card entitling me to permanent residence here but not the right to vote. That struck me as anomalous. I certainly was paying my taxes here, but I wasn't a full participant in the democratic process. Taxation without representation is a bad idea.

Bush Center: In a recent lecture, you said that a sudden surge of immigration is a key contributor to the rise in populism, which we've seen not just in the United States but in other places. So how can democratic societies both welcome immigrants and yet ease the fears that more immigrants will only change the culture of their country?

Ferguson: When you look back over American history, you quickly realize that it's not quite true to say that we've always been a nation of immigrants. The last great peak before our own time was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the foreign-born population reached about 14 percent of the total. It fell steeply from that level in the mid-twentieth century, and only relatively recently have we gotten back up to around that 14 percent level. The key point is, in those periods when there has been large-scale migration, there has also been a reaction to it.

"What's remarkable about the history of the United States is that this problem has been solved again and again, even in defiance of critics and skeptics who said it couldn't be."

For example, the populism of the late nineteenth century, which produced the 1882 Exclusion Act against Chinese immigrants, has a lot in common with the populism of the Trump era. It combined a nativist desire to limit or even halt immigration with a suspicion of liberal elites and a preference for easy money. We have had a classic populist backlash to globalization now, just as happened after 1873. But populism has a relatively short half-life, partly because it tends not to deliver quite what its supporters hope

for. If you look back in the late nineteenth century, populism ultimately fizzled out.

In the debates about national identity in the early twentieth century and mid-twentieth century, populists said that you can't construct a national identity from a very diverse population. So, you have to reduce the diversity, which is in fact impossible. And the radical left said, "The only way we can hold this together is with the massive welfare state and a complex of entitlements." That's wrong too, because history tells us that a dynamic free market economy with easy access to the labor market and good access to education will do the assimilation much better than a European-style welfare state.

We know this because of the European experience. Large-scale welfare states were built particularly after World War II. One consequence of those structures is that it's much harder for immigrants to get employed. The unemployment rate in Northern Europe for non-native-born workers is roughly double that of native-born workers.

"Identity is constructed in the American case so that anybody can become an American."

The answer to this question you raised is, get people into the economy, get them working, get their kids educated, and then you will find that assimilation happens more or less by itself. There is enough that is attractive about American culture for resistance to it to be pretty difficult.

Building enclaves where traditional cultures hold out is what immigrants always try to do. But pretty quickly by the second generation, people have become American. That's the way this works.

As long as we keep understanding our history, which we're not doing a good job of, we'll realize that this isn't so tricky and it doesn't require walls, and it doesn't require welfare states. The American way, with its extraordinary combination of individual freedom and patriotism based upon the Constitution, does the job.

Bush Center: In a free society, how do people maintain an identity without weaponizing their racial, religious, ethnic, or national identity against someone else?

Ferguson: When I grew up in Glasgow in the 1970s, the most frightening question you could be asked by a boy bigger than you was, "What are you?" And "What are you?" was a coded question for, "Are you a

Protestant or a Catholic?" Are you a Rangers or a Celtic supporter? That was the culture I grew up in, where sectarian divisions often spilled over into violence.

But this was absurd. Any visitor from another country couldn't tell a Rangers fan from a Celtic fan. Moving to England, which was the first of my migrations, I began to realize that identity couldn't possibly be so simplistic. I was certainly a Glaswegian and we have our own peculiar identity in Glasgow, but I was also a Scot and a Briton.

"It doesn't require walls, and it doesn't require welfare states."

Then, on reflection, part of my childhood having been spent in Kenya, I was part of what was left of Britain's empire. And my identity in religious terms was complicated because my parents had left the Church of Scotland in protest against sectarianism.

So, the more one unpacks one's own identity, the more one realizes that it can't be simply defined. And the key thing that we have gotten wrong, particularly in the universities in the past twenty or so years, is that we bought into notions of identity that are very absolute. They produce a ranking of people by their minority status, by how much historical mistreatment a particular minority has experienced. Sorting people into distinct ethnic or other identity silos is completely the wrong way to think about identity. Rather, we should recognize that each individual has a curious kaleidoscopic identity—that identity depends on family circumstances, on place of birth, on things over which we have absolutely no control, even sexual orientation.

We need to remind ourselves that the core animating idea of the United States is that "we the people" are a collection of individuals and our individual liberties set the United States apart from its geopolitical rivals. They invariably attach more importance to collective rights than to individual rights. And that's as true today, as we face China as a strategic rival, as it was when we faced the Soviet Union or, for that matter, Nazi Germany and imperial Japan.

"The American way, with its extraordinary combination of individual freedom and patriotism based upon the Constitution, does the job."

What makes the United States distinctive is the emphasis on the individual's rights. And that includes the individual's right to choose and shape his

or her own identity. It's not set in stone. There's nowhere in the world quite like the United States for allowing you to develop your identity in whichever direction you wish to go. And that's the key idea for me.

Bush Center: How might leaders in democratic societies create the kind of culture you're talking about, where ethnicity is not used as a weapon against someone else or another group of people?

Ferguson: The most important thing that a leader can do is make clear that he or she can identify with all citizens and can recognize that all citizens have a common claim to American values and rights. A president should not attach any special importance to his ethnic or religious or other origins. The trick is to have at least an attempt at universalism. Don't go overboard with woke notions of identity. Rather, say that all Americans are equal before the law, regardless of their origins or their religious orientation. A fundamental equality before the law defines this country, as well as the idea of individual over collective right.

Bush Center: How would you take what you were just talking about and apply it to the situation in Europe? Some of these challenges have been acute there.

Ferguson: The European problem isn't entirely different from the American problem. But there has been much larger-scale immigration from Muslim-majority countries into Europe than into the United States. Those Muslim-majority countries instill in people who grow up in them ideas that are quite at odds with the ideas of Western societies. For example, the equality of the sexes is not something that is enshrined in Islam. This has been and still is a huge challenge for European countries.

"The more one unpacks one's own identity, the more one realizes that it can't be simply defined. . . . Each individual has a curious kaleidoscopic identity."

Bush Center: How do you get societies that once saw diversity as a threat to their national identity to see diversity instead as an advantage?

Ferguson: If you look at global surveys, the United States is much more inclined to see diversity as an advantage than almost any other country. The United States is still comparatively one of the most tolerant countries of diversity.

There's been something of a backlash against the notion of diversity in the past few years, as part of that populist backlash that I talked about earlier. But the problem has been the way in which the left has sought to weaponize the issue of identity in its own way. This is potentially a huge tactical mistake. It underestimates the extent to which people choose their political affiliations in the United States and the way they choose other things. They're not baked, as it were, in the cake of one's country of origin. The good news is that the American electorate doesn't behave as those two different models imply. We are wonderfully confusing and perplexing. ◼



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"Pluralism Is the Lifeblood"

How do healthy democracies embrace both differences and common values? Hoover fellow Timothy Garton Ash discusses the crucial balance—and the danger that lies "down the road of identity politics."

By Chris Walsh and William McKenzie

Bush Center: We would be interested in your perspective as someone who is not a US citizen on a question that we have put to several American scholars. The question is: how would you interpret or define the American Constitution's opening statement of "we the people"?

Timothy Garton Ash: What an interesting question to start with. My spontaneous answer is that it identifies the difference between the US but also Canadian or Australian senses of the people and a traditional European sense of what the people is. In German, that would be *Volk*. The folk, the people, would be defined by blood and soil. It would be an ethnic definition of the people.

Timothy Garton Ash *is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and participates in Hoover's History Working Group. He is Professor of European Studies in the University of Oxford and the Isaiah Berlin Professorial Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford.* ***Chris Walsh*** *is the senior program manager in the Human Freedom Initiative at the George W. Bush Institute.* ***William McKenzie*** *is the senior editorial adviser at the Bush Institute.*

The US definition of the people, like also the French and British definition, is a civic democratic definition. That seems to be an important difference. Traditionally, not everyone could become a German or a Pole, but everyone and anyone can become an American.

Bush Center: You wrote recently about a populism that is defined as "us versus them," and you have defined "them" as often meaning immigrants and people of a different ethnicity. How, then, do democracies with diverse populations create a common narrative?

Garton Ash: This is one of the great challenges of our time for all our democracies. I wrote about this a bit in my book on free speech. My Stanford colleague David Kennedy told me about a cabaret where a deliberately sort of multicolored chorus sang, "In 2042 there'll be more of us than of you." In other words, it would be the tipping point, where those categorized as white or Caucasian would become less than the majority, simply a plurality. In Germany today, one in four people have what's called a migration background, not just immigrants, but also second or third generation. So, it's a huge challenge for all of us.

