HOOVER DIGEST

RESEARCH + COMMENTARY ON PUBLIC POLICY

SPRING 2022 NO. 2

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ON THE COVER

The Hoover Tower displays the colors of the Ukrainian flag in solidarity with the people of that war-torn nation. Hoover Institution Director Condoleezza Rice said, "Our hearts go out to the Ukrainian people across the world, and to all those in our own Hoover and Stanford community impacted by the war. The people of Ukraine have reminded us of how fragile freedom can be, that we must not take it for granted, and that it is worth fighting for." Hoover's archival collections chronicle many historical struggles for freedom, democracy, and human rights.



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Spring 2022

HOOVER DIGEST

A Tectonic Shift

A global economic upheaval has begun. The transition to supply-constrained growth will produce profound changes in prices, supply chains, and entire economies.

By Michael Spence

In 1979, W. Arthur Lewis received the Nobel Prize in economics for his analysis of growth dynamics in developing countries. Deservedly so: his conceptual framework has proved invaluable in understanding and guiding structural change across a range of emerging economies.

The basic idea that Lewis emphasized is that developing countries initially grow by expanding their export sectors, which absorb the surplus labor in traditional sectors like agriculture. As incomes and purchasing power rise, domestic sectors expand along with the tradable sectors. Productivity and incomes in the largely urban, labor-intensive manufacturing sectors tend to be three to four times as high as in the traditional sectors, so average incomes rise as more people go to work in the expanding export sector. But, as Lewis noted, this also means that wage growth in the export sector will remain depressed as long as there is surplus labor elsewhere.

Because labor availability is not a constraint, the key factor with respect to growth is the level of capital investment, which is needed even in labor-intensive sectors. The returns on such investment depend on competitive conditions in the global economy.

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These dynamics can produce startlingly high growth rates that sometimes continue for years, even decades. But there is a limit: when the supply of surplus labor is exhausted, the economy reaches the so-called Lewis turning point. Typically, this will happen before a

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

country has climbed out of the lower-middle-income range. China, for example, reached its Lewis turning point ten to fifteen years ago, which brought about a major shift in the country's growth dynamics.

At the Lewis turning point, the opportunity cost of shifting more labor from traditional to modernizing sectors is no longer negligible. Wages start to increase across the whole economy, which means that if growth is to continue, it must be driven not by shifting labor from low- to higher-productivity sectors, but by productivity increases within sectors. Because this transition often fails, the Lewis turning point is when many developing economies fall into the middle-income trap.

THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP

Lewis's growth model is worth revisiting because something similar is happening today. When the global economy started to open and become more integrated several decades ago, massive amounts of previously disconnected and inaccessible labor and productive capacity in emerging economies shifted to the manufacturing and export sectors, producing dramatic results. Manufacturing activity relocated from developed countries, and emerging economies' exports grew faster than the global economy.

Owing to the sheer scale of relatively low-cost labor in emerging economies (especially China), wage growth in advanced economies' tradable sectors was subdued, even when the activity did not shift to emerging economies. Labor's bargaining power was reduced in developed economies, and the negative pressure on middle- and low-income wages spilled over to nontradable sectors as displaced labor in manufacturing shifted to nontradable sectors.

These dynamics can produce startlingly high growth rates that sometimes continue for years, even decades. But there is a limit.

But that process is largely over. Many emerging economies have become middle-income countries, and the global economy no longer has any more large reservoirs of accessible low-cost labor to fuel the earlier dynamic. Of course, there remain pools of underutilized labor and potential productive capacity, for example in Africa. But it is unlikely that these workers will enter productive export sectors fast enough and at sufficient scale to prolong the pre-turning-point dynamics.

The Lewis turning point will have profound consequences for the global economy. The forces that have been depressing wages and inflation over the

past forty years are receding. A wide range of emerging and developed economies are growing older, reinforcing the trend, and the COVID-19 pandemic has further reduced the labor supply in many sectors, possibly on a permanent basis. Under these conditions, the four-decade decline in labor incomes as a share of national income is likely to be reversed—though automation and other rapidly advancing labor-saving technologies may counteract this process to some extent.

In short, now that several decades of developing-country growth have exhausted much of the world's unused productive capacity, global growth is increasingly constrained not by demand but by supply and productivity dynamics. This is not a transitory shift.

One clear consequence of this process is that inflationary forces have shifted fundamentally. After vanishing or flattening for an extended period, the Phillips curve (which describes an inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment) is probably back, permanently. Interest rates will rise along with inflationary pressures, which are already forcing major central banks to withdraw liquidity from capital markets.

The global economy no longer has any large reservoirs of accessible low-cost labor.

A highly indebted global economy (the legacy of years of low interest rates) will go through a period of turbulence as debt levels are reset for a "new normal" interest rate environment. Portfolio asset allocations will be adjusted accordingly, and the extended honeymoon during which risk assets outperformed the economy will end.

LASTING CONSTRAINTS

It is anyone's guess how abruptly this will happen. Specific outcomes are impossible to forecast precisely. The global economy's encounter with the Lewis turning point will be a period of considerable uncertainty, which is to be expected with any tectonic shift.

Many parts of the global economy will experience a fundamental regime change. Several decades of growth in emerging economies have driven a massive increase in middle-income consumers and overall purchasing power, while simultaneously removing the world's ultra-low-cost productive capacity.

Of course, there may still be periods of demand-constrained growth, after crises like the COVID pandemic or future climate-driven shocks. But

the underlying pattern will be one of supply- and productivity-constrained growth because the remaining reservoirs of underutilized productive capacity simply are not large enough to accommodate growing global demand.

Lewis's work was not primarily focused on the global economy, except to the extent that international markets provide the technology and demand needed to fuel early-stage export-led growth in developing countries. Nonetheless, his insight that growth patterns shift dramatically depending on whether there are accessible untapped productive resources (especially labor) is as relevant as ever.

The forces that have been depressing wages and inflation over the past forty years are receding.

Applied to the transitions now under way in the global economy, Lewis's insights imply major changes in growth patterns, the structure of economies, the configuration of global supply chains, and the relative prices of pretty much everything—from goods, services, and labor to commodities and various asset classes. Equally important, they indicate that this transition will be irreversible.

Navigating the global version of the Lewis turning point will be tricky. Understanding the underlying structural changes is the necessary place to start.



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How Inflation Is Reborn

Washington throws open the fiscal floodgates, but consumers fear **the debt will never be fully repaid.**

By Tunku Varadarajan

Annual inflation in the United States rose to 7.5 percent in January, the highest it's been since February 1982, when it was 7.6 percent and declining. This current crisis, economist John Cochrane says, came as "a complete surprise" to the Federal Reserve. "All of the governors who reported forecasts, all of the staff, missed it." When he calls this an "institutional failure," he sounds almost kind.

Cochrane, 64, parses the present inflation in a conversation by Zoom from his house in Palo Alto near Stanford University, where he's a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. His tone is wry, and it's obvious he doesn't hold this Fed in the greatest esteem. "They're leading us in the dark," he says, "with a great pretense of knowing exactly what the map is in front of us."

He traces the present inflation to the pandemic and the government's response. Starting in March 2020, "the Treasury issued $3 trillion of new

John H. Cochrane *is the Rose-Marie and Jack Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a member of Hoover's Working Group on Economic Policy, and a contributor to Hoover's Conte Initiative on Immigration Reform. He is also a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research and an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.* ***Tunku Varadarajan*** *is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and at Columbia University's Center on Capitalism and Society.*

debt, which the Fed quickly bought in return for $3 trillion of new reserves." The Treasury then sent checks to people and businesses, later borrowing an additional $2 trillion and sending more checks. Overall federal debt rose nearly 30 percent. "Is it at all a surprise," Cochrane asks, "that a year later inflation breaks out?"

He likens this $5 trillion in checks to a "classic parable" of Milton Friedman, the great monetarist at the University of Chicago, where Cochrane was a professor for thirty years before moving to Stanford in 2015. "Let us suppose now that one day a helicopter flies over this community and drops an additional $1,000 in bills from the sky, which is, of course, hastily collected by members of the community," Friedman wrote in *The Optimum Quantity of Money* (1969). If they spent the money, inflation would result.

The COVID-19 checks, Cochrane says, were "an immense fiscal helicopter drop. People are spending the money, driving prices up."

Why didn't the Fed see that this massive stimulus would cause inflation? Cochrane sees a "big blind spot" in the institution and its "large circle of policy commentators." The Fed's "modeling and understanding of 'supply' constraints is very simplistic," he says. It focuses only on unemployment "as a measure of slack in the economy. There is no group of analysts at the Fed measuring how many containers can get through the ports." More deeply, he says, "the Fed and its larger intellectual circle don't think about supply at all. All variation in the economy is more or less demand."

WHY THE SURPRISE?

This "intellectual failing" showed up first in the recession that followed COVID. "The economy didn't need demand-side stimulus," Cochrane says. "It's not 1933 again and again. A pandemic is, to the economy, like a huge snowstorm. Sending people money won't get them out to closed bars, restaurants, airlines, and businesses."

The government did have to act "as a sort of insurer, making sure there wasn't a wave of bankruptcy and helping people really hurt by the recession." But it should have been obvious that supply constraints would lead to inflation after the recession ended. "The Fed being surprised by supply shocks is as excusable as the Army losing a battle because its leaders are surprised the enemy might attack," Cochrane says.

He notes that even Lawrence Summers, who served as Bill Clinton's treasury secretary and Barack Obama's director of the National Economic Council, foresaw inflation as early as February 2021 (in a column in the *Washington Post)*. "Summers, who had argued for big deficits and loose monetary policy

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

to combat low inflation and 'secular stagnation' for a decade, saw inflation coming, and saw its source in the massive fiscal stimulus of the COVID recession. So why didn't the Fed?"

I invite Cochrane to give the current inflation a name to distinguish it from previous episodes. "Naming it sounds like a fun project," he says. "Our partisan world will likely call it the Biden Inflation, given that it started pretty much on Inauguration Day. But there was a lot of needless stimulus under Trump as well." The administration may wish to call it the "It's Not Our Fault Supply-Shock Inflation," he says. "I'd like to call it the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level Inflation."

The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level is the title of Cochrane's next book, to be published in the fall. It's a challenge to monetarism, the theory of controlling money as the chief method of stabilizing the economy. The new theory holds that when the overall amount of government debt is more than people expect the government to repay, we see inflation. The price of everything goes up, and the value of the dollar declines.

How does this work? "The US government has $20 trillion of debt outstanding," Cochrane says. "That means, over the long run, people must expect taxes to exceed spending by $20 trillion to repay the debt." But if they think the government will be able to pay back only $10 trillion in today's money, "people will try to get rid of their government debt fast, before it is worth less. They try to sell it in order to buy other things," driving up the price of everything else. "That keeps going until all prices have doubled—until the $20 trillion promise is only worth $10 trillion at today's prices."

"They're leading us in the dark," John Cochrane says, "with a great pretense of knowing exactly what the map is in front of us."

Why hasn't "fiscal inflation" of this kind happened sooner? After all, the government has been borrowing money, as Cochrane puts it, "like the proverbial sailor"—the drunken one—for decades.

"Inflation comes when government debt increases relative to people's expectations of what government will repay," Cochrane says. "If the Treasury borrows but everyone understands it will later raise tax revenues or cut spending to repay the debt, that debt doesn't cause inflation." The borrowing and money-printing in 2020–21 was different: "It came without a corresponding increase in expectations that the government would someday raise surpluses by $5 trillion in present value to repay the debt."

The failure of the Democrats' Build Back Better bill "may augur well for budget seriousness," Cochrane allows. But the "troublesome question" remains: "Do people, having decided that at least some of our government's new debt will not be repaid—leading them to spend it now and inflate it away—also think that the government is less likely to repay its existing debts, or future borrowing? If so, even more inflation can break out seemingly—as always—out of nowhere."

WANTED: FISCAL RESTRAINT

Cochrane believes that "we overstate the Fed's power" to respond: "The Fed likes to say it has 'the tools' to contain inflation, but never dares to say just what those tools are." In recent historical experience, "its tool is to replay 1980," the year when inflation peaked at 14.8 percent. That means "20 percent interest rates, a bruising recession that hurts the disadvantaged, with the medicine applied for as long as it takes. Will our Fed really do that? Will our Congress let our Fed do that?"

There's no way out without regulatory, tax, and entitlement reform, and "clear-eyed monetary policy that works on the narrow things it actually understands."

In any case, Cochrane says, raising rates is a "crude tool to fight inflation, especially when the source is fiscal policy." He likens the situation to a car going too fast. "Fiscal policy is the accelerator; monetary policy controls the oil. OK, if fiscal policy has floored it, you can slow the car down by draining oil, but that's not a terribly good way to drive." Fiscal policy sends checks, stoking inflation; monetary policy raises interest rates to discourage borrowing or encourage savers to hold the extra Treasury debt. To change the analogy slightly, the driver is accelerating and braking at the same time.

To overcome inflation, fiscal constraints on monetary policy will need to play a large role, Cochrane says: "The Fed is merely a co-pilot." He notes that in 1980, the ratio of debt to gross domestic product was 25 percent. Today it is 100 percent and rising: "Fiscal constraints on monetary policy are four times larger today." So for a rise in interest rates to lower inflation, "fiscal policy must tighten as well. Without that fiscal cooperation, monetary policy cannot lower inflation."

An additional complication is that any increase in interest rates raises interest costs of servicing the debt. "The government must pay those higher interest costs by raising tax revenues and cutting spending, or by credibly

promising to do so in the future." At 100 percent debt to GDP, he says, "5 percent higher interest rates mean an additional deficit of 5 percent of GDP, or $1 trillion, for every year that high interest rates continue." This consideration is especially relevant if fiscal policy is at the root of the inflation.

"If we're having an inflation because people don't believe the government can pay off the deficits it's running to send people checks, and it will not reform the looming larger entitlement promises, then people won't believe the government can pay off the additional $1 trillion deficit to pay off interest costs." Result: "The central bank raises rates to fight inflation, which raises the deficit via interest costs, which only makes inflation worse."

RESTORING FAITH

What kind of policy path would it take to stabilize inflation? Cochrane relies on history as well as theory. "Inflations do not happen to happily growing economies, whose governments run things well and with flush treasuries." Historically, inflations have always come "to countries in trouble, primarily fiscal trouble, but fiscal trouble caused by bad macroeconomic policies."

When people fundamentally distrust the government to repay debt, interest-rate policies and quantitative easing have limited power. So "the bottom line" is to ensure that people have faith in the government as debtor, and that comes "from solid growth, and transparent, responsible, durable institutions." There's no way out without "regulatory reform, tax reform, entitlement reform, as well as clear-eyed monetary policy that works on the narrow things it actually understands."

"Dreams of costless fiscal expansion, flooding the country with borrowed money to address every perceived problem, hit a hard brick wall."

Cochrane wants Americans to grasp that ending inflation "isn't just technocrats at the Federal Reserve fiddling with interest rates." Healthy economies don't have inflation "no matter what the central banks do," while dysfunctional ones have inflation even with "heroic central bank presidents."

Cochrane calls himself a free market economist who's always "trying to find a better phrase than 'free market' or 'supply side' or 'neoclassical' " to describe himself. He likes the word *incentivist,* because his understanding of economics is "really not so much about markets, but about paying attention to people's incentives."

He's been this way since he had a "wake-up moment" in 1969, when he was twelve and lived in Italy. (His father was a professor of Florentine history.) Reading the newspaper, he learned that Tuscany had an infestation of vipers, so the authorities had offered a bounty of 1,500 lire per snake, about $1 at the time. "You can guess what happened next," he says. "It didn't take long for enterprising Tuscan farmers to figure out how to breed and raise vipers. Unintended consequences!"

That last phrase, Cochrane says in a follow-up e-mail, could describe the outcome of those COVID stimulus checks. Yet a bout of inflation, he says, "may be useful to our body politic." Inflation is where "dreams of costless fiscal expansion, flooding the country with borrowed money to address every perceived problem, hit a hard brick wall of reality."

The present crisis may "reteach our politicians, officials, and commentariat the classic lessons that there are fiscal limits, that fiscal and monetary [policy] are intertwined." It may also teach them, Cochrane says, "that a country with solid long-term institutions can borrow, but a country without them is in trouble." ◼



Treacherous Times

Stamping out inflation was a long, bruising process. Today's Fed should vividly remember the high cost of delayed exits from monetary easing.

By Michael D. Bordo and Mickey D. Levy

Inflation is at a forty-year high and gaining momentum, and the Federal Reserve is now faced with the difficult challenge of tightening monetary policy enough to reduce inflation back to target, but not too much to generate recession. Delayed exits from periods of countercyclical monetary easing have been an unfortunately recurring theme in modern US history. With so much experience, how did the Fed get itself into such a situation?

Since the Fed assumed a more active role in managing aggregate demand after World War II, it has downgraded its price stability objective and tilted toward prioritizing employment and favoring higher inflation. The Fed's discretionary approach has involved constantly changing its interpretations of its objectives and expanding the monetary tools to achieve them. This has involved excessively fine-tuning economic outcomes without adequate regard to the lags between monetary policy, the economy, and inflation, and occasional slippages in its effort to make monetary policy data-dependent.

***Michael D. Bordo** is the Ilene and Morton Harris Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a Board of Governors Professor of Economics and director of the Center for Monetary and Financial History at Rutgers University. **Mickey D. Levy** is senior economist at Berenberg Capital Markets.*

History suggests that the Fed has been guilty of the all-too-human trait of "fighting the last battle": basing policies on the most recent cyclical policy response and outcome. This has led the Fed to frequently misinterpret the most appropriate lessons of history.

In this essay we review historic episodes of the Fed's exits after periods of monetary ease that resulted in undesired inflation and subsequent tightening phases. These include the post–World War II period; the 1960s and 1970s; the early 1990s; the 2002–6 period; the period following the 2008–9 financial crisis; and the current pandemic period. While every episode of inflation unfolded under different circumstances, we find that all were initiated by some combination of monetary and fiscal stimulus that generated excess demand. In each episode, the Fed proved too slow to remove its monetary stimulus, fueling inflation. The subsequent Fed tightening typically generated recession.

Our findings contrast with the assessment of the Biden administration's Council of Economic Advisers, which attributes these bouts of inflation to supply shocks and a variety of other factors but not to the stimulative impacts of monetary and fiscal policies. Similarly, as inflation rose last year, the Fed asserted that inflation was due to supply shocks while significantly understating the role of monetary and fiscal policy stimulus on aggregate demand. The Fed belatedly pivoted in December 2021 toward acknowledging the persistence of inflation and the need for the Fed to raise rates to slow demand.

The cyclical experiences since the 1920s were carefully documented by Michael Bordo and John Landon-Lane. Their narratives and empirical evidence found that up until the 1950s, the Fed began to raise rates after the general price level turned up. Since the 1960s, the Fed has often tightened after inflation has begun rising, and its belated exits to remove the inflation have led to recession.

Unless the Fed corrects its unevenly balanced approach to achieving its employment and inflation mandates and acknowledges the lags between monetary policy, the real economy, and inflation, it will be prone to future policy mistakes. This correction requires removing the asymmetries and imbalances introduced in its new strategic framework and replacing that framework with a rule-based approach for achieving maximum employment that provides sufficient flexibility to the Fed during emergencies.

AFTER WORLD WAR II

The high inflation that followed the war has important analogies to today. Before the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951, the Fed supported the Treasury's



DISASTROUS: Arthur Burns, Fed chairman from 1970 to 1978, attributed inflation to an array of non-monetary sources rather than to Fed policy. This led to his advocacy of President Nixon's wage and price controls. "In a rapidly changing world the opportunities for making mistakes are legion," Burns later remarked. [US Army]

financing of World War II with artificially low rates and rapid money growth. As the war ended and on the heels of the Great Depression, it was widely agreed that managing aggregate demand was the proper role of the government. The biggest concern was that aggregate demand would collapse and recession and deflation would follow, as during the period after World War I.

Instead, pent-up demand surged, fueled by sustained low interest rates and monetary ease, as the Fed was constrained from raising interest rates. Consumption and housing boomed, and business investment surged. The excess demand for goods strained the transition from wartime to civilian production and drove up production costs. Businesses benefited from strong demand and raised product prices after the wartime wage-price controls were lifted. The inflation was temporary but intense, with three consecutive years of inflation exceeding 10 percent after the removal of wartime price controls.

The Fed is constantly changing its interpretations of its objectives and expanding the monetary tools to achieve them.

The Fed belatedly tightened monetary policy through higher bank capital requirements and reserve requirements, while the government's defense spending fell faster than anticipated and fiscal policy turned restrictive. This generated a mild recession in 1949 that quickly subdued inflation. This episode highlighted two common themes. First, monetary stimulus generates aggregate demand with a lag. Second, once inflation rises significantly, it is difficult to reduce it without harming economic expansion.

THE LATE 1960S

After a decade of subdued inflation leading up to 1965, inflation accelerated significantly in the second half of the decade, from 1.6 percent in 1965 to 5.9 percent in 1970. Excessive fiscal stimulus—President Johnson's Great Society programs and Vietnam War spending—accommodated by easy monetary policy generated excess demand and higher inflation. By the 1960s, activist Keynesian policy prescriptions had become mainstream. Lowering unemployment took precedence and the belief that moderate inflation was good for economic performance dominated policy makers' mindset.

Although the ramping up of government spending stimulated demand, to the dismay of fiscally conservative Fed chair William McChesney Martin, the Fed caved in to LBJ's wishes not to raise interest rates in late 1965. The Fed attempted to dampen aggregate demand in the summer of 1966

through higher bank capital requirements and not lifting Regulation Q on interest rates. This resulted in a "credit crunch" that temporarily stalled economic activity, forcing the Fed to step back. Accelerating Vietnam War spending and renewed monetary accommodation spurred aggregate demand and rising inflation. The Martin-led Fed began raising rates aggressively only after LBJ announced he would not seek re-election. Coupled with the extension of the Vietnam War surtax, the economy tilted into mild recession in 1970.

THE 1970S

After the recession of 1970, inflation receded only to 3.5 percent, more than double its 1965 average, and inflationary expectations remained elevated. New Fed chairman Arthur Burns placed more concern on the high unemployment rate, which rose from 4.2 percent when he became chair in February 1970 to 6.1 percent in December. Reflecting his eclectic views and skepticism of monetary policy, Burns attributed inflation to an array of nonmonetary sources, including labor unions and greedy businesses, rather than to Fed policy. This led to his disastrous advocacy of President Nixon's wage and price controls and abandonment of the gold standard.

Among the many lessons from the misguided policies and high inflation of the 1970s is that the wage and price controls were destructive in many ways, attempting to address the symptoms of inflation rather than its causes, understating the role of inflationary monetary policy, and creating massive confusion. The abandoning of the gold standard in August 1971 unanchored inflationary expectations. The Fed's accommodative monetary policy during Nixon's re-election bid fueled inflation pressures that were constrained by wage and price controls. High inflationary expectations then became embedded in wage- and price-setting behavior, pushed up interest rates, and damaged financial markets.

A tendency to "fight the last battle" leads the Fed to misunderstand history.

The oil price shocks in November 1973 and in 1979 contributed to inflation and poor economic performance, but in the absence of accommodative monetary policy these negative supply shocks would not have generated sustained excess demand and inflation. After a temporary spike in nominal spending, aggregate demand and inflation would have fallen. Instead, nominal GDP growth exceeded 10 percent in the consecutive years 1978–81, creating the excess demand that fueled the wage-price spiral.

In the end, the 1970s saw a decadelong policy tilt toward prioritizing lower unemployment while using failed administrative means to keep a lid on inflation without any viable strategy for lowering that inflation. These actions eroded the confidence of the public and the financial markets and culminated in the US dollar crisis in 1978. The appropriate and necessary disinflationary policies of the Volcker-led Fed broke inflation, and inflationary expectations resulted in damaging recessions during 1980–82 but ushered in a sustained period of moderate inflation and healthy economic performance.

THE 1990S

Fed policy during the 1990s was highlighted by one of the Fed's greatest successes: a midcycle monetary tightening in 1994 that resulted in an economic soft landing and in reduced inflationary expectations that established the basis for strong economic performance in the second half of the decade.

The Fed had sustained monetary accommodation during the so-called "jobless recovery" that followed the shallow recession of 1990. In delayed response to the economic overheating that began in 1993, the Fed raised rates sharply, from 3 percent in February 1994 to 6 percent a year later.

This dampened inflationary expectations and successfully orchestrated an economic soft landing, but the sharp rate increases were not costless. Domestically, spikes in Treasury and mortgage yields resulted in bankruptcies of several US public sector money managers. More important, the Fed rate hikes contributed to the Mexican debt and peso devaluation crisis (the "tequila crisis") that rippled through Latin America.

THE 2000S

The negative side effects of rate hikes in 1994 heavily influenced the Greenspan-led Fed. In 1999, the Fed maintained monetary accommodation despite an overheating economy and the dot-com stock market bubble because it mistakenly insisted on maintaining excess liquidity going into 2000. Then it tightened monetary policy too much. The stock market bubble burst, and recession unfolded in 2001, culminating with the shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. After 9/11, a new worry surfaced at the Fed: inflation fell to 1 percent and the Fed feared that the United States would follow Japan's 1990s path of deflation, which would lead into a downward spiral of weak aggregate demand from which escape would be difficult. Fed chairman Greenspan characterized deflation as a low-probability but high-cost outcome, and tilted monetary policy decidedly in the other direction, while Fed governor

Bernanke described how Fed asset purchases could combat deflation if the Fed faced the zero lower bound.

Even as inflation rose to 2 percent, the Fed kept rates at 1 percent, and when it belatedly began raising rates, in deference to the jarring impacts of the rapid rate increases of the mid-1990s, the Fed gave advance warning of very gradual increases, with a clear objective of minimizing any disturbance to financial markets. For a sustained period, rates were well below what a Taylor-type monetary policy rule would have prescribed and real estate activity and values and mortgage debt soared.

While the Fed's policies did not cause the debt-financed housing bubble, which was characterized by a proliferation of excessively complex mortgage-based debt instruments, the Fed's lower-for-longer monetary policy clearly facilitated the debt-financed housing boom. Subsequent rate increases in 2005–6 shifted expectations about housing and unraveled the mortgage debt markets. This led to the financial crisis. This was another instance in which the Fed's delayed exit from monetary ease proved costly.

The Fed needs a rule-based approach for achieving maximum employment that provides flexibility during emergencies.

AFTER THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS

The Fed's sustained aggressive monetary ease was striking in character and impact, with considerable longer-run ramifications. The Fed followed its QE1 crisis response in November 2008 with QE2, "Operation Twist" (selling short-dated securities and buying long-dated securities), and open-ended QE3. Fed chair Bernanke stated that the primary purpose of QE3 was to lower the unemployment rate. The Fed subsequently maintained zero interest rates until December 2015, well after the economy had recovered on a self-sustaining basis. While the economy grew slowly and labor markets improved gradually after the Great Financial Crisis, inflation remained subdued and stayed below the Fed's 2 percent longer-run target. The Fed raised rates very gradually from December 2015 to September 2018, to 2.5 percent, modestly higher than inflation. Although this jarred financial markets, the economy continued to expand and the Fed avoided recession. The elongated modest expansion following the financial crisis heavily influenced the Fed's policy making in response to the 2020 pandemic.

The Fed learned the wrong lessons from this episode. Inflation stayed low because the Fed's unprecedented monetary ease beginning in 2009 did not stimulate an acceleration in aggregate demand, with nominal GDP never accelerating above 4 percent, providing little support for higher prices or wages. The economic and financial environment was negative, with a crippled banking system and housing sector, and fragile household finances took years to repair. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided only limited stimulus, and tax increases in January 2013 imposed fiscal restrictiveness.

After the Great Financial Crisis, the Fed presumed that its monetary response had been too timid, and that the subdued inflation that ensued would be repeated.

In this environment, the Fed's quantitative easing increased bank reserves and the monetary base, but remained as excess reserves, and did not translate into increased money supply or credit expansion that generated economic activity. This may be attributable to the Fed paying interest on excess reserves beginning in October 2008, raising capital and liquidity requirements, and imposing tighter controls and bank supervision as part of its stress tests of the large banks. The Fed's strategic review in 2018–19, which focused on the low inflation and worries about the effective zero lower bound, did not thoroughly analyze why monetary policy failed to achieve the Fed's 2 percent inflation target.

THE PANDEMIC AND ITS AFTERMATH

In response to the unfolding severe economic contraction and dysfunction in the US Treasury market, the Fed reduced rates to zero and engaged in massive asset purchases, including mortgage-backed securities. The Fed's actions were matched by the largest fiscal support package in US history. Financial markets quickly stabilized and in May 2020 there were signs that the economy was beginning to recover. The government followed with more and more stimulus, which totaled over $5 trillion in deficit spending, over 25 percent of GDP. For nearly two years, the Fed has maintained its zero rates and its asset purchases have more than doubled its balance sheet to $8.9 trillion.

The Fed made clear that a critical lesson it had learned from the Great Financial Crisis was that its monetary response had been too timid, and it presumed that the subdued inflation that followed the GFC would be repeated. This presumption emboldened the Fed to aggressively pursue its

maximum employment mandate. The Fed's new strategic framework that chair Powell introduced in August 2020 institutionalized the Fed's unbalanced approach to monetary policy, prioritizing maximum employment and explicitly favoring higher inflation. The Fed interpreted its assessment that the Phillips curve was flat as eliminating the need to pre-emptively tighten monetary policy in response to conditions of maximum employment.

The Fed's presumptions and forecasts proved wrong. The economy and labor market recoveries far exceeded Fed expectations and inflation rose far above its December 2020 forecast of 1.8 percent in 2021. Even as the recovery accelerated, the Fed emphasized the downside economic risks and asserted that the high inflation was transitory. It incorrectly attributed the inflation to supply shortages, while largely ignoring robust aggregate demand and understating the impact of its aggressive monetary stimulus. The Fed subsequently backed off this assertion.

Consumer Price Index inflation had risen to 6.9 percent and personal consumption expenditure inflation to 5.7 percent before the Fed signaled in December 2021 that it would need to raise rates in 2022. By then, the Fed's delayed exit had put monetary policy way behind the curve.

Certainly, the pandemic has posed unique risks for the Fed. But its current situation is nothing new. Rather, it is an unfortunate repeat of a history of delayed exits from extended monetary ease.

***Special to the* Hoover Digest.**



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Losing the Anchor

Rather than holding fast, central banks have slipped their moorings. This time, the course back to stability will be much harder to chart.

By Raghuram G. Rajan

Smart economic policy making invariably requires trading off some pain today for greater future gains. But this is a difficult proposition politically, especially in democracies. It is always easier for elected leaders to indulge their constituents immediately, in the hope that the bill will not arrive while they are still in office. Moreover, those who bear the pain caused by a policy are not necessarily those who will gain from it.

That is why today's more advanced economies created mechanisms that allow them to make hard choices when necessary. Chief among these are independent central banks and mandated limits on budget deficits. Importantly, political parties reached a consensus to establish and back these mechanisms irrespective of their own immediate political priorities. One reason why many emerging markets have swung from crisis to crisis is that they failed to achieve such consensus. But recent history shows that developed economies, too, are becoming less tolerant of pain, perhaps because their own political consensus has eroded.