"Without pluralism, there is no democracy. It's as simple as that."

The answers are rather clear. You need senses of community and identity and belonging that are open to all, provided they live by the rules, the laws, and the values of the society in which they live.

Empirically, many of the most successful such identities are local ones. You very often find, for example, in Britain that people will identify very strongly with the city in which they live. There'll be people of Manchester or of Liverpool or particularly Londoners, who have an almost national sense of identity. But it's essential that at the level of the nation, you also have an inclusive, civic, liberal patriotism.

Bush Center: You've also talked about how, in modern populist movements, populism hates pluralism. So, how do liberal democracies like the United Kingdom, the United States, or others welcome diversity and pluralism into their societies?

Garton Ash: Those are two separate things. One is, we have in all our advanced democracies a lot of very unhappy and quite angry people at the moment. What populists do is to cynically channel that all and blame it on "the immigrants" generally without much rational justification. That's point

number one, we simply have to do a better job of explaining the origins of the problems.

Number two, what distinguishes a tyranny of the majority from a genuine democracy is precisely pluralism. It's not majority-takes-all. It's the fact that there are anti-majoritarian institutions. Classically, that means an independent judiciary, the separation of powers between the legislature and the executive, but also the media, churches, universities, and civil society institutions.

Pluralism is the lifeblood of a genuine democracy. Without pluralism, there is no democracy. It's as simple as that.

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

What populists are trying to practice is the theory of the British constitution. You may laugh because you may think the British don't have a constitution. We don't have a written constitution, but we have an unwritten one. And the theory of parliamentary sovereignty is that the majority in Parliament is completely sovereign.

In classic British constitutional theory, if the Parliament decided that all red-bearded people should be shot tomorrow, then all red-bearded people would be shot tomorrow.

But the reality in the British system is one of incredibly

rich pluralism. You have an enormously well-established independent judiciary, a powerful independent media, the House of Lords, universities, churches, and so on. It's all about not having a winner-takes-all tyranny of majority politics.

Bush Center: You were talking about Londoners having a strong identity while being part of the United Kingdom. In your writings, you have defended the right of people to be rooted in more than one place or in more than one way. So, how can people in diverse nations maintain a strong national identity while still having their own particular ethnic, social, or cultural identity?

Garton Ash: In principle, it's not that difficult, because all human beings have multiple identities. I don't know of any single human being who has only one identity. The question is how to structure that within a liberal and pluralist democracy. The mistake that liberals made over the past thirty years was to go too far down the road of identity politics and a relativist multiculturalism, in which every little community, particularly those of immigrant origin but not only that, was allowed to have its own identity.

"It's essential that at the level of the nation, you also have an inclusive, civic, liberal patriotism."

That had very damaging consequences. One was a moral and cultural relativism: "Your traditional Muslim community restricts the rights of women. That's fine because that's your culture." No, we have to have a set of common standards.

Second, it left the former majority—typically white working class in many of our countries—feeling that everybody else was entitled to their identity politics except them. Then, you get Donald Trump with white-identity politics or Brexit with white-identity politics.

The third thing wrong with it was there wasn't a strong enough common identity. The flag, the national anthem, the constitution, if you're lucky enough to have one, are all important in creating a strong common identity. But it's also very important identifying with personalities. For the Brits, it's the queen; the federal president in Germany; the French president, the symbols of the republic in France. There's not just a rational identification, but an emotional identification. An emotional identification with the nation is a key part.

Bush Center: We see some autocracies rising in places like Hungary in part by defining their ethnic identity against others. How might democratic

leaders in Europe best uphold what you described as liberalism's best quest, which is a way for diverse people or peoples to live together well in conditions of freedom?

Garton Ash: Hungary is a classic example of the difference between tyranny of the majority and a proper democracy. Viktor Orbán wins elections, which are not particularly free and fair, partly by scapegoating Roma, Muslims, and, I'm afraid to say, Jews, as he did with the attack on George Soros. This is a classic nationalist ethnic scapegoating, as we've known it many, many times in European history. What is so shocking about this example, and Poland to a lesser extent, is that these are supposedly democratic countries inside the European Union (EU). Only democracies are to be members of the EU. That's written into the basic treaties of the EU. Part of the question for Europe is its inability to make a reality of the values it has in its treaties.

"I don't know of any single human being who has only one identity. The question is how to structure that within a liberal and pluralist democracy."

Bush Center: When you have large flows of refugees and immigrants into a country, or as we saw more broadly in Europe a few years ago, what strategies work well in reassuring the citizens of that country that this flow of immigrants or refugees will not replace their national culture?

Garton Ash: That's an excellent question. In absolute terms, even those seemingly large flows at the height of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016 were a tiny percentage of the total population of what was then five hundred million people in the European Union. The problem was that people in Germany and elsewhere felt that the state was no longer in control. This situation wasn't being managed. It's no accident that the great slogan of Brexit was "take back control."

If the numbers are vast, if they're 10 percent of the population in a single year, that's a challenge. Although please bear in mind that at the end of the Second World War, we had these vast movements of people across the European continent, and postwar West Germany integrated twelve million refugees from the east. So it can be done.

It's the sense that the movement is under control and being managed that is so important. The great example of this is Canada. We did a study

at Oxford of how the United States, Canada, France, Germany, and Britain manage diversity. The only one of those countries that actually controls its immigration is Canada. All the rest of us have flows that are not fully under control or not under control at all. Canada has it completely under control partly because of the blessings of geography, but they also carefully ensure that there's no single dominant minority. If you look at the Canadian immigration statistics, it's a rainbow but no single group is dominant. As a result, Canadians are very accepting of immigration and the prime minister can turn around and say, "We'll take thirty thousand or forty thousand refugees from Syria," and nobody minds.

The starting point is to be able to manage your immigration. If you let people in, then treat them properly. School them, give them the language skills, give them the vocational skills. It's very important that people get into the workplace, and put them on a track to citizenship. It's a two-part thing: controlling the inflows, but then really integrating people once they're there.

"If we think our maternal language is part of our culture, that's, in a sense, a human and civil right."

Bush Center: Are there other ways that leaders can persuade their countries that diversity can be an advantage?

Garton Ash: Yes, and I'll give you a concrete example. In Germany, the biggest single group of migrant origin is Turkish. There have been a lot of difficulties about integrating the guest workers and their children, partly because Germany didn't grant them citizenship. So, people who had been born in Germany were still being treated as foreigners.

Last year, two scientists—German but of Turkish origin—discovered the BioNTech vaccine. That is the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine against COVID-19 that many of us have gotten. That single fact does more to persuade people of the value of diversity than a hundred school classes.

Individual examples, such as the brilliant footballer or film star who is of immigrant origin, also bring it home to people in the way that statistics never do.

Bush Center: Are there examples at the local level where strategies for integrating immigrants or refugees worked particularly well? If so, what can we learn from them?

Garton Ash: Another important thing is television. Nothing does more for the recognition and acceptance of people of different origin than their being

on a soap opera. There was a great soap opera in Canada called *Little Mosque on the Prairie*. It had a terrific impact.

That goes to representation by the media and in the media. It really matters that people from a minority see people who look like them on the television screen. For example, the BBC now has a terrific correspondent called Faisal Islam. But Faisal Islam is not their correspondent on Islam, he's their economics correspondent—and a very good one. That's what you need. You need people who are doing, so to speak, ordinary jobs, not just talking about their own communities, but, in some sense, representing those communities.

As for the local thing, cities and towns are fantastically important. Barcelona, which has a large immigrant population, has an initiative called "We Are Barcelona." Paris has something similar. They use symbols, flags, events, and so on to show we're all in this together. That has a terrific impact. Sometimes it's easier for people initially to identify at the lower level with the city than it is to identify with the whole country, particularly if the country you're in is a former colonial country, where your memories of, say, the Brits or the French are not necessarily altogether sweet.

"At the end of the Second World War . . . West Germany integrated twelve million refugees from the east. So it can be done."

Bush Center: Are there other ways leaders can reassure their constituents that bringing in immigrants or refugees will be a good thing and not replace their national culture?

Garton Ash: It's a tricky one, isn't it? To a significant degree, we are entitled to our own culture. If we think our religious faith is part of our culture, if we think our maternal language is part of our culture, that's, in a sense, a human and civil right.

What one can't do is classic nineteenth-century-style assimilation, where, at the extreme, little children in the Belgian Congo were told that they were Belgians. That is an imperial enterprise. But what one can do is to make sure that everyone speaks the main language of the country or languages of the country really well from an early age, which is often not the case. That everyone knows the history of the country, as well as the history of their own country of origin. That everyone has civics classes, so that there's a common core of communication there, and that we all meet in the same media spaces.