Raghuram G. Rajan *is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Katherine Dusak Miller Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago's Booth School.*

Financial markets have become volatile once again, owing to fears that the Federal Reserve will have to tighten its monetary policy significantly to control inflation. But many investors still hope that the Fed will go easy if asset prices start to fall substantially. If the Fed proves them right, it will become that much harder to normalize financial conditions in the future.

Investors' hope that the Fed will prolong the party is not baseless. In late 1996, Fed Chair Alan Greenspan warned of financial markets' "irrational exuberance." But the markets shrugged off the warning and were proved correct. Perhaps chastened by the harsh political reaction to Greenspan's speech, the Fed did nothing. And when the stock market eventually crashed in 2000, the Fed cut rates, ensuring that the recession was mild.

Historically, it's been the Fed's job to take away the monetary punchbowl before the party gets out of hand.

In testimony to the congressional Joint Economic Committee the previous year, Greenspan argued that while the Fed could not prevent "the inevitable economic hangover" from an asset-price boom, it could "mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion." The Fed thus assured traders and bankers that if they collectively gambled on similar assets, it would not limit the upside, but it would limit the downside if their bets turned bad. Subsequent Fed interventions have entrenched such beliefs, making it even harder for the Fed to rein in financial markets with modest moves. And now that much more tightening and consequent pain may be needed, a consensus in favor of it might be harder to achieve.

Fiscal policy is also guilty of peddling supposedly painless economic measures. Most would agree that the COVID-19 pandemic created a need for targeted spending (through extended, generous unemployment benefits, for example) to shield the hardest-hit households. But, in the event, the spending was anything but targeted. Congress passed multitrillion-dollar bills offering something for everyone.

The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), for example, provided $800 billion in grants (effectively) for small businesses across the board. A study by MIT's David Autor and his colleagues estimates that the program helped preserve two- to three-million job-years of employment over fourteen months, at a stupendous cost of $170,000–$257,000 per job-year. Worse, only 23 percent to 34 percent of this money went directly to workers who would otherwise have lost their jobs. The balance went to creditors, business owners, and

shareholders. All told, an estimated three-quarters of PPP benefits went to the top one-fifth of earners.

Of course, the program may have saved some firms that otherwise would have collapsed. But at what cost? While capitalists anticipate profits, they also sign up for possible failure. Moreover, many small businesses are tiny operations without much organizational capital. If a small bakery had to close, the economic fallout would have been mitigated by the enhanced unemployment insurance. And if it had a loyal clientele, it could restart after the pandemic, perhaps with a little help from a bank.

Pandemic-sparked spending was anything but targeted. Congress passed multitrillion-dollar bills offering something for everyone.

The standard line is that the unconstrained spending was driven by a sense that unprecedented times called for unprecedented measures. In fact, it was the response to the 2008 global financial crisis that broke the previous consensus for more prudent policies. Lasting public resentment that Wall Street had been helped more than Main Street motivated politicians in both major parties to spend with abandon when the pandemic hit. But targeted unemployment benefits were associated with the Democrats, leaving Republicans seeking wins for their own constituencies. Who better to support than small businesses?

While political fractures were driving up untargeted spending, budget hawks were nowhere to be found: their voices had been steadily drowned out by economists. In addition to the cranks who show up periodically to advocate ostensibly free lunches through money-financed spending, a growing chorus of mainstream economists had been arguing that prevailing low interest rates gave developed countries significantly more room to expand fiscal deficits. Politicians who were eager to justify their policies ignored these economists' caveats—that spending had to be sensible, and that interest rates had to stay low. Only the headline message mattered, and anyone suggesting otherwise was dismissed as a hair-shirt fanatic.

If everyone wants a free lunch, the bill eventually will be paid by those least able to afford it.

Historically, it has been the Fed's job to take away the monetary punchbowl before the party gets frenzied, and Congress's job to be prudent about

fiscal deficits and debt. But the Fed's desire to spare the market from pain has driven more risk-taking, and reinforced expectations of further interventions. The Fed's actions have also added to the pressure on Congress to do its bit for Main Street, which in turn has led to inflation and a belief that the Fed will back off from raising rates.

All of this makes a return to the previous consensus more difficult. When the Fed does raise rates significantly, the government's costs of servicing the debt from past spending will limit future spending, including on policies to reduce inequality (which has fueled political fragmentation), combat future emergencies, and tackle climate change.

Budget hawks were nowhere to be found.

Every economy has a limited reservoir of policy credibility and resources, which are best used to mitigate genuine economic distress, not to shield those who can bear some pain. If everyone wants a free lunch, the bill eventually will be paid by those least able to afford it. Emerging-market economies have had to learn this the hard way. Developed countries may have to learn it again. ■

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"Credible, Lovable, and Respectable"?

Hoover fellow Elizabeth Economy appraises China's performance as a star player on the world stage. Beijing, she concludes in her new book, *The World According to China*, is still struggling to master the role.

By Shannon Tiezzi

The pandemic era crystalized a shift in China's role on the world stage. The message from Beijing is increasingly triumphalist, emphasizing an inevitable rise and the West's decline. Meanwhile, overseas—and particularly in the world's democracies—China's assertive and uncompromising stances have generated great suspicion about the Chinese government and its intentions.

In her new book, *The World According to China,* noted expert on Chinese politics and policy Elizabeth C. Economy examines not only China's role in the world today but its desired role for the future—and Beijing's plan

Elizabeth Economy** is a senior fellow (on leave) at the Hoover Institution, where she has participated in Hoover's project on China's Global Sharp Power, the National Security Task Force, and the Strengthening US-India Relations program. She is also the Senior Fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. **Shannon Tiezzi** is editor in chief of **The Diplomat.

to remake the world system to achieve its goal. She also outlines what this means for other countries, and how concerned governments should respond.

Economy is on leave from her position as a Hoover senior fellow and is serving as a senior adviser to the US Department of Commerce. The views she expresses are her personal views and do not represent those of the US government or the Commerce Department.

Shannon Tiezzi, **The Diplomat:** As you note, there is a growing bifurcation between perceptions of China's government within China and outside of China—with pandemic management as Exhibit A. This is exacerbated by the government's strict control over the media landscape within China, which results in emphasizing positive narratives about China from abroad while tamping down any criticisms. What are the long-term implications of the disconnect between China's vision of itself and other countries' perceptions?

Elizabeth Economy: The Chinese government creates a number of longer-term problems for itself by limiting the ability of Chinese citizens to access outside information and insisting on a false positive narrative around international perceptions of China. First, it constrains its own ability to make informed decisions. Many Chinese scholars are critical of Beijing's bullying "Wolf Warrior" diplomacy, which they believe undermines Chinese influence globally. However, they are unwilling to criticize the government's official narrative for fear of political reprisal. The Chinese leadership also runs the risk that when travel to and from China reopens, its citizens will gain a more complete understanding of how their country is perceived internationally; this disconnect between Beijing's narrative and that of the rest of the world could cost the Chinese government significant trust and credibility among its own citizens. The nearer-term danger, however, is that in purposefully reinforcing ignorance in its own people, the Chinese leadership is fostering an arrogance and potentially dangerous form of popular nationalism that it may ultimately find difficult to moderate.

> ***"China's international image derives from its actions and not from a narrative manufactured by the country's officials."***

Tiezzi: On a related note, many studies that emphasize increasingly negative views of China are focused on the developed world or the Western liberal democracies. Yet China has some more success in norm-building in the

WE COULD BE HEROES: A movie poster shows a Chinese science-fiction blockbuster,* The Wandering Earth, *in 2019. Chinese leader Xi Jinping is acutely conscious of China's international image, and attempts to shape it with a manufactured narrative. [Imagine China—Newscom]

developing world—for example, its state media outlets have found more traction in African countries than in European ones. How would you rate China's narrative and normative influence in the developing world?

Economy: China's state media are more likely to gain traction in countries that do not offer a wide range of choice in media outlets—a situation that is most often found in still-emerging economies. However, there is significant variation in how citizens in emerging economies view China and its influence. In Africa, for example, one 2019–20 popular opinion poll revealed that 65 percent of Kenyans but only 29 percent of Tunisians hold a positive view of Chinese influence in their country. Similarly, in a 2021 survey of elites from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the percentage of those worried about China's growing regional economic influence ranged from 47.6 percent in Cambodia to 90.4 percent in Vietnam.

Xi Jinping's call in June 2021 for Chinese officials to create an image of the country that is "credible, lovable, and respectable" suggests that the Chinese

leadership recognizes that the country faces a serious soft power deficit. It also suggests, however, that Xi, at least, does not fully appreciate that China's international image derives from its actions and not from a narrative manufactured by the country's officials.

Tiezzi: Taiwan is one of Beijing's most important red lines and has also emerged as a test case for Beijing's ability to influence the actions of other governments. Some countries—for example, Lithuania and Czechia—have shown they are willing to flout Beijing's increasing condemnations to bolster relations with Taipei. How do you interpret these cases? Is China coming up against the limits of its ability to shape overseas behavior?

Economy: China's ability to influence the behavior of international actors is often less than we believe. Although it has had significant success in using its economic leverage to persuade multinationals to accept its political preferences (for example, that Taiwan not be recognized as a separate political entity), it has had much less success in changing the preferences of other countries. For example, Chinese economic boycotts against the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia all failed to persuade those countries to change their stance on issues related to Chinese sovereignty, social stability, and national security.

Most broadly, China's conduct both at home and abroad—its coercive Wolf Warrior diplomacy, assertive military behavior in the Asia-Pacific, political influence operations in other countries, and domestic human rights abuses—has caused many countries to rethink their policies toward China. International popular opinion polls reveal record low levels of trust in Chinese leadership and in Xi Jinping himself. Rather than convince other countries that China is ready to be a responsible global power, for instance, Beijing appears to have persuaded many countries to coalesce in opposition to its leadership.

"In purposefully reinforcing ignorance in its own people, the Chinese leadership is fostering an arrogance and potentially dangerous form of popular nationalism."

Tiezzi: China's successful handling of COVID-19 is a major point of pride at home, but it has drawbacks. China continues its severe restrictions, which have drastically limited in-person exchanges, at both the people-to-people and the government-to-government levels—even as the rest of the world

is starting to reopen and re-engage. Do you think there's an opportunity cost to China's insistence on remaining largely closed to the outside world?

Economy: One of the many tragedies of COVID-19 is the extent



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

to which countries have elected or been forced to close their doors to others. In China, however, the leadership's decision to remain mostly closed also reinforces a pre-existing trend of declining engagement with the outside world. Since taking power almost a decade ago, Xi Jinping has issued a continuous stream of regulations designed to reduce foreign influence in China by limiting Western ideas in cultural and educational spaces, restricting the flow of information via the Internet, and curtailing opportunities for civil society engagement.

For Chinese citizens who are interested in the world of ideas, want their children to be competitive in a global market, or simply favor a China that is more open to the rest of the world, the opportunity cost of Xi's and the rest of the Chinese leadership's choices is high. In contrast, for a Chinese leadership that desires greater control over its economy and society, the cost may appear to be not only acceptable but even perhaps negligible in the near term.

Tiezzi: As you note, overseas Chinese play an important role in Chinese Communist Party influence operations and



BEARING GIFTS: Chinese-donated COVID vaccines arrive in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in February 2021. Residents of emerging economies have varying views of China and its influence. One poll showed that 65 percent of Kenyans but only 29 percent of Tunisians held a positive view of Chinese influence in their country. [Li Boyuan—Xinhua]

"United Front" work. How can foreign governments address the challenge posed by the United Front without feeding into dangerous stereotypes about the Chinese diaspora, especially in the context of growing attacks on Asians?

Economy: Governments, the media, and educational institutions all have an important role to play in ensuring that efforts to constrain malign PRC behavior do not contribute to attacks on the Chinese diaspora. This means not conflating the Chinese government with people of Chinese descent and avoiding policies and language that perpetuate and inflame racism. In addition, when responding to Chinese influence operations, countries need to take the time necessary to understand the precise nature of the threat in order to develop the most effective response. This is particularly important when policies have the potential to harm innocent people's lives and reputations (such as those designed to identify scientists engaged in Chinese-government-sponsored espionage in university and national labs).

Finally, the Chinese diaspora has an important role to play in holding both host countries and China accountable. In the United States, for example, Chinese-American community leaders rightly draw attention to cases in which the government needlessly ruins the careers of Chinese-American scientists through false accusations of scientific espionage. It is equally important that this community defend American values in the face of Chinese coercion, for example, by publicly defending the rights of Chinese students in the United States to voice their opinions freely and without fear of Chinese government coercion. ■

Global Warning

To punish Beijing for human rights abuses, Washington has imposed trade restrictions. American businesses, heavily dependent on the vast Chinese market, are balking.

By Michael R. Auslin

In the toxic world of American politics, the bipartisanship showed by the House of Representatives last December in overwhelmingly passing a bill to stop the import of Chinese products made with forced labor from Xinjiang was a rarity. The 428–1 vote on the Uighur Forced Labor Prevention Act, the second in as many years, was the clearest indicator yet of how a new era in American relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is developing. It's one where national security and moral concerns find common ground in opposing the oppressive and predatory policies of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Yet while American politicians are at last beginning to grapple with the threat posed by unrestrained engagement with China, American companies remain conflicted, pursuing their bottom lines in the world's most important manufacturing country while professing their opposition to abhorrent policies they would never countenance in the United States, Europe, or Africa. Widespread media reports indicate that companies such as Apple, Nike, and Coca-Cola either lobbied against the Uighur labor bill or (in Washington

Michael R. Auslin *is the Payson J. Treat Distinguished Research Fellow in Contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution. He is the author of* ***Asia's New Geopolitics: Essays on Reshaping the Indo-Pacific*** *(Hoover Institution Press, 2020) and the co-host of the Hoover Institution podcast* ***The Pacific Century*** *(https://www.hoover.org/publications/pacific-century).*

speak) "suggested edits" to the legislation. President Biden signed it into law on December 23 and it will take effect in June.

This current divide between American corporations and the government reveals a larger fracture in American society. It's one that presages a battle between those who seek to reduce the threat to US interests posed by our half-century-old China policy and those who are too deeply embedded with the PRC to easily extricate themselves or who continue to benefit from unlimited engagement with China.

The House passed the first Uighur labor bill in 2020. Just before leaving office in January 2021, then–secretary of state Mike Pompeo determined that the Chinese government was committing genocide against the Uighurs, a Muslim minority of about ten million people who live mostly in the far western province of Xinjiang. To leaked information about concentration camps and re-education centers in which at least one million detained Uighurs undergo compulsory Mandarin language training and communist ideology, and to reports of the forced collection of genetic information and the imposed cohabitation of Chinese men and Uighur women, have been added studies on the massive use of forced Uighur labor throughout Xinjiang and China.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) estimated that from 2017 to 2019, at least eighty thousand Uighurs were forcibly transferred from Xinjiang to factories dotted about China. American consumers, who buy billions of dollars' worth of Chinese goods, are filling their homes with products at least some of which have been made with what is essentially prison labor.

Thus, the sins of pursuing globalization with authoritarian regimes now alight on consumers who have little to no say in where they get their daily goods. There is a particularly nasty irony in that American workers have lost their jobs over the past decades to oppressed Chinese laborers.

Nearly every major US company depends on Chinese suppliers for some part of its production.

For their part, American corporations have steadfastly denied any longer using forced labor in Xinjiang. Coca-Cola states that its human rights policy "prohibit[s] the use of all forms of forced labor, including prison labor." Nike asserts that it "does not source products from the [Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region] and we have confirmed with our contract suppliers that they are not using textiles or spun yarn from the region."

In reality, the PRC's opaque supply chain means that foreign companies can never be sure exactly where in China their components or products

came from, or whether, as the ASPI report showed, forcibly transferred Uighur labor is being used. The same can be said for Chinese products that may be made wholly or in part by slave labor in North Korean prison camps, which are then exported across the border into China.

In January 2021, then–secretary of state Mike Pompeo determined that Beijing was committing genocide against the Uighurs, a Muslim minority in China.

There is no easy answer for American and global companies. They either remain committed to China or are trapped by decades of investment and building manufacturing facilities there. Nearly every major US company depends on Chinese suppliers for some part of its production. Last July, the CEO of Nike stated that his company, with Chinese sales of just under $2 billion in the fourth quarter of 2020, is "a brand of China and for China." For its part, Apple assembles almost all its products in China, and has been reported as paying $275 billion to Beijing to maintain its position in what has become its second-largest market.

While groups like Human Rights Watch have long criticized American companies for their activities in China, the new law represents a potentially significant evolution of the US-China relationship. The PRC's security challenge to US interests has been increasingly noticeable since the end of the Obama era, but only recently has the economic threat become a focus of major attention, particularly during the Trump administration, when tariffs were laid on $250 billion worth of Chinese goods.

And yet, even with the Biden administration maintaining both the Trump tariffs and hard rhetoric, Beijing still appears to hold the whip hand over American business elites. Hence Jamie Dimon's craven apologies for making a joke last November about JP Morgan outlasting the CPC. Hence too billionaire hedge fund manager Ray Dalio comparing Beijing's disappearance of women's tennis star Peng Shuai to being a "strict parent."

Foreign companies can never be sure exactly where in China their components or products come from.

If anything should be a "slam dunk," to use the words of ex–CIA head George Tenet, it should be a law to ban products made with forced labor. In the topsy-turvy world of US-China relations, however, even a commonsense

attempt to deny Beijing its blood profits becomes entangled in quarterly bottom lines and distasteful horse trading. As the battle to free America from its unhealthy dependence on China continues, even small steps like the Uighur Forced Labor Prevention Act should be cheered.



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The Art of Political War

Through flattery or fear, praise or punishment, Beijing always puts the party's aims first. How the United States can resist.

By Matthew F. Pottinger

Many Americans were slow to realize it, but Beijing's enmity for the United States began decades ago. Ever since taking power in 1949, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has cast the United States as an antagonist. Then, three decades ago, at the end of the Cold War, Beijing quietly revised its grand strategy to regard Washington as its primary external adversary and embarked on a quest for regional, followed by global, dominance.

The United States and other free societies have belatedly woken up to this contest, and a welcome spirit of bipartisanship has emerged on Capitol Hill. But even this new consensus has failed to adequately appreciate one of the most threatening elements of Chinese strategy: the way it seeks to influence and coerce Americans, including political, business, and scientific leaders, in the service of Beijing's ambitions.

The CCP's methods are manifestations of "political warfare," the term that George Kennan, the chief architect of our Cold War strategy of containment, used in a 1948 memo to describe "the employment of all

***Matthew F. Pottinger** is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. He served as deputy White House national security adviser in 2019–21.*

the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives."

One of the most crucial elements of Beijing's political warfare is so-called "United Front" work. United Front work is an immense range of activities with no analogue in democracies. China's leaders call it a "magic weapon." And the CCP's ninety-five million members are all required to participate in the system, which has many branches. The United Front Work Department alone has three times as many cadres as the US State Department has Foreign Service officers. Instead of practicing diplomacy, however, the United Front gathers intelligence about and works to influence private citizens and government officials overseas, with a focus on foreign elites and the organizations they run.

"Political warfare," as George Kennan described it, means "the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives."

Peter Mattis, who detailed how United Front work is organized during his 2019 testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said, "Put simply, United Front work is conducted wherever the party is present." And the party is quite present here in the United States.

Assembling dossiers on people has always been a feature of Leninist regimes. But Beijing's penetration of digital networks worldwide has taken this to a new level. The party compiles dossiers on millions of foreign citizens around the world, using the material it gathers to influence and intimidate, reward and blackmail, flatter and humiliate, divide and conquer.

Beijing has stolen sensitive data sufficient to build a dossier on every American adult—and on many of our children, too, who are fair game under Beijing's rules of political warfare.

Newer to the party's arsenal is the exploitation of US social media platforms. Over the past few years, Beijing has flooded US platforms with overt and covert propaganda, amplified by proxies and bots. The propaganda is focused not only on promoting whitewashed narratives of Beijing's policies but also on exacerbating social tensions within the United States and other target nations.

The Chinese government and its online proxies, for example, have for months promoted content that questions the effectiveness and safety of Western-made COVID-19 vaccines. Research by the Soufan Center has also

found indications that China-based influence operations online are outpacing Russian efforts to amplify some conspiracy theories.

So what are some things Washington should do to address Beijing's political warfare?

» First, we should **stop funding technologies in China that are used to advance its surveillance state and its military**. Beijing is turning facial recognition, data mining, and machine-learning technologies not only against Chinese citizens but increasingly against Americans here at home. Executive orders issued by the Trump and Biden administrations that prohibit the US purchase of stocks and bonds in fifty-nine named Chinese companies are a good start. But the Treasury Department needs to expand that list by orders of magnitude to better encompass the galaxy of Chinese companies developing so-called dual-use technologies.

China's United Front gathers intelligence about and works to influence private citizens and government officials overseas.

» Congress should look at **revising the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)** to include more robust reporting requirements, steeper penalties for noncompliance, and a publicly accessible database of FARA registrants updated frequently.

» The United States can also do more to **expose and confront Beijing's information warfare over US social media platforms**—platforms that are themselves banned inside China's own borders. US social media companies have the technological know-how and resources to take a leading role in exposing and tamping down shadowy influence operations. The US government should partner more closely with Silicon Valley companies in this work. Washington should also partner with US technology giants to make it easier for the Chinese people to safely access and exchange news, opinions, history, films, and satire with their fellow citizens and people outside China's so-called Great Firewall.

Beijing has stolen sensitive data sufficient to build a dossier on every American adult—and on many of our children, too.

» Finally, we should also do more to **protect Chinese students and other Chinese nationals living in the United States.** Many people of Chinese descent, including some US permanent residents and US citizens, live in

fear that family members in China will be detained or otherwise punished for what their American relatives say or do inside the United States. Coercion by Beijing has silenced countless Chinese language news outlets around the world—so much so that almost no private Chinese language news outlets exist in the United States or abroad that don't toe the Communist Party's line.

The US government can help by offering grants to promising private outlets and re-energizing federally funded media such as Radio Free Asia. US universities, perhaps with help from the US government, should also hand a second smartphone to every Chinese national who comes to study in the United States—one free from Chinese apps such as WeChat, which the Chinese security apparatus uses to monitor users' activity and censor their news feeds. ■

Adapted from testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (August 2021).

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What Xi Said

In an imagined commencement speech, the Chinese leader urges his new graduates to put aside childish things—such as democracy.

By Markos Kounalakis

In just a few weeks it will again be graduation time around the country, which can mean only one thing: boring commencement speeches to indifferent students.

The "coronavirus commencements" we saw over the past two years were unusual, however, with many of them denying the graduates their public procession of pomp and circumstance. Grads were unable to dine with grandparents who came from afar to get to the ceremony. Travel was curtailed, campuses closed, bookstores stuck with unsold commencement swag. Graduation speakers delivered their laugh lines and sage advice as webcammed words of wisdom.

Into this breach, let's invite an atypical commencement speaker to give a universal graduation speech that can be simulcast to every US institution of higher learning this year. Who should that person be? The guy who paid for more undergraduates' educations in America than any other single individual: China's leader and Communist Party general secretary, Xi Jinping.

At the start of the 2020 academic year, approximately 360,000 students from the People's Republic of China attended American colleges, most of them paying full freight for tuition, books, housing, and food. The overall

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estimate of what the United States earns from all the foreign students coming to America for education comes to around $39 billion a year. Not all of that is from China, but a lot of it is. So let's hear what their sugar daddy has to say.

In lieu of a Communist Party–vetted speech to the many Chinese students and other attendees, here's my best shot. I include both the text and subtext of a potential Zoomed speech to the graduating classes all across America.

♦ ♦ ♦

Graduates of the Class of 2022, congratulations! This is your time.

I am told that speeches in America should begin with a joke, but this is not a common practice in Beijing. In fact, we never joke. Not about how powerful we are or our plans for world domination.

We do not have William Shakespeare, *Will & Grace,* or Will Ferrell. What we have is iron will.

China's cultural strength and fortitude are born from your parents' generation and sacrifice. They suffered through a century of humiliation, living through extreme poverty and eating what little they had to eat out of an iron rice bowl.

Your generation, however, is a privileged one. For those of you watching who are Chinese nationals, you come from single-child homes. My generation's one-child policy made you all privileged princelings who have never known want, have always experienced economic growth, and had the extraordinary luck to go overseas to study. You got to see, learn in, and live in America.

Please bring back to China your technical training, especially your insights into artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Bring back our Middle Kingdom's power and help re-establish the privilege of a nation destined for greatness and global leadership.

You have a great number of gifts and learning that you must bring back to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Wuhan.

But as you bring back your valuable knowledge, there are some things you must leave behind: do *not* bring back your dangerous ideas of liberal democracy.

Leave behind whatever decadent thoughts you have appropriated. Muzzle any new instincts you have developed for free speech, religion, or assembly. Purge from your hearts any passion or interest of the need for self-expression over the collective common good. Remember the primacy of the Communist Party.



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

Yes, we have reports from our student committees, consular corps, and others unknown to you that some of your student comrades experimented with cannabinoids and studied anti-authoritarian theories. Some of you have toyed with direct democratic governance and participated on campus and in the classroom in discussions surrounding the Tiananmen Square events of 1989, Falun Gong, Winnie the Pooh, Taiwan independence, Uighur detention, and the Dalai Lama. Take these learnings and your newfound understanding of our adversary and apply them for the greater good. Take them with you to help achieve China's greatness.

This is our time.

We will use this era as an opportunity to woo Western allies. We will confound the conversation surrounding China's culpability in the coronavirus crisis. We will cry racism whenever our national interests are threatened and wherever our newfound confidence and regional hegemony is questioned.

"Leave behind whatever decadent thoughts you have appropriated."

You have all profited from the undeniably strong American higher education program. In this, the United States continues to excel. The price of that education has been high and unattainable for many American students.

China has invested in you and in our nation's future. The return on that investment is the unarticulated understanding we established at the start of your foreign-education journey. It is now your obligation and duty to help your nation become globally more productive, competitive, and successful.

Your collective strength, wisdom, and vision will assure that our party, state, and future will remain inseparable. Together we will achieve the Chinese dream.

This is, after all, my time. ■

Special to the* Hoover Digest. *Adapted from* Freedom Isn't Free *(Anthem Press, 2022).

Vlad the Invader

Vladimir Putin indicated long ago that he would overpower and absorb Ukraine. Egging him on is not Stalin's ghost but that of Peter the Great, victor of Poltava.

By Niall Ferguson

Last July, Russian leader Vladimir Putin published a lengthy essay, "On the Historical Unity of the Russians and Ukrainians," in which he argued tendentiously that Ukrainian independence was an unsustainable historical anomaly. This made it perfectly clear that he was contemplating a takeover of the country along the lines of Nazi Germany's 1938 *Anschluss* of Austria. Even before Putin's essay appeared, Russia had deployed around a hundred thousand troops close to Ukraine's northern, eastern, and southern borders.

The news these days reminds me unpleasantly of the English historian A. J. P. Taylor's *Origins of the Second World War,* which—in prose that simmered with his trademark irony—traced the diplomatic steps that led from appeasement to war in 1938 and 1939.

Repeatedly over the past year, the Russian president warned of "red lines" with respect to Russia's security, the crossing of which would elicit an "asymmetric response." On November 30, for example, he declared that "if some

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kind of strike systems appear on the territory of Ukraine . . . we will have to then create something similar in relation to those who threaten us."

On December 17, Russia issued a virtual ultimatum to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—the keystone of European security since its founding in 1949—by publishing two draft security agreements, one a bilateral US-Russia treaty and the other a multilateral NATO-Russia agreement. The documents made six key demands:

» NATO must not accept new members, including Ukraine.

» The United States and NATO must not deploy short- or intermediate-range missiles within range of Russian territory.

» The United States must not station nuclear weapons abroad.

» NATO must not deploy forces or arms to member states that joined after the so-called Founding Act of May 1997. This includes all former Warsaw Pact states such as Poland as well as the formerly Soviet Baltic states.

» NATO must not conduct military exercises above the brigade level (3,000 to 5,000 soldiers) and within an agreed-upon buffer zone.

» The United States must agree not to cooperate militarily with post-Soviet countries.

True, some of Russia's demands amounted to resuscitating defunct security arrangements that NATO and Russia signed in the past. A ban on short- or intermediate-range missile deployments, for example, would be akin to reviving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which collapsed in 2019 after US claims of Russian violations.

The Russian demands implied nothing less than a "new Yalta," conceding to Russia a sphere of influence across the former Soviet republics.

An agreement not to deploy NATO forces to former Warsaw Pact member states would reinstate the twenty-five-year-old Founding Act, which NATO partially froze after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. NATO still does not permanently station troops in Eastern Europe because it never formally abrogated the Founding Act. Russia's proposed limits on military exercises similarly recall the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which Moscow suspended in 2007.

However, since 2017 the alliance has "rotated" approximately 1,100 soldiers apiece into Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland under its policy of Enhanced Forward Presence. (The term "rotation" was used at Germany's insistence to avoid explicitly violating the NATO-Russia Founding Act.) Ending rotation would be a significant concession to Moscow.

The Russian demands also included several obvious non-starters. NATO is highly unlikely to revoke its promise, made in 2008, of eventual membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Even if President Biden wanted to accede to Russia's demand that the United States end military cooperation with Ukraine, Congress would almost certainly not let him, and could legislate military aid on its own. Finally, Russia's demand that the United States not station nuclear weapons abroad would overturn a founding principle of NATO—nuclear sharing between member states.

Taken together, the Russian demands implied nothing less than a "new Yalta" that would effectively concede to Russia a sphere of influence extending across the former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe, much like the original Yalta Agreement of 1945, as well as eroding the security of former Warsaw Pact countries. Such demands would be worth discussing only if Russia offered something major in return—for example, a withdrawal of all its forces from Ukrainian territory. But Putin has no intention of making concessions.



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

MODELS OF GREATNESS

On December 23, Putin held his usual marathon year-end press conference. He said that even if Russia's "red line" security guarantees were met on paper, Russia still could not trust the US assurances because he had been "lied to, blatantly" over NATO expansion. For the United States to have offensive strike



CONQUEROR: A bronze statue of Peter I, known as Peter the Great, in the Karelian city of Petrozavodsk. Karelia was among the regions mostly ceded to Russia after the Great Northern War. [Dmitry Rozhkov—Creative Commons]

weapons on "Russia's doorstep," he said, was like Russia having such weapons in Canada or Mexico. Asked by a journalist if Russia was angry, he quoted the nineteenth-century czarist foreign minister Prince Gorchakov: "Russia is not angry, it is concentrating"—as in "concentrating its forces."

Western commentators often make the mistake of thinking that Putin's goal is to resurrect the Soviet Union, recalling his notorious comment in 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet empire was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." To judge by the ruthless way his government has gone after Memorial—an organization dedicated to preserving the evidence of the Soviet system's crimes and commemorating its millions of victims—Putin does indeed owe some residual fealty to the baleful shade of Stalin. Last December, a Moscow court shut down Memorial on the specious ground that it had failed to acknowledge publicly that it was a foreign agent.

"Memorial creates a false image of the Soviet Union as a terrorist state," declared state prosecutor Alexei Zhafyarov before the court's verdict. "It makes us repent for the Soviet past, instead of remembering glorious history . . . probably because someone is paying for it."

It is not hard to imagine Zhafyarov having a walk-on role in *The Master and Margarita,* Mikhail Bulgakov's unforgettable magical-realist depiction of the Stalin era. And yet it is not Stalin's Soviet Union for which Putin hankers. It is the rising Russian empire of Peter the Great. He made this quite clear in a fascinating interview with Lionel Barber, then editor of the *Financial Times,* in 2019. "A towering bronze statue of the visionary tsar looms over his ceremonial desk in the cabinet room," noted Barber. Peter I was Putin's "favorite leader." "He will live," declared the Russian president, "as long as his cause is alive."

To understand what exactly Putin meant by this, you need to travel back three centuries, to the time of the Great Northern War (1700–1721). The dominant military power of northern Europe in those days was not Russia but Sweden, then under the leadership of that most extraordinary of Scandinavian warriors, Charles XII. The Great Northern War pitted Charles against Frederick IV, the king of Denmark and Norway; Augustus the Strong, who was simultaneously elector of Saxony, king of Poland, and grand duke of Lithuania; and the Muscovite czar, Peter I. By 1709, the Swede had defeated both Frederick and Augustus. But he met his match in Czar Peter.

Generations of Russian troops have been raised on Peter's speech demanding they fight "for your kin and for the people of all Russia."

At the Battle of Poltava (July 8, 1709), Peter the Great won the most important victory of his reign. Because of Russian scorched-earth tactics, the Swedish army had been forced to abandon its advance on Moscow and instead marched south to establish winter quarters. The location Charles XII picked, the town of Poltava, is around two hundred miles east of Kyiv. Today it lies in eastern Ukraine, not far from the contested areas around Luhansk and Donetsk, which are controlled by Russian-backed separatists.

Where was Poltava then? Certainly not in Russia. But you could not really say that it was in Ukraine, either—not in the modern sense, anyway. When Ivan Mazepa, hetman of the Zaporizhian Host, threw in his lot with the Swedish king, he said he was acting "for the common good of our mother my fatherland poor Ukraine, for all of the Zaporizhian Host and the Little Rossian [Ruthenian] nation."

The Cossack Hetmanate had been founded in 1649 by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who had thrown off Polish rule over the Ruthenian palatinates of Volhynia, Bratslav, Kyiv, and Chernihiv, though he ended up being confined

SALUTE: President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu greet participants in a naval parade marking last year's Russian Navy Day. The warship passing by is a replica of the* Poltava*, a ship launched in 1712 and named in honor of the famous Russian victory. [Alexei Nikolsky—ZUMA Press]

to the region around Kyiv. What is Ukraine today was pulled both westward toward Poland and eastward toward Muscovy. The Battle of Poltava decided the issue.

Because of the ravages of severe winter weather, Charles was left with an estimated 22,000 Swedes to face Peter's 40,000 Russians plus 5,000 irregular troops. Charles himself was wounded when a stray bullet hit his foot. Because of poor reconnaissance and errors during their initial attack, about a third of Swedish forces were lost before the decisive battle. Outnumbered and outfought, the Swedes were put to flight. The survivors surrendered at Perevolochna on the River Dnieper. Charles himself made his escape across the Dnieper into Ottoman territory. Peter had triumphed.

HISTORY IS ALIVE

The legacy of Poltava has been an enduring one, as Lindsey Hughes shows in her biography of the czar. According to legend, Peter narrowly escaped death at three points during the battle. One bullet pierced his three-cornered hat,

which is preserved in the Hermitage's collection of the czar's personal effects. (Although no bullet hole is visible, there are traces of military action on his bronze breastplate, which is also preserved.)

Poltava also inspired two of the great paintings of Peter's reign, J. G. Tannauer's *Peter I at the Battle of Poltava* and Louis Caravaque's Poltava panorama. And generations of Russian soldiers have heard recitations of the speech the czar is supposed to have given before the battle:

> Let the Russian troops know that the hour has come which has placed the fate of all the fatherland in their hands, to decide whether Russia will be lost or will be reborn and improve its situation. Do not think of yourselves as armed and drawn up to fight for Peter but for the state which has been entrusted to Peter, for your kin and for the people of all Russia, which has until now been your defense and now awaits the final decision of fortune. . . . Of Peter know only that he sets no value on his own life if only Russia and Russian piety, glory, and well-being may live.

This is the history that inspires today's Czar Vladimir, much more than the dark chapters of Stalin's reign of terror, which will forever be associated in Ukrainian minds with the Holodomor, the genocidal manmade famine inflicted on Ukraine in the name of agricultural collectivization. It is a history that reminds us how crucial victory in the territory that is now Ukraine was for the rise of Russia as a European great power. It also reminds us that this territory was as contested in the early eighteenth century as it is today.

Where was Poltava in 1709? Certainly not in Russia. But you could not really say that it was in Ukraine, either.

Is Putin merely a fantasist when he imagines himself the heir of Peter I? Not necessarily. It is not true, as I often hear it asserted, that Russia's population is shrinking. In fact, it grew every year from 2009 to 2020. True, Russia's GDP may be less than South Korea's, and just 20 percent the size of America's (based on purchasing power parity, according to the IMF's World Economic Outlook figures for 2020). But consider the economic size of the aggressor states at the outbreak of World War II. The British economic historian Angus Maddison estimated that the Soviet Union's GDP then was roughly half that of the United States, Germany's was 43 percent, Japan's 24 percent, and Italy's 18 percent. You do not need to be Goliath to start a war.

Russia's most recent wars—not only in Ukraine since 2014 but also in Syria since 2015—have been marked by steady, stepwise escalation, not by surprise large-scale invasions. You have to go back to Georgia in 2008 to see anything resembling a Russian Blitzkrieg, but even that was over in five days and didn't involve taking the Georgian capital.

There is no doubting the willingness of many young Ukrainians to fight to defend their country. But without assistance they stand little chance. For years, Ukrainian governments have sought membership of the EU and NATO. Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba renewed these requests in two *Foreign Affairs* articles in August and December last year. Ukraine hoped to be invited to join a NATO Membership Action Plan at the alliance's June 2021 Brussels summit. No invitation came.

What is Ukraine today was pulled both westward toward Poland and eastward toward Muscovy. The Battle of Poltava decided the issue.

War has a habit of coming to Ukraine and its vicinity, a part of the world justly called the "Bloodlands" by Yale historian Timothy Snyder because of the horrors it witnessed in the 1930s and 1940s. Yet that is not the history uppermost in Vladimir Putin's mind. Do not be surprised if his victory parade takes place in Poltava. ◼

"Realism" vs. Putinism

In his struggles with the West, Russia's leader not only plays a long game—he plays an entirely different game.

By Michael McFaul

In March 2011, I was in the room during a meeting between then–vice president Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin (who was then serving as Russia's prime minister until he returned to the presidency not long thereafter). At one point, Putin told Biden (and I'm paraphrasing from memory), "You look at us and you see our skin and then assume we think like you. But we don't." To emphasize his point, Putin slid his index finger down his cheek.

In the United States, the dominant analytic framework for explaining international relations today is realism. This theory assumes that all countries are the same: unitary actors seeking to maximize their power or security through rational calculations in an anarchic world. The only thing that matters in the world

Key points

» Vladimir Putin believes that the West imposed its own ideas on Russia when the Cold War ended.

» Maintaining his autocratic rule is vital to Putin. He feels threatened by protests and democracies.

» Not all Russians think like Putin, or support unification with Ukraine.

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is power—both the power of individual countries and the balance of power among them.

Those deploying this model to explain Russia's behavior (not Putin's, because individuals don't matter to realists) have also offered several prescriptions for how to end the Russia-Ukraine crisis: Freeze NATO expansion and Russia will be content. Offer face-saving concessions that give Russia tangible gains and the threat of war will subside. Don't arm Ukraine, because that will fuel escalation and trigger Russian aggression.

If Putin thought like us, maybe some of these proposals might work. But Putin does not think like us. He has his own analytic framework, his own ideas, and his own ideology—only some of which comport with Western rational realism.

Three tenets of Putinism are particularly important to grasp. First, Putin believes that the West unfairly dictated the terms of peace at the Cold War's end. In Putin's view, the West imposed liberal restructuring inside Russia, compelled Moscow to sign lopsided arms control treaties, expanded NATO with no regard for Russia's interests, and—the greatest sin of all—divided the Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union into separate countries and then "systematically and consistently pushed Ukraine to curtail and limit economic cooperation with Russia." (Actually, it was the leaders of the three Slavic Soviet republics who signed the agreement dissolving the USSR in December 1991, not leaders from Washington, London, or Brussels.) Now that Russia is powerful again, Putin is prepared to risk a lot to revise this so-called American imperial order, especially in Europe. He sees this mission as his sacred destiny.

American leaders can't command other societies to stop wanting democracy.

Preventing Ukraine from becoming a member of NATO is therefore only one dimension of Putin's revisionist agenda. Even if Biden and his NATO allies wanted to offer that concession, Putin would not be satiated. He will press on to undo the liberal international order for as long as he remains in power. Normalizing annexation, denying sovereignty to neighbors, undermining liberal ideas and democratic societies, and dissolving NATO are future goals.

Second, unlike realists, Putin does not view countries as unitary actors; he looks within countries to distinguish between dictatorships and democracies. Not without reason, Putin believes that US support for democracy abroad threatens his autocratic rule. During Putin's reign, most crises in relations

with the United States have been triggered not by NATO expansion but by democratic mobilizations—Putin calls them "color revolutions"—within countries, be they Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, the Arab Spring in 2011, Russia in 2011, or Ukraine in 2014.

On this contentious issue, there is no deal to be had between the United States and Russia as long as Putin is in power. US leaders cannot command other societies to stop wanting democracy. Putin will always fear mass protests and feel threatened by democracies, especially successful ones on his border with a shared history and culture such as Ukraine.

Putin expressed a third idea of his worldview that day in March 2011 with Biden when he proclaimed that "we" think differently. He should have said "I." Russians do not all think alike, and their ideas and values about domestic and foreign policy have changed over time. Western analysts who treat "Russia" as a unitary actor or who equate Putinism with all Russians are making a mistake. Even today, it would be wrong to assume all Russians support war with Ukraine to pre-empt some fictitious, future threat of NATO expansion. In 2021 Levada polls, most Russians expressed positive attitudes toward the Ukrainian people, and only 17 percent of respondents supported unification between the two countries.

The Cold War reminds us that we succeeded before to simultaneously deter Moscow and negotiate treaties with Soviet leaders whose thinking also was radically different from ours. For instance, the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975 represented a major diplomatic achievement to enhance European security. We should aim for a revived version of Helsinki today, but without any illusions about negotiating with a Russian interlocutor who thinks the way that we do. And over the long run, we also should remember that not all Russians think like Putin—and that Putin will not rule Russia forever. ■

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Clarity Is a Superpower

Two arms-control strategies from the Cold War, both built upon transparency, could prove very useful in talks with China. First, focus on overall stability, not specific weapons. Second, be deeply patient.

By Rose Gottemoeller

After months of watching hundreds of new nuclear missile silos being dug in the dirt northwest of Beijing, it is welcome news that President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping seemingly agreed last fall on the need for strategic stability talks. Strategic stability—the idea that nuclear-armed countries should not be able to gain decisive advantage over one another—has

Key points

» "Controlling" arms can mean many different things in a negotiation.

» In contrast to the Cold War, faster progress with China should be possible.

» We need to understand more about China's objectives in its nuclear modernization—and also to be willing to talk frankly about our own.

» While China's nuclear push is worrisome, there is no need to panic. We have time to understand each other's nuclear strategy and force posture.

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taken on new importance as China expands and modernizes its nuclear arsenal.

China is expected to quadruple its number of warheads in the next decade, and is upgrading its nuclear capabilities with new missiles, submarines, and bombers. Last summer, it reportedly fired a missile from a hypersonic glide vehicle while testing its fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS)—a technical advance that, if true, means the Chinese can attack targets from space with nuclear weapons. Although China insists it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, this claim has less credence than in the past, when the country's nuclear force was much smaller.

The last thing we want to do is repeat the experience of the Cold War, when the United States built more than 32,000 warheads and the USSR more than 40,000. We created a nuclear impasse that was expensive and destabilizing. It almost ended in nuclear holocaust during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Now, with new technologies once again driving the risk of escalation, we could end up in a similarly dangerous situation with China.

WHAT DOES "CONTROLLING" MEAN?

The United States and Russia have been working together since the Cuban confrontation to avert new nuclear crises. The world's first nuclear arms race offers two important lessons for how to prevent a second: First, the United States and China should avoid trying to limit new technologies and focus on ensuring mutual nuclear predictability. Second, they should be prepared for a long road, since agreeing to joint measures to foster that predictability is far from straightforward. Luckily, both countries have more experience with nuclear diplomacy than the United States and the Soviet Union did, which offers reason to be hopeful.

Realistically, both the United States and China are likely to evade any restrictions made on new nuclear technologies. The United States and the Soviet Union learned this the hard way in the 1970s, when the first strategic arms limitation agreement, SALT I, froze deployment of new strategic intercontinental missiles. The USSR got out from under that freeze by deploying additional warheads on top of ground-launched missiles—multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs. This violated the spirit of SALT I, if not the letter, and undermined strategic stability by giving Russia an edge.

Although many in the United States cried foul, before too long the United States had deployed its own MIRVs on highly accurate submarine-launched missiles. Now, in theory, the United States had the upper hand in the nuclear

stability contest, since its missiles, hidden underwater, could survive and retaliate against a surprise Russian attack.

It became clear that limiting technologies, such as new types of missiles, would be difficult. Instead, the United States and the Soviet Union came around to the notion that weapons themselves should be controlled and reduced. Hardware can be monitored or destroyed during an arms reduction process, but the technology that goes into them cannot.

Yet as the two sides learned, "controlling" arms can mean many different things in an arms control negotiation. It can be operational, such as constraining where weapons are deployed, or numerical, such as setting caps on missiles and warheads. It also has an element of verification to it.

The world's first nuclear arms race offers important lessons for how to prevent a second.

Which leads us to the second lesson for the US-China strategic stability process: patience will be key. Control and reduction may sound straightforward, but it took the United States and the Soviet Union more than a decade to agree to that course. Verification involving on-site inspection was always difficult for the Soviet Union, which did not like the idea of foreign inspectors poking around sensitive nuclear deployment sites. Reductions, while more straightforward, were not very popular in either the Russian general staff or the Pentagon. It was not until President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met at Reykjavík in 1986 that our two countries began to take deep reductions in nuclear weapons seriously.

QUICKER PROGRESS

When the US-China talks do kick off, American negotiators should be prepared to hear some longstanding complaints that the United States is undermining strategic stability, through missile defenses that undermine the Chinese nuclear deterrent or highly accurate conventional missiles that are capable of destroying Chinese nuclear targets. The US side, in turn, will want to hear clear explanations for China's multifaceted nuclear developments.

Both sides will have to deal with these complaints, but fortunately, the process will not require the years of effort that the Cold War demanded. The United States has enough experience with nuclear diplomacy, including with the Chinese, to avoid that outcome. After all, the Obama administration carried on multiple strategic stability tracks with Beijing, including at the military-to-military level.

China, though a relative newcomer as a nuclear competitor, also brings valuable experience to bear, having participated in talks with the United States and in international regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The nuclear weapons states under the treaty—France, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and Russia—regularly get together to discuss stability; they will do so again. In other words, it should be possible to make faster progress with China than in the old days with the Soviet Union.

Russia can help by holding its own stability discussions with the Chinese. It will not be possible, nor particularly desirable, to put all three countries in a room together: America's separate nuclear agenda with Russia is far more advanced, despite the countries' troubled relationship, with a working group already in train to pursue a follow-on treaty to New START.

The relationship with China is not as mature, nor do the Chinese have the nuclear parity that the United States and Russia have. We should therefore not expect them to jump into nuclear reduction negotiations. US officials reportedly acknowledged that fact after the Biden-Xi conversation, saying a formal arms control negotiation is not a realistic goal "because Beijing wouldn't accept limits on its nuclear arsenal unless it was closer to parity with Washington and Moscow."

Instead, based on my discussions with Chinese experts, I expect a broad-ranging stability agenda, including discussions of traditional nuclear strategy, doctrine, and force posture. Just as the 1970s and '80s brought more clarity about the USSR's nuclear intentions, we need to understand more about China's objectives in its nuclear modernization—and also to be willing to talk frankly about our own. Our top goal must be to avoid an arms race.

Hardware can be monitored or destroyed during an arms reduction process. The technology that goes into them cannot.

One opportunity to make progress more quickly than the United States and the Soviet Union did might be in sharing information and eliminating misperceptions around new technology, rather than moving to limit it. For instance, the two sides could discuss the danger of cyberattacks on nuclear command and control; missile defense modernization; or the implications of hypersonic missiles. China might also be willing to engage early in areas where it has more equality of capability, such as space-based assets. Progress

in this area would be especially timely, given the Chinese FOBS test last summer and the more recent Russian anti-satellite test.

TAKE YOUR TIME

Of course, we do not yet know how seriously the Chinese will take this process. At times in the past, the stability dialogues with Beijing seemed to add up to all talk and no results. If the Chinese are serious, both countries may gain in predictability and security. If they are not, the United States will have more reason to see malign intent in their actions.

While China's nuclear push is worrisome, there is no need to panic. The United States has more than four thousand nuclear warheads; even if the Chinese do quadruple their force, they will only have a quarter of that. We have time to understand each other's nuclear strategy and force posture.

On-site inspection was always difficult for the Soviet Union, which did not like the idea of foreigners poking around sensitive sites.

In the end, the most important development is that Biden and Xi have taken ownership of the strategic stability dialogue. That will motivate their governments to end the current nuclear silence between Washington and Beijing. If we succeed in launching a good discussion and the Russians help, we will be on the road to avoiding a new arms race. Thankfully, history shows this outcome to be eminently possible, if we work hard at it.

Available from the Hoover Institution Press is ***Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict,*** *edited by Harold A. Trinkunas, Herbert S. Lin, and Benjamin Loehrke. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.*

Purely Problematic

Ideological purity has gummed up Washington politics. How can we find a solvent—and produce changes the majority of Americans actually want?

By David Brady

When Senator Joe Manchin announced late last year that he could not support President Biden's "Build Back Better" legislation even at its reduced price, he took heat from White House Press Secretary Jan Psaki, followed quickly by criticism from journalists and pundits.

"How will the nation ever address the enduring market failures, glaring inequality, and big social-safety-net gaps that the Build Back Better plan was designed to tackle?" asked *New Yorker* columnist John Cassidy. Manchin was also accused of voting against his state's interests, while others attributed his no vote to the fact that he takes campaign money from the coal, oil, and gas industries. The

Key points

» Centrists have long been crucial to carrying out the plans of whichever party is in power.

» Party sorting has made moderate senators—of either party—an endangered species.

» The "purity problem" works against both Republicans and Democrats, and damages voters' approval of Congress.

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coal miners' union upped the pressure by calling on West Virginia's senior senator to vote for BBB.

As a political scientist who has studied and written about Congress for more than fifty years, I do not find it surprising that an incumbent more conservative than the average Democratic senator should balk at legislation he considers too liberal. Nor was it surprising when a Republican who occupied a space on the spectrum to the left of the average GOP senator vexed party leaders by voting at the last minute to preserve the Affordable Care Act, which is what John McCain did.

I don't find any of that surprising because I was around when Bill Clinton came to office—after twelve years of Republican presidents—with high hopes for universal health care, a large jobs stimulus plan, tax increases, family leave, and a major energy tax. A brief review of some of these measures and who determined their fate is useful.



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

POWER TO THE MODERATE PEOPLE

The energy tax (calculated on British thermal units) was reduced to a small increase at the gas pump by moderate Senate Democrats from oil patch states, most specifically John Breaux of Louisiana and Oklahoma's David Boren. That duo, plus Sun Belt moderates such as Sam Nunn and Dennis DeConcini, made sure that Clinton didn't derail the North American Free Trade Agreement over environmental and labor issues, which is what labor-friendly colleagues were pressuring the administration to do.



In order to get his job stimulus bill through Congress, Clinton jettisoned some urban spending and an expansion of student loan grants. Legislation expanding national service programs had to be cut by over half before centrist Democrats would vote for it.

In the current Senate, only one Democrat—Manchin—was elected from a red state.

And the much-touted universal health care bill shepherded by first lady Hillary Clinton never made it out of the relevant House committees. Representatives Mike Andrews of Texas and Jim Cooper of Tennessee were among those who objected to the cost.

The same pattern held when the Republicans took over Congress in 1995 for the first time in forty years and tried to enact various elements of their "Contract With America." The Senate during the 104th Congress had only fifty-two Republicans, meaning that it needed the votes of every centrist Republican to pass anything. Two states alone prevented conservatives from acting on balanced budget legislation, term limits, and efforts to curb unfunded mandates. Oregon's delegation (Mark Hatfield and Bob Packwood) and Maine's (William Cohen and Olympia Snowe) were made of confirmed moderates. These four, along with Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, Jim Jeffords of Vermont, and Democrat-turned-Republican Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, forced the leadership to simply abandon the idea of reducing Medicare and Medicaid.

The George W. Bush administration began with a 50/50 Senate, with Vice President Dick Cheney casting the deciding vote in case of ties. Some of Bush's policies ranging from tax cuts to drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge were watered down by a combination of more-liberal Republicans (including Snowe and Specter), along with newer additions Lincoln Chafee and Susan Collins of Maine. Jim Jeffords actually left the GOP, swinging the balance in the upper chamber.

In the last YouGov poll of the Trump presidency, only 14 percent of registered voters approved of the job Congress is doing.

Given this history, no one should be surprised that a moderate (or conservative, if you prefer) Democrat elected from a conservative state that Joe Biden lost by nearly 40 percentage points should balk about transformative

progressive legislation or that such a lawmaker can determine the fate of major legislation. As I say, it's happened before.

RUTHLESS SORTING

Yet today things are different. What distinguishes Manchin and his treatment from that of Breaux, Boren, Specter, Snowe, and the others? The first difference is that there are not many Democrats elected to the Senate from "red" states anymore. I'm talking about Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. In Clinton's first Congress, twenty of the twenty-six Senate seats representing these states were held by Democrats. In the present Senate, there is one, and only one, Democrat elected from those thirteen states. Yes, his name is Joe Manchin.

Legislative compromise in the Clinton and Bush presidencies kept the party in power from veering too far toward its ideological purists.

In the 103rd Congress, the states of Delaware, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington had more Republican than Democratic senators. In the present Senate, these states have no Republicans.

The sorting and polarization that has occurred over the past three decades results in fewer moderate senators of either political party. The smaller the number of such lawmakers, the more likely they are to be targeted for criticism and electoral challenge. In the Clinton era it was harder to assail them because there were more of them—and they were people whom liberals might need on the next key legislative vote.

The overall effect of party sorting is that voting in the Congress has become much more polarized. In the Senate during Clinton's first term in the White House, Americans for Democratic Action (a liberal organization that awards numerical scores to members of Congress) recorded an average of 75 percent support among Democratic senators for liberal policy, with thirteen of them showing less than two-thirds support for ADA-backed legislation. In the same Congress, the ADA gave Republican senators an average score of 20 percent, with seven moderates registering scores between 40 percent and 75 percent.

These scores stand in sharp contrast to the contemporary Senate where, in 2020 (the last year data are available), the average Democratic score was over

95 percent while Republicans averaged less than 4 percent. The lowest Democratic senator—no surprise—was Manchin, who voted the liberal position 75 percent of the time, a score that was the partywide average in the 103rd Senate.

On the Republican side in 2020, there were only two senators who scored over 10 percent on the liberal index, with the high score 25 percent.

Not only are there fewer moderates in Congress, but even as moderates like Manchin and Arizona's Kyrsten Sinema still affect legislative results, they increasingly face scathing attacks from members of their own party. Manchin's position was labeled "anti-black, anti-child, anti-woman, and anti-immigrant" (Representative Cori Bush) and his reasoning "bullshit" (Representative Ilhan Omar). House Progressive Caucus leader Pramila Jayapal claimed publicly that Manchin "betrayed his commitment not only to the president and Democrats in Congress but, most importantly, to the American people."

In the days when there were more centrists in Congress, one did not find the intensity and number of such intraparty attacks. Much is lost in addition to civility. Those senators closest to the fiftieth vote in the chamber have always transformed policy. The result in both the Clinton and Bush presidencies was legislative compromise that, in both cases, prevented the party in power from veering too far in the direction of the ideological purists and its party's left or right base.

THE COST OF EXTREMISM

In the politically sorted and polarized Congress today, few tolerate anything other than extreme policy. This is one obvious reason why the American people do not think highly of Congress and its policy process. In the final YouGov poll of Donald Trump's presidency, only 14 percent of registered voters approved of the job Congress is doing. Those numbers have ticked up slightly in the past year, but in the RealClearPolitics poll average, a solid two-thirds of voters disapprove of Congress.

The question liberal purists must ask themselves is: how do we win a majority—or accomplish anything—if Democrats such as Joe Manchin and Representative Abigail Spanberger of Virginia are not progressive enough? Republicans face an even more difficult quandary: how to build sustainable majorities if everyone who accepts the outcome of the 2020 presidential election is considered unfit to be a GOP candidate for elective office.

It is hard these days to imagine West Virginia electing a Democrat. If Manchin were not in the Senate, where would the liberal agenda be? Without Democrats winning Senate and House races in more moderate or

conservative states like Arizona, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, it is hard to see how the party could maintain control of Congress in future elections. The intense criticism of Manchin and Sinema for defending the filibuster and questioning Build Back Better is unlikely to inspire crucial centrist-minded independents to maintain Democratic control of both branches of the Congress. If and when Republicans regain the majority, they will be faced with the same purity problem but over a different set of issues, mainly those revolving around Donald Trump's ambitions.

In sum, for both parties, purity is fatal for solving problems and sustaining majorities. ◘



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Let Markets Clear the Air

"Net carbon zero" investments are stifling healthy market responses to climate change. And they probably won't benefit anyone but the investors themselves.

By Joshua D. Rauh and Mels de Zeeuw

At the COP26 UN climate change conference last fall, a group of four hundred and fifty financial firms pledged $130 trillion in capital to finance the transition to "net zero" emissions. Government mandates have already driven large private capital flows into expanding renewable energy, and now financial firms are eager to kick the phaseout of fossil fuels into high gear.

The finance industry's palpable excitement is electrifying to climate activists and the politicians who cater to them. Wall Street is now squarely on their side. Yet the enthusiasm of

Key points

» Government mandates and incentives are artificially driving the demand for renewable energy.

» Large financial companies increasingly benefit from the political desire to cater to climate concerns.

» The $130 trillion in private capital pledged to support the energy transition is money that can no longer be invested in other productive activities.

Joshua D. Rauh *is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and participates in Hoover's Human Prosperity Project. He is also the Ormond Family Professor of Finance at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business.* ***Mels de Zeeuw*** *was a senior research analyst at Hoover.*

asset managers and banks is hardly surprising. Any government mandate that a large amount of capital must be swiftly retired and replaced creates a tremendous opportunity for financiers, no matter the underlying reason.

Suppose a government announces that all machines of a certain color—say, brown—must be destroyed and replaced with machines of a different color, perhaps green. Owners of the brown machines aren't happy, but those who can finance the new green machines will profit handsomely. This artificial demand distorts the efficient allocation of capital and comes at a great cost to economic prosperity.

This thought experiment isn't so different from current developments in the energy industry. Government mandates and incentives are artificially driving demand for renewable energy. The political desire to cater to climate concerns is increasingly benefiting large financial companies, which have been quick to lend their support. Institutional investors have been preparing by reducing their fossil-fuels exposure.

The opportunity costs include the investments that aren't made and the jobs not created.

To be sure, private capital is better suited to fund energy investments than overstretched government budgets. Public investment is highly susceptible to inefficiencies such as project delays, cost overruns, and politically driven investment decisions. (Remember Solyndra?)

But it isn't true, though it's asserted often, that the benefits of energy transition investments make their ultimate net costs minimal or zero. The boosters of the energy transition are ignoring the opportunity costs of replacing existing energy production with renewables.

Government mandates and incentives steer existing capital, including natural gas and nuclear plants, to retirement for being "dirty," rather than for age or obsolescence. These still-productive assets must then be replaced. This is on par with trying to get wealthier by breaking one's own windows—the classic fallacy that holds that the necessary repairs would help the economy, not recognizing that the funds that must be spent on repairs now can't be spent on efficient production.

The crowd-out will be substantial. The $130 trillion in private capital pledged to support the energy transition, more than 135 percent of the world's gross domestic product in 2021, is $130 trillion that can no longer be invested in other productive activities. No economy has infinite productive or financing capacity.

The opportunity costs will be the investments that aren't made, the products and services not invented or scaled up, the jobs not created in other industries, and the productivity gains and prosperity that don't materialize.

The accelerated transition to renewables also imposes direct costs on Main Street. The huge increase in demand for financing and factors of production raises the cost of capital and labor inputs. Further, US households and businesses will face higher utility prices because of electricity grids' greater reliance on expensive battery storage technology.

Boosters of the energy transition ignore the opportunity costs of replacing existing energy production with renewables.

This is particularly troubling when many households already face an inflationary pinch, with rising bills forcing them to make tough choices. Additional costs may arise from power outages, as the power grid becomes less stable and baseload capacity is reduced.

The transition to an energy industry that emits less carbon is a positive development and an important tool to combat climate change. But policy makers and commentators ought to be realistic about the costs, include nuclear energy as part of the solution, and accept that a more gradual replacement can alleviate some of the potential costs and problems.

President Eisenhower famously cautioned about the "military-industrial complex." Today, an emerging coalition of governments and environmental activists singularly focused on net zero are empowering a "finance-industrial complex" eager to affirm the activists' goals—and get rich doing so. ◼



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Green Squeeze

Thanks to misguided climate policies, the upward spiral of energy prices is just getting started.

By Bjorn Lomborg

Energy prices are soaring, and it's probably a sign of things to come. The rise can be blamed on a variety of things, including the demand rebound after the COVID lockdowns ended, a drop in renewable-electricity output from a lack of wind in Europe during most of 2021, and increasingly costly climate policies. But while the pandemic will end and the wind will blow again, climate policies to achieve "net zero" emissions will keep increasing prices.

President Obama acknowledged in 2008 that electricity prices "would necessarily skyrocket" under his proposed climate policies. He was more candid than many of today's politicians and advocates. Limiting the use of fossil fuels requires making them more expensive and pushing people toward green alternatives that remain pricier and less efficient.

In Britain, real electricity prices have doubled since 2003, after dropping greatly over the twentieth century. British climate policy had already added more than £10 billion annually to the national electricity bill by 2020. Even before last year's energy price hikes, fifty million to eighty million people in the European Union couldn't afford to heat their homes sufficiently. That's likely to get worse, as this year European energy bills are expected to increase by almost $400 billion. And in the United States, gasoline prices

***Bjorn Lomborg** is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, president of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, and a visiting professor at Copenhagen Business School. His latest book is **False Alarm: How Climate Change Panic Costs Us Trillions, Hurts the Poor, and Fails to Fix the Planet** (Basic Books, 2020).*

soared to a seven-year high in October, while gas heating was forecast to be 30 percent more expensive during the 2021–2 winter than the previous one.