As we all know, one of the great problems in the United States at the moment is hyperpolarization, where people are simply living in completely different realities. That's not just a problem between Republicans and Democrats, or between Fox News and MSNBC. It's also a problem if every local community or every ethnic community has its own particular media world.

We have to bring those worlds together and having a great public service broadcaster like the BBC or the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is a very important part of the mix. I devoutly wish we could see the United States getting back to the place where you had a shared public sphere. ■



Small Kindnesses

Looking back on a year of great tumult and, at times, **reassurance.**

By Condoleezza Rice

I haven't been out of the country in more than a year—the longest stretch since I was twenty-three.

On March 4 of last year, I had a ten-day teaching stint planned at Oxford and in London. I didn't go. And I am more than fine with it. I have learned that I never again want to travel the way that I once did.

My professional stay-at-home life has worked out well. I became director of the Hoover Institution on September 1, and I have been in the building only once. Yet conferences and research activities continue remotely with better attendance, since travel is no longer an obstacle. Virtual seminars and webinars are reaching people who would never have come to Palo Alto. We are productive and efficient. But Stanford is a ghost town—a university without students feels weird.

In my personal time, I have learned that remote strength training and Pilates work just fine. So too do piano lessons on Zoom. I spent last summer wrestling the Chopin F Minor Ballade to the ground. My piano teacher retired and moved to Pennsylvania, where we will continue to work together "virtually." I would never have thought to do that before 2020. And golf is God's gift to social distancing and a reason to get outside.

***Condoleezza Rice** is the Tad and Dianne Taube Director and the Thomas and Barbara Stephenson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She is the Denning Professor in Global Business and the Economy at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business as well as a professor of political science at Stanford. She served as secretary of state from 2005 to 2009.*

Not all has gone well. I have attended Zoom funerals for four people whom I loved. I celebrated Easter with the disembodied heads of my family—and again this year. I miss holidays with family and friends.

Still, my pandemic life has been pretty good. And it makes me a bit guilty to say that—because for so many it really is a struggle.

I worry about the inequality of work in the United States, which the pandemic revealed so starkly. Knowledge workers like me who sit at home and remain productive are worlds apart from the reality of the waitress who is unemployed. I am concerned about student learning loss, particularly among the poorest kids. I don't understand why opening schools was not deemed essential.

In the depths of the pandemic, I found our national dialogue toxic, as elites scoffed at small-business owners who fought to work: "Don't you understand that lockdowns are necessary?" Well, yes, but it is easy to say that if you are working from home, your paycheck secure. I hated the criticism of religious people who wanted to gather and worship, but I didn't understand why they wouldn't wear a mask. We were all so judgmental and couldn't seem to walk in each other's shoes.

But just when I became despondent about our behavior, I saw a story about a teenager delivering food to an elderly neighbor or a nurse determined to help a wife see her husband one last time—on FaceTime. There were many kindnesses to celebrate, large and small. These were signs that we will be OK.

The past year has been unnerving and frustrating at times, revealing and affirming at others. We have learned to take the unexpected in stride. Speaking of unexpected, my Cleveland Browns won a playoff game this season. Maybe next year—God willing—I can go and see them play. ◘

New from the Hoover Institution Press is ***Sidney D. Drell: Into the Heart of Matter, Passionately,*** *by Lenora Ferro. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.*

Disruptive Strategies

A new military history book edited by Hoover fellow David L. Berkey explores the repeated collisions of rising and established powers.

By Jonathan Movroydis

Jonathan Movroydis: The new Hoover Institution Press book *Disruptive Strategies: The Military Campaigns of Ascendant Powers and Their Rivals,* edited by David L. Berkey, collects historical case studies that explore what happens when a rising power, such as modern China, disrupts the predominance of a hegemon, such as the United States.

What is the genesis of *Disruptive Strategies?*

David L. Berkey: The book is the product of the military history working group at Hoover, which was established by Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow Victor Davis Hanson and former Hoover director John Raisian back in 2012. The purpose of the working group is to apply the lessons of military history to contemporary policy challenges. The working group has always maintained that the study of military history, long a staple in history departments at colleges and universities across the country, has experienced a

David L. Berkey *is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and participates in Hoover's Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict. He is the editor of* ***Disruptive Strategies: The Military Campaigns of Ascendant Powers and Their Rivals*** *(Hoover Institution Press, 2021).* ***Jonathan Movroydis*** *is the senior content writer for the Hoover Institution.*

decline, both in the number of courses that are being taught as well as in the number of faculty who are dedicated to its study. The working group was intended to inform not only academics but also people within the echelons of military leadership and in the media.

The book was designed to show how a contemporary crisis facing the United States—a rising China—can be informed by historical case studies. We wanted to illustrate some examples from the past that showed how states could successfully, or as the case may be, unsuccessfully, grapple with a similar situation. The point here was not necessarily to be prescriptive in coming up with an answer to what the United States must do under the current circumstances, but rather it was to look at what historical factors might be important to consider.

The result of this study is that it became very clear that the number of possible examples to choose from was really extensive. As a historian, I think we can take comfort in the knowledge that the situation that we are in today is by no means unique and throughout history has been confronted by many different nations and states.

Movroydis: Is the central theme of *Disruptive Strategies* what Graham Allison calls the "Thucydides trap"?

Berkey: Graham Allison of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government wrote a very important book that examines what pre-emptive measures a hegemonic state might take to prevent the challenge to its supremacy by a rising power.

This is the story found in Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century BCE. In Thucydides's view, Athens's fear of a rising Sparta led it to declare war as a pre-emptive measure. Graham Allison questioned whether it was inevitable that the United States, fearing the rise of China, would also pre-emptively go to war. Allison looked at historical studies that show under what circumstances states go to war.

Our focus is different. This is a book about military campaigns. The book provides examples that are all illustrative of states that had already made the decision to go to war. We look at what factors were important from a

LION OF THE NORTH: A cup (facing page) commemorates Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden in 1611–32 and a military leader in the Thirty Years' War who made his country into a major European power. Sweden was unable to hold onto its gains after his death. The cup, made in Frankfurt, resides in the British Museum. [Jonathan Cardy—Creative Commons]

leadership perspective in bringing about a successful resolution to these conflicts.

Movroydis: The Peloponnesian War essay written by visiting fellow Paul Rahe explains how Athens and Sparta exploited each other's weaknesses. What were their respective weaknesses?

Berkey: During the Peloponnesian War, Athens, at the outset, had an extremely powerful navy dating back to the conclusion of the Persian Wars in the first quarter of the fifth century BCE. Athens had established an imperial base, which required tribute payments from allies for protection from incursions by the Persian empire. Over time, Thucydides notes, the character of this alliance changed, and there was no longer necessarily a Persian threat in the way that there had been at the outset of the century. As a result of the tributes, Athens acquired a tremendous amount of financial reserves, enabling it to further increase the size of its navy and also to undertake some of the great cultural programs for which Athens is still known and admired to this day.

"We wanted to illustrate some examples from the past that showed how states could successfully, or as the case may be, unsuccessfully, grapple with a similar situation."

In contrast, Sparta had for centuries been the predominant land power in the Greek world and it had a much more insular society, unlike the far more cosmopolitan Athenian empire. The Peloponnesian War pitted against each other these two states with very different visions of governance, very different forms of government, different strengths and weaknesses in military terms, and a different set of relationships with their allies.

While Sparta had a strong hoplite infantry, it lacked the naval forces and training to contest Athens at sea. In a similar way, Athens, which had established a great navy, had a much smaller and less capable land force. Again, the Peloponnesian War was really a conflict about different views of governance and relationships with allies, and from that perspective it is somewhat similar to what we're seeing in the world today with respect to the United States and China. These tensions were fueled also by innate differences between a democratic, Ionian, naval, cosmopolitan, and imperial Athens, and an oligarchical, Doric, infantry-centered, rural, and parochial Sparta.

One of the really decisive moments in the Peloponnesian War, and this is brought out in Paul Rahe's chapter, was the re-entrance of Persia into

Greek politics. The Persian empire began in the later stages of the conflict to re-engage diplomatically with Sparta and its allies by providing them with financial resources to construct a fleet. Therefore, for the first time, Sparta was able to contest Athens's strength at sea. This development became a major turning point of the war.

Movroydis: An essay written by visiting fellow Barry Strauss discusses how Rome overcame Carthage in the Punic Wars by marshaling armies of free citizens. Why was that a key factor?