Costs will continue to rise if politicians remain bent on achieving net-zero emissions globally. Bank of America finds that achieving net zero globally by 2050 will cost $150 trillion over thirty years—almost twice the combined annual gross domestic product of every

country on earth. The annual cost ($5 trillion) is more than all the world's governments and households spend every year on education. Academic studies find the policy is even costlier. The largest database on climate scenarios shows that keeping temperature rises to 2 degrees Celsius—a less stringent policy than net zero by midcentury—would likely cost $8.3 trillion, or 3.3 percent of world GDP, every year by 2050, and the costs keep escalating so that by the end of the century taxpayers will have paid about $1 quadrillion—a thousand trillion—in total.

These estimates are based on the heroic assumption that climate



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

TURN, TURN: Wind turbines occupy a bucolic hill in the Golan Heights. In Europe, inadequate wind during most of last year led to a drop in renewable energy generation and a subsequent rise in consumer energy bills. [Creative Commons]

policy costs will be spread efficiently, with big emitters China and India cutting the most. New Delhi says it will keep moving toward net zero only if the rest of the world pays it $1 trillion by 2030, which won't happen. Other developing nations are showing the same understandable reluctance. This means that achieving global net-zero emissions by 2050 will be impossible. Those cuts that are enforced will most likely occur in rich countries, taking a smaller notch out of global emissions at high cost.

Though the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and others have adopted national net-zero emissions goals, few have undertaken rigorous cost estimates. The official independent assessment done in New

Zealand shows achieving net zero by midcentury would cost 16 percent of its GDP annually by 2050. That is more than its entire current budget for social security, welfare, health, education, police, courts, defense, and the environment—combined.

For the United States, one recent study in *Nature* found reducing emissions only 80 percent by 2050 would cost more than $2.1 trillion in today's money annually by midcentury. That is more than $5,000 per American a year. The cost of achieving 100 percent reductions would be far higher. And this study assumes reductions will be carried out in the most efficient way possible—namely using a single national, steadily increasing carbon tax—but that's unlikely, and with less-than-ideal policies, the price would be still higher.

Climate activists may not want to acknowledge these costs, but voters will force them to eventually. If you divide Bank of America's annual cost for net-zero emissions globally, it comes to more than $600 a person—including the world's poorest, in India and Africa. Even in a rich country like the United States, most voters are unwilling to give the government more than about $100 a year to fight climate change, and a couple of hundred dollars is the limit for a majority of voters in many other countries, such as China and the United Kingdom. France has already seen sustained protests against gasoline price hikes of only twelve cents a gallon. Imagine the backlash against policies enforcing net-zero emissions.

The only politically viable approach to fighting climate change is to focus on ramping up research and development to innovate down the price of green energy. Governments should invest across all options including nuclear fusion and fission, solar, wind, improved batteries, and better biofuels. Only when green energy is cheaper than fossil fuel—or at least close to cheaper—will voters be willing to switch. ◘



Fix the Electoral Count Act

A nonpartisan reform could render the counting of votes in the Electoral College simple, straightforward, transparent—and uncontroversial. How to avoid another January 6.

By Edward B. Foley, Michael W. McConnell, Richard H. Pildes and Bradley Smith

We are scholars of election law who span the ideological spectrum but agree on two fundamental principles to help avert potential political upheaval in the aftermath of the 2024 presidential election.

First, to avoid a repeat of the January 6 events, or worse, Congress must rewrite the Electoral Count Act, the outmoded 1887 law that governs the certification of the presidential vote. There is a pressing need for a clear set of rules to govern the certification of the presidential vote.

Second, this revision should be based on the premise that Congress is not a national recount board or a court for litigating the outcome of presidential elections. It is not the role of Congress to revisit a state's popular vote tally.

***Michael W. McConnell** is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a participant in Hoover's Human Prosperity Project, and the Richard and Frances Mallery Professor of Law and the director of the Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School. **Edward B. Foley** is a professor of constitutional law at Ohio State University. **Richard H. Pildes** is a professor of constitutional law at New York University School of Law. **Bradley Smith** is a law professor at Capital University.*

This fundamental truth has been lost on both sides of the aisle since 2000. After that year's election, and again after 2004 and 2016, some Democrats objected to electoral votes from various states on the inappropriate ground that the popular vote in those states, which served as the basis for appointing electors, had been corrupted for one reason or another.

In each of these cases there was no doubt that the single submission of electoral votes from a state was cast by the electors that the states themselves had appointed, following their own rules. (Disputes about the legality of those rules can, of course, be challenged in court.) In this context, any congressional objection to what the state had sent was out of bounds.

For the 2020 election, many Republicans similarly decided it was their role to second-guess the voting process in the states. This time the consequences were far more serious.

To prevent another such event, which could be launched by either party in an effort to control the outcome of a hotly contested presidential election, a revision of the Electoral Count Act should be based on the following guidelines:

Whenever there is just one submission of electoral votes from a state—in other words, no competing slates of electors—Congress should disavow any power to question those electoral votes on the ground that there was something wrong with the popular vote upon which those electors were appointed. As long as the state itself has settled on who won that state through policies established in advance of the election, Congress has no role other than to accept those as being the state's electoral votes.

Uncertainty invites contestation at precisely the most dangerous point, on the eve of inaugurating the new president.

In a situation in which Congress receives conflicting submissions of electoral votes from different institutions of state government—something that has not occurred since 1876 and that we hope remains rare—Congress should give states an incentive to identify in advance which institution is entitled to speak for its voters. If states do this, then Congress only has to count the electoral votes sent from the designated part of the state's government.

If a state has failed to make clear which part of its government is authoritative in determining the popular vote, Congress could set a default rule (awarding power to the governor or state supreme court, for example). Or it could create in advance a nonpartisan tribunal empowered to identify which

part of state government has a better legal claim for being authoritative under the specific circumstances.

Whichever approach Congress takes is less important than that the revised statute be unambiguous about how the matter is to be resolved. Uncertainty invites contestation at precisely the most dangerous point, on the eve of inaugurating the new president.

Both sides have forgotten this: it's not the role of Congress to revisit a state's popular vote tally.

To be sure, there is no way to fully eliminate the risk that those with the final authority to decide on a state's electoral votes might abuse that power for partisan political objectives. At the state level, election administrators might act for partisan reasons.

But there is now substantial judicial oversight of the voting process. To the extent there remain concerns that state supreme courts might also abuse their authority for partisan reasons, federal constitutional doctrines and federal courts also constrain potential state court manipulation of voting laws.

By contrast, if Congress has the final say, it is virtually guaranteed that partisan political calculations will overwhelm any good-faith legal judgments. Nor are courts likely to play any role in overseeing the way Congress "counts" electoral votes.

Congress committed in the original Electoral Count Act not to second-guess a state's vote when that state sends only a single slate of electors. In recent decades, that commitment has become dangerously frayed. Congress needs to update and clarify the act to produce a statute that does not invite abuse by its own members. ■



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The Battle Over Patents

Patents are complicated, and subject to much confusion and even opposition. Here's what makes them a firm foundation for intellectual-property rights.

By Stephen H. Haber and Naomi R. Lamoreaux

> "There are a considerable number of patents issued annually from the Patent Office which are of no force or value except for black-mailing and for interfering with the business of parties competing with their owners.

Key points

» Patents proliferated alongside the half century of rapid technological progress known as the Second Industrial Revolution.

» Patents have always been controversial because they have great consequences for the distribution of producer surplus from innovation.

» Patents provide a temporary, reassuring property right and facilitate an efficient division of labor.

Stephen H. Haber *is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a participant in Hoover's Human Prosperity Project, and the A. A. and Jeanne Welch Milligan Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University. He is a professor of political science, professor of history, and professor of economics (by courtesy), as well as a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Stanford Center for International Development.* ***Naomi R. Lamoreaux*** *is the Stanley B. Resor Professor of Economics and History at Yale University. They are the co-editors of* ***The Battle over Patents: History and Politics of Innovation*** *(Oxford University Press, 2021).*

> "[These patents] do not cover practical machines, but contain principles upon which other more practical inventors have buil[t], and which are infringed by the other patent devices, and are good for nothing except to be bought and speculated upon by those who are justly called patent sharks."
>
> —J. H. Raymond, secretary and treasurer of the Western Railroad Association

Were it not for his use of the word "shark" instead of our more familiar term "troll," J. H. Raymond might be taken for someone complaining about the patent system in the present day. The quotations, however, come from testimony he gave before the Committee on Patents of the US Congress in the 1870s. Raymond was lobbying (unsuccessfully, it turned out) for a bill to reform the patent system and cure it of the evils inflicted on the public by the "curse" of worthless patents. Whatever problems Raymond attributed to the Patent Office's granting of "about fifteen times as many patents as ought to issue," the failure of the reform effort did not prevent the United States from embarking on the half century of rapid technological progress known as the Second Industrial Revolution. Nor did it prevent the United States from rising to world leadership in such new technologically advanced industries as electricity, steel, telecommunications, and automobiles.

As Raymond's testimony suggests, complaints about the patent system—and about how it could be abused to the detriment of legitimate businesses—are nothing new. Indeed, virtually all the sources of market friction that critics seize upon today as pretexts for patent reform ("patent thickets," "patent trolls," "patent holdup," "excessive patenting," and so on) were raised as matters of concern in the nineteenth century. These complaints have resurfaced again and again for the simple reason that the issues that underpin them have enormous consequences for the distribution of the producer surplus from innovation.

Producer surplus is the sum total of all the profits earned by the firms that make up the production chain for a good or service. Innovators create surplus by developing new products that consumers want to buy or by devising new ways to make existing products more cheaply, but ultimately the total amount of surplus available to producers is determined by consumers' demand for the final good or service. Regardless of whether or not they are innovators, firms at the end of the production chain—that is, those that sell the final good or service to consumers—want to retain

as much of the producer surplus as they can. Firms further up the chain, from the producers of raw materials to those that make intermediate inputs, also want as much of the surplus as they can get, regardless of whether they are innovators.

Every firm in the production chain battles over the surplus, and they fight with all the arrows in their quivers, including lobbying to change the laws governing patents. As a general rule, firms that develop the innovations that create surplus tend to lobby for stronger patent laws, because stronger property rights improve their negotiating position vis à vis businesses in the rest of the production chain. The other firms in the production chain, by contrast, tend to lobby for weaker patent laws in order to improve their negotiating position.

Raymond certainly had cause for his complaints; railroads across the country were facing expensive lawsuits from people who bought up patents with the aim of forcing deep-pocketed businesses to pay licensing fees. The lawsuits filed by these "sharks" generated outrage in the late nineteenth century for much the same reason as those brought by "patent trolls" today, and Raymond's protests about the sharks' exploitation of worthless patents allowed him to build support for the railroads' proposed reforms. Many businesspeople, of course, were on the other side of this debate. They benefited from patent protection and objected that the proposed legislation would drastically limit their ability to enforce their intellectual property.

Virtually all the sources of market friction that critics seize upon today (thickets, "trolls," and so on) were already matters of concern in the nineteenth century.

Most of the academics who have participated in recent debates about the patent system are economists and legal scholars whose work is either highly theoretical or based on the analysis of very recent experience. Despite the contemporary focus of their research, they often attempt to validate their claims about problems with the patent system by invoking historical experience. And when they do, they just as often fall into errors—accepting uncritically claims made by interested parties, repeating older allegations in the secondary literature that historians have discounted or outright rejected, and/or proclaiming that some source of market friction in the patent system today is unprecedented when in fact it has a long history and may even have taken a more extreme form in the past.

It is important, of course, to correct such basic errors, but getting the history right involves much more than that. It requires scholars to examine critically the claims about the patent system made by actors in the past, situate those claims relative to the disputants' places in the production chain, and understand the political environment in which claims were made and adjudicated. The essays in our

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

new book, *The Battle over Patents,* take up this challenge and thus enable us to see the patent system as a very human creation, the product of contending interests battling over surplus in specific economic and political contexts that varied over time and across different locations.

Like all human creations, patent systems are necessarily riven with imperfections. As Adam Smith (1776) noted, it is a natural human tendency to barter, truck, and trade. As he also made clear, however, bartering, trucking, and trading arise not from the goodness of human hearts but from self-interest. That same self-interest means that human beings will use markets for law and politics, as well as the economic marketplace, to achieve their goals. They will search out, generate, and exploit any and all sources of friction as they battle over economic surplus, and, the larger the potential surplus, the more extreme will be their efforts. Imperfections, in short, are an inherent feature of *any* system that is designed to generate and apportion economic surplus.

PROTECTION AND REASSURANCE

Patents are valuable to inventors for two reasons. First, the right to exclude protects them against competitors seeking to free-ride on their ideas. Second, the right to exclude takes the form of a temporary property right that can be sold, licensed, and traded.

Most technologically creative people are eager to profit from their discoveries; even those who just enjoy inventing for its own sake need to earn revenues in order to keep doing what they love. Inventors are not always good at running businesses, however, so they often prefer to transfer the task of commercialization to others whose abilities are better suited to that activity. This transfer can occur within a firm, as, for example, when inventors in an R&D department develop technologies used in products that are manufactured and marketed by other units in the same firm. Or inventors can set up their own R&D firms, as Thomas Edison did with Menlo Park, with the aim of selling or licensing their patents to other enterprises better placed to exploit them. (Edison, however, was a poor businessman and typically ended up fighting with his financial backers, most notably J. P. Morgan.)

Either way, inventors need assurances that their discoveries will not be appropriated without compensation: those inside a manufacturing firm need their accomplishments to be legally recognized to ensure they feed into

salary negotiations; those outside a manufacturing firm need to be able to reveal enough information about their discoveries to close a licensing deal or a sale without fearing that their ideas will be stolen. The temporary property right that comes with a patent grant provides the requisite assurance, facilitating a division of labor in which inventors can specialize in what they do best.

The same temporary property right that enables inventors to specialize in invention also makes it possible to assemble the numerous technologies needed to produce complex products. Most products are not themselves patented; what are patented are the technologies that make the products possible. Many people reading these words are doing so on a laptop computer, a tablet, or (eyesight permitting) a smartphone. There is no patent for a laptop, tablet, or smartphone. Rather, there are tens of thousands of patented technologies that are embedded in these devices and allow readers to download this book, display the words on a screen, make notes in the margins, share their thoughts with other readers—and do all of these things regardless of the type and brand of device they own. Most of these patented technologies were not developed by the firm whose brand name appears on the device but by specialized firms, many of which do not manufacture any part of the device but instead focus on developing the technologies that permit the parts and the whole to function.

Every firm in the production chain battles over the producer surplus, and they fight with all the arrows in their quivers.

Basic economic logic suggests that the patents held by these specialized firms do not confer monopolies. A monopoly allows a firm to restrain output and raise the market price. If any of the firms that own the patented technologies in your laptop, tablet, or smartphone were a monopolist, the royalty paid by the manufacturer to the patent owner would reflect that monopoly, and the manufacturer would pass it along to you. That prediction does not square, of course, with the fact that the prices for these devices have been falling like stones for years and are now so low that parents give them as toys to children.

The patent system is a very human creation, the product of contending interests battling over surplus. It is necessarily imperfect.

The patents-as-monopolies hypothesis would also predict that the owners of the patents in the smartphone production chain would capture a huge portion of the revenues generated by smartphone sales, yet they do not. Instead, as Alexander Galetovic explains in our new book, the relentless improvement in quality and decline in price are due to the emergence of a productive division of labor between chip manufacturers and the myriad of small design firms that developed integrated circuits for specialized uses. Patents played a key role in making that division of labor possible. As the industry became increasingly decentralized, the number of patents soared from about four hundred semiconductor patents per year in the 1960s to ten thousand per year in the 2000s to more than twenty thousand per year today. The rich abundance of capable design firms that this property-rights environment supports means that substitutes are always at hand, keeping royalty rates relatively low.

Even those who enjoy inventing for its own sake need to earn revenues to keep doing what they love.

MOTHERS OF INVENTION

Critics of the patent system point to cases where (at least so they claim) patent holders were able to block technological progress for considerable periods of time by suing competing inventors for infringement. By now, however, it should be obvious that litigation, or the threat of it, has strategic value in the battle over the producer surplus. Litigation is simply one negotiating tool among many others.

Critics of the patent system acknowledge this basic fact, but then frequently claim that the rate of patent litigation has recently become "excessive." This raises the question: compared to what? This question is taken up in our book in Christopher Beauchamp's essay, "Dousing the Fires of Patent Litigation." Using a unique dataset of nineteenth-century patent lawsuits that he laboriously collected, Beauchamp shows that present-day patent litigation rates were dwarfed by the levels reached during the 1840s to 1880s. Patent litigation rates then fell dramatically during the final decades and remained at low levels from roughly 1900 to the 1980s, despite the failure of patent reforms (advocated, as we have seen, by the railroads). The mid-nineteenth-century litigation explosion took place during a period when American manufacturing was characterized by large numbers of highly specialized small- and medium-sized firms engaged in the development of

new Second Industrial Revolution technologies. The parallel to the present day is striking.

The mid-nineteenth-century period of high litigation was a period of extraordinarily rapid innovation and industrial expansion. The equilibrium outcome that is of interest to the public is not the number of lawsuits but rather the standard of living. If the creation of new products that continually improve in quality and fall in price is generated by a system in which small- and mid-sized firms at the front end of a production chain bargain with larger firms further down that chain through patent litigation, it is naive to think that one could eliminate the lawsuits without altering the production chain.

Litigation, or the threat of it, has strategic value in the battle over the producer surplus. But it's just one negotiating tool among many others.

For all their imperfections, US-style patent systems spread because they had multiple advantages. By creating property rights that could be traded in a market, they facilitated the development of a productive division of labor, either within the firm or through the market, that enabled inventors to specialize in technological discovery and leave the task of developing and commercializing their ideas to others. They also made it possible for firms to transfer technological knowledge to other firms, even to firms in other countries. Moreover, patents are available not just to inventors of breakthrough technologies but also to those who improve existing technologies incrementally or find novel ways to use them in other applications. This "democratization of invention," as explored in the book by B. Zorina Khan that bears that title, is a strength, not a weakness. ◘

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Giant Stumbles

Anger management may be useful for individuals, but for a superpower? Why being slow to wrath isn't always in the United States' best interests.

By Josef Joffe

Much of international politics can be reduced to a single law: "When the cat's away, the mice will play." More formally: order requires a housekeeper. In the Biden era, the United States hasn't quite absconded, but neither is it patrolling its space as attentively as a great power must if it wants to remain one.

Start with Europe, America's oldest bailiwick. President Biden has wisely rescinded the troop drawdown ordered by Donald Trump. But Vladimir Putin is not awed. Having tested NATO's borders with overflights, cyberattacks, and naval incursions, he massed Russian mechanized troops on the edge of Ukraine. Memories of the German-populated Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, which Hitler pocketed in 1938 without firing a shot, well up. Putin deploys similar language, fuming about "genocide" inflicted by Ukraine on its Russian ethnics. Russia is where Russians live, the message runs, and so eastern Ukraine rightfully belongs to the Rodina, the Motherland.

Putin delivered the second part of the message in his 2021 year-end press conference—a classic of expansionist powers that exonerates the aggressor

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and blames the victim. Accordingly, the massive buildup on the eastern border of Ukraine was strictly defensive—as if NATO had moved its divisions into an attack position. In truth, there are but a few battalions on NATO's eastern flank. Separated from Russia by Ukraine and Belarus, these units have been there not as a spearhead but as a minimal deterrent—no more than a tripwire. Recall that Hitler pretended to be threatened by Poland to dress up his invasion on September 1, 1939: "As of 5:45 a.m., we are now shooting back."

The purpose of Russian Westpolitik—threats on tank tracks—is as transparent as glass. This new czar wants to restore the old Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe—not necessarily by forcible repossession, but by hegemonic domination that would turn the lands east of Germany into unofficial satrapies. Keep out—or else, Putin is snarling at NATO and the EU.

CHALLENGERS

Look next at the Middle East: instead of nurturing the Abraham Accords—the Arab-Israeli realignment against Iran—Team Biden is sniffing at this historic deal; score one for Tehran. Nor is Washington too eager to resupply Riyadh with anti-aircraft missiles against the mounting attacks by Iranian-armed Houthi militias, which threaten to demolish Saudi Arabia's—the world's—oilfields.

Symbols often count for more than hardware. Iran's supreme leader must have savored America's self-humiliation when it caved to Iran's refusal to talk directly to the United States in the revived nuclear negotiations in Vienna. Notes had to be carried back and forth. Even diplomatic novices—which Biden, Antony Blinken, and Jake Sullivan are not—would have grasped that the Iranians were not serious but executing a classic power play: buy time and split Russia and China from the West.

Meanwhile, Israel has demonstratively practiced bombing runs against the nuclear installation of Iran, a nation sworn to its annihilation. Yet the United States will not soon deliver its most advanced tanker aircraft, the KC-46, which would make the threat more credible short of war. It doesn't take a doctorate in international politics to implement a good cop/bad cop strategy that allows the United States to travel the diplomatic road while profiting from the Israeli cudgel in the background.

In the Far East, one sees the same dynamic. In the Pacific, Beijing is signaling the United States: this is our lake, at least as far as Guam. Roll over, please. As China ramps up its rhetoric against Taiwan, "strategic ambiguity," an old US shibboleth that dodges explicit guarantees, continues to rule.

WHAT WILL AMERICA DO? Taiwan military officials attend a promotion ceremony last December. As China beefs up its military forces and sharpens its rhetoric against Taiwan, "strategic ambiguity," which avoids explicit guarantees, continues to drive American policy. [Walid Berrazeg—SOPA Images]

Would the United States protect Taiwan? "Yes, we have a commitment to do that," responded Biden. But his minions quickly affirmed ambiguity. "The president was not announcing any change in our policy," a White House statement read.

Long gone are the days when Bill Clinton dispatched a carrier group to the Taiwan Strait after China had unleashed rocket barrages against the island. Today, US ships might be sitting ducks, given the enormous missile, artillery, and aircraft buildup on the nearby mainland. Just being there in a show of resolve is no longer enough. To repel an invasion, the United States would have to escalate by demolishing the jump-off points on the mainland: coastal batteries, missile sites, and command-and-control nodes. That would be real war, which makes for American self-deterrence.

FEEDING ON UNDERREACTION

What is the moral of this tale? To take its measure, rivals always probe a far-flung empire on the periphery. How reliable are its commitments to allies

and wards? Does thrust beget counterthrust—or indifference? Are American threats hollow? This may sound like a game of chicken, but if you don't play because you don't care or dare, you lose. And many small losses add up to a big one.

This is not to invoke America's abrupt abandonment of Afghanistan as harbinger of decline. That benighted land is not a stake in the global contest against Russia and China, not yet. But Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia are. Lose any one of them, and your career as a global power takes a fatal hit.

The United States is not doing its far-flung allies a favor by protecting them. Yes, they are semi-free riders, as smaller powers always are. That they should do more for themselves goes without saying—and Japan actually does. But as fate has it, these outposts are the outer ring of American security, and history will not forgive the country for shrugging off this elementary fact. The rule is as old as state history: whosoever pulls back in a global zero-sum game invites more challenges in the next rounds. Why stop when the going is good?

"Strategic ambiguity," an old US shibboleth that dodges explicit guarantees, continues to prevail.

So, what is Mr. Big to do? To begin, the president should have submitted a far more ambitious defense budget for 2022. His request was for $715 billion, just 1.6 percent above the fiscal year 2021 total. Subtracting inflation, that is a decline in real terms, which could not impress Beijing and Moscow. It took a bipartisan Senate to go up to $768 billion, which at least makes for a modest real increase.

But there is more at stake than percentages. Since the days of Barack Obama, the United States has shifted into retrenchment mode, another such cycle in US history, which spells opportunities for the revisionist trio of Russia, China, and Iran. Obama was the first to cut back on global commitments. His lodestar was: it's time for a little nation building at home. Trump, supposedly a minion of the rich, was first to pour out COVID trillions to the masses—welfare over warfare. He also invented the infrastructure bill submitted to Congress by Biden in 2021. He bashed allies and withdrew troops from the American periphery; Trump concocted the Afghanistan pullout his successor implemented. Outarming the Soviets was something done forty years ago, under Ronald Reagan.

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin would have been dense not to notice America's retractionist reflex. What now? How about Containment 2.0, which is being bandied about in the strategic community? The analogy is wobbly.

Today, America is up against two global foes who are both arrayed against the United States. It is imprisoned in a three-dimensional chess game where Russia and China are ganging up on the status quo power. As Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger learned, pitting one against the other did not work even in the Vietnam War era, when the United States enjoyed strategic supremacy. Raising up towering containment walls across contested areas as in the Cold War does not quite fit a nation in retrenchment mode.

The United States will not put significant troops into Taiwan to deter China, nor more than symbolic contingents in Eastern Europe to sober up Putin. Like the Europeans, it initially shied away from providing Ukraine with a serious defense, which would have required massive anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry. If you want neo-containment, remember what it took: the United States fielded up to 350,000 GIs plus thousands of tactical nukes in Cold War Europe.

After Iraq and Afghanistan, the country is not in the mood to commit entire army corps to secure its far-flung realm. But for that matter, twentieth-century mass armies don't rule the twenty-first-century battlefield. The global contest has become more subtle and devious. How do you push back those "little green men" without insignia who spearheaded the annexation of Crimea? Or Russia's underhanded subversion of the Baltic states?

Putin fumes about "genocide" inflicted by Ukraine on its ethnic Russians.

Beijing and Moscow's strategy is as simple as it is refined: use your local advantage and get there first. Being next door gives them the benefit of short "interior lines," as Clausewitz had it. Once you have moved your pawns forward, you put the onus of escalation on your rival. The United States won't demolish China's artificial islands in the South China Sea. Nor will it roll back Russia in Ukraine. Too late. To dislodge is to court real war.

Their indirect overreach feeds on American underreaction. President Obama wrote the script when he abandoned his "red line" in Syria in 2012. Naturally, Putin saw an invitation to push into the vacuum. How could he resist? Try now to displace the Russians from the Middle East, whence Nixon and Kissinger had extruded them fifty years ago.

LOOK ALIVE

What would be the appropriate counterstrategy? "Get there first with the most," preached Civil War general Nathan Bedford Forrest, and let your opponent worry about the cost of escalation. Here are some tools this side of open-ended force. Arm your proteges to raise the price of aggression. Put a lot more clout—not just a couple of battalions—on NATO's eastern border to reassure your allies. No longer let China buy strategic ports like Greece's Piraeus, let alone "appropriate" Western technology.

Enable the Saudis to protect their oilfields. Mohammed bin Salman, better known as MBS, is a nasty fellow who will not stop at murder to cow his domestic enemies. But he occupies a key position on the global chessboard. So, when the United States denies the Saudis ballistic missile technology, Riyadh just buys it from China, which thus acquires another foothold in the Middle East.

Don't hem and haw on delivering advanced fighter craft to Abu Dhabi, which is bound to please Tehran. Work with the Europeans to lighten their excruciating dependence on Russian gas in lieu of proceeding with Nord Stream 2, especially while German political opinion is turning against Putin. Strengthen, don't disparage, the Arab-Israeli alliance against your Iranian tormentor. Don't signal to Tehran that the United States is more interested in a refurbished nuclear deal than an adversary who has angled for the bomb since the days of the shah.

The rule is as old as state history: whosoever pulls back in a global zero-sum game invites more challenges in the next rounds.

None of this requires a high-risk direct confrontation, as over Cuba in 1962. To repeat, use an indirect strategy, which is so masterfully deployed by Russia and China. Don't go mano a mano in a nuclear environment. Instead, exploit your unique advantages like globe-spanning forces and allies, which Russia and China don't have.

The key elements are watchfulness and resolve, traits that seem scarce in the Biden administration—plus massive investment on the cyber front, which will make Russia and China think twice about digital aggression. Don't let your fleet sink into obsolescence, not when China is churning out up-to-date craft as if there were no tomorrow. A maritime empire like the United States will lose its first-line defense without a first-rate global navy. That is expensive, but still cheaper in the longer run than war or indifference.

Beyond hardware and global diplomacy, the core is conceptual: great powers fall behind when they are not on guard 24/7. In this three-dimensional chess game, rivals will bottle up your major pieces on your side of the board.

Above all, avoid the trap George F. Kennan ridiculed a lifetime ago when he wrote in *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (1951) that America was like a dinosaur who wallows in his mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath—in fact you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.

Hence, stay away from the Jimmy Carter model. He started out in 1977 with a policy of goodness by urging the nation to lose its "inordinate fear of communism." He called for a new American foreign policy based on "constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision." Put your money on "human rights," "peaceful change," "cooperation," and the "power of moral suasion." He was determined to achieve "mutual reductions in the nuclear arms race."

That was four months into his term. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter changed from Paul to Saul. It had made "a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done [previously]," he said. It was a "fundamental turning point" that triggered rearmament even before Reagan. Plus, the Carter Doctrine signaled an abrupt turn toward power politics. Whosoever wanted to gain "control over the Persian Gulf," Carter orated, would be "repelled by any means necessary, including force."

One tactic: arm your proteges to raise the price of aggression.

It would have been wiser to act like a great power ex ante and patrol the Gulf with an awe-inspiring naval force. Goodness does not teach others to be good, but being on your toes 24/7 raises their risks and favors stability. Nor have sanctions, a favorite American tool, ever chastened a great power. Human rights rhetoric à la Carter has never intimidated revisionist powers out to dethrone the guardian at the gate.

LOOK FOR ADVANTAGE

Today, Biden's America is an uncertain giant, and its foes have noticed. Practicing opportunistic expansion, they probe and push beneath the threshold of direct confrontation, playing an astute game that allows them to score

without courting incalculable risks. Biden, Blinken, and Sullivan surely see who has the advantage. They need to internalize that the game is about power, the ultimate currency in the affairs of nations.

Goodness doesn't teach others to be good. But vigilance teaches others not to provoke you.

The task is a grand strategy that equips the United States to best a chess master like Russia and a Go virtuoso like China. Those win who capture the most stones and encircle the adversary's territory. Think two, three steps ahead. Being there beats wading in after the fact. Containment 1.0—one on one—was easy by comparison, so let's resist cheap advice. But time is pressing in.



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That's "Spytainment"

Americans know little about the world of espionage—except what they see in movies and TV shows. These popular depictions don't help.

By Amy B. Zegart

For fans of spy movies and television shows, a visit to CIA headquarters will be disappointing. The visitor center looks nothing like the high-tech offices of Jason Bourne and Carrie Mathison. Instead, the entry to America's best-known intelligence agency has more of a shabby post-office feel. There are teller windows with bulletproof glass, soda machines, and an old-fashioned black landline phone mounted on

Key points

» Americans' ignorance of their intelligence agencies distorts their views on the role, effectiveness, and power of those agencies.

» Notions derived from spy-themed entertainment bleed into real-world policy decisions.

» The distortions of "spytainment" make it difficult not only to understand the work of spy agencies but also to trust them.

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the back wall. Once cleared by security, visitors head back outside, where they can walk down a winding road or take the rambling shuttle bus to the old headquarters building. There, lobby security has no retina scanners or fancy fingerprint devices, just a few turnstiles and a friendly security guard who takes cellphones and hands out paper claim checks.

The only clue that this is not a typical government building is the burn bags: because classified documents cannot just be thrown away, instead of trash cans, striped burn bags that look weirdly like Trader Joe's holiday shopping bags are scattered around the building to make incineration easier.

The National Counterterrorism Center is another story. Created after 9/11 to fuse terrorism-threat reporting across the United States, NCTC has an ultramodern operations center with giant wall monitors, an open floor plan, and computer stations tracking bad guys around the globe. It looks like it came straight out of Hollywood. Because it did. Government officials hired an engineer from Walt Disney Imagineering to design the agency's offices, right down to the sleek consoles and lunchroom chairs.

In intelligence, art is imitating life and life is imitating art. The implications of this shift are far more serious than they appear. In the past two decades, the amount of spy-themed entertainment, or "spytainment," has skyrocketed, while spy facts remain scarce and university professors teach courses on just about everything other than intelligence. The result: spy-themed entertainment is standing in for adult education on the subject, and although the idea might seem far-fetched, fictional spies are actually shaping public opinion and real intelligence policy.

Most Americans don't know much about the secret world of intelligence because they have never come into contact with it. Although many are concerned about the growing gulf between civilians and the all-volunteer military, far more Americans interact with soldiers than with intelligence officers. On a typical American street, military veterans live in two out of every ten houses. But outside of the Washington area, almost no one lives next door to an intelligence official—or, if they do, they don't know it. Intelligence isn't very present in Congress, either. In 2020, just eighteen of the 535 representatives and senators serving in Congress had ever worked in an intelligence agency.

SECRETS AND AGENTS

In 2009, I started hunting for polling data about Americans' knowledge of intelligence, as well as their attitudes toward intelligence issues. I didn't find much, so I decided to gather my own small sample of rough data, surveying

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

UCLA undergraduates enrolled in my US-intelligence-history class. The results were illuminating. My students, even those who followed the news closely, knew almost nothing about intelligence agencies and how they worked. What's more, the data seemed to show a disconcerting connection between students' ideas about intelligence and their consumption of spy-themed television. Those who said they regularly watched the hit show *24,* which depicted torture often and favorably, were statistically more likely than their peers to approve of harsh interrogation methods such as water-boarding, which simulates drowning and which many regard as torture.

Of course, the survey couldn't prove that watching *24* caused these attitudes; my sample size was only about one hundred and it was hardly representative. Maybe the show attracted viewers who had been more pro-waterboarding all along. In 2012 and 2013, I ran two national surveys through YouGov, a polling firm, gathering data from about a thousand respondents per survey from a nationally representative pool.

The YouGov findings echoed my less-scientific student poll. I found that Americans' knowledge of intelligence is generally poor. A majority of Americans did not know who the director of national intelligence was or how much of the information in a typical intelligence report came from secrets. Perhaps most interesting, I found that even in 2013, when the media were saturated with stories about secret NSA programs revealed by the former contractor Edward Snowden, most Americans still had no idea what the NSA actually did. Many (wrongly) thought that the agency interrogated detainees and ran operations to capture or kill suspected terrorists. One in four Americans thought that the NSA built spy satellites (it doesn't). The NSA does make and break codes—but only half of Americans knew that. The biggest crisis in NSA history was unfolding against a backdrop of widespread public misperception and ignorance. (The NSA intercepts and analyzes foreign signals intelligence, including e-mail, telephone calls, and encrypted data transmissions, and is also, as its website declares, "home to America's codemakers and codebreakers.")

Most Americans don't know much about the secret world of intelligence because they never come into contact with it.

Findings from my 2012 and 2013 YouGov polls also resonated with my student survey about the real influence of fictional spies. I found that the more frequently American viewers watched spy-themed TV shows and movies, the more likely they were to support aggressive counterterrorism tactics.

ROUTE 007: A London bus advertises* Skyfall*, a James Bond movie, in 2013. The CIA is among the real-world espionage outfits to cultivate an association with the fictional British spy. The agency even named its venture-capital firm In-Q-Tel after Q, the gadgets master from the James Bond series. [Creative Commons]

Frequent spy-TV watchers were more willing than infrequent viewers to support assassinating known terrorists (84 percent versus 70 percent) and transferring suspected terrorists to a country known for using torture (60 percent versus 45 percent), and were more likely to believe that waterboarding suspected terrorists was the right thing to do (38 percent versus 28 percent).

Spytainment-viewing habits were also highly correlated with opinions about the NSA. The more that people watched spy-themed television shows and movies, the more they liked the NSA, the more they approved of NSA's telephone- and Internet-collection programs, and the more they believed that the NSA was telling them the truth about its surveillance activities.

HOLLYWOOD GOLD

Whatever one thinks about these activities—whether they are effective or ineffective, morally right or morally wrong—the fact that fiction may be significantly influencing public attitudes about them is unsettling.

There is good reason to believe that the relationship between spytainment and beliefs about intelligence could be causal. We know that entertainment has influenced popular culture and attitudes on plenty of other subjects. In the 1980s, law school applications shot up when *L.A. Law* became a hit television show. Prosecutors have bemoaned the "*CSI* effect"—the way the popular television show has led jurors to expect fancy forensic evidence in court and to assume that the government's case is weak without it. And the 1986 blockbuster *Top Gun* became a Navy-recruiting bonanza, boosting enlistments and applications to the Naval Academy. The film made the Navy so popular that recruiters even began setting up tables outside of movie theaters. If art can affect life in the legal profession, criminal investigations, and the military, imagining that the same thing could be happening in intelligence is not much of a stretch.

The more frequently American viewers watched spy-themed TV shows and movies, the more likely they were to support aggressive counterterrorism.

Evidence suggests that this is the case. Spytainment has ballooned in the past twenty years, becoming the predominant, and often only, way for Americans to understand the intelligence agencies that serve them.

Spy-themed entertainment is everywhere these days—in Robert Ludlum novels, Tom Clancy video games, the James Bond and Jason Bourne movie franchises, and hit television shows such as *Homeland* and *24*.

To be sure, spies have been big business for a long time. Bond first appeared in Ian Fleming's 1953 novel *Casino Royale* and has been around so long that seven different actors have played him on the big screen. Clancy's CIA hero, Jack Ryan, first turned up in the 1984 novel *The Hunt for Red October,* and Bourne first forgot his shady CIA past back in 1980, when Ludlum published *The Bourne Identity*. In fact, America's first-ever bestselling novel was a fictional account of a double agent during the Revolutionary War that was published in 1821 and aptly titled *The Spy*.

The difference today is the quantity and variety of spy-themed entertainment surrounding us. A hundred years ago, American readers first discovered the allure of spytainment. Now they can't get away from it.

Spies today corner a larger share of television and movie audiences than before. In the 1995–96 television season, only two shows remotely related to intelligence—*The X-Files* and *JAG*—made Nielsen's list of the one hundred most-watched programs. In the 2005–6 season, there were twelve spy shows

on the list. As households have switched from traditional TV to Internet streaming services, spy-themed shows have followed them—Jack Ryan made his Amazon Prime debut in 2019. Today, Hollywood studios are releasing twice as many spy blockbusters as they did in the 1980s.

READY FOR ITS CLOSEUP

Real spies have always had a complicated relationship with fictional ones. On the one hand, intelligence agencies have been courting Hollywood for decades in the hopes of getting favorable portrayals. On the other hand, they decry the negative and unrealistic depictions that often result.

No one promoted an agency's reputation in the entertainment industry more assiduously than former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. Presiding over the bureau from 1924 until his death in 1972, Hoover was a one-man public-relations machine who cooperated only with producers and reporters who portrayed the bureau in a favorable light. By the 1930s, there were FBI-themed radio shows, comic strips, bubblegum cards, and especially movies, including the Warner Bros. film *G Men,* starring the biggest tough guy in Hollywood, James Cagney. These films glorified FBI agents as intrepid heroes, guns in hand, who worked the streets to solve crimes and always got their man. Although Hoover was quick to say that he did not officially endorse *G Men,* the bureau was flooded with fan mail after the movie's release.

Today, the FBI, CIA, and Defense Department all have public affairs officers or entertainment-industry liaisons who work with Hollywood writers, directors, and producers behind the scenes to try to get them to favorably portray their organizations. In 2008, the FBI sponsored a special public relations seminar called "FBI 101" for the Writers Guild of America. The CIA has developed and pitched its own list of story lines for screenwriters to consider. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines have deployed to Los Angeles, setting up entertainment-liaison offices there.

Hollywood studios are releasing twice as many spy blockbusters as they did in the 1980s.

Movie posters decorate the public affairs conference room at Langley. In 2004, the CIA had the *Alias* actress Jennifer Garner appear in a recruitment video. For years, the CIA's kid website featured a cartoon spy, Junior Officer Ava Shoephone, who wore bright-red lipstick and a trench coat and spoke through a secret telephone embedded in her high-heeled shoe. The agency

even named its venture-capital firm In-Q-Tel after Q, the gadgets master from the James Bond series.

At the same time, the CIA dislikes the sinister depictions of agency life that ride shotgun with all the Hollywood glamor. Perhaps no movie captures the risks that arise when Hollywood writes history like *Zero Dark Thirty,* the Academy Award–nominated film about the CIA's ten-year hunt for Osama bin Laden. The film received significant assistance from the CIA and portrays the agency in a very flattering light. According to declassified documents, CIA officials met with the movie's makers on repeated occasions, reviewed draft scripts, and provided access to a number of key people involved in the hunt for bin Laden. Yet when the film was released, it generated so much controversy about what was real and what wasn't that the then–acting director of the CIA, Michael Morell, had to issue a memo to his workforce clarifying the facts.

As long as citizens believe that intelligence agencies can track anyone, go anywhere, and do anything, weaknesses are less likely to get fixed and excesses more likely to go unchecked.

"The film creates the strong impression that the enhanced interrogation techniques that were part of our former detention and interrogation program were the key to finding bin Laden. That impression is false," Morell wrote. This was a big deal. Both the efficacy and morality of harsh interrogation techniques have been the subjects of intense debate: defenders argue that these methods produced some useful information that contributed to finding bin Laden, and critics emphasize the way that harsh interrogations produced false and misleading information that hindered progress and raised deep ethical concerns. Reality is nuanced. The movie was not. The result was deeply misleading.

Yet the film's writer, Mark Boal, and its director, Kathryn Bigelow, marketed *Zero Dark Thirty* as a faithful reporting of the facts, calling it a "reported film" and a "docudrama." The film's opening frame declares that it is "based on firsthand accounts of actual events." These are strong words. Bigelow kept using them, including when she went on the comedy show *The Colbert Report*. It was a surreal moment: a filmmaker masquerading as a journalist telling a comedian masquerading as a news anchor that her fictional film masquerading as a documentary was a "first draft of history."

GOING WRONG

The proliferation of spytainment has generated two policy problems. The first is a public mindset that sees intelligence agencies as far more powerful, capable, and unaccountable than they actually are. In its most extreme form, the tendency to believe that intelligence agencies are omnipotent has fueled conspiracy theories that a "deep state" is out there, running rogue. The second problem is a policy-making elite that invokes fictional spies and unrealistic scenarios to formulate real intelligence policy. From the heartland to the Beltway, a little knowledge of intelligence turns out to be a dangerous thing.

Conspiracy theories may make for great entertainment, but they are also believed by more and more Americans. A 2006 Scripps poll found that 36 percent of Americans considered it "likely" or "somewhat likely" that US government officials either carried out the 9/11 attacks or knowingly allowed them to occur. Ten years later, a YouGov/Economist survey found that 25 percent of Americans still believed it was "probably" or "definitely" true that the "US government helped plan the attacks of 9/11." There's absolutely no evidence that this is true and overwhelming evidence that it's not.

Scratch the surface of any conspiracy theory and you'll find a prevailing belief that intelligence agencies are too high-tech, too powerful, too secretive, and reach too far to make mistakes. Bad events don't just happen. They are intended and carefully planned. The government's penchant for secrecy is used as further proof; conspiracy theorists argue that if government officials were telling the truth, they'd let us see the classified documents.

By the 1930s, there were FBI-themed radio shows, comic strips, bubble-gum cards, and movies featuring the biggest tough guy in Hollywood, James Cagney.

More recently, connective technologies have created an online ecosystem tailor-made for spreading false narratives at lightning speed and unprecedented scale. The Internet has become a misinformation superhighway where conspiracy theories can be conjured up by anyone, posted on social media, spread by hashtag, amplified by bots, and picked up by mainstream media—all at the touch of a button. In this new arena, conspiracy theories are being peddled by everyone from radical bloggers to Kremlin cyberproxies.

The 2020 election revealed the powerful grip of conspiracy thinking and the very real dangers that it poses. The following year, Senate Intelligence Committee vice chairman Marco Rubio, a Republican from Florida, was so

concerned about myths and misperceptions that he gave a short tutorial about what intelligence actually is during the committee's public intelligence-threat hearing. "There's a lot of TV shows about intelligence, there's a lot of movies," warned Rubio. "The work of our intelligence agencies is depicted in all kinds of ways in the popular culture, in the media, in the darkest recesses of the Internet."

I do not mean to suggest that intelligence agencies and officials never overstep their legal authorities, keep information from Congress, or engage in objectionable activities. They have. And even programs deemed to be legal—such as CIA drone strikes targeting American citizens without judicial review—bring up unsettling issues related to ethics and policy. But the allure of conspiracy theories and deep-state thinking raises serious questions about how well intelligence agencies will be able to fulfill their mission in the future if large swaths of the public, and even the president, view them with such suspicion.

So long as citizens believe that intelligence agencies can track anyone, go anywhere, and do anything—whether for good or for ill—real intelligence weaknesses are less likely to get fixed and real excesses are more likely to go unchecked.

Fictional spies are influencing policy makers, too, from soldiers fighting on the front lines to justices sitting on the nation's highest court.

In the fall of 2002, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, the staff judge advocate general at Guantánamo Bay, ran a series of brainstorming sessions to come up with interrogation techniques that could be used on terrorist detainees held there. She later admitted that Jack Bauer, the lead character on *24*, "gave people lots of ideas." On the show, Bauer, a federal counterterrorism agent played by Kiefer Sutherland, repeatedly used torture to elicit information that would save the United States from an imminent terrorist attack, using the mantra "whatever it takes." Beaver ultimately approved the use of dogs, sexual humiliation, waterboarding, and other controversial interrogation techniques. The dean of the US Military Academy at West Point, Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, became so concerned that *24* was hurting cadet training by glamorizing the efficacy and morality of torture that he visited the show's creative team in Los Angeles to request that they produce episodes where torture backfires. (In a truth-is-stranger-than-fiction moment, the

The so-called ticking-time-bomb scenario has never actually happened.

show's crew thought that General Finnegan, who came wearing his military uniform, was an actor.)

Other military educators became similarly concerned that soldiers in the field could not differentiate what they were seeing on television—in shows that included *24, Lost, The Wire,* and *Alias,* where interrogators faced imminent threats and torture always worked—from how they were supposed to behave in the field. Military leaders and FBI interrogators have long argued that other tactics work better; academic studies, for example, have found that prolonged sleep deprivation makes respondents unable to provide accurate information even if they want to. Rising concerns about spytainment's influence on the military eventually led to an unusual partnership among military educators, Hollywood producers and writers, and the nonprofit organization Human Rights First to create a military-training film aimed at educating junior soldiers about the differences between fictionalized interrogations and their real-life jobs.

A belief that intelligence agencies are omnipotent has fueled conspiracy theories that a "deep state" is out there, running rogue.

BEYOND JACK BAUER

The military is not suffering this problem alone. Members of Congress, presidential candidates, and even former CIA director Leon Panetta have all debated serious issues of policy by contemplating Jack Bauer plotlines, particularly ones involving so-called ticking-time-bomb scenarios, in which a suspected terrorist in custody is thought to hold vital information about an imminent threat to large numbers of people. In reality, these ticking-time-bomb situations have never occurred, and national security experts have long argued that they are unrealistic.

And yet both Jack Bauer and ticking time bombs have been real considerations in the creation of national security policy. In a 2006 Heritage Foundation panel discussion of *24,* former secretary of homeland security Michael Chertoff praised Jack Bauer and the show as "reflecting real life." The late Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia even suggested—twice, in public—that he would sometimes turn to TV operative Jack Bauer to resolve legal questions about interrogation methods.

In 2009, several members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence pressed Panetta about what interrogation techniques he might use if

confronted with a "ticking-time-bomb situation." Panetta took the hypothetical seriously, telling the intelligence committee that he would seek "whatever additional authority" he needed to get information that would protect Americans from imminent harm. The press quickly dubbed the policy the "Jack Bauer exception" to President Barack Obama's ban on the use of harsh interrogation techniques.

Spy fiction has also affected congressional policy making. Tom Clancy's *Red Storm Rising* inspired Dan Quayle's support for the development of antisatellite weapons during his time in the Senate. Of Clancy's stories, Quayle said, "They're not just novels. . . . They're read as the real thing." Quayle later recommended Clancy as a consultant for the White House Space Council.

Mounting evidence suggests that spytainment too often substitutes for fact, creating fertile ground for conspiracy theories to grow and influencing the formulation of real intelligence policy. The costs are hidden but significant.

In the twenty-first century, the tip of the spear isn't a spear. It's intelligence—the ability to find, acquire, and analyze information to give us the advantage against adversaries in physical space, outer space, and cyberspace. But secret agencies in democratic societies cannot succeed without trust. And trust requires knowledge. As the former CIA and NSA director Michael Hayden once put it, "The American people have to trust us, and in order to trust us they have to know about us." ◘

Adapted from Amy B. Zegart's new book,* Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence *(Princeton University Press, 2022). © 2022 by Amy B. Zegart.

The Mission that Matters

Memo to the Pentagon: your job is to prevent wars or win them. You can't afford to get distracted by climate-change policy.

By Nadia Schadlow

The Defense Department is in trouble under the Biden administration. It surrendered to the Taliban and has been slow in responding to the challenge posed by China. Meanwhile, Pentagon leaders wasted time and resources developing a climate strategy, which they released last fall.

At the root of these blunders is a failure to distinguish between strategic challenges posed by adversaries and problems such as climate change. Unless the military refocuses on deterring and winning wars, we will likely lose more conflicts.

China is an adaptive actor—an adversary who can think and shift course. Yet the Biden administration conflates such actors with challenges like

Key points

» Fossil fuels are still critical to propel ships and airplanes, maneuver to distant theaters, and keep the lights on. All this is critical to deterrence.

» Misplaced priorities can lead the Pentagon to deal with problems best handled by others.

» Peripheral concerns keep the military from focusing on critical planning and essential training.

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COVID-19 and climate change, lumping them together as threats. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said few threats to national security "deserve to be [called] existential," but that climate change qualified. He ordered the Pentagon to "prioritize climate change considerations." President Biden's interim national-security guidance reiterates this point. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said that among the top challenges facing the US Navy are China, climate change, and COVID.

This is misguided. The Chinese Communist Party, unlike climate change and COVID-19, is an opponent that makes choices to advance its goals.

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

That is why defense experts consider China a "pacing threat." China has modernized its armed forces to deny others access to the island chain running from Japan through Taiwan down to Singapore. This makes it more difficult for the US military to project power in the area. In recent months, China has sent dozens of aircraft into Taiwan's air-defense identification zone. It has developed weapons systems, such as hypersonic missiles and cyber capabilities, and is expanding its nuclear arsenal.

Climate change and COVID-19 are complex challenges with many potential consequences, including mass migration and political instability. But

actors with strategic intent don't drive these outcomes—unless the administration is willing to deem the COVID-19 outbreak a deliberate act.

The essence of strategy is competition. Good strategy must respond to actors pursuing their objectives. The military strategist Carl von Clausewitz called this a "dialectic of wills," whereby actors take actions and counteractions against each other. Similarly, modern strategist Edward Luttwak writes of "the paradoxical logic of strategy," in which successful actions can't be repeated because "the other party adapts." That's why fighting the last war is a formula for defeat: it would be unwise to repeat the same action against an adaptive adversary.

In contrast, successful approaches to complex problems should be repeatable. Lockdowns and mask mandates were deployed a century ago during the Spanish flu with some success. A well-designed vaccine works against its designated target.

Certainly the US military can work to reduce its carbon footprint. But meaningful shifts away from fossil fuels are limited by the need to power ships and airplanes, maneuver to and across faraway theaters, and keep the lights on in its installations. All this is critical to deter adversaries. Until scalable and sustainable advances in power generation and energy storage arrive, decarbonizing the Pentagon would undermine deterrence.

Similarly, COVID-19 affects the readiness of US forces. The Pentagon can contribute to solutions—through, for instance, its scientists sharing information and its logistics capabilities. But a pandemic is not a pacing threat.

Conflating threats posed by strategic actors and those posed by operational challenges has several debilitating effects. First, it shifts Defense Department attention and resources from pressing strategic challenges. Last year, senior officers called into question America's ability to deter and defeat a possible Chinese military action against Taiwan. What is the military's operational concept to defend Taiwan? How does it plan to counter the growing Chinese nuclear capability? How does the United States intend to build up its naval forces, despite shrinking defense budgets? While Pentagon leaders focus on strategies for climate change, they don't yet have answers to these problems.

Climate change and COVID are complex challenges, but actors with strategic intent don't drive the outcomes.

Second, misplaced priorities can result in using the military to deal with problems best handled by others. The United States has several agencies

dedicated to public health, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, the US Public Health Service, and the Food and Drug Administration. States also have public health capabilities. Environmental regulation and energy policy are the principal responsibilities of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Energy Department. Simply put, climate change and pandemic response are not the Pentagon's problems to solve.

Until the futuristic forms of power generation and energy storage arrive, decarbonizing the Pentagon would harm deterrence.

Third, such concerns take time and focus away from developing the skills needed to compete against adaptive actors like China. The toughest questions facing the Defense Department have little to do with COVID-19 or climate change. Pentagon planners need to speed up acquisition cycles to take advantage of new technologies. They need to manage the proliferation of artificial intelligence and harness emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles and electronic warfare.

Militaries exist primarily to defeat strategic actors. As the Biden administration develops its National Security Strategy, it must distinguish between thinking, adaptive adversaries and the problems posed by COVID-19 and climate change. Improving the Pentagon's ability to deter or win wars against pacing threats will keep it busy enough.



"Complexity Is the Enemy of Security"

Describing cyberwar, Hoover fellow **Herbert Lin** lists novel threats—and novel ways of fighting back.

By John Mecklin

As the United States modernizes its nuclear forces in coming decades, it will upgrade the computer and communications technology associated with them. Much of the technology now controlling US nuclear weapons was produced before the rise of the Internet. Newer technology will improve aspects of command, control, and communications related to the US nuclear arsenal. But if not carefully planned, the updating of nuclear technology could also increase risk in distinct ways. Stanford fellow Herbert Lin, a member of the Science and Security Board of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* sat down with *Bulletin* editor in chief John Mecklin recently to discuss his new book, *Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford University Press, 2021). Lin explains why the nuclear modernization effort could actually increase the chances that adversaries could misread US intentions, with potentially disastrous results.

John Mecklin, **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:** We'll start with nuclear modernization. You clearly see that as US nuclear forces are modernized,

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the computer systems are all going to be modernized. And you see some potential danger there in terms of cyberattack and intrusion. Why don't you explain the danger you see.

Herbert Lin: Let me give a prefatory comment. When people think about cyber risk, they most often think about cyber vulnerabilities in computer systems, and that is a big deal. There's no question about it. Cyber vulnerabilities have to do with flaws in the implementation or the design of a computer system that may be connected or controlling a missile or a nuclear weapon or command control system or something. But these are flaws in the design or implementation that if the bad guys know about them, they can make the system do something that the designers of the system never intended. So that's one kind of cyber risk.

There's a different kind of cyber risk that comes about because of the potential for inadvertent or accidental escalation. For example, an adversary's cyberattack may be intended to degrade our conventional forces, but we may think the adversary is going after our nuclear forces. That might increase the pressure on us to consider going nuclear. There are certain technical characteristics of cyber that make that kind of question about intent much more ambiguous.

The kind of risk that you just mentioned, the first kind of risk, the fact that you have more computer systems out there, and then you can be more likely to be hacked—yes, that is true.

You're computerizing to a much greater extent than you did before. And now, with nuclear modernization, it's going to be plug and play; there's going to be a common architecture, and people are going to be plugging into it. And there'll be people who will communicate not over the Internet, but over an internet-like, IP-based network where all these systems talk to each other. And yes, there are additional risks that come with that.

FATAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS

Mecklin: You see particularly a problem with the United States and I guess other countries with intertwined conventional and nuclear systems—or with their doctrine, in some ways those are combined. And you had talked in your book about that being such a problem that you were even suggesting the idea that there ought to be impact statements. Why don't you explain that a little bit.

Lin: Here's an example. We have satellites that are staring down at the Earth that are intended to detect ballistic missile launches. These were originally put

up in the sky so that we could know when the Soviet Union—at that time, the Soviet Union and now of course the Russians or Chinese—are launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the direction of the United States. We have these satellites in orbit that look down at the Earth continuously, and they see a big hot flare, and they say, "Aha, that's a missile being launched against the United States." OK, so that's a nuclear warning system that signals that the United States may be under missile attack from Russia or from China.

Now it also turns out that these satellites, because of technological improvements, are good enough to see not just the very, very bright flare of an ICBM, but the much dimmer flare of a tactical ballistic missile. So, for example, it is publicly known that we see Scuds being launched in the Middle East, Scud missiles, which have much shorter range. They are ballistic missiles, but they're not armed with nuclear weapons. And we see these launches, too, with the same satellites.

"The system is doing what it is designed to do, but it's the whole philosophy of how we operate this stuff that's the problem."

Now imagine a scenario in which those short-range tactical missiles are being used. The United States, for example, might be using information gleaned from the satellites in orbit on these tactical ballistic missile launches to warn its missile defense forces in a region, such as in the Middle East or near China or something like that. So, because of these satellites, the United States has a more effective tactical missile defense in Asia, for example.

The Chinese might well say, "Hey, wait a minute. We don't like this. Their missile defenses are now much more effective against our tactical ballistic missiles. Why don't we just take out the satellites that are improving their missile defenses, which after all we have an interest in penetrating?" So now they launch a cyberattack against one of the early warning satellites, and we see it. Are we to conclude that their intention is to compromise the tactical ballistic missile warning function, or the strategic ICBM warning function? The Chinese will say, "No, no, no, no. We're not interested in going after your nuclear warning function. We have no intention of attacking with nuclear weapons, but your conventional ballistic missile defenses are a real problem for us. And we're attacking you because you're compromising the effectiveness of our short-range ballistic missiles."

But the United States will look at that and say, "Hey, wait a minute. They're trying to disable our most critical early warning systems. And we're going to suffer because the Russians are going to take advantage of it."

This is an example of where the United States has dual capability in one of its assets: a strategic nuclear capability, the warning of strategic nuclear attack, and a tactical role for warfighting purposes. And if the adversary goes after our stuff for war fighting purposes, how are we going to know that? Now, obviously this is not a problem in implementation or in design. The system is doing what it is designed to do, but it's the whole philosophy of how we operate this stuff that's the problem. And that's the potential for inadvertent escalation. If they start attacking our early warning satellites, we may misinterpret it.

"The United States has a tendency to believe that others believe our benign intentions. They don't."

I mention the desirability of impact statements when US forces go on the offense to make sure we consider the possibility that an adversary might conflate an attack on its conventional capabilities with one on its nuclear capabilities, and also a different kind of impact statement for US systems regarding their impact on nuclear decision making by both adversaries and US decision makers.

ESCALATION

Mecklin: An overarching theme of your book seems to be that various cyber issues are increasing the possibility of inadvertent escalation that could increase the possibility of nuclear war in a number of these scenarios that you lay out. You can't tell what the attack is really aiming to do.

Lin: That's right. The introduction of cyber here helps contribute mightily to a worst-case analysis scenario, which of course you have to worry about. If conventional war scenarios are things that you have to worry about, you have to worry about the possibility of escalation to nuclear. And from my standpoint, I want to keep that firebreak. I want to keep nuclear as far away from conventional as I can, because I'm concerned about this issue. But that philosophy—which I think is shared by many *Bulletin* readers and by many people on the Science and Security Board—is not shared by the majority at the Department of Defense, who want to use nuclear weapons as a way of deterring conventional war. And they say that we want to put in nuclear weapons to establish that you can't go down a path of conventional war, because they think conventional war is the most likely path to nuclear war.

That's the difference in philosophy and I think they're wrong about that, but that is what they think.

Mecklin: I'd like you to talk about what needs to happen, from your point of view, but also to respond to my thinking that boy, it would take a lot of coordination and a lot of interest in this at a whole bunch of different levels of government to really address the problem you're broadly describing in your book. Am I getting that right or wrong?

Lin: No, I think that's very, very true. Here's one very big aspect of the problem. As a part of American DNA—and it's not just American, it's human DNA—everybody wants their information technology system to do more—to have more functionality in some way. We want it to be better, faster, easier to use, have more functions, support more applications, et cetera. You always want it to be doing more. The problem is that whenever you want a computer system to do more, you have to make a bigger system. You have to add to it.

And every computer professional will acknowledge that complexity is the enemy of security. More complexity means more security problems. More complexity means less security. And so, what happens today is that we say we want more functionality, more, more, more, more, more, and the security guys shrug their shoulders and do the best they can. They never get the opportunity to push back, to say, "No, you can't do that. That makes the system too hard to make secure." So the security guys are not able to affect the functional requirements of the system, and until you can get somebody who's willing to discuss that trade-off—ask for less, and you'll get a more secure system—until someone is willing to say that, we're going to have a big problem. And that speaks to the large-scale, institutional problems that you were just describing.

"I want to keep that firebreak. I want to keep nuclear as far away from conventional as I can."

Mecklin: That would take people at or near the tops of the services and the Joint Chiefs (of Staff).

Lin: That's correct.

Mecklin: Is there a solvable problem, given that all the services do their own tech, their own acquisitions?

Lin: Well, that's an interesting question. I do have one proposal in there, which is that right now, US Strategic Command has the authority to specify the requirements for nuclear command and control systems. To the extent that these systems are also going to be dual-use to deal with capabilities for the conventional forces, under the current state of affairs, you would say, "No, no, Strategic Command gets to specify the nuclear part." But it's still the services that are going to be buying these systems. And they're going to optimize them for their own warfighting purposes, which is mostly conventional war.

My proposal is that STRATCOM ought to have acquisition authority over anything that touches nuclear, and that will make the services very mad, because they'll say, "You're developing the system to be optimized for nuclear. Most of the time it's going to be used for conventional. What's the problem here? This is not good for us." And that's true. It's not good for them, but if you really believe that maintaining security and integrity of the nuclear command and control system is the really important thing, you're going to optimize for that. And the conventional guys should take what they can get. Right now, all the power is in the services because they control the money. They control the contracts. STRATCOM may be able to come in and say, "Well, I want this requirement, this requirement, this requirement," but they can't beef up the whole business.

Mecklin: Well, that would take direction from the White House.

Lin: It's more than that; it takes legislation. We have some instances in which the operational commands have acquisition authority. Special Operations Command, for example, has its own acquisition authority. To some extent, Cyber Command now does, too. And I say STRATCOM should have it.

Mecklin: That's one hard recommendation that you've talked about in the book, which is really a wide-ranging look at cyber-nuclear vulnerability that includes things that people don't ordinarily think of, such as supply chains and where computing components come from. Is that a solvable problem? Outside of some hard-to-imagine "buy everything American" policy. How do you resolve that?

Lin: There are methods for mitigating that risk, not for eliminating it entirely. In the end, what you have to do is make sure that the effect of a compromise [of a system] stays limited.

Mecklin: Is there anything in the book that I haven't touched on that you particularly wanted to talk about?