Berkey: Rome had the tremendous human resources on the Italic Peninsula from which it was able to marshal a defense against Carthage. This is a particularly interesting study. Unlike some of the other examples of military campaigns that are found in this book, Barry Strauss looked at not just one specific military event, but rather three wars spread out over more than a century.

The first Punic War was a contest between Rome and Carthage over Sicily. Then in the second Punic War, under the leadership of Hannibal, Carthage invaded the Italic Peninsula. It was during that struggle that Rome was able to marshal not only its own citizens but also the other allied states in Italy that could contribute to the common defense against this external existential threat. This was a very important development for the Roman army, because it tipped the scales of the power balance in its favor and created a situation where it could combat a really remarkable general, Hannibal, and prevent the destruction of its empire in that campaign. Carthage was never able to assemble the manpower of North Africa in the way that republican Rome had been able to unite much of Italy.

"The situation that we are in today is by no means unique, and throughout history has been confronted by many different nations and states."

Movroydis: Edward Luttwak's essay illustrates a high-risk strategy used by Byzantine emperor Herakleios. What does this say about taking calculated risks during military campaigns?

Berkey: Luttwak has taken in many ways the opposite approach to that taken by Paul Rahe and Barry Strauss, which is that he elected to look very closely at a single year of the Byzantine empire in the seventh century. The Sassanid empire had been a near-constant thorn in the side of the

Byzantine empire for centuries. When a new Sassanid emperor, Khosrow II, assumed power, what was a low-level conflict escalated into an attempt to push Sassanian forces all the way to Constantinople and overthrow the Byzantine empire.

The Sassanids invaded the Byzantine empire from multiple sides, including Egypt, Syria, the Anatolian Plateau, and up to Constantinople. In this situation, Herakleios, rather than trying to make some heroic defense from within the walls of Constantinople, elected instead to gamble by leading a counteroffensive toward the heart of the Sassanid empire.

This was really an extraordinary move. In effect, Herakleios was able to take advantage of the fact that Sassanian forces were dispersed throughout the Byzantine empire. He was also able to exploit military alliances that had been established in previous generations on the outskirts of the Sassanid empire. This then led to the capture and plunder of various important cities within the heart of that empire and ultimately to the withdrawal of Sassanian forces from Byzantine territory.

"Leadership is a very important factor in the success of military campaigns in trying either to promote a rising state's power or to prevent a state from being overthrown."

Movroydis: Visiting fellow Andrew Roberts and Peter Mansoor talk about the genius of military leaders, respectively Napoleon Bonaparte of France and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. Will you talk about the importance of wise and bold leadership in campaigns and how to continue sound policy making after a great leader has left power?

Berkey: It's an important question. Part of this book deals with successful military campaigns and contributing factors such as systems of government, structures of alliances, and favorable balances of power. What's very different in the case of the chapters about Napoleon Bonaparte and Gustavus Adolphus is that they encompass crucial issues surrounding successful military leadership.

I think what's important here is, one, Napoleon's education in military history and martial training were very important to his initial successes, including his first test as a commander during France's 1796 campaign in Italy. Napoleon's careful preparation for battle permitted his numerically smaller forces to achieve success by the use of speed and deception, thereby allowing his French forces to keep their opponents on their heels.

Two, in a military campaign that had been going on for some time during the Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century, Sweden's Gustavus Adolphus was able to control large parts of continental Europe. What initially had been a campaign to protect Sweden gradually took on a different character under his leadership. Both of these examples show how military leaders through their genius, preparation, and influence with their soldiers were able to achieve success on the battlefield.

After Gustavus Adolphus died, a small and resource-strapped Sweden was no longer able to sustain its success in Europe. There are other examples that we could point to in ancient history when individual generals achieved great successes but, after their death or decline in political influence, their countries' military campaigns fell apart.

I'm thinking about Alexander the Great and his remarkable success extending Macedonian influence throughout vast stretches of the Persian empire. After his death, Macedon's power quickly fell apart in a struggle that involved numerous other successor monarchs who were all trying to maintain what Alexander had achieved. This is also the case with the Theban general Epaminondas. After the Battle of Mantinea in the middle of the fourth century BCE, a tactical Theban victory over Sparta that also resulted in the death of Epaminondas, the historical record shows that Epaminondas's successors weren't able to maintain Thebes's hegemony in the Greek world.

"When human beings, operating by air, sea, and land, are engaging with the forces of a competitor state, it is possible for accidents and misunderstandings to occur."

These studies certainly show that leadership is a very important factor in the success of military campaigns in trying either to promote a rising state's power or to prevent a state from being overthrown. These cases are reminders that while great generals can lead smaller powers to historic victories, if institutional support and manpower and resources are lacking, such plans are often aborted on the deaths of such rare gifted leaders.

Movroydis: The essay by Michael Auslin, the Payson J. Treat Distinguished Research Fellow, is about a hypothetical Sino-American conflict. What lessons can be learned from this look at a possible future?

Berkey: Misha's essay is interesting in that it lays out, in great detail and accuracy, the current military assets of both the United States and China

stationed in the Indo-Pacific region. He stresses the reality that when human beings, operating by air, sea, and land, are engaging with the forces of a competitor state, it is possible for accidents and misunderstandings to occur, which could then rapidly escalate to war. Given the havoc that a major war would bring to the nations of the Indo-Pacific—in addition to the damage to the international financial system and the unimaginable cost of a nuclear war between China and our nation—it is imperative to prevent such a war from occurring. The way to achieve that goal is by continuing to maintain our military and technological advantages, and to promote our leadership among allies in the region such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This chapter is a cautionary tale about how the erosion of American power and influence might force us to make concessions to China that would result in the loss of freedom and independence for the people of the Indo-Pacific, and damage our standing in the world. H

***Special to the* Hoover Digest.**



New from the Hoover Institution Press is ***Disruptive Strategies: The Military Campaigns of Ascendant Powers and Their Rivals,*** *edited by David L. Berkey. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.*

Operation Tagil

The Paris archive of the imperial Russian secret police is among Hoover's most treasured holdings. How it landed on the Stanford campus is a cloak-and-dagger tale worthy of the collection.

By Bertrand M. Patenaude

On October 29, 1957, the Hoover Institution staged a media event unlike any other in its hundred-year history. National and local news outlets were on hand, including a film crew from NBC News, to cover the proceedings, which began at 10:30 a.m. inside Hoover Tower. The occasion was the unveiling of a blockbuster collection Hoover had been harboring in secret for thirty years. It was the files of the Paris branch of the Okhrana, the imperial Russian secret police. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Russian capital, the Okhrana had established an office inside the embassy in Paris in 1883, and that office eventually absorbed all other czarist police bureaus outside Russia. It became the principal repository of all of Russia's intelligence information on the revolutionary movements abroad.

The Paris files were long assumed to have been destroyed at the time of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Now, in 1957, they turned up on the Stanford campus.

As the press coverage of the Hoover event reported, the rescue of this Okhrana archive was due largely to the determination and resourcefulness of Vasilii Maklakov, the Russian ambassador to France of the Provisional Government, the unstable entity that sought to govern Russia in 1917 between

Bertrand M. Patenaude *is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. His latest book is* ***Defining Moments: The First One Hundred Years of the Hoover Institution*** *(Hoover Institution Press, 2019).* ***Sarah Patton*** *of the Hoover Institution Library & Archives contributed to the research for this article.*

IN FROM THE COLD: Hoover Director C. Easton Rothwell, Assistant Director Witold Sworakowski, and reference librarian Marina Tinkoff open the first crates of the Okhrana collection in October 1957 under the watchful eye of a news camera. Secretly stored for more than thirty years before its debut, the blockbuster collection immediately drew the attention of intelligence agents and students of espionage, surveillance, and terrorism. [Bob Campbell—*San Francisco Chronicle*/Polaris Images]

"OPERATION TAGIL": Those who assembled and shipped the Okhrana collection gave it a code name derived from an obscure Siberian village, whose railway station is shown in this 1922 photo taken by an American relief worker. To preserve secrecy, the word "Tagil" was not to be written on the crates themselves. Only the initials "H.W.L.," for Hoover War Library, would appear.
[Raymond McKnight Sloan papers, 1920–1926—Hoover Institution Archives]

the fall of the Romanovs in the February Revolution and the Bolshevik seizure of power in what became known as the Great October Socialist Revolution. Western European governments held out on granting diplomatic recognition to the Soviet government for several years, on the assumption that the Communist regime would soon collapse, but eventually they were forced to reconcile themselves to the new reality. When France granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1924, it was obliged by international law to turn over the former Russian embassy building and all its contents to the Soviet government. Ambassador Maklakov—as the story was told in 1957—signed a letter to the French government saying he had incinerated the Okhrana archive when in fact he had managed to hide it in a secret location in Paris.