Lin: Well, speaking from the *Bulletin*'s perspective, there's a lot of it that implicitly adds to the case against ICBMs, as they're currently configured. There's a sense in which eliminating the ICBM force would also significantly reduce cyber risk.

Mecklin: Because you would lose the launch-on-warning time pressure.

Lin: That's correct. And that time pressure makes understanding what's happening in cyberspace much more difficult. You can't understand what's happening in cyberspace in a short, high-pressure time.

Mecklin: What's your Hollywood elevator speech, the message of your book? What are you trying to get across?

Lin: One, don't computerize unnecessarily. Two, be careful about how your actions in cyberspace will be perceived by others. Because those two statements speak to both kinds of cyber risk. "Don't computerize unnecessarily" speaks to the vulnerabilities inherent in computer systems. And as I said, the more and more we develop and deploy the complicated stuff, the more vulnerable we are. And the second one points to reduction in the risk of inadvertent escalation and consequences.

The United States has a tendency to believe that others believe our benign intentions. They don't. We may know we're benign. But the other guys sure don't know that we're benign, and we should not act as though they know we're benign.



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America's Wars

A decade ago, the Pentagon prophesied an "era of persistent conflicts." That era is upon us.

By Thomas H. Henriksen

America finds itself grappling with a series of international threats unlike anything it has confronted during the past three decades. A surging China and a resuscitated Russia loom as major-power rivals in ways reminiscent of the Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union. Both revisionist states make no bones about their contempt for the United States, and their territorial aggressions and authoritarian governance clash with American interests and values. Amid these growing big-power confrontations are the wildcards of Iran and North Korea: both rogue states are pursuing nuclear arms and longer-range missiles to reach the United States and Western Europe. Finally, peripheral regions in Asia, Africa, and Arabia have been the scenes of a series of US counterterrorism operations that spread American fighting forces across a dozen small quasi-wars.

None of these dire conditions darkened anyone's crystal ball when the Soviet Union toppled into the historical dustbin. With the USSR's disappearance in 1991, the future promised blue skies for the United States. Free of the military costs of the Cold War duel, Washington cut defense budgets, brought troops home, and pursued nondefense spending for domestic priorities.

Thomas H. Henriksen *is a Hoover Institution senior fellow (emeritus). His latest book is* ***America's Wars: Interventions, Regime Change, and Insurgencies after the Cold War*** *(Cambridge University Press, 2022).*

But rather than peace and stability after the Berlin Wall fell, Americans found themselves in an "era of persistent conflicts," as noted in a memorandum by the US Joint Forces Command in 2010. Indeed, the Pentagon, whether controlled by Democratic or Republican presidents, marched into the Middle East, Central America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and islands in the Western Pacific. Instead of a respite, the Defense Department got interventions, regime changes, and insurgencies.

As the Cold War's victor and the world's most powerful nation, the United States assumed the captaincy for global stability and peace. Other states looked to Washington to solve international problems. Even American citizens expected their own government to "do something" when conflict broke out or disaster struck a hapless people.

America engaged in wars to remove troublesome autocrats, safeguard minority populations from annihilation, and spread freedom. Its presidents imbibed Wilsonian dreams to make the "world safe for democracy." Like Silicon Valley engineers, US political leaders believed that American political values could function alongside any cultural software. These herculean exertions fell short.

In Washington's mind, democracy promotion was integral to its interventions, regime changes, and conflicts. But while Western-style democracy and personal liberty possess universal appeal, the political and cultural institutions underpinning democratic governance and political freedom demand long development before they can flourish.

QUICK MOVES IN PANAMA

In one of the first quasi-wars after the sun had set on Soviet Russia, the United States invaded Panama. During the 1980s, General Manuel Noriega, the behind-the-scenes powerbroker, had been a CIA asset, helping Reagan administration officials smuggle arms to the Contra rebels in their battle against Nicaragua's Sandinista regime. But by the time George H. W. Bush settled into the White House, Noriega had become a liability. The caudillo trafficked in narcotics, threatened the strategic Panama Canal, and defied the United States. Fed up, Bush launched an invasion and arrested the caudillo on drug charges. Operation Just Cause got under way in late 1989; it went well and resistance collapsed in less than a week.

The twenty-member Organization of American States, a South American grouping, condemned the US invasion as a violation of sovereignty. The OAS's furor soon subsided because the United States ushered in a democratic president, stabilized the country, and left within a few months of the incursion. In many ways Panama represented a model of how to dispatch

"COME AND GET ME": Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega condemns US involvement in Panama's affairs during a rally in 1988. Noriega had been a US asset in the 1980s, but his threats and criminal activities eventually led to his being deposed by a US invasion. [David Walters—*Miami Herald*]

a dictatorial regime, implant democratic rule, and escape entanglement in postwar problems.

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Iraq's invasion of neighboring Kuwait took the world by surprise. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, claimed the country as Baghdad's nineteenth province. President Bush toyed with sanctions to persuade Saddam to withdraw. Convinced that only force would protect Saudi Arabia's vast oil reserves from Iraq, Bush opted for military force.

Operation Desert Storm crushed the Republican Guard in a lopsided victory. US air attacks, a ferocious fusillade of precision bombs and missiles, drew comparisons to a video game. Five hundred thousand US troops (with over a quarter million allied combatants) swept aside the decimated and shell-shocked Iraqi divisions in a hundred-hour land war.

Kuwait's liberation was just one consequence of the Gulf War. The conflict also notably deepened Washington's political and military involvement in

the Middle East. Additionally, the success of the information-age weaponry contributed to the concept of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), which seemed to forecast rapid and easy American battlefield victories. But RMA proved to be no silver bullet against terrorism and insurgency. As high-tech warfare, RMA enabled US forces to obliterate platforms—tanks, aircraft, and ships—but elusive snipers, suicide bombers, or ambushers proved maddeningly harder to eliminate.

One critical facet of the post-bellum Iraq policy arose from the Bush administration's imposition of "no-fly zones" to shield the Shiite population and the Kurds from Saddam's murderous police. Patrolled by American, British, and for a while French warplanes, the allied pilots rained down missiles and bombs on military vehicles, radars, and missile batteries. These airstrikes constituted a de facto war that lasted until the actual Iraq War. Bush bent UN resolutions, waged war in a time of peace, and set the precedent for subsequent White Houses to carry out drone attacks against terrorists in a host of countries not at war with the United States.

Finally, President Bush broadened his "new world order" doctrine to international relations, which borrowed from Wilson's idealism. He eschewed isolationism and called for "a Pax Universalis built on shared responsibilities." Bush and subsequent American leaders invoked the principles of liberal internationalism that led to military incursions for democracy and human rights.

HIGH TIDE OF INTERNATIONALISM

During the mid-1990s, the Pentagon staged quasi-combat operations on behalf of humanity into Somalia and Haiti, and twice into the Balkans. These nontraditional engagements, known as "military operations other than war," were regarded skeptically even by the top Pentagon brass as a diversion from real soldiering.

In the twilight of his presidency, Bush deployed thousands of US troops into chaotic and lawless Somalia to distribute food to the starving population. Before leaving office, Bush pulled out most of the forces and laid plans to turn over responsibility to the United Nations early in the new Clinton administration. The Clinton White House instead presided over a star-crossed nation-building plan. The military's "mission creep" in Somalia ended with an ill-fated raid in the seaside capital of Mogadishu in October 1993.

Although it could have been a mere historical footnote, the Battle of Mogadishu had a far-reaching impact. It convinced Osama bin Laden that when

NEVER FORGET: A banner in The Hague, the Netherlands, marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1995 massacre of Muslims in Srebrenica, Bosnia. Yugoslavia's long-simmering ethno-nationalistic tensions exploded in 1991, and the phrase "ethnic cleansing" entered the world's vocabulary. [Romy Arroyo Fernandez—NurPhoto]

push came to shove, America would cut and run from a fight. The US pullout attracted jihadists, who in Somalia and elsewhere continue to exploit instability to recruit adherents and launch terrorism.

Haiti became President Clinton's next test. A democratic election placed Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the presidential office, where his leftist calls for society's reordering and wealth redistribution unnerved the Haitian elite. They made common cause with the nation's top army officers to overthrow Aristide in 1991. Clinton eventually authorized a democracy-restoring intervention in 1994.

"Uphold Democracy" did restore Aristide to the presidency, but it was beyond American power to establish corruption-free democratic governance. The Clinton administration handed over its Haiti operation to a UN task force in 1995. During the George W. Bush presidency, the Pentagon fielded Marines to participate in a UN stabilization mission in 2004, which presided over the defenestration and exile of Aristide, whose criminal and thuggish rule had generated acute political turmoil.

In Europe, the Balkans plunged into the worst bloodshed seen on the continent since World War II. Yugoslavia's long-simmering ethno-nationalistic tensions exploded in 1991. The catalyst was Slobodan Milošević, the new president of Serbia, one of the six republics that had made up Yugoslavia. The former communist functionary fanned extreme Serbian nationalism and sense of victimhood. Serbian militias intimidated, raped, and murdered to "ethnically cleanse" neighboring territories they claimed. Other nationalities took up arms in defense, but the chief victims were Bosnia's Muslims and Croats.

The Clinton administration sought to sidestep a bloody quagmire that the UN peacekeeping forces were struggling to contain. Eventually Washington, London, and Paris struck back with air assaults, forged an alliance between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats, and urged the Russians to cease their wholehearted support for the Serbs. In 1995 the United States brokered a contentious peace settlement in Dayton, requiring several thousand US troops to ensure the peace.

No sooner had peace descended over Bosnia than shooting and killing broke out in Kosovo, a tiny Muslim enclave ruled by Serbia. Determined to wrest their own sovereignty, the Kosovars staged attacks on Serbian police and soldiers. To drive Serbia to negotiations, the Clinton administration initiated a seventy-eight-day NATO bombing campaign that drove Milošević to stand down for fear of an allied ground intervention.

TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN—AND BACK

The twin Balkan wars bookended the liberal international era after the Cold War—a time of US militarized humanitarianism—and set the stage for the wars to come against terrorism. The former Yugoslavia was remade in the spirit of Wilson's Fourteen Points, with self-determination and statehood for all the former republics. What would follow were robust combat invasions in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These would pursue Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and phantom nuclear arms in Iraq, and even in these new wars, Washington would subscribe to Wilsonian principles such as the protection of minorities, advocacy for self-determination of nationalities, and the imposition of democracy.

Osama bin Laden's terrorist strikes catapulted the United States into an intervention and occupation of Afghanistan, and fears of another mass-casualty assault later brought about the Iraq intervention and the global war on terrorism.

The George W. Bush administration used an innovative strategy to force out the Taliban regime that hosted the Al-Qaeda network. US special forces

DOWNED: Parts of a downed Black Hawk helicopter lie in a neighborhood in Mogadishu, Somalia. This was the second helicopter shot down during the 1993 US raid. The Battle of Mogadishu convinced Osama bin Laden that America would retreat from combat. [Peter Tobia—*Philadelphia Inquirer*]

teams and CIA field officers harnessed anti-Taliban militias as a ground force in lieu of American troops. The Defense Department provided extensive air cover. Together these forces pushed the Taliban from power in a matter of weeks. This unconventional-warfare tactic of leveraging local partners against a common foe would be repeated in many other theaters. The multinational occupation implanted a democratic system on a polarized citizenry; it strove to build a modern nation with rights for women and ethnic communities in a pre-Enlightenment society. Soon the occupiers faced an insurgency undertaken by militants returning from their sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan, and the US-led forces suffered from errors and the diversion of resources to the Iraq War. In time the Afghan battlefront would badly deteriorate.

The second conflict against Saddam Hussein arose out of the fears aroused by the 9/11 attacks along with the mistaken intelligence assessment that Iraq

possessed chemical and nuclear weapons. Without UN approval, President Bush went to war with a coalition of the willing in 2003, and the opening offensive with massive airpower and fast armor took Baghdad in three weeks. Soon, however, the invading armies became ensnared in Iraq's raging sectarian civil war.

A significant dimension of the Iraq War was the American efforts to foster democracy amid an intensifying insurgency spearheaded by Salafi-jihadist militants and their Iranian supporters. Under US supervision, Iraq held countrywide elections for an assembly to draft a constitution, then staged a referendum to adopt the document, and finally mounted nationwide balloting to elect a parliament from which the prime minister was selected. Unfortunately, self-rule and democracy failed to slow the bloodshed.

In many ways Panama represented a model of how to dispatch a dictatorial regime, implant democratic rule, and escape entanglement in postwar problems.

Three things saved the US-led efforts from almost certain defeat. Chief among them was the Awakening movement within the Sunni Arab tribes, which turned against the jihadists for their excesses and joined up with US troops to rout the extremists. The Pentagon sent 28,500 additional troops into the fight. And the US military implemented a fine-tuned counterinsurgency strategy. The street battles had greatly subsided by the end of 2011, when President Obama withdrew all US combat troops from Iraq.

Arriving at the White House committed to end George Bush's "dumb war," Obama was unmoved by his generals' plea to retain a modest US garrison in Iraq, now nearly free of Al-Qaeda forces. At that time the Shiite-led government veered toward majoritarian rule, excluding the Sunni population from decision making and creating fertile ground for extremism to establish a foothold. The terrorist echo was not long in returning.

Al-Qaeda organizers and fighters had traveled to Syria to take advantage of the gathering chaos in the civil war to unseat Bashar al-Assad. There, the Salafi militias recruited widely. With tens of thousands of militants, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) network smashed back into Iraq, overrunning the weak Iraqi defense. Baghdad called upon Washington to rescue the country. Before sending military forces, Obama sensibly required political changes, including a new prime minister, to ease the Sunni-Shiite animosity.

American forces loosely cooperated with the Syrian government, Russia, and even Iran to expel ISIS from its Syrian enclave, which buckled in defeat during the Trump presidency. The strange-bedfellow coalition collapsed once ISIS lost its territorial caliphate.

In Afghanistan, the Obama administration pursued a surge-and-withdraw strategy. The president authorized forty thousand additional troops but placed the reinforcements on a tight timetable, with some returning home by 2012. He also insisted on substantial drawdowns by 2014. By then the Afghans had assumed combat missions and the United States and allies had stepped back to training and mentoring, except for copious air support for airstrikes and transportation. The war slipped into a stalemate.

President Obama turned over a "forever war" to his successor, Donald Trump, who made changes in its conduct. Like his predecessor, Trump favored a pullout of all American forces from the mountainous country, but he did give the Pentagon slightly more resources and greater leeway for managing the war. He also oversaw a withdrawal deal that required the United States and its allied forces to withdraw by May 2021.

Instead of a respite after the Cold War's end, the Defense Department got interventions, regime changes, and insurgencies.

After a few months in office, President Biden decided to withdraw all US combat troops by September 11, 2021, the twentieth anniversary of the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. This decision ran against the advice of many military officers and civilian experts. Their assessment proved sound. Amid the helter-skelter retreat from the two-decade war zone, the Taliban not only took over the country but also looked triumphant. The Biden White House appeared weak and irresolute to its foes in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang.

TOMORROW

After the 9/11 attacks, small counterterrorism operations commenced in the Philippines, Somalia, Yemen, and in several countries in Africa. Such light-footprint campaigns are considered necessary to stop jihadists from establishing bases from which they could launch terrorism against the American homeland and other targets. They are fought mainly by special-operations forces who work "by, with, and through" locally recruited combatants. Reinforcing this type of warfare are US airstrikes using drones, warplanes, and missiles. To date, no subsequent 9/11-magnitude terror assault has touched

US shores. Some lawmakers, retired officers, and opinion leaders in the United States now wish to retreat from America's forward presence, citing both fatigue and dangers elsewhere.

The emergence of Chinese and Russian belligerence constrains Washington's ability to intervene militarily, carry out regime change, build nations, and reconstruct societies along democratic lines, at least on the scale once undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq. Together those two wars cost more than seven thousand American lives and about $2 trillion. They were not follies, but they are cautionary tales—especially in light of the Taliban's swift victory in August 2021 and America's failed commitment to rebuild Afghan society along Western lines. And the new national-security environment dictates greater spending on missiles, warships, cyberwar, and advanced aircraft, not on counterinsurgency and nation building.

A "revolution in military affairs" seemed to promise rapid, easy American battlefield victories.

Despite the need to deal with new great-power threats, it is important to recognize that ending the Pentagon's counterterrorism partnerships in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East would most likely heighten the risk of a catastrophic terrorist strike against the US mainland. Moreover, America's partners depend on our military forces for training, weapons, mentorship, logistics, intelligence, and transport. Without the Pentagon's help, the besieged nations still face the possibility of being overrun by jihadist militants, just as Iraq and Syria were when ISIS surged. A complete exit from the "9/11 wars," even as other demands take on importance, could lead to murderous replays of history. ◘

***Special to the* Hoover Digest.**



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Healing Pandemic Scars

The "COVID generation" of students will require our full attention for years to come.

By Michael J. Petrilli

Last fall brought the latest results from the National Assessment of Educational Progress's Long Term Trend series, and they were sobering. Just before the pandemic kicked in, American thirteen-year-olds saw statistically-significant declines in both math and reading—a first in the study's nearly fifty-year history. Black, Hispanic, and low-achieving students saw the largest declines.

The question is why. And the answer is: nobody knows for sure. The Nation's Report Card is great for tracking trends across time and across subgroups, but clunky for looking inside the black box of cause and effect. So we pundits are left to float hypotheses and stitch together what evidence we can to test them.

So it was that I suggested to several reporters, and on Twitter, that the Great Recession might be to blame. I've floated the idea before, given that "main" NAEP results have also lagged of late for more or less the same cohort of students. This led to some gentle teasing from some of my edu-wonk friends, making fun of my supposedly tortured logic that blames a long-ago economic downturn, and related spending cuts in schools, rather than a more proximate cause, like the Common Core.

***Michael J. Petrilli** is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution and the president of the Thomas B. Fordham Institute.*

And you know what? All these folks might be right! Test scores alone are akin to a Rorschach test. Just as we don't have consensus on why America's violent crime rate dropped precipitously in the 1990s and 2000s—or why it's on the rise again—we struggle to make sense of gyrations in national test scores. But allow me to make my case.

THE POVERTY CONNECTION

Test scores go up and test scores go down. It's powerfully tempting for wonks to believe that policies deserve the credit or the blame. Most notably, when achievement for black students rose sharply in the 1970s and early 1980s, especially in the South, most analysts argued that it reflected the impact of desegregation and the access to greater resources that came with it. (Later studies would question these assumptions, though they remain the conventional wisdom.)

So when test scores started shooting up again—in the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially for black, Hispanic, low-income, and low-achieving kids—pundits and politicians alike wanted to credit the major policy shifts under way at the time, especially the advent of results-driven school accountability. And indeed, rigorous studies found that accountability did cause some improvements in NAEP scores. But those impacts were relatively modest and limited to math, while the national improvements were huge and seen across multiple subjects.

A few years ago, I dug into the data and concluded that most of the achievement gain was probably the result of plummeting child poverty rates in the 1990s. For example, using the "supplemental poverty measure," which looks at income from both jobs and social programs, the black child poverty rate dropped from close to 55 percent in the mid-1980s to 32 percent in 2000. This was a wonderful development in its own right and meant that millions more American children came to school ready to learn. And once those kids were old enough to sit for NAEP exams, we started to see those trends reflected in test scores.

The lesson is an important one: we must be careful not to put our education-policy selves at the center of the story. As a George W. Bush administration alumnus who still has his No Child Left Behind pin stored away somewhere, I want to believe that it was accountability policies that lifted achievement. And I believe they did—a bit. But the forces lifting families and their children out of poverty almost surely did even more.

So why should it not also be true that the worst economic catastrophe since the Great Recession put these trends into reverse? The thirteen-year-olds who took the Long Term Trend exam in January 2020 would have been

[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

babies when the economy started falling apart in 2007. Parents were thrown out of work. Many families were thrown into poverty. And the hardship was deep and long lasting. It would have been a miracle had such shocks not had a negative impact on the academic and noncognitive development of these children.

Then this unlucky cohort of kids got hit again when they entered kindergarten during the era of deep spending cuts—roughly 2011 to 2013—after federal relief funds had been spent and districts went over a fiscal cliff. This was no typical downturn. It was the first time in recorded history that real per-pupil spending declined nationally. High-poverty districts were hit hardest. And despite much pleading by us pundits, those districts, by and large, did not make cuts strategically, but wielded a meat cleaver—laying off the most junior teachers (regardless of their effectiveness), raising class sizes across the board, eliminating reading coaches, getting rid of tutoring programs, and on and on. This happened just as this cohort was making its way through kindergarten, first, and second grades—arguably the most important period for developing literacy and numeracy skills. So it's not surprising that Kirabo Jackson and his colleagues have found compelling evidence that these school-budget cuts did real harm to student achievement.

We can, and should, bemoan that we allowed these kids to get off to such a slow start, that we didn't find a way to insulate them from the storm around them. And we can wish that schools had accelerated their learning over the past eight years so they might have recovered from their early life challenges. But are we really surprised that, in general, at scale, the American education system failed to do so?

DISMAYING ECHOES

Again, I can't be sure that I'm right. Maybe it was Common Core—though the timing isn't quite right, given that few schools were implementing the new standards in earnest until the new tests came on the scene around 2015. The cohort of kids we're talking about would have missed the Common Core in their most formative years.

Or maybe it was the end of consequential accountability starting early in the Obama administration, when waivers allowed most states to take the pressure off low-performing schools, or certainly by the advent of the Every Student Succeeds Act. But if accountability can't take too much credit for test score gains, can the lack of accountability take much blame for test score declines?

The reason all this matters is that it helps us make better decisions. If we think Common Core is the culprit for these latest scores, for example, we will

conclude that we should ditch the standards. But that might turn out to be a huge mistake.

And we are entering a very challenging period, given the COVID-19 crisis and its already-all-too-clear consequences for student achievement. Needless to say, it's the impact on kids that we should worry about most. But we also need to be smart when it comes to analyzing achievement trends now and over the next decade. In particular, we need to expect that scores will be depressed through at least the early 2030s. Think of today's first-graders, who spent last year doing "remote kindergarten." Many of those kids likely learned next to nothing, meaning they entered first grade a year behind. For our neediest students, who tend to enter kindergarten years behind in normal times, the challenge is even greater.

And of course we're not yet out of the woods, given disruptions such as staffing shortages. So our first-grader is probably going to fall further behind this year, too.

In three years, when he takes the fourth-grade NAEP, these scars are going to show. And they will still be apparent seven years from now, when he sits for the eighth-grade NAEP, and eleven years from now, when he takes the twelfth-grade NAEP. (If he makes it to twelfth grade, that is.)

Unless.

As the Lorax famously said, "Unless someone like you cares a whole awful lot, nothing is going to get better. It's not."

Changing the course of history for this cohort of kids is the challenge at hand today. Accelerating student learning will take commitment, smarts, and the political will to invest federal relief funds strategically. A decade ago, it's now pretty clear to me, we failed to rise to the challenge in the wake of the Great Recession. Let us not repeat the same mistakes.



A Lesson in Balance

Schools must learn, with wisdom and humility, to blend both parents' rights and society's needs.

By Chester E. Finn Jr.

Candidate Terry McAuliffe surely blundered when he declared—out of context though it was taken—that "I don't think parents should be telling schools what they should teach," thereby handing his Virginia gubernatorial rival, Glenn Youngkin, a perfectly timed campaign issue. Millions of parents in Virginia and across the land were already aggrieved by their schools' mishandling of education during the COVID-19 pandemic, conscious that many school systems paid greater heed to the demands of their adult employees than the needs of their pupils. This caused huge learning losses for most kids and enormous challenges for parents. Lots of parents were also alarmed by reports that their schools were going to extremes in teaching about race, gender, sexuality, and other touchy or politically charged issues. At a time when the larger polity was already polarized, siloed, and jittery, it was a no-brainer for Youngkin and his advisers to make this a winning issue in the Virginia governor's race.

Key points

» Moms and dads have every right to know what's going on in their children's schools.

» Schools are not exclusively the province of parents any more than they are the monopoly of the state.

» Concerned parents can exercise other options: changing schools, running for the school board, or even starting new schools.

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Signals from other elections plus polling data also suggest that education has re-emerged as a top concern for much of the electorate. House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy has responded with a promise that the GOP will soon develop a "parents' bill of rights" intended for Republican use in the midterm elections and beyond, as well as future action on Capitol Hill.

It's too soon to know what will be in it, though undoubtedly it will make a big deal of parents' right to select their children's schools. One may hope it also includes a push for curricular transparency so that parents can readily see what their kids are being taught, not just in the three R's but also in civics, history, literature, and the less academic realms of social and emotional well-being, health, and values. Parents should know who is teaching and counseling their daughters and sons—their names, their training, their work experience, and (where relevant) their certification. Moms and dads also have every right to know what's going on in their children's schools by way of disciplinary policy and practices, building security, and the handling of awkward "social" issues (who uses which restrooms and locker rooms and plays on which teams), as well as such basics as what's on offer in the lunchroom.

That's all legitimate information for parents—and much of it is very difficult for most parents to find out today. Bravo for a "bill of rights" that takes up and runs with transparency as well as choice.

But how much farther should it go and is there a risk of going too far?

Indeed there is such a risk. Bill-of-rights architects should strike a careful balance, something nearly unheard of at an unbalanced time. For education is not exclusively the province of parents any more than it's the monopoly of the state—precisely the balance the Supreme Court struggled with a century ago in its landmark *Pierce* decision.

That balance is a combination, a sort of hybrid, that begins with the truth that education is both a private good and a public good—as any economist will tell you. The child is not the creature of the state, yet society has an obligation to ensure that its next generation is adequately educated. That's why every state has embedded that obligation in its constitution. That's also why, for instance, states have compulsory attendance laws even as parents have the right to educate their kids at home. If they send them to school, as most do, they should have choices among schools, yet the state decides what is a school. Parents should of course select the school or schools that best suit their children, but having done that, they should entrust things like curriculum to the schools and their educators. If parents are then unhappy with how it's going in the school they chose, they should—and should be able to—change schools.

But that's not the same as meddling in the curriculum and pedagogy of their chosen schools or harassing the professionals who staff them.

Schools should be free to differ in dozens of ways, yet it's reasonable for the state to verify that they all provide adequate learning outcomes in core subjects. That doesn't mean all schools must use the same curriculum or pedagogy or follow the same philosophy to produce those outcomes. Again, it's a balance, one easily thrown out of whack if, for example, the state doesn't permit or overly constrains school choices, or if parents, having chosen, still interfere overmuch with how their schools go about it.

Parents have other options, too. They can—and many more should—run for the school's board or the local school board. They can run for the state board of education, the town council, or the legislature. They can start their own charter or private schools, at least they can where this is permitted by law and where the state's dollars follow children to the schools they actually attend. A non-trivial issue in Virginia is the Old Dominion's extreme paucity of public charter schools—just seven at last count—because of a highly restrictive charter law, meaning that the overwhelming majority of Virginia families have no choices beyond their local school district. This means the political system builds up education steam without adequate escape valves. That leads to rancor, protests, and overheated campaigning rather than the creation of viable alternatives.

So let's applaud the generous provision of quality school choices everywhere in the land. And let's push for maximum school transparency. In pursuit of those ends, a parents' bill of rights is a fine thing. But let's also make sure that it can coexist with society's responsibility to ensure that its next generation gets satisfactorily educated and the state's obligation to ensure that that happens. Let's try—let's hope—to get this balance right despite the imbalances that surround us. ◘

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Draining the Golden State

Your tax dollars (not) at work: voters approved billions in bonds for affordable housing, but the state not only built nothing, it couldn't even figure out how to spend the money.

By Lee E. Ohanian

Ever heard of the state's Debt Limit Allocation Committee? Neither had I until I read a state audit that found this committee squandered roughly $2.7 billion in bond funds that were intended to build housing. Yes, one of the state's organizations responsible for allocating funding for affordable housing couldn't even get the money out the door for its intended purpose.

This is not surprising. This is the inevitable consequence of a government that gets too big and too complex, has too much funding, and has no accountability, so no one keeps their eye on the ball.

The Debt Limit Allocation Committee, which is the branch of the State Treasurer's Office that issues bonds for private projects with a public benefit, had $3.5 billion in tax-exempt housing bonds to allocate to developers to encourage them to build low- to moderate-income housing.

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But the committee dropped the ball and kicked the bonds, all $3.5 billion of them, to the California Pollution Control Financing Authority, which finances green projects. In a game of musical chairs, the pollution authority got stuck with several billion dollars it would never be able to spend. Overriding its own staff recommendation to decline the funds, the pollution authority took the bonds and spent $800 million, letting $2.7 billion expire when the deadline to distribute the funding passed. Whoops.

So now we have California voters, trusting and good-hearted souls, having agreed to a bond issue that they will pay back in the future with their tax dollars, believing that those in state government—who are paid more than those in the private sector on average—would distribute those funds to build new housing.

But when government is no longer founded on principle, integrity, and accountability, government commitments are routinely broken—and not just a wee bit, but to the tune of billions of dollars. And California ends up squandering what would be new housing for tens of thousands of people.

How could any organization dealing with $3.5 billion not implement standard accounting practices?

But it is worse than that. Much worse. This ten-year-old failure was implicitly covered up until it came under the scrutiny of the state auditor, Elaine Howle, who discovered this massive mess-up in late 2020, stating in a none-too-kind report as follows:

> The absence of a comprehensive and coordinated plan allowed the Debt Limit Committee to mismanage and ultimately to lose $2.7 billion in bond resources with little scrutiny, a loss that the committee failed to publicly disclose and struggled to explain.

Who was on the committee at that time (2012)? Governor Jerry Brown, state Treasurer Bill Lockyer, and state Controller John Chiang. Sean Spear was the executive director.

Such a committee should not be staffed by the governor, treasurer, and state controller. None of these positions offers additional bandwidth for any of these people to deal with allocating billions in housing funds. But in any case, what do these members have to say in response to questions about the committee's failure to allocate those bond funds? Brown: silence. Lockyer: silence. Spear: silence. Chiang says he doesn't remember the bonds.

It is not as if the Debt Limit Committee members didn't understand that the bonds had a deadline for distributing the funds. They did, and they

drop-kicked the $3.5 billion to the Pollution Authority, which bought another three years for distribution, resulting in $800 million spent on various green projects.

"If the committee had allocated bond resources based on demand and past use of bonds and assigned more of the remaining bonds for affordable housing purposes, it might have avoided substantial waste," noted the auditor's report.

The auditor's report notes that the Debt Limit Committee now has implemented accounting and auditing practices to track distributions and amounts that are carried forward to future years. Really? What a novel, outside-the-box idea: using elementary accounting methods to keep track of account balances, distributions, and carryovers!

How could any organization dealing with $3.5 billion not implement standard accounting practices? The year 2012 wasn't the Stone Age. California has more than 150,000 accountants; they are not unicorns. There are even free online apps that can do this.

But doesn't the state have to file any IRS forms on this kind of stuff? It does. It needs to file an IRS form that keeps track of funds carried forward. So, were those IRS forms ever filled out? Who knows? The state treasurer now indicates that the committee will make sure that what it reports to the IRS and what it keeps track of internally will be consistent. Another breakthrough!