Maklakov then arranged for the Okhrana archive, together with the embassy's diplomatic papers, to be shipped to the Hoover Library. The files were packed into eighteen large wooden crates, each weighing about five hundred pounds, each bound with wire whose ends were fastened together by lead

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PASSPORT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I the undersigned Secretary of State of the United States of America, hereby request all whom it may concern to permit

Ralph H. Lutz

a citizen of the United States safely and freely to pass and in case of need to give him all lawful aid and protection.

This passport is valid for use only in the following countries and for objects therein, unless amended.

All Countries — Study and travel

The bearer is accompanied by

Given under my hand and the seal of the Department of State at the City of Washington the 17th day of May in the year 1924 and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and forty eighth.

Charles E. Hughes

PERSONAL DESCRIPTION

Age 37 years
Height 5 ft 8½ in
Forehead medium
Eyes gray
Nose straight
Distinguishing marks
Home town Circleville, Ohio
Date of birth May 18, 1886
Occupation professor

Ralph H. Lutz
SIGNATURE OF BEARER

This is to certify that the attached photograph resembles the signature and is a likeness of the person to whom this passport was issued. In witness whereof the seal of the Department of State is impressed upon the photograph.

PHOTOGRAPH OF BEARER

No. 418724

seals impressed with the Westernized variant of Maklakov's initials on one side—B.M., for Basil Maklakoff—and a code word on the other: "Tagil," the name of an obscure Siberian village. In accordance with the contract Maklakov signed with the Hoover Library in 1926, the existence of the collection was to be kept secret for thirty years.

THE GREAT UNVEILING

The revelation that the Okhrana's Paris files had survived and were being opened and inventoried on the Stanford University campus made national headlines and attracted the attention of intelligence agents and students of espionage, surveillance, and terrorism.

The collection easily lived up to the hype; it is one of Hoover's gems, a treasure among treasures. No other archival collection can match the Okhrana files' vivid documentation of Russia's revolutionary underground in the decades leading up to the fall of the Romanovs. The Okhrana's Paris branch was established in the wake of the assassination of Czar Alexander II in St. Petersburg in 1881 by bomb-throwing political terrorists. From that moment on, revolutionary terror and assassination became chief concerns of the Russian imperial government, which enhanced its surveillance of the swelling number of Russian political émigrés in Europe, many of them recent fugitives from Siberian exile.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, one of the exile groups, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, had formed a secret Combat Organization to run terror operations inside Russia targeted at czarist ministers and the royal family, including Czar Nicholas II. This terrorist unit carried out a series of spectacular assassinations in the first decade of the century that took the lives of numerous officials, including provincial governors, two interior ministers, and the governor-general of St. Petersburg. Such terrorist acts helped foment, and then punctuated, the Russian Revolution of 1905, which nearly toppled the czarist regime. In 1911, an Okhrana agent-turned-terrorist shot and killed the prime minister, Pyotr Stolypin.

The once-top-secret Okhrana files and photographs—contained in more than two hundred archival boxes—detail the activities of the police and their

EUREKA: Ralph Lutz (facing page), chairman of the Hoover Library's board of directors, headed to Europe in 1926 on an extended collecting trip. He arranged to acquire many important Russian archives, including the papers of Petr Vrangel, former commander of White forces in Southern Russia. Three nights before Lutz was due to sail for home, he was stunned by the news that the Paris files of the czarist-era secret police not only still existed, but that they could be entrusted to Hoover for safekeeping—if the matter were handled very carefully. [Hoover Institution Archives]


Hoover Opens Russian Secret Police Files

RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONIST LEON TROTSKY AT THE AGE OF 25
One of the photographs of men "wanted" by Tsarist Russia, found in secret police files

"DEATH CLAUSE" CONTRACT WITH CRATE SEALS AND BINDING WIRE
Last Imperialist Russian ambassador to Paris made secret contract with Hoover Institution

The Stanford Daily
Associated Students of Stanford University

EDITORIAL OFFICE: DA 5-2336; BUSINESS OFFICE: DA 5-2331 STANFORD, CALIFORNIA, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1957 VOLUME 151, NUMBER 39

Dekes Hurt Polls Open at 10 a.m. Al Masters Says Football NATO'S SPAAK Free Tickets

ROTHWELL (RIGHT) AND SWORAKOWSKI
Hoover Institution Officials Examine Russian Documents

BIG NEWS: A banner headline atop the* Stanford Daily *of October 30, 1957, introduces a mugshot of a young Leon Trotsky, a picture of the confidential contract regarding the Okhrana files, and a photo of Rothwell and Sworakowski examining the material. Initially the crates were stored in the basement of the Stanford Museum, today the Cantor Arts Center. After the Hoover Tower was finished in 1941, they were removed to the tower's top floor. [Hoover Institution Archives]

surveillance targets in locations across Europe. The intelligence gathering of the czarist secret police involved plainclothes surveillance, secret informants, intercepted mail, and collaboration with local police forces such as Scotland Yard and the French Sûreté. The collection's most visually compelling feature is its thousands of photographs: police mugshots of individual radicals—males and females, young and old, some later famous, many photographed multiple times through the years—as well as studio photographs of individuals unaware that the cameraman would turn the negatives over to the Russian police. The collection shines a spotlight on what US diplomat and historian George F. Kennan once called "the dim half world of czarist police intrigue," resurrecting cloak-and-dagger tales of double-dealing and treachery that unfolded at the dawn of the twentieth century, in the twilight of imperial Russia.

It would take years to inventory and organize the vast collection before it could be made available to researchers. By the morning of October 29, 1957, only a few of the crates had been pried open and their contents hurriedly inspected. What the Hoover staff discovered were dozens of thick folders, each belted with a cloth strap and buckle, containing detailed records about the backgrounds and activities of Russian revolutionaries in Western and

Central Europe. The Hoover Institution's investigators, led by assistant director Witold Sworakowski, were naturally on the lookout for bold-faced names among the files, with future Soviet leaders such as Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin at the top of the list. For now, their big catch was Leon Trotsky, as seen in side and front mugshots as an eighteen-year-old radical in 1898. That pair of images of a youthful and confident-looking Trotsky—identified by his family name, Bronstein—stole the show. The news outlets took their cue from a Stanford University News Service press release, which remarked that Trotsky "is pictured with such a bushy head of hair he might easily be mistaken for a woman." Of course, a decade later he would have passed as just another campus radical.

Newspaper articles about the Okhrana unveiling tantalized readers by suggesting a dramatic story behind the clandestine shipment of the files from Paris to Palo Alto, an exploit the Stanford press release called Operation Tagil. "Hoover Institution officials said they could not divulge at this time how Maklakoff was able to ship the huge files here without their being opened at the time for French or United States government inspection," wrote the *Chicago Daily Tribune*. "Some of the agents who helped him are still alive." The assumption that Maklakov himself would have been imperiled seemed confirmed by his insistence on a "death clause," assuring that the seals on the crates were not to be broken during his lifetime.

In a piece headlined "Phantom File," Harry Bergman, a reporter for the International News Service, outdid his fellow reporters in sensationalizing the story behind the Okhrana Big Reveal. A veteran newshound, Bergman had seen it all, but that did nothing to inhibit his powers of imagination in describing Hoover's "historical bombshell," the release of the "dossiers and other hush-hush documents" that Ambassador Maklakov, "at the risk of his life," had smuggled out of Paris with the help of "secret anti-communist agents," some of whom were still at large:

> Cloak and dagger intrigue worthy of the most hair-raising movie thriller accounted for the survival of these tell-tale documents which are expected to shed much light on hitherto unrevealed facets of the rise of the Bolsheviks to power.

Bergman's prose was extravagant, but it captured the spirit of deception and intrigue involved in the execution of Operation Tagil. The true story of how the Okhrana files escaped the clutches of the Soviet and French authorities and landed on the Stanford campus has become lost over the years beneath multiple layers of myth and misinformation. Now it can be told.


INSCRITS

PARIS, 1926

In a remark that was ignored by just about all the reporters present at the Okhrana unveiling, the Hoover Institution's director, C. Easton Rothwell, indicated that a former Russian imperial army general had served as intermediary between the Hoover Library and Ambassador Maklakov. Rothwell was referring to Lieutenant General Nikolai Golovin, an imperial Russian officer and military historian. In 1919, during the civil war between Reds and Whites that followed the Russian Revolution, Golovin had made his way to Siberia to join up with the White army forces there. He arrived to find those forces in retreat and, doubling back to Vladivostok, sailed for Europe by way of the United States. On the transatlantic crossing in August 1920, Golovin met Stanford historian Frank Golder, who was starting out on his first collecting trip for the Hoover Library. Golovin impressed Golder as "a highly trained man and a gentleman," and he recommended the general as a valuable contact to his colleagues at what was at the time known as the Hoover War Library, founded by Herbert Hoover in 1919.