You really can't make this up. Meanwhile, the state budget grows rapidly, with no change in accountability. Governor Gavin Newsom has proposed a state budget for fiscal year 2022–23 that will rival the size of Finland's total GDP. These types of grand mistakes will continue until California voters vote differently, or until the state empties out, whichever comes first. ◘



"The Ball Is in Our Court"

Hoover fellow Glenn Loury urges black Americans to embrace "the freest, most prosperous, most dynamic society on the planet," adding this reminder: "We need our fellow Americans onside."

By Peter Robinson

***Peter Robinson,* Uncommon Knowledge:** Glenn Cartman Loury is the Merton P. Stoltz Professor of the Social Sciences and professor of economics at Brown University. He also hosts a weekly podcast on Ricochet: *The Glenn Show*. Professor Loury, welcome.

Glenn Loury: My pleasure.

Robinson: On *The Glenn Show,* you call yourself a "woke buster." You're a chair professor at one of the nation's oldest and most prestigious universities. What do you do to call yourself a woke buster?

Loury: Well, if the other side—the woke side—weren't so crazy, I could go on with my equations and my lectures and mind my own business. I'm trying to stay in touch with reality and maybe save the country.

Glenn Loury *is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the Merton P. Stoltz Professor of the Social Sciences and professor of economics at Brown University, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and the host of a podcast called* ***The Glenn Show. Peter Robinson*** *is the editor of the* ***Hoover Digest,*** *the host of* ***Uncommon Knowledge,*** *and the Murdoch Distinguished Policy Fellow at the Hoover Institution.*

Robinson: "Maybe save the country": modest ambitions.

Loury: [laughs]

Robinson: You're a man who has traveled great distances. You grow up in a rough neighborhood in Chicago; you become a father while still in your teens; you take a job as a clerk in a printing plant. From there, you go on to earn a doctorate at MIT by age twenty-seven and become a tenured professor of economics at Harvard by thirty-three. How did you get from the South Side of Chicago to a chair professorship in Providence, Rhode Island?

Loury: Well, it is a long story. I had a lot of help. I got inspiration from my father, a self-made man who labored hard all his life and rose to a high level in the Internal Revenue Service as a federal employee. I got wonderful support from teachers. I was fortunate enough at Northwestern University to have been recruited as a scholarship student, even though I was married with kids and working a full-time job. Northwestern was looking for some promising prospects from the South Side of Chicago in the 1970s. I discovered the whole world, intellectually speaking, at that university in the few years I spent there. I had tremendously inspirational teachers at MIT. It's a great economics department now, but an even greater department then, with Nobel laureates to spare. And God-given talent that allowed me to take advantage of these opportunities. I worked my tail off. I kept my nose to the grindstone, even though I bounced around a bit in my teens. It has paid off.

WOKE BUSTING

Robinson: In a lecture you delivered in Richmond in 2005, you discussed the 1968 Kerner Commission report on the riots during the long summer of 1967. The commission blamed the riots on racism, failed social programs, and a lack of economic opportunity. This is what you said in 2005: "To a significant extent, the Kerner Commission's recommendations were heeded. There is not one significant institution in American political or economic life which has been unaffected by the push for 'diversity' and the emphasis on 'multiculturalism' which now dominate discussions of race relations. Blacks wield vastly more political clout at all levels of government today than was the case four decades ago. Yet it is arguable that conditions are worse. The prisons of the nation overflow with young black men. Two-thirds of black babies are born to unwed mothers nationwide." What went wrong?

"WOKE BUSTER": Brown University Professor Glenn Loury, a Hoover distinguished visiting fellow, says that "in 1968, it made a lot of sense to say that white America should own up to its responsibilities. In the year 2021, it's basically a level playing field we're dealing with." [Glenn Loury—Substack]

Loury: That's a hard question. The vision of the anointed—as our friend Thomas Sowell would say—that we could solve this problem by expanding the Great Society, by enacting more antidiscrimination laws, by doubling down on affirmative action, and so forth, was an error. This problem is a development problem, not a bias problem. This is an issue of empowering and envisioning a confrontation with the consequences of our history that have left large swathes of the African-American population not performing in ways that allow us to take advantage of the opportunities that have been created. As my friend Shelby Steele is fond of saying, the problem before us now is not a problem of oppression, it's a problem of freedom, a problem of seizing opportunity, a problem of taking responsibility. Jails are overflowing with African-Americans not because there is a conspiracy in state legislatures or in police departments to go around locking up black people, but because too many of our young men are behaving in ways that end up leaving them in confrontation with the law and susceptible to imprisonment. In education, the skills development gap is reflected in test scores and representation of African-Americans in elite educational venues.

The kind of circumstances that people want to invoke affirmative action to repair are, to a large extent, a result of the failure of public institutions of educational service delivery for their clients. It's also a reflection of the patterns of behavior of the allocation of time, of values of communal norms, the extent of parenting, the emphasis on developing the intellectual potential of our population. Look at the family: two-thirds of kids are born to women who are not married. The abortion rate among African-Americans is stratospheric. Gender relations between men and women, which is the central focus of how societies reproduce themselves in a healthy fashion, are deeply troubled.

In 1968, it was a compelling argument to say "two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal," as the Kerner Commission said. In 1968, it made a lot of sense to say that white America should own up to its responsibilities. In the year 2021, it's basically a level playing field we're dealing with. In the freest, most prosperous, most dynamic society on the planet, which millions of people are willing to risk everything just to get into, African-Americans are birthright citizens. The ball is in our court.

Robinson: Here's a quotation from the "What We Believe" page on the website for Black Lives Matter: "The impetus for our commitment was, and still is, the rampant and deliberate violence inflicted on us by the state." And here's a quotation from *Newsweek* about a year ago: "On Saturday, May 30, 2020, Chanel Hawk's store was one of dozens looted in Atlanta—and many more across the United States—amid days of protests following the death of George Floyd. As a black business owner, Hawk said she was shocked to learn looters targeted her store at a time when protesters were taking to the streets to call on the government to address systemic racism." Black Lives Matter sounds noble and aspirational in some ways. But what is happening in these cities? How do you think about what took place?

"We find intellectuals and political leaders—some black, some white, all progressive—making excuses, saying there's nothing to see here, turning away from the obvious failures within society."

Loury: I think it's hysteria and wild hyperbole. Sometimes police acting badly, or outside their legitimate authority, take black lives. That does happen. On the other hand, it's a country of 330 million people. There are tens of thousands of arrests every day in this country. We're talking about a handful of incidents, which become viral events on social media, where there can be

some question about inappropriate behavior by police toward black people. But the metaphor that Al Sharpton invoked at George Floyd's funeral—"America, get your knee off our necks"—is fiction. It's a lie. It's not an apt description of the actual circumstances. For a black person to fear going out their door because the police might somehow inappropriately treat them is like not going outside because you're afraid of being struck by lightning. That's objectively an inaccurate characterization of the circumstances. And if you lay that alongside the actual threats to black lives, which are sadly coming from the possibility of violent criminal victimization in the neighborhoods in which they live, often by other black people, the narrative that they're pushing is troubling. I'm talking about Black Lives Matter and the anti-racist activists who take the unfortunate few incidents of police mistreatment of black people and use them as a general characterization of the circumstances of black people in this country. It's something that a woke buster like myself is willing to devote a little bit of time to debunking.

"African-Americans are birthright citizens."

Robinson: In Chicago during the past twelve months, 790 people have been killed, and almost 80 percent were black. About 30 percent of the city is African-American and only about 20 percent of the police force, but the superintendent of police and the mayor are African-American. Why aren't there protests calling for more police?

Loury: Not only calling for more police and making public safety of black people in that city a primary issue, but condemning relentlessly the despicable behavior of a few people that is making that city so unsafe for everybody else. Instead, too often, we find intellectuals and political leaders—some black, some white, all progressive—making excuses, saying there's nothing to see here, turning away from the obvious failures within society that are manifest in this despicable behavior. Many of these victims are children. This is barbarism. We're better than that. Where's the leadership in African-American society on this issue? This is not us. This is not what a healthy African-American community would produce. Condemn this behavior.

MORALITY AND VALUES

Robinson: Once again from your Richmond lecture: "Liberals insist that these problems derive ultimately from the lack of economic opportunities.

Conservatives, like Charles Murray, have argued that the problems are the unintended legacy of a welfare state. If the government would stop underwriting irresponsible behavior, poor people would be forced to discover self-restraint. These polar positions have something very important in common. They both assume that economic factors lie behind the behavioral problems." What are you up to there?

Loury: "On Being a Christian and an Economist" was my subtitle for that lecture. I'm an economist, and we have our theories about human behavior. Our basic idea is that people respond to incentives, and we want to get the prices right. So, we have a pretty deterministic and materialistic outlook on things—left or right. But in those years, I was a better Christian perhaps than I am now. I was on fire, and it occurred to me, notwithstanding my training at MIT and my positions in the universities I have worked at, that there is more to human motivation than getting more, than greed, than satisfying want, than maximizing utility, than accumulating wealth. There's also something called right living. There's something called being comfortable with the way in which I am living my life. There is a spiritual dimension. What people believe, what they take to be significant, where they draw meaning in their lives, is also a fundamental aspect of human culture and human civilization. I wanted to give voice to the idea that everything is not about getting more.

"The problem before us now is not a problem of oppression, it's a problem of freedom, a problem of seizing opportunity, a problem of taking responsibility."

Charles Murray, whom I respect as a social scientist, says in *Losing Ground* that we had a war on poverty and poverty won, reflecting on the inadequate outcomes associated with the Great Society. He's right that the incentives of the welfare state often were poverty-promoting as opposed to poverty-alleviating. But that's not all that's going on when I look at two-thirds of African-American kids being born to women without a husband. That's not all that's going on when I look at the rates of violence that we were just talking about. There's space for appealing to people at the level of their spiritual responsibilities and urging them to look differently at how they should live their lives. What program could be more effective at encouraging parents to take responsibility for their children and persuading them that they are God's stewards in the lives of their children? A clever economist can come up with

all kinds of schemes to motivate them financially. But if parents embrace the idea that this is a precious responsibility and a sacred obligation, they're going to get the job done.

Robinson: I'm quoting you again: "Raising the issues of morality and values is vitally important. The family and the church are the natural sources of moral teaching—indeed, the only sources." If we were at a tent meeting, I would have converted now, listening to preacher Loury. This is very moving and it feels to me right. I don't know how government puts the family back together. I certainly have no idea how any government program can reassert the centrality in African-American life of the black church. But there's a sense in which it could let everybody off the hook and say, well, it's up to the black church and the family, and if they're not there, there's really nothing we can do about it. Do you see what I mean?

"The metaphor that Al Sharpton invoked at George Floyd's funeral—'America, get your knee off our necks'—is fiction. It's a lie."

Loury: I do see what you mean, because the ability of the state through law and policy to tell people how to live is limited, because we're a pluralistic society. We don't have a state religion; we don't tell people what to believe at that level. So, given that what they believe is important to how they function and that the state can't dictate to people what to believe, there's a conclusion there, which is that there's a limit on what the state can achieve in the face of this problem. And if we really want to see this problem ultimately resolved, we have to encourage the development of institutions from the ground up. We have to—in our rhetoric and our public leadership—extol the virtue of these institutions.

Let me be very concrete: education. Big city, public school, teachers' unions basically control the flow of resources for the delivery of those services to youngsters. There is nothing written anywhere that says that the only model for educating young people is large public-union-driven institutions delivering the services. You could have one thousand flowers blooming, ten thousand flowers blooming, a million flowers blooming. They could be charter schools with some public funds going in. They could be parochial schools. They could be homeschooling. They could be twenty families getting together and deciding to pool their resources to educate their children. I don't know all the possibilities. I do know that the entrepreneurial spirit and

the convictions that people bring about their responsibilities to their children have unlimited potential. This is what I believe.

Robinson: So, the government just has to get out of the way?

Loury: It could provide some resources because people are paying taxes, but it would give parents the autonomy to redirect those resources in ways that they saw were best.

Robinson: Tom Sowell—ninety-one years old and still swinging—recently wrote in a column: "When school propaganda teaches black kids to hate white people, that is a danger to all Americans of every race. Low-income minority students, especially, cannot afford the luxury of having their time wasted on ideological propaganda in the schools, when they are not getting a decent education in mathematics or the English language. When they graduate and go on to higher education that could prepare them for professional careers, hating white people is not likely to do them nearly as much good as knowing math and English."

Loury: I couldn't agree more. He's absolutely right about that. The ideological temper of much of the educational establishment, which wants to spew its propaganda over our children, is a waste of time, because we don't really have the luxury to indulge that, given the serious impediments to African-American children's participation in our society that comes about from their failure to get a decent education. But I would go further. We're Americans. African-Americans are 10–12 percent of a population of a dynamic, growing, constantly changing country. We need our fellow citizens onside with us on behalf of any program of any worth that we might want to pursue. Hating white people is madness in this country. It's simply a losing strategy. It's akin to a toddler throwing a tantrum when he does not get his way. It gets us nowhere.

"Justice Thomas was on my syllabus because he thinks for himself, and he's an iconic representative of the cost you pay for thinking for yourself."

The intellectuals, the people who throw this kind of "whitey is your enemy" stuff around, are already living high on the hog in this society. They can afford to alienate their colleagues. But people who are dependent upon basic functioning of social institutions to further their effort of achieving prosperity, those working-class and lower-class black people who are just barely holding on, need our fellow Americans onside. Alienating them gratuitously

with this racist rhetoric, hating white people because of the color of their skin, blaming them for the supposed sins of their fathers, it's not only a waste of time in the schools, it's a political distraction that we really can't afford.

CAMPUS GROUPTHINK

Robinson: Last spring, you conducted a seminar at Brown called "Free Inquiry and the Modern World." I showed your syllabus to my research assistant, who is a recent graduate of Yale, and he said it's the most courageous syllabus he's ever seen.

Loury: I should mention David Sacks here, who was my teaching assistant. He's an undergraduate at Brown. He's a great concert pianist who reads Greek and Latin and is a classics major at Brown. And he's a contrarian. He walked into my office one day and said: "You're one of the two or three professors around here who I think has his head on straight. I want to break free from the groupthink. Can you help me?" So, we put together a reading list and we did an independent study.

Robinson: Why does a kid at one of the most elite institutions in the country feel shackled in his mind, intellectually subjected to groupthink? How can this happen?

Loury: This is a kid who thought that every Republican politician was *not* necessarily a fascist, who thought that capitalism might *not* be the road to hell, who thought that religious people actually have a place within society. And what he's getting all around him in the dorm and in classes is this kind of left-of-center, secular, ultra-woke mantra. And he knows that it isn't quite right, and he's looking for an alternative. So, he walks into my office and says, "I cannot breathe around here. Can you help me get some fresh air?"

Robinson: "I cannot breathe"—that's just awful.

Loury: After that year of reading with David, we decided to make a course out of the material. The students loved being challenged to think about what a philosophical life means. What is an examined life? It was scintillating. The questions and discussions that went on within the class were deeply rewarding. And I've gotten some tributes from students after the course saying that it was the best experience in their educational career by far.

Robinson: Your syllabus ranges from Plato to Milton to Václav Havel. You also devote a week to Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas's memoir, *My*

Grandfather's Son. Why? What do you hope the students at this elite university will learn from his example?

Loury: I'm so glad you raised that, because it's not necessarily what you would expect. These kids are pro-choice in terms of abortion and pro–gay rights and things like that. A conservative, Catholic, long-serving jurist on the US Supreme Court is an unlikely hero for them. My point was that you may agree or disagree with this or that opinion of Clarence Thomas, but let me tell you about his life. Born in rural Georgia, dirt poor, scraped his way along, etc. If you want a model of African-American heroism and an ideal of what we should teach our kids to aspire to, I don't see how you could do any better than the life of Justice Thomas. But guess what? The National Museum of African American History and Culture did not even have an acknowledgement of the existence of Clarence Thomas in it until people started complaining. And guess what? If you go to any liberal law school and you ask civil rights professors what they think about Justice Thomas, they'll say he's a sellout and an Uncle Tom. And you can't find in Hollywood films or in novels any affirmation of the heroic character of this man's life. Why? He's a black conservative; he's off the reservation; he's thinking for himself. I had my students look at the film from the testimony that Justice Thomas gave at his confirmation hearings, in which he valiantly and powerfully affirms his right to think for himself. Justice Thomas was on my syllabus because he thinks for himself, and he's an iconic representative of the cost you pay for thinking for yourself. I wanted my kids to be able to look at his life in the whole, not filtered through what the talking heads at MSNBC might have to say about him.

"If parents embrace the idea that this is a precious responsibility and a sacred obligation, they're going to get the job done."

ANSWERING THE CALL

Robinson: In a lecture you gave at Oxford, you said, "I am a black intellectual. And I must stand with my people." Why? You don't have anything to prove to anybody. You could just relax and enjoy yourself.

Loury: I guess it's my upbringing on the South Side of Chicago in the 1950s and '60s. As you said that, it reminded me of something my uncle Alfred

said. He's now deceased, my mother's brother, a patriarch in our family, and I loved him. He was a wonderful man in so many ways. Early in my flirtation with Reaganomics in the '80s, when I started moving right, he pulled me aside and said, "Son, we can only send one from the South Side to MIT and Harvard. We sent you, and we do not see us in anything you do." It crushed me. I wanted him to see me as a furtherance of the river that's flowing along of our human existence, of our culture, of our family, of "our people." I wanted to be seen as a black man making it in the world and making the world a better place for "his people." In that very same essay, I acknowledge that when I say "my people," the antecedent is ambiguous. I'm an American, so my people are the American people, as well as the African-American people. And maybe one hundred years from now a man like myself, with the same kind of background of descent from Africans, will not feel it so necessary to affirm as his people that subset of the American nation that is the African-American people. I expect that if you were of Irish, Italian, or Jewish descent now—perhaps not so much the latter—that the need to affirm peoplehood in your ethnicity is less in 2021 than it was in 1921. I hope for the sake of our country that that'll be something we can also say about blackness in 2121. But I don't think we're there yet, with jails overflowing and everything else. I just feel it's a part of my own identity—a call of the tribe—and I'm not resisting it entirely.

"Hating white people is madness in this country. It's simply a losing strategy."

The Research Comes First

Hoover's "GoodFellows"—Niall Ferguson, H. R. McMaster, and John H. Cochrane—talk about the many ways the institution turns learning into action.

Bill Whalen: Welcome to *GoodFellows,* a Hoover Institution broadcast exploring social, economic, political, and geopolitical issues. I have the great honor of sharing the stage with three very wise men whom we call Hoover's "GoodFellows." That would be the economist John Cochrane; geostrategist and hopeless optimist H. R. McMaster; and historian and author Niall Ferguson—Hoover senior fellows all.

Let's talk a bit about the role of think tanks. What caught my eye was a piece in the *Economist* that ran two years ago. The headline: "Can think tanks survive in a post-fact world?" I think what they were getting at is think tanks are populated by pointy-headed academics, many of whom did not see Brexit coming, did not see Donald Trump coming, maybe they do not see the world the way they should be. Let's talk about the relevancy of think tanks these days.

Niall Ferguson: Let me begin by saying that in many ways Hoover is not a think tank in the conventional sense. I mean, we are a strange hybrid entity

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which is part academic center on the campus of one of the world's leading universities. But unlike many academic institutions, we are interested in policy. So we want our findings to become actionable. I think in that sense Hoover occupies a unique position that sets it apart from the Washington-based think tanks, particularly at a time when academia has swung so far to the left that most people would be absolutely staggered by the things that go on on a typical campus. We are in the unique position that we can at least offer some antidote to rampant wokeism and identity politics. I think Hoover is not really a think tank in the same way that the American Enterprise Institute or Heritage are. We are really trying to make academic research, the most sophisticated research on economics, on history, on international relations. We are trying to make it relevant to the people who have to make the decisions, whether it is in Washington or further afield, because I do not think our scope is purely the United States.

H. R. McMaster: I would say that is the key: the connection between scholarship and then having a positive influence on policy but also education. I think one of the ways that we get out of the mess that we are in, in terms of the lack of strategic competence we have seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere, is for the American people to demand better from their leaders. I think Hoover's uniquely positioned to do that. The other problem you sometimes see with some think tanks is they become very superficial; they are trying to have immediate policy impact with essays or events or discussions that may or may not be grounded in rigorous academic research. We have a tremendous opportunity to do that here. We have amazing students at Stanford and the opportunity to work with them as research assistants. It is like an ongoing seminar as we examine the greatest challenges and opportunities we are facing internationally or economically. I think we have some unique advantages based on where we are but also on our colleagues. The ability to share and borrow ideas freely across disciplines within an institution like this is immensely powerful and it has been part of my continuing self-education.

"We do not produce the unintelligible, or at least once we have done the unintelligible, then we produce the tweet."

John H. Cochrane: I would say that if we are in a post-fact world it is because people choose to live in a post-fact world. We are in a dysfunctional partisan world where most people choose to be post-fact. Where do we fit in?

There is a conventional view of think tanks that our job is to whisper wisdom into the ear of the emperor to help the policy makers make policy more wisely, as if they do not know what to do. That was an important function of think tanks back when there were policy makers who needed help on "how do you make a tax code work?" or things like that. But in our current world there are two important roles for us. One, as Niall has alluded to: we are the medieval monastery during the Dark Ages that keeps the wisdom alive. And we do not just transcribe it, we improve on it. When the world is ready, we are here.

"We are in the unique position that we can at least offer some antidote to rampant wokeism and identity politics."

Also, I think it is a mistake to think of our political system as "there is the policy maker, and we whisper in his or her ear and good policy gets made." No, we are a democracy. There are the people who are making policy, and around them are the chattering classes, those who read the op-ed pages of the *New York Times,* the *Wall Street Journal,* and care about public affairs. Then there are the vast mass of voters. Politicians that I have met are actually quite smart and quite knowledgeable, but they are constrained by the ideas of the people around them. When the ideas of the chattering classes are completely nuts, things are going to go bad. We want what used to be called the elite of ideas to have *better* ideas.

Here's an example. I think one of our great successes was Milton Friedman's school-vouchers essay in 1955 ["The Role of Government in Education"]. Now, he did not give it to some governor who said, "oh great, we will do vouchers." That idea has slowly spread and inspired much more research. Senior fellow Rick Hanushek keeps working on it now, and it is taking over because people understand that I should have the right to say where the money goes. That is the kind of long-run influence I think we aspire to. And the mechanism combines scholarship, research, and outreach.

Ferguson: I agree with all of what John said. But I think parts of what we have learned from doing *GoodFellows* is that we can reach folks all over the country and all around the world who do not belong to the elite but *do* want to be informed about policy and *do* want to get fresh ideas. For me, an exciting departure—and it was an unintended consequence of how you respond to a pandemic—is that we are reaching way more people than we used to, and we are no longer confining ourselves to conversations with members

of the political elite. Frankly, I think what is really refreshing is the kind of communications we get from people all over the place who are responding to what we discuss on these shows. I think we are becoming an institution with a much greater reach than we used to have, precisely because we no longer target exclusively the elite or the chattering classes.

Whalen: The three of you write in the here and now, you write about current events, you write books, you testified at Congress, you have a lot of phone calls with people of influence. Where do you feel you make an impact?

Ferguson: The way to think about this is that there is this very, very hard process of coming up with answers to difficult questions. In my case, as a historian, that usually means writing a book far too long for anybody to read it from cover to cover. I recognize that a book is now essentially a decoration in an office or in a home. The number of people who actually got through volume one of my biography *Kissinger* was probably quite small, but that is OK, I have to do that work. That is essential as the foundation for everything that I do after that. What I do then is I will start writing some shorter articles, there will be something in *Foreign Affairs* or someplace like that. Then you get to the next level, which is the op-ed in the *Wall Street Journal* or wherever it happens to be. I have done television; I did a PBS series just a year or so ago. Ultimately when we have conversations like this or on other podcasts, I think that is sort of the final product. You are building layers on top of that base of primary research, and ultimately you get it to the point where you can express your most sophisticated idea in a tweet. I know that is a terrible thing to admit to . . .

"The ability to share and borrow ideas freely across disciplines within an institution like this is immensely powerful and it has been part of my continuing self-education."

McMaster: Maybe a thread, maybe a thread.

Ferguson: . . . maybe a thread, but I still like the art form of the single tweet. The point is if you cannot express an idea—and I have said this to students for twenty-five years plus—if you cannot express your thesis in a single sentence, you are not ready to start writing. Also, if you cannot express it in a single sentence, do not expect large numbers of people to know what you are all about. Many academics never see that and indeed

make a virtue of speaking at excessive length and in obscure language. Hoover is against that, and that is why I am so proud to be part of this institution because we are always striving to make it clear, to make it intelligible. Talk to anyone in Washington, the staffers, what will they tell you: "we are super busy, we cannot read a five-hundred-page book; just give us an abstract." I think that is healthy and one of the strengths of Hoover: we do not produce the unintelligible, or at least once we have done the unintelligible, then we produce the tweet.

McMaster: Or the superficial. I think one of the reasons we are increasingly polarized is the superficiality of discussions. The people who are the most vitriolic and adamant about the most extreme positions on both sides are oftentimes those who know the least about the issues. The point that Niall made is really important. Before you can bulletize something, you have to have done the research and the thinking and the reading and the discussing to ensure that you have confidence in that sort of compressed version of your scholarship. And to have the opportunity is a real gift. It *is* kind of like a monastery, as Niall said, but it is kind of a fun monastery.

"You have to listen and have a conversation in all dimensions."

Cochrane: What you guys are pointing out is the importance of continued engagement. You do not just write one thing and that is that.

McMaster: Right.

Cochrane: But you engage continually over a range of topics on many platforms. Ultimately what we want is the average American—when there is a crisis and somebody says, "well, the government should just send us all checks; that will be easy"—to have understood the philosophy. To have understood the larger way of thinking about things and not to need to call us for a ten-bullet-point plan on why that might not be such a good idea.

Ferguson: In truth, there is a lot of quite wonkish stuff going on that you do not see, which involves plowing through the not-quite-fully-baked manuscripts of your colleagues. Doing it in an interdisciplinary way. I am an economic historian, not an economist; I have learnt so much from John over the years. I am somebody who writes a book about war *[The War of the World]* but would never go near a battlefield because I would be killed immediately. I

have learned a huge amount from H. R. We had a conversation just the other night over dinner about some of his combat experiences. If you are trying to write about war but you have never been nearer to a battlefield than your armchair, you need a colleague like this who has seen real action.

Cochrane: I just want to add that everything is a conversation. Scholarship is a conversation among us and between us and the policy makers or the educated, thoughtful citizens of the country. The engagement we get at Hoover is not just in one direction. You have to engage in policy and listen and understand concerns of people. People on the other side of your own political preferences as well, to try and say we are all concerned about how we can get there. You have to listen and have a conversation in all dimensions. That is another great part about being in a think tank.

"When the world is ready, we are here."

McMaster: I have had so many of our students and alumni research assistants say, "I never thought about the world the way that we thought about it in our research efforts." I think we're setting an example for a counter to this orthodoxy of the new left, or of post-colonial theory, or these reified philosophies they teach our young people: that they should be intolerant of other people's views, they do not have agency, they cannot build a better future for generations to come. A really toxic combination of anger and resignation. I think we are kindling in the younger generation a sense that they can make a difference. ◘



Woke Islamism

United by their contempt for open societies and their reliance on social-justice pretexts, political Islamists increasingly find themselves in sync with leftists.

By Ayaan Hirsi Ali

Since the demise of ISIS, Islamists around the world have been forced to radically reassess their strategy against the West. Dashing the hopes of Islamic State's sympathizers, the fall of the self-proclaimed caliphate has set back the Islamist cause for decades. Just as when many communists became disillusioned once their ideology had been implemented in the Soviet Union, ISIS's barbarity can no longer be ignored.

True, even in 2022, some groups such as the resurgent Taliban and Boko Haram—to say nothing of the Iranian regime—remain committed to a type of Islamist militancy that includes an emphasis on violence, with all the human suffering that entails. But for the most part, jihadist militancy has proved unpopular among Muslims, often inviting a violent counterreaction. Its promise of an Islamist dream state has lost its appeal.

Yet Islamists in the West appear to have found a possible solution that sidesteps, at least for now, the use of explicit violence. The core of this alternative strategy is to focus as much as possible on *dawa*.

Nearly twenty years after the 9/11 terror attacks, Westerners still remain unfamiliar with *dawa*. In theory, the term simply refers to the call to Islam,

Ayaan Hirsi Ali *is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and the founder of the AHA Foundation. Her latest book is* ***Prey: Immigration, Islam, and the Erosion of Women's Rights*** *(Harper, 2021).*

a kind of invitation; Westerners would recognize it as part of a proselytizing mission. In practice, however, Islamists rely on *dawa* as a comprehensive propaganda, PR, and brainwashing system designed to make all Muslims embrace an Islamist program while converting as many non-Muslims as possible.

Among Western analysts, *dawa*—which became a tool of the Muslim Brotherhood in the twentieth century—has traditionally received far less attention than militant jihad, though observers have emphasized its importance in the "humanitarian" activities of Hamas.

In her book *Unveiled: How Western Liberals Empower Radical Islam,* former Muslim Yasmine Mohammed compellingly describes her difficult marriage to the Egyptian jihadist Essam Marzouk. Yasmine commented on the rivalry that exists between jihadists (such as her ex-husband) and ostensibly "nonviolent" Islamists:

> The truth is that Essam hated the [Muslim] Brotherhood: he thought Islamists were a bunch of pansies. He was actually aligned with a more militant group in Egypt called Al-Jihad, who were the Egyptian wing of Al-Qaeda. Both Islamists and jihadis have the same goal—to spread Islam—but they have different methods. Islamists want to do this through passive means such as politics, immigration, and childbirth.

This important point is often lost on politicians in Western countries. For no matter what misguided retired CIA officials may claim, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood are neither moderate organizations nor pluralist partners in civil society. Islamist groups are certainly not likely to prevent the radicalization of young Muslims. Instead, as one observer noted more than a decade ago, "the history of the Brotherhood movement shows, in fact, that it has operated by and large not as a firewall against jihadism, but as a fertile incubator of radical ideas in a variety of locales."

A MORE SUBTLE APPROACH

In a cynical way, Islamists achieve far more through *dawa* than when they confine themselves to simply blowing things up and stabbing people to death. The threat is not as obvious. Jihad and the use of violence tend to provoke an immediate response. With *dawa,* on the other hand, it is possible to talk about charity, spirituality, and religion—and then compare it to normal religious proselytizing missions. In a free society, what reasonable person would take issue with that?

COMMON CAUSE: Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, exhorted "Islamic countries to address Islamophobia as one of the main challenges facing the Islamic Ummah." Islamists increasingly invoke the language of grievance against the West, even as they persecute and oppress their own people. [Chatham House—Creative Commons]

But *dawa* is also about building networks: local, regional, and international. In *The Call: Inside the Global Saudi Religious Project,* Krithika Varagur revealed both the enormous global scale and opaque nature of these efforts. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has channeled billions of dollars into *dawa*—with much of it directed into the United States.

In the West, these regimes are not given much thought, nor is the Islamist infrastructure in the United States. Nonetheless, Islamism is spreading within Western institutions, and it's largely thanks to an unlikely alliance: *dawa* has recognized the alluring power of "woke," and has started to adopt the language of civil rights and multiculturalism.

Of course, this is not an entirely American phenomenon, but the energy in the US progressive movement has taken this cooperation one step further.