This was the beginning of Golovin's long association with the Hoover Library, a relationship formalized in 1924 by Ephraim Adams, the library's founding director, who appointed Golovin, based in Paris, an agent for the Hoover Library. Thanks to Golovin's efforts, during the next several years Hoover acquired the papers of White army generals and Russian political figures and diplomats in emigration.

In 1925, Ralph Lutz succeeded Adams, his former history professor at Stanford, as chairman of the Hoover Library's board of directors. The following year, Lutz embarked on an extended collecting trip in Europe. In Paris his work was greatly facilitated by Golovin's expertise, connections, and diplomatic skills. Lutz signed an agreement to acquire the papers of General Petr Vrangel, commanding general of the White army in Southern Russia until his defeat in 1920. Golovin had secured the cooperation of former imperial foreign minister Sergei Sazonov to assist him in collecting the archives of the various Russian embassies and missions. A major acquisition in 1926 was the

SUSPICION: The Okhrana collected vast numbers of mugshots (facing page) and surveillance material on Russian political émigrés and people involved in the revolutionary underground. The Paris branch, established in 1883 after the assassination of Czar Alexander II, eventually absorbed the other czarist police bureaus outside Russia and became the principal repository of their intelligence information. [Okhrana records—photos collated by Samira Bozorgi, Hoover Institution Archives]

papers of Mikhail Girs, dean of the Russian diplomatic corps abroad. Lutz completed the negotiations that Golovin had begun before his arrival in Paris and signed the contract for the Girs papers on December 10. Lutz called it "one of the greatest diplomatic archives that it would be possible for any private library to acquire. . . . Golovine deserves great credit for the way he continued the negotiations and secured the support of Sazonoff for the idea of depositing all Russian diplomatic archives in the Hoover War Library."

His six-month European sojourn now coming to an end, Lutz was set to sail for New York on December 14. Three nights before his departure, Golovin surprised him with the news that Ambassador Maklakov was "ready under certain conditions to place in our library for safekeeping not only the diplomatic archives of the embassy," he wrote to Adams, "but also the famous archive of the secret imperial police force." Lutz was unaware that the secret police archive still existed; that it might now be made available to the Hoover Library came as a shock. Golovin sketched in the backstory for his American colleague.

At the time of the October Revolution of 1917 the Okhrana's Paris records were being examined by a committee set up by Alexander Kerensky, head of the Russian Provisional Government. After Kerensky was overthrown by the Bolsheviks and fled Russia, the French foreign office told Maklakov to lock up the archives inside the embassy building—at 79, rue de Grenelle—or else they would be seized by the French police. Maklakov readily complied. Seven years later, as the French government was preparing to announce its de jure recognition of the USSR, a tip from the French foreign ministry alerted Maklakov that the embassy building was about to be turned over to the Soviets and encouraged him to remove the Okhrana files from the premises and simulate their destruction by fire. Instead, he concocted the story that the archive had been stolen from the embassy by "infuriated reactionaries," in Lutz's description. "Since then," he informed Adams, "the documents have remained concealed from even the French police in a place known only to Maklakoff and his aides."

Now, two years after that act of deception, the archive once again appeared to be in danger of confiscation. During recent negotiations between French

THE LAST AMBASSADOR: Vasilii Maklakov (facing page) was the key to the rescue of the Okhrana archives and the diplomatic papers of imperial Russia's embassy in Paris. He had been Russia's ambassador to France on behalf of the short-lived Provisional Government, which was swept aside by the Bolsheviks. When France recognized the Soviet Union in 1924, Maklakov hid the Okhrana files instead of destroying them or turning them over to the Soviet government. [Boris I. Nicolaevsky Collection—Hoover Institution Archives]

THE GO-BETWEEN: Nikolai Golovin had been a lieutenant general in imperial Russia. On a transatlantic crossing in 1920, he met Stanford historian Frank Golder, who was sailing to Europe on a collecting expedition. Golovin helped steer multiple important Russian archives to Hoover over the next several years. It was he who presented Lutz with the tantalizing possibility of acquiring "the famous archive of the secret imperial police force." [Hoover Institution Archives]

and Soviet officials, the latter raised the question as to the whereabouts of the archive. The Soviets assumed it was in the possession of the French government and requested that it be handed over. A key member of a French parliamentary commission involved in negotiations allegedly told his Soviet counterparts that they could have the archive if they could locate it. The French police were now said to be actively looking for the files, which were assumed to hold compromising information about former and current French officials and politicians. Golovin's tale must have set Lutz's head spinning. "After stating the above facts," he later recalled of their conversation, "Golovine asked me what I could do to save the archives."

PARIS TO PALO ALTO, 1927

Lutz had little time to act. Golovin arranged for him to meet with Maklakov, whom Lutz found "anxious to turn the archives over to us right away." He was also struck by Maklakov's cautiousness. After the two men agreed on the general terms of a draft contract, the ambassador insisted that no one but Golovin's son would be allowed to type the proposed contract. When Lutz, who would need to request the authority of the Hoover board of directors in order to sign the contract, told Maklakov that he would go to the US embassy and send a cable to Stanford using the embassy code, Maklakov objected. Owing to a recent strain in Franco-Italian relations caused by tensions in border towns along the Riviera, the French government had reimposed the wartime censorship of cables. French experts would be able to decipher the embassy code, Maklakov said, a fact confirmed for Lutz by embassy officials later that same day. Maklakov asked Lutz to wait until he arrived in New York to telegraph his request to Stanford for authority to sign their agreement.

Maklakov told Lutz that the Tagil collection was stored in three separate locations within Paris. They would need to be gathered in one place—and it would have to be a safe place. As Herbert Hoover was the US secretary of commerce, Lutz knew he could turn for help to the commercial attaché at the US embassy, Chester Lloyd Jones. Before the war, Jones had been a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin. He was instinctively sympathetic to Professor Lutz's quest to rescue the prized collection for the Hoover Library. He agreed to stash the cases in his storeroom in the embassy pending their shipment to Stanford. He asked Lutz to write him a letter from aboard ship stating that he would be sending him boxes of "war documents" for storage.

Lutz must have been under considerable strain as he contemplated the various ways the operation could go terribly wrong and bring scandal on the Hoover Library and its founder. "One of my conditions," he explained to



A NEW HOME: The signature page of the contract signed by Ralph Lutz and former Russian ambassador Vasilii Maklakov is shown with the twine, wire, and seals that secured the boxes for shipment from Paris to Stanford. The word "Tagil" and Maklakov's initials, B.M., appear on either side of the seal. Maklakov hoped all along to return the files to a restored Russian government. He expressed misgivings in 1956 when the collection's thirty years of secrecy were about to end, imploring the Hoover Library "to let the past sleep a little longer." Director Rothwell agreed. [Hoover Institution Archives]

Adams, "was that as soon as the boxes were uncovered all Russian markings were to be removed and the words Hoover War Library etc. painted on each box. Then the boxes were to be taken in daylight in a truck driven by former Russian officers to the embassy." Lutz did not indicate whether these soldiers should be armed, but the plot now begins to have the makings of a hair-raising movie thriller. If Maklakov did not think this course of action was advisable, Lutz told Golovin, an alternative was to store them with G. E. Stechert & Co., the international publisher and book exporter and importer whose Paris office regularly shipped books and periodicals to Stanford. Lutz left letters with Golovin authorizing him to place the documents either with Jones at the embassy or at the Stechert office. The decision would be his to make.

Maklakov informed Lutz that "in case of trouble" he had prepared a letter of justification to be sent to French Premier Raymond Poincaré. "Since Poincaré knows about the Hoover Library and has written us about war questions," Lutz reassured Adams, "I feel certain that he will be glad to have these documents sent to Stanford and the evidence against certain French statesmen kept sealed for thirty years." These arrangements now in place, Lutz prepared to depart Paris. Golovin's elation is palpable in a letter he addressed to Adams on December 12: "I may add now, that Mr. Maklakoff has decided to hand over his Archives to H.W.L. and signed a Contract subject to approval by the Directors of the Library. Professor Lutz is taking a copy of this Contract with him to U.S.A. and will give you certain particulars on the Collection which, for a certain reason, cannot be mentioned in a letter. All I can tell you, is that this Collection is unique and of an enormous value."

Lutz set sail on the SS *Leviathan* on December 14. Aboard ship he wrote letters to Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilbur, a fellow member of the Hoover board of directors, and Professor Adams in which he described the basic terms of the Maklakov contract. Maklakov agreed to turn the archive over to Hoover for "safekeeping," with Hoover obligating itself "to take care of and preserve the aforesaid Archives" for a period of thirty years. The key clause read: "Documents, papers, and other historical material enclosed in sealed cases bearing the mention 'Tagil' are to be delivered without inventory and shall be kept under seal for the whole of the thirty year period." Maklakov retained the right to withdraw all or part of the Tagil collection from the library "upon a twelve months' notice. It is understood that in such case the Documents will be returned to a Restored Russian Government, duly recognized by Mr. Basil Maklakoff." At the end of the thirty-year period, all documents not reclaimed by Maklakov would become the property of the Hoover War Library.

Upon arrival in New York on December 20, Lutz sent Adams a telegram requesting authority from the board of directors to sign the contract. He asked for the response to be sent by wire to Herbert Hoover's office in Washington, where Lutz was headed next. Approval arrived the following day, and Hoover, himself a member of the board, endorsed the contract. Lutz wrote Golovin: "I have just this minute received a wire from Stanford authorizing me to sign the contract with Ambassador Maklakoff and at Secretary Hoover's suggestion I am sending this contract signed through the diplomatic pouch in care of Mr. Jones, the Commercial Attaché at Paris. I am asking Mr. Jones to send it to your address or to deliver it to you in person." Golovin received the contract on January 14 and delivered it in person to Maklakov.

The next challenge was to assemble the Tagil boxes in one place, no minor feat considering that their total weight was about 2500 kilos (2.75 tons). This part of the story is documented in the letters exchanged within Paris between Golovin and Maklakov, writing in their native Russian. On one occasion Golovin had misread Maklakov's handwritten note and shown up at the wrong meeting place. Anxious to avoid future such missed connections, Golovin diplomatically requested that the former ambassador type his letters: "Despite all my good intentions I cannot understand your handwriting." Lutz had left it up to Golovin to decide whether to store the cases at the US embassy or the Stechert office. As it happened, the files were stored at both locations in succession. The boxes were gathered together and delivered by truck to Stechert on April 3. There the seals were put in place. It was Jones who stipulated that neither the word "Tagil" nor the words "Hoover War Library" should appear on the cases: only the initials H.W.L. and the number of the case.

Golovin then arranged for the transfer of the precious cargo to the American embassy, which took place on April 12. He wrote to Lutz that same day to convey the good news: "I have the pleasure to inform you that I have handed over to-day the Collection 'Tagil' to Mr. Jones. . . . I am very pleased with the successful performance of this difficult task and this Collection is now to be forwarded to the Hoover War Library. I will be very thankful if you inform me about the reception of these boxes as soon as they arrive to Stanford." He added appreciatively: "I think I may as well inform you of the exceptional amiableness manifested by Mr. Jones towards me and concerning all our business."

Vasilii Maklakov—so the story went in 1957—claimed to have incinerated the Okhrana archive. In fact he had hidden it.

The final hurdle to clear was to find a way for the cases to be shipped to Stanford without having to pass inspection by French or US customs officials. At President Wilbur's direction, Lutz wrote to Secretary Hoover on April 25 to inquire if Jones could ship the eighteen boxes directly from Paris to San Francisco by water freight. "We feel that we can place these documents here in an absolutely safe place provided that Mr. Jones can get them out of France as official material." Hoover's office made the arrangements. Three months later, the boxes arrived at the customs house at 555 Battery Street in San Francisco with the seals intact.

On July 29, Lutz wrote to Golovin with the good news: "The Tagil collection has arrived and has been safely stored." The boxes were kept in the

basement of the Stanford Museum, today known as the Cantor Arts Center. In those days the Hoover Library was located in two of the lower floors of the stacks of the University Library, today known as Green Library, and storing them there was out of the question. The boxes were bound together in four groups with strips of wood, each group bearing the following label: "This TAGIL COLLECTION of 18 boxes belongs to the Hoover War Library." After the Hoover Tower was constructed in 1941, the boxes were transferred to a storage room on the tower's top floor.

"LET THE PAST SLEEP A LITTLE LONGER"

In 1956, as the end of the thirty-year period approached, Maklakov began to get nervous about the inevitable hoopla that would accompany the opening of the Okhrana archive. He conveyed his concerns to an old friend who was now affiliated with the Hoover Institution: Alexander Kerensky, the last prime minister of the Provisional Government, who had appointed Maklakov as Russia's ambassador to France in 1917. In February 1956 Kerensky was named a Hoover research associate in connection with a project to compile and publish a multivolume collection of documents on the Provisional Government. That spring, Maklakov wrote to him for advice and assistance.

Maklakov informed Kerensky of the circumstances that led him to conceal the existence of the Okhrana archive back in 1924, even though legally it should have been handed over to the Soviets. He justified his action by saying that its removal from the embassy had been done "with the knowledge, and even at the request of, the French government of the time," which feared that the files "could compromise a lot of people." Now he worried that their unveiling would be used to create a sensation and a scandal that would tarnish the reputations of former Russian and French officials and leave him open to accusations of illegally removing the archive from the embassy and shipping it to Stanford. The Soviet government and private individuals of one or another camp, Maklakov was certain, would cause him much unpleasantness.

Of course, Maklakov told Kerensky, he had not expected it to come to this when he signed the contract with the Hoover Library. On the contrary, he had assumed that at some point he would be able to turn the Okhrana archive over to a "restored Russian government" whose legitimacy he would recognize, as the contract allowed. "In 1926 nobody thought that Soviet power would still exist in thirty years," he lamented. "But now that deadline is approaching." Maklakov said he was in no position to demand of the Hoover Institution that it delay opening the collection, and he wished to avoid writing a formal request that might be denied. Perhaps Kerensky would be willing to

make inquiries on his behalf to find out if Hoover's directors might possibly agree to postpone the unsealing of the cases, or at least to delay publicity about their contents. "If the Hoover Library . . . could allow me not to live to see that scandal, I would be grateful to it for every postponement."

Kerensky spoke about Maklakov's unease to Rothwell, who readily agreed to extend the period of restriction on the Tagil collection. "Your reasons are perfectly understandable and I shall be glad to comply," Rothwell wrote to Maklakov in June, enclosing a draft of the proposed revision to the contract ensuring that the collection would remain closed during Maklakov's lifetime. Maklakov expressed his gratitude to Rothwell for appreciating "*ma position délicate*." On September 26, Rothwell sent Maklakov the finalized statement for him to sign and return. "This will close the 'Tagil' matter according to your wishes."

After the Hoover Tower was constructed in 1941, the boxes were transferred to a room on the tower's top floor.

As it turns out, it did not. A Hoover Library staff member visiting Paris that October reported back to campus that Maklakov was agitated about what he assumed was the imminent opening of the Okhrana files. "*Laissez dormir le passé*," he told his visitor. "Tell them . . . beg them, to let the past sleep a little longer." Reading this letter, assistant director Sworakowski realized that Maklakov had not received the statement revising the Tagil contract. He mailed the document once again, this time via Kerensky, who was spending the winter in Paris. Maklakov, enfeebled by declining health and grief over the death of his beloved sister, did not get around to mailing back the signed statement until June 4, 1957. At the end of June he went to Switzerland on vacation. He died there, near Geneva, on July 15, at age eighty-eight. That October, Maklakov having been laid to rest, the Tagil seals were broken and the past reawakened. ◼

***Special to the* Hoover Digest.**



Return to Chernobyl

Thirty-five years ago, a nuclear disaster unfolded in Ukraine. The Soviet empire, too, was about to melt down. Archival materials illuminate those times of danger and dissolution.

By Anatol Shmelev

The Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe of thirty-five years ago holds a special place among technogenic disasters. Aside from the environmental, health, social, and economic consequences of this uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction, it also had unparalleled political impact. Harvard historian Serhii Plokhy covered the significance of Chernobyl in the collapse of the USSR in his book *Chernobyl: The History of a Nuclear Catastrophe* (Basic Books, 2018), arguing that the disaster was both a result of failures in the Soviet system as well as a cause of the ultimate failure of the system itself. Therefore, the catastrophe is very much part—and even a central part—of the story of the late Soviet period, making it an important event for the Hoover Institution Archives to document and preserve for researchers.

Hoover holds a broad array of Chernobyl documentation ranging from the personal fates of local inhabitants affected by the disaster to Politburo discussions of causes and consequences.