In France, by contrast, *Islamo-gauchisme* (Islamo-leftism) is much more likely to be correctly identified as a threat to the model of universal, secular, and republican citizenship. In Britain, it remains less prominent, confined to fringe politicians such as George Galloway, who believes that "the progressive movement around the world and the Muslims have the same enemies."

Both are anti-West and anti-American. Both have a critical attitude towards "capitalism" based on individualism.

Yet as historian Daniel Pipes has noted, the relationship between Islamism and extreme leftism is nothing new. In 2007, Oskar Lafontaine, former chairman of Germany's Social Democratic Party, noted: "Islam depends on community, which places it in opposition to extreme individualism, which threatens to fail in the West. [In addition,] the devout Muslim is required to share his wealth with others. The leftist also wants to see the strong help the weak."

At the same time, the internal tension between "wokeism" and Islamism is never far away. Just look at Al-Jazeera, which uploads documentaries about transgender rights onto its social media channel while broadcasting sermons suggesting husbands should beat their wives on its Arabic station.

Nevertheless, the two movements do share objectives. Both are anti-West and anti-American. Both have a critical attitude towards "capitalism" based on individualism. The Islamists have been around for much longer. But Islamist ideologues are willing to co-operate with non-Muslim leftists as long as it serves their purposes.

CAPTURING THE AGENDA

To their credit, some on the left refuse to countenance Islamism, as they become increasingly aware of the contradiction between supporting universal human rights (including women's rights) and the demands of Islamists. In France, for example, the center-left former prime minister Manuel Valls courageously denounced Islamo-leftism without the least hesitation.

In the United States, however, such vocal opposition from the left is increasingly rare. Indeed, at the 2019 Netroots Nation conference—America's "largest annual conference for progressives"—multiple panel discussions and training sessions reflected the Islamist agenda, frequently coalescing around a critique of Israel while neglecting the toxic role played by Hamas in perpetuating the conflict. Meanwhile, Linda Sarsour, a feminist organizer and co-chair of the "Women's March," has made her support for Islamism more

explicit: "You'll know when you're living under sharia law if suddenly all your loans and credit cards become interest-free. Sounds nice, doesn't it?"

In government, too, Islamism's capture of progressivism has become increasingly clear. Turkey's Islamist president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, might lead one of the world's most brutal and repressive regimes, but that hasn't stopped Ilhan Omar, a Democratic congresswoman from Minnesota, from expressing support for him. No doubt she was inspired by Erdoğan last year when he proclaimed that "social justice is in our book" and that "Turkey is the biggest opportunity for Western countries in the fight against xenophobia, Islamophobia, cultural racism, and extremism."

Erdoğan, in effect, was explicitly using progressive rhetoric. It's a move that's since been mirrored in Iran. The *Tehran Times*—which describes itself as "a loud voice of the Islamic Revolution"—recently attacked former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo for "deep-rooted Islamophobia." And in March, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif "lauded the determination of Islamic countries to address Islamophobia as one of the main challenges facing the Islamic Ummah [community in the West]." Islamists, in other words, are becoming skilled at wrapping themselves in a mantle of woke words while engaging in systematic brutality and repression within their own countries.

To this new alliance between Islamism and progressive rhetoric, there is no simple response. *Dawa,* by its very nature, is inherently more difficult to fight than jihad. But those who believe, as I do, in a free, open, pluralist society need to be aware of the nature and magnitude of this new challenge. After two decades of fighting Islamist terrorism, we have a new and more subtle foe to contend with. Wokeism has long been regarded as a dangerous phenomenon—but only now are we starting to see why. ◘



Available from the Hoover Institution Press is ***The Challenge of Dawa: Political Islam as Ideology and Movement and How to Counter It,*** *by Ayaan Hirsi Ali. To download a copy, visit www.hooverpress.org.*

Overcoming Woke Racism

Scholar and public intellectual John McWhorter's new book calls for courage and a rebirth of the liberal spirit.

By Peter Berkowitz

The partisans going to the barricades on opposing sides of America's political divide are united in the conviction that the old-fashioned liberal spirit has outlived its usefulness. A system that is rotten to the core and requires a radical overhaul, say the rabble-rousers on the left, precludes toleration, civility, and the disposition to consider the merits of contending perspectives. Meanwhile, the firebrands on the right respond that it's pointless to speak of mutual respect and understanding in the face of those who insist that America is rotten to the core and requires a radical overhaul.

The scorn shared by belligerents on the left and right for the old-fashioned liberal spirit underscores the need to nurture it. John McWhorter leads the way in his new book, *Woke Racism: How a New Religion Has Betrayed Black America*. His hard-hitting critique of what he calls "Third Wave Antiracism" weaves together reasoned analysis, empirical evidence, common sense, and autobiographical reflection, and is set forth in engaging and colloquial prose.

***Peter Berkowitz** is the Tad and Dianne Taube Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is a participant in Hoover's Human Prosperity Project and a member of Hoover's task forces on foreign policy and grand strategy, and military history.*

His underlying conviction is that dealing justly with issues of race depends on developing workable public policies within a framework that secures equal rights under the law. It's a view, once championed across the political spectrum, that reflects a vote of confidence in the resilience of constitutional democracy in America.

A professor of linguistics at Columbia University, a *New York Times* columnist, and an accomplished podcaster (on linguistics and on race and justice with his "sparring partner," Glenn Loury), McWhorter draws on history and social science, keen observation of contemporary events, and his experience as a black American. He knows that, even as this country has come a long way in combating racism, the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow continues to burden African-Americans. While stating "that I see myself as serving my race by writing" this book, he never uses his skin color to demand acquiescence to his thinking or to silence or vilify critics. Contrary to "antiracist" advocate Ibram X. Kendi, who tends to reduce critiques of his views to white supremacy, McWhorter stresses that the primary victims of the new antiracism's demonization of those who disagree (and infantilization of those whom it mobilizes) are black people themselves.

McWhorter explains that he was in part prompted to write the book to understand what kind of people shame and destroy others for utterances and actions that only a few years ago would have been seen as innocent infelicities of expression or perfectly legitimate contributions to the robust exchange of ideas in a free and democratic society. He provides no shortage of recent examples of woke vindictiveness: the *New York Times* food writer who in 2020 was set upon by a Twitter mob and chased from her job because she criticized two famous women—one half-white and half-Thai, the other a Japanese citizen—for commercialism; the University of Massachusetts, Lowell, nursing school dean who was fired that year shortly after the killing of George Floyd because she wrote to colleagues and staff, "BLACK LIVES MATTER, but also, EVERYONE'S LIFE MATTERS"; and the progressive consulting-firm analyst, also fired in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd, for mentioning in a tweet a scholarly paper demonstrating that protests for racial justice that involve incidents of violence—as opposed to protests that remain peaceful—drive voters to the Republican Party.

FANATICAL FERVOR

It wasn't always like this. "First wave antiracism battled slavery and legalized segregation," according to McWhorter. "Second wave antiracism, in the 1970s and '80s, battled racist attitudes and taught America that being racist

STANDING UP: Author and scholar John McWhorter's book* Woke Racism: How a New Religion Has Betrayed Black America *argues for workable public policies that secure equal rights under the law. The "extremist version of antiracism today," he writes, must be understood as a new religion. [Neilson Barnard—Getty Images]

is a moral flaw." Both were consistent with, indeed compelled by, the nation's founding principles.

However, the third wave, the one through which we are living, attacks those founding principles while condemning America's core institutions and public culture: "Third wave antiracism," writes McWhorter, "becoming mainstream in the 2010s, teaches that because racism is baked into the structure of society, whites' 'complicity' in living within it constitutes racism itself, while for black people, grappling with the racism surrounding them is the totality of experience and must condition exquisite sensitivity toward them, including a suspension of standards of achievement and conduct."

McWhorter elaborates commonsense reasons for regarding third wave antiracism as itself a debilitating form of racism. It bases the allocation of benefits and burdens on skin color. It demeans black people by insisting that they see themselves as weak and wounded, lacking agency, and unable to compete with white people. It buys off white people by satisfying them with virtue signaling through the shaming and ostracism of those who deviate

from the rigid ideological strictures it propounds. And it distracts everyone from feasible political reforms that would improve the lives of the most vulnerable black Americans.

It cannot be because of the coherence of its tenets that the new antiracism has attracted a huge following at universities, in the media, among corporations, and throughout the government bureaucracy. After all, as McWhorter argues, the doctrine is fraught with contradictions. For example, third wave antiracism teaches that one must not speak of "black culture" because each black person is a distinct individual while insisting that black people must not be expected to adopt "white" social norms since black people have their own culture. It demands that white people strive to understand black people even as it labels white people who think they understand the black experience as racist. And it proclaims that black people cannot be held accountable for the actions of black individuals even as it holds all white people responsible for the evil of "whiteness."

McWhorter was prompted to write the book to understand what kind of people shame and destroy others for utterances and actions.

To make sense of the harms that it inflicts and the inconsistencies with which it is riddled, maintains McWhorter, the "extremist version of antiracism today" must be understood as a new religion. He calls its members "the Elect." Kendi, Robin DiAngelo, and Ta-Nehisi Coates are among its most eminent clergy. Their writings and workshops are delivered and received more as sermons than as arguments subject to empirical study and logical analysis. Their tone is evangelical. They and their parishioners traffic in conversion and demand confession. They enforce taboos, convene star chambers, punish blasphemies, and ban heretics.

It would have been better if McWhorter had characterized "the Elect" as religious fanatics because it is a mistake to equate religion with the intolerant, the irrational, and the cruel. Nevertheless, his perceptive exploration of third wave antiracism's zealotry persuades him that "the Elect" cannot be reasoned with. They can, though, be worked around.

A SUMMONS TO THE SPIRIT

"What ails black America in the twenty-first century," writes McWhorter, "would yield considerably to exactly three real-world efforts that combine political feasibility with effectiveness." To wit:

» The United States should **end the war on drugs,** which has created a thriving illicit market that draws inner-city black youth into a life of crime, increases their encounters with police, and, for those who land in jail, drastically diminishes their prospects.

» Black children in low-income areas growing up in homes that give relatively less attention to books should be **taught to read through phonics**—sounding out letters and memorizing exceptions. "Since the 1960s," reports McWhorter, "phonics has been unanimously demonstrated to be more effective at teaching poor kids to read."

» We must **reject the idea that a four-year college degree is essential** to "being a legitimate American." Instead, opinion shapers and policy makers need to learn to appreciate that solid-paying working-class jobs like welding, plumbing, and carpentry—often obtainable with not more than two years at a vocational institution—form pillars of well-lived lives and in particular give people who grew up poor the opportunity to improve their condition.

McWhorter gives reasons to see "third wave antiracism," which allocates benefits and burdens by skin color, as itself a debilitating form of racism.

To advance these salutary political reforms, McWhorter warns, we must stand up to the new antiracism's "ideological reign of terror." He asks us to summon the courage to show respect to all individuals, whatever their race, by calling out incoherence, historical falsification, and authoritarian conduct wherever we find them and whatever their source.

That is another way of saying that the struggle for racial justice in America depends on the rejuvenation of the old-fashioned liberal spirit. ◘

Available from the Hoover Institution Press is ***Varieties of Conservatism in America,*** *edited by Peter Berkowitz. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.*

More Method, Less Madness

King George III, the allegedly addled monarch who "lost America" and ended up a punch line in the musical *Hamilton*, deserves better. So says historian Andrew Roberts, whose new book undertakes his royal rehabilitation.

By Peter Robinson

***Peter Robinson,* Uncommon Knowledge:** A graduate of Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge, the historian Andrew Roberts is a professor at Kings College London, a lecturer at the New York Historical Society, and the Roger and Martha Mertz Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Dr. Roberts is the author of more than a dozen major works of history, including *Napoleon: A Life, Churchill: Walking with Destiny,* and now *The Last King of America: The Misunderstood Reign of George III,* which the *Times* of London called "magisterial" and picked as its book of the year. Andrew, welcome.

Andrew Roberts: Thank you very much, Peter. It's great to be back on the show.

***Andrew Roberts** is the Roger and Martha Mertz Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of Hoover's Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict. His latest book is **The Last King of America: The Misunderstood Reign of George III** (Viking, 2021). **Peter Robinson** is the editor of the **Hoover Digest,** the host of **Uncommon Knowledge,** and the Murdoch Distinguished Policy Fellow at the Hoover Institution.*

Robinson: My opening question involves just a few seconds of perhaps the most influential portrait of George III—prior at least to the publication of your book—which comes from the musical *Hamilton:* "When push comes to shove," says George III, "I will send a fully armed battalion to remind you of my love." Fair?

Roberts: Not at all fair! I tap my foot to *Hamilton* as much as everybody else. But there's another song where he talks about how he's going to kill your friends and family to remind you of his love. In fact, he was a benevolent monarch, he was a true Enlightenment monarch, and he was a Renaissance prince in many ways. He was far from that sort of camp, preening, sadistic character in *Hamilton*.

Robinson: You spent three years on this book and the queen recently released roughly one hundred thousand pages of papers dealing with George III, many in his own hand. You've read that material and you've kept company with the man. I can't escape the feeling in the book that you like him.

Roberts: Yes, and that's why I use the word "misunderstood" in the subtitle, because he's been hugely traduced by historians. Not just American historians, which you would expect, but also by British historians, who've attacked him for things that he simply wasn't guilty of. One of them is the form of his madness. But mainly it's the concept of him being a tyrant, which goes all the way back to Thomas Jefferson's ad hominem attacks on him in the Declaration of Independence.

Robinson: We'll come to that. First, this is a passage from *The Last King of America:* "The year 1775 ended with the British having signally failed to strangle the rebellion in its cradle. Although some in the government wanted to concentrate on blockading the colonies into eventual submission, the majority, including the king, were determined upon a land war to force the issue." George III was liberal, humane, generous, likable, a devoted husband and father, but at least at one moment he actually did wish for war against the Americans.

Roberts: Once the Americans had already started the conflict at Lexington and Concord, yes, he was very much in favor of sending the battalions. The point is that there was no precedent in history for colonies just being allowed to go. To expect an eighteenth-century Hanoverian monarch to just let America go without a shot being fired is completely impossible.

Robinson: George III was born in 1738 and died in 1820. That's a good long life, especially by eighteenth-century standards. He comes to the throne at age



[Taylor Jones—for the *Hoover Digest*]

twenty-two in 1760. By then, nobody believes an English king rules by divine right or possesses in practice the power to veto legislation. Nobody expects him to lead troops in battle. So, when he comes to the throne, what's his job?

Roberts: His job is a limited constitutional monarch under the precepts of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which overthrew King James II and the Stuarts in part because he was a Catholic. George's family, the Hanoverians, are on the throne because they're not Catholics. So, one of his primary duties is to be a Protestant, which was fine because he was a believing Anglican. Also, although he had the right to appoint prime ministers and indeed governments, he only on one occasion in the entirety of his very long reign—the longest reign of any king of England—appointed a prime minister without a majority of the House of Commons, which was subsequently vindicated in the next general election. He was somebody who very much revered the British Constitution and was not like the absolutists of the past.

"He's been hugely traduced by historians. Not just American historians, which you would expect, but also by British historians, who've attacked him for things that he simply wasn't guilty of."

Robinson: Nor was he like his contemporaries on the continent.

Roberts: Absolutely, when you contrast him with Catherine the Great, or Frederick the Great in Prussia, or the Bourbons in France who behaved so absolutist that they wind up having a revolution against them. During George's reign, the Spanish execute the ringleaders of uprisings in Louisiana and so on during this period. Pretty much any other nonlimited monarch at the time was of an entirely different ilk from somebody who, like George III, essentially went along with the common law. He never arrested any American editors or closed any newspapers in America or any of these kinds of things, which a tyrant would have done in the eighteenth century.

COMMITTED TO WAR, GRACIOUS IN DEFEAT

Robinson: We come now to war, 1775, and the siege of Boston. The British navy invests Boston Harbor with ten or so warships. They are expensive pieces of equipment that have sailed across the Atlantic, a proper fleet. And the army puts on land how many thousands of men?

Roberts: I can't remember offhand, but it had already had four thousand in Boston since 1768. It's a large army anyway.

Robinson: What role does the king play in making that decision?

Roberts: Very little. He put ticks by the names of the four leading major generals, but otherwise it was a combination including the Admiralty, the War Office, the Treasury, and the Cabinet.

Robinson: This is in some ways the key to your whole argument. Again, from *The Last King of America:* "It was the king's fundamental respect for the concept of Crown-in-Parliament that helped bring about the American Revolution. Had King George III been a ruthless despot, Britain would have had a much better chance of winning the war."

Roberts: And also of stopping the war from taking place, because he could have said, I am king of America and so I'm happy the Americans have got self-government, aren't paying taxation to the British Parliament, and so on. One of the interesting things that some colonists asked for was for the king basically to step beyond his constitutional role and become king of America. That wouldn't require him physically to be in America, but it would require him to prevent Parliament from taxing America, or from having veto rights over American legislation.

"He was somebody who very much revered the British Constitution and was not like the absolutists of the past."

Robinson: So, conceptually, they're anticipating the Commonwealth, where the queen is queen of Canada and so on.

Roberts: Precisely. But you don't get the actual Commonwealth until 1931.

Robinson: He wouldn't do that because?

Roberts: Because he was a constitutional monarch.

Robinson: The reader of this book gets the feeling that everybody is a bit reluctant about the war, and George III is disappointed that it has come to this, and so forth. It starts out to be quite a gentlemanly operation on both sides. But in the first big battle, Bunker Hill, four hundred Americans and more than one thousand British are killed. These are shocking numbers for small communities.


CHURCHILL

Roberts: Including ninety British officers, who were aristocracy or the high gentry, so it's very much brought home to Britain's governing classes what's going on over there. There is a shock throughout the country. It's a very unpopular war at the beginning in Britain, and recruiting is difficult, because the Americans are seen as Britons, as cousins—and many of them are actual cousins. The war remains very unpopular in Britain until the French get involved, at which point it suddenly becomes tremendously popular.

Robinson: Take us through the military aspects of this. You write that there is really only one British war plan that is coherent.

Roberts: Yes. Lord George Germain, the American secretary in the Cabinet, has what's called the Germain Plan, which is to send Sir William Howe north from New York up the Hudson at the same time Sir John Burgoyne is coming south from Canada. They were going to meet at Albany and thereby split the New England colonies off from the other colonies. The idea would then be to crush the New England colonies. There were several problems with the plan. Coordinating in those days over hundreds of miles across enemy-held territory was in itself a problem. Also, to get any changes in the plan agreed to in London took three months for a ship to get back and forth across the Atlantic. The major problem was that Sir William Howe veered eastwards against the precepts of the plan and captured Philadelphia, which had lots of advantages because it was the American capital and so on. But it meant that the swarms of American troops that were around Burgoyne could capture him at Saratoga in October 1777. After that, France stepped forward to try to split Britain off from its American colonies, and the whole thing got turned into a world war, especially when the next year the Spanish declare war against Britain and then in 1780 the Dutch do as well. A purely colonial war could have been lost anyway, but once it became a world war, British troop levels in America dropped, and they were stuck in the Eastern Seaboard cities.

And the Americans had a superb general in Washington: his Fabian tactics of retreating whenever he thought he was going to be defeated; the way in which he managed to get off Manhattan; the counterattacks at Trenton and Princeton; the way in which he somehow kept his army together at Valley Forge, which was a truly astonishing act of charisma and leadership.

THE CROWN: Visiting Hoover fellow Andrew Roberts (opposite), biographer of Winston Churchill and Napoleon Bonaparte, says King George III "was a benevolent monarch, he was a true Enlightenment monarch, and he was a Renaissance prince in many ways." [Jay Godwin—LBJ Library]

Compared to that, George III's generals—Burgoyne and Howe and later Cornwallis—were simply not up to it.

Robinson: Who knows what Americans are taught these days now that we've all become woke and all of that, but in my generation the people we were taught were great men turned out to be great men. They do stand up.

Roberts: Not just the soldiers in the war, and the founding fathers before the war, but also the sheer courage of standing up against the most powerful empire in the world is a tremendous thing in itself, because the American population was only about 20 percent of the British population. But the creation of the Constitution as well: the idea that these are the same people who have the guts to do the fighting and then after the fighting have the genius to put together such an extraordinary document.

"Compared to [Washington], George III's generals—Burgoyne and Howe and later Cornwallis—were simply not up to it."

Robinson: It is courage, intelligence, and prudence: a bundle of virtues.

Roberts: Against that we had Lord North and General Cornwallis [laughter].

Robinson: Well, we can't always be lucky. I want to come to the Declaration of Independence in a moment, but first let's end the conflict. Can you get us to Yorktown and explain the role the French played and why that was viewed as decisive when in fact the war continued for some time after?

Roberts: Cornwallis landed in South Carolina and made his way up to the Yorktown peninsula, which was going too fast and not taking into account the huge American regular forces that were behind him. He was exposing his supply lines, which to all intents and purposes were shot to pieces, especially once he positioned himself on the peninsula, where he could be boxed in. The key role of the French is with their navy. Admiral de Grasse prevents the British from being evacuated from Yorktown. Instead, in October 1781, Cornwallis is forced to surrender with his whole force, some seven thousand men. That in effect brings to an end the shooting part of the American War of Independence, although not the actual war, which drags on because the prime minister, Lord North, doesn't want to make peace and the king supports him in this. The king is a last-ditcher.

Robinson: Explain that please. Cornwallis surrenders at Yorktown—a devastating defeat even if you are a last-ditcher. What's the king's reaction?

Roberts: To fight on. He says, well, we've lost two armies now (the other one being Burgoyne's), and the best thing is to gird our loins and continue fighting. As Max Boot points out in his book on irregular warfare, what the Romans would have done would be to continue to send larger and larger armies until finally the Americans were defeated. They didn't have a majority they needed in the House of Commons in ancient Rome. By that stage, Charles James Fox and the Whig Party were in a position to prevent the war from continuing.

Robinson: How is the king persuaded that it's over and that negotiations must be concluded?

Roberts: It's a combination of factors, but primarily it's what's going on in the House of Commons. The fall of Lord North in March 1782, the incoming radical government, the way in which they stop the funding. It's Vietnam and 1975, essentially. Parliament won't fund the war anymore, and this is what finally persuades the king that peace needs to be signed.

Robinson: In 1785, John Adams, now ambassador from the new nation of the United States, meets the king. Adams says, "I think myself more fortunate than all of my fellow citizens in having the distinguished honor to be the first to stand in your majesty's royal presence in a diplomatic character." To which George III responded?

Roberts: He responds with words to the effect of "even though I was the first to support the idea of going to war, now that you have won, I welcome you as the representative of the new independent United States." It's a tremendously gracious way of dealing with it. And his graciousness towards the people who had essentially taken away the jewel in his crown doesn't stop there. When George Washington retired as president in March 1797, the king said, "Washington was the greatest character of the age."

THE DECLARATION: INDICTMENT OR PROPAGANDA?

Robinson: The other evening you gave a talk in which you referred to the Declaration of Independence as a "wartime propaganda document." Explain your argument.

Roberts: The war had been going on for fourteen months by then and there had been a lot of bloodshed on both sides. It was an attempt essentially to make the American public recognize that loyalism was no longer an option for one-third or so of Americans. Also, that this was not just a war against Parliament but a war against the king and this was not just about trying to get into some Commonwealth arrangement; this was about independence and sovereignty for the United States. War has hardened the position, as it always tends to, especially as this had elements of a civil war. It was essential for the Continental Congress to make a radical statement that would also work as propaganda against the king, so that there could be no longer any sense of loyalty towards the king.

Robinson: There's no middle ground.

Roberts: Yes. The shifting alliances and shifting moods have to solidify at this point by July 1776, and the statement had to be made that the Americans were fighting for complete independence. The king had to be vilified in order to do that. You can't say he's a good king and he's a nice man, you have to create him as a monster who, in the words of the Declaration, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. So, the word "tyrant" crops up relatively early and it's repeated in the document, especially at the end. There are these twenty-eight articles that attempt to establish him as a tyrant and monster.

"It's Vietnam and 1975, essentially. Parliament won't fund the war anymore, and this is what finally persuades the king that peace needs to be signed."

Robinson: After that wonderful and sublime preamble.

Roberts: It is sublime, isn't it?

Robinson: There are twenty-eight charges—specific grievances—and you really will have nothing to do with twenty-six of them.

Roberts: Yes, the seventeenth, which is about taxation, and the twenty-second, which is about Parliament having veto rights over American legislation. They are in and of themselves justification for the Revolution, because that's what it's all about. The other twenty-six are essentially padding. The king is accused of doing things that all of the previous monarchs had done, without sparking a revolution, for example the Navigation Acts that come in

under Oliver Cromwell in 1650. George III is accused of taking people across the oceans for trial, but that didn't happen to a single American. When he is accused of ex post facto rationalizations, essentially of things that had already happened after the war had started, you have to appreciate that the Declaration was written by a lawyer who's padding his brief.

The great American historian Richard Brookhiser says that America in the 1760s and early 1770s was amongst the freest societies in the world. The colonists were talking about all these seditious things and what did the king do about any of that? Did he try to clap anyone in jail for it? Did he try and shut the newspapers? Did he try to arrest them? No. Catherine the Great would have hung them. So, he's a different man from that. He did not try to stop the Stamp Act Congress or the First Continental Congress from meeting. This is the kind of thing a tyrant who had troops in the region would have done.

"The king had to be vilified. . . . You have to create him as a monster who, in the words of the Declaration, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. So, the word 'tyrant' crops up relatively early."

LEGACY

Robinson: The Treaty of Paris ends the Revolution in 1783, and the man reigns for another thirty-seven years. In that time, Britain largely consolidates its position in India, sets in place the first rudiments of steam-powered industry, defeats Napoleon, and enlarges the navy. By the time he dies in 1820, the stability of the throne is taken for granted as it could never have been fifty-nine years earlier when he ascended to the throne. Britain has assumed the place in world affairs that it will retain for one hundred and fifty years as the most powerful nation on earth. What role did George III play in post-America Britain?

Roberts: He played a major role. In some of the things you mentioned, such as the Industrial Revolution, he played no appreciable role whatsoever. He never visited a factory, never went down a mine. In other aspects, like the Napoleonic Wars, he played a very significant role. While the Prussians fought France for 53 months, the Austrians for 108 months, and the Russians for 58 months, Britain fought against revolutionary and Napoleonic France for 242 months. This is largely because George III would

not make peace with a regicide and atheistic country like revolutionary France.

Robinson: There the last-ditch tendencies worked.

Roberts: Yes. But it's so sad because by the time Waterloo happens—the great moment of victory—he's blind and deaf and he's gone mad. He's senile and living in Windsor Castle playing his harpsicord. He doesn't know that he's won.

Robinson: He reigned for fifty-nine years. You quote the obituary that appeared in the *Manchester Guardian:* "In the perplexity of nations, the throne of the king of England was the only one unshaken, and its stability was the work of his virtue." Again, I have to ask you about the notion of kingship. Why do we care that the throne is secure?

Roberts: We care because it's the thing that makes Britain secure. You only have to look twenty-two miles across the English Channel to see that when the king and queen of France have their heads chopped off, then the next stage is the Terror. You go straight from executing the king in 1793 to guillotining forty thousand people a year in 1794. Nobody wanted that to happen in Britain, except for some of the extreme radicals. That explains his tremendous popularity, that and the fact that he got over his most serious bouts of illness by that point. He's seen as somebody who is "farmer George," who is interested in the way that 80 percent of Britons made their livelihood, in agriculture. He's seen as being frugal in terms of what he eats and drinks, being financially prudent, and being immensely hard-working.

"He never arrested any American editors or closed any newspapers in America or any of these kinds of things, which a tyrant would have done in the eighteenth century."

Robinson: How many children?

Roberts: Fifteen. I'm not saying that implies hard work, but I am saying that he's very much a family man. He's so hard-working, and he dates his letters to the minute, all of them. You can see how many he's writing, about all sorts of issues. He has also got this tremendous sense of both Christian piety and duty. If you're looking for a template for the modern monarchy, for Her Majesty the Queen today, you can do an awful lot worse than to go back to George III.

Robinson: "What comes next? You've been freed. Do you know how hard it is to lead? You're on your own—awesome, wow. Do you have a clue what happens now?" sings George III in *Hamilton*. Two hundred and fifty years later, how is the Anglo-American project coming along?

Roberts: Well, what happened next for America, of course, is that it became the greatest nation in the world. Fortunately, we handed on the baton to, or at least had the baton taken from us, by a power that has the same aspects of law and language and liberty, and that has the same precepts of decency and a law-based world order. We couldn't have been luckier really as Britons that the people who come next are the Americans, who've already established through their Constitution that they are a great nation. So, it's totally different really from today, where the successor top dog world power is one that's essentially totalitarian.

Robinson: One final quote from *The Last King of America:* "George's sense of duty had a profound effect upon the monarchy. When we look at the reign of Elizabeth II, with its leitmotif of hard work, conscientiousness, Christian piety, abstemiousness, philanthropy, and uxoriousness, we indeed see George III." In February, Elizabeth II celebrated her seventieth year on the throne. She is powerless and yet she is omnipresent. How do you sum up her reign? Does the monarchy still matter in some way?

Roberts: I think it does matter to all patriotic Britons and to everybody in the countries of which she is queen and the fifty-four countries of the Commonwealth. I think that she shows in her own personality this sense of duty, of commitment. When she was twenty-one, she said that her whole life would be spent in the service of the people of the Commonwealth. That's exactly what has happened. So, you have a woman who made a promise to people on her twenty-first birthday, and she's spent more than seventy years fulfilling that promise to the letter. That's something I think that anybody is going to respect and admire and thank her for.

In the Land of the Little Green Men

Collecting historical material in a country at war—in this case, Ukraine—means dealing with both danger and disinformation. Not to mention chaos, suspicion, and the imperative of capturing digital history before it vanishes. An archivist's story.

By Anatol Shmelev

When "little green men" showed up in the Crimea in February 2014, hardly anyone thought that they would signal the beginning of a lengthy conflict, now engulfing all Ukraine, that would lead to thousands of deaths, the establishment of two breakaway republics (Donetsk and Luhansk), and the absorption of a strategic territory (Crimea) into the Russian Federation. Unlike most wars of the past, this is a "hybrid conflict," incorporating traditional weaponry such as tanks, machine guns, and propaganda but fought with twenty-first-century tools, including social media, Photoshop, and computer simulation, along with other clever tricks to confuse, disorient, and disinform both opponents and public opinion in affected and unaffected countries. This type of conflict is also a challenge to document and archive.

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Beyond the traditional difficulties of finding the right people who have relevant papers, the twenty-first-century archivist is challenged by a general reduction in the use of paper as documentation, by increased security over the dissemination of information, and by the purposeful obfuscation of people, events, and details pertinent to this conflict. Even the obvious need to follow the relevant social media is tempered by the desire to curate the content: to follow what is important and separate the significant from the insignificant, because the tsunami of information is overwhelming both to the curator, whose job it is to try to preserve information, and to the researcher, who could spend a lifetime sifting through the opinions of every person who had an opinion to express but no real knowledge to impart.

The Hoover Institution Library and Archives has been systematically collecting records and printed matter of Ukrainian political parties and movements for many decades. Today the collecting continues with a special focus on printed and archival materials from the eastern Ukrainian conflict region, colloquially known as the "Donbass," so that researchers will be better able to understand the sources and development of the conflict.

One of the first difficulties I encountered when beginning to search for materials in Kyiv