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Among the first materials on the topic to find their way into the Archives are the records of Fond 89, microfilmed in the early 1990s as part of the massive Hoover Institution/Chadwyck-Healey/Rosarkhiv project that now forms the Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State microfilm collection. Fond 89 occupies a special place in this resource as an artificial documentary collection pulled together by order of President Boris Yeltsin to document the high crimes and misdemeanors of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for a public trial . . . which never took place.

Numerous documents in this collection pertain to Chernobyl, and of these particularly important are the Politburo discussions on dealing with the consequences of the tragedy.

The recently acquired Alla Yaroshinska papers serve as an important supplement to the documents of Fond 89, in some cases eclipsing the official documentation in value. Yaroshinska is a journalist and was a political figure in the late USSR. She served as a member of the Supreme Soviet from 1989 to 1991, deputy to the minister of press and information until 1993, and then adviser to Yeltsin and member of his Presidential Council. As a journalist in the 1980s, she was a prominent campaigner for perestroika, and has since written or co-written more than twenty books on freedom of speech, human rights, nuclear ecology, and nuclear security in the former USSR. As a member of the Ecology and Glasnost Committee of the Supreme Soviet, she urged full disclosure of the extent of the Chernobyl nuclear accident and the contamination it spread over wide areas of territory. In 1990, Yaroshinska was appointed to a commission of inquiry into Chernobyl, collected a large amount of material on the subject, and used some of it in a report to the European Parliament at that time.

The papers in this collection fall into two categories. The first is largely correspondence with constituents, as well as with local (municipal and regional) authorities and ministries (defense and others) regarding constituent issues. This correspondence provides a valuable window on the workings of the Soviet system in the two years before its collapse, especially in the region of Zhitomir (in northern Ukraine), heavily affected by radioactive contamination during the Chernobyl disaster. Constituents ask for assistance with a variety of issues, and together these requests form a microcosm of Soviet economic and social problems, underscoring the system's excessive centralization and paternalism.

The other subset of papers consists almost entirely of materials dealing with the Chernobyl nuclear accident, especially its effects on the region of Zhitomir. The key documents in the collection are minutes of meetings of the

DON'T WALK—RUN: A pedestrian crossing sign stands in Pripyat, Ukraine, within the area evacuated after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident. Hoover's recently acquired Alla Yaroshinska papers are among the collections that provide a window into the investigations of the Chernobyl disaster and the radioactive contamination. [Eddie Gerald—Alamy]

Politburo's ad hoc committee to address the disaster, including associated documentation on countering foreign reporting of the news (counterpropaganda). Many of these minutes never made it into Fond 89 and have since been restricted and are now unavailable for research, except at Hoover.

A set of photographs shows the damaged nuclear power plant and surroundings, including animals suffering from radiation-induced mutations. There are also papers dealing with other Soviet nuclear accidents and nuclear policy in general in the USSR, before and after Chernobyl.

Sonja Schmid is an associate professor of science and technology studies at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and author of *Producing Power: The Pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear Industry* (MIT Press, 2015), as well as numerous articles and book chapters on Chernobyl, Fukushima, and issues in nuclear safety. In 2011 she was contracted by the Hoover Institution to conduct a series of oral history interviews with several of the scientists and engineers who led the efforts to deal with the consequences of the nuclear

RECLAIMED BY NATURE: Bumper cars rust in an abandoned amusement park in Pripyat, a city within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. Archival materials about the "Chernobyl children"—youth who were affected by radiation, displacement, and other health issues—are among Hoover's Chernobyl holdings. Amid the picturesque ruins, tourism actually has been on the rise since parts of the zone were deemed safe for short visits. [Alamy]

meltdown at Chernobyl. The topics ranged from the political to the technical. The interviews are supplemented by video recordings, printed matter, and slides. Among the interviewees was Nikolai Steinberg, chief engineer of Chernobyl from 1986 to 1987, and later top-level Ukrainian regulator.

Both the records of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) broadcasts and the BBC World Service radio recordings provide valuable audio and paper documentation on the catastrophe, and not just from a Western perspective: the BBC recordings contain an interview with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and other audio material that touches on Chernobyl, for example a program on the "Chernobyl children": youth who suffered or were affected by radiation, displacement, and other health issues. The RFE/RL broadcast audio recordings and scripts cover the unfolding tragedy in the form of news bulletins, interviews, press monitoring, and other reports (particularly well represented in the records of the Belarus service).

In addition to the major resources described above, the true archival archaeologist will unearth even more beneath the surface. The papers of Eileen Gail De Planque, a member of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, deal with the accident in connection with US nuclear policy. Hoover also has the recording of a *Firing Line* program devoted to Chernobyl; various Soviet propaganda pamphlets and articles on the subject in the Herbert Romerstein collection; photographic prints of the damaged nuclear plant and demonstrations against its return to functioning status in the Ukrainian pictorial collection; a large clipping file; documentary video materials in the Victor J. Yasmann papers; newspapers published by groups of invalids and veterans of the "liquidation" of the disaster within the independent press collection; and much more.

Documents show the Soviet system's excessive centralization and paternalism.

Some of these riches have already been mined by scholars, the most recent example being a thorough and penetrating scholarly book published in German by Professor Melanie Arndt titled *Tschernobylkinder* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020), an examination of the fate of the "Chernobyl children," particularly those sent abroad for treatment and rehabilitation. Arndt places the stories of these children within the context of transnational humanitarian relief and the shifting political landscape of the post-Soviet independent states, particularly Belarus.

In this manner, the Hoover Institution's archival treasures allow scholars to examine historical events from a variety of perspectives, enabling them to interweave the seemingly disparate strands of environmental, technological, scientific, humanitarian, diplomatic, and political history into a complex quilt that forms the narrative of the past. ■

***Special to the* Hoover Digest.**



On the Cover

Julie Helen Heyneman (1868–1942) spent her childhood and youth in San Francisco, where she attended classes at the Art Students League. She sailed for Europe in 1891 to immerse herself in art. Living in London, she became a pupil and lifelong friend of John Singer Sargent, the noted portrait painter. Heyneman would continue her life of art—painter, teacher, and writer—but for a brief period during the terrible years of the Great War, she also shone as a humanitarian.

In February 1916 she established California House, located at 82 Lancaster Gate, West London, as a refuge for disabled Belgian soldiers. The carnage of World War I had produced vast numbers of wounded men who found themselves in a strange land unable to work, get home, or even make themselves understood. This poster by Belgian graphic artist Constant "Stan" Van Offel (1885–1924) shows one such soldier approaching Heyneman's door, the shading of the figure suggesting the man's need to be made whole.

California House met a very specific, if fleeting, need. According to the website *Lost Hospitals of London,* "Wounded Belgian soldiers crowding into the Belgian Refugee Clearing Station at the former skating rink at Aldwych clamored for 'something to do.' Miss Julie Helen Heyneman . . . took pity on them and, together with a committee of fellow Californians living in London, arranged to provide premises and some occupation for them which would benefit them in the future." Subscribers back in California proved eager to give money; Lou Henry Hoover was on the board of California House, along with luminaries such as Bernard Baruch, Phoebe Hearst, and Sargent.

Most of the soldiers spoke Flemish. Heyneman and her allies taught them English, of course, and found work for some as interpreters. The soldiers also took free classes in subjects such as math, chemistry, and other languages. Those who had lost their legs in battle were taught manual arts: woodworking, bookbinding, drawing, and painting. The emphasis, Heyneman later said, was on *productive* work: handicrafts were sold and the soldiers kept part of the proceeds.

In time, Heyneman would extend her charitable work to British soldiers recovering from their wounds. The British gathered in a refuge called Kitchener House, co-managed with the British Red Cross and modeled along

Heyneman's lines. In 1918 it drew ten times as many men as California House. As a news article pointed out that year, the war's deadly impact was not confined to visible injuries: "Everybody knows it on the face of our men—a sort of apathy, the look of a mind divested of mental initiative. . . . A man's body heals much faster when his mind and spirit are kept from rusting." At a time when "shell shock" was a new and disturbing phenomenon, Heyneman's work helped draw attention to the great need for both physical and mental rehabilitation of combatants.

California House closed in 1919 as the need diminished, and "the good angel of this establishment," as she was described in *The Argonaut,* went on to other things. "Many hundreds have found in its hospitality that which has saved their lives and, equally important, that which has re-established their efficiencies for practical life and revived their hopes," the magazine noted. "Nothing better in the sphere of mercy and charity has been done in connection with the war."

Heyneman eventually returned to San Francisco and was active in society and art there. Her example during the war went beyond kindness. It helped the public understand—and prepare for—the needs of wounded warriors.

—Charles Lindsey

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

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

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

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

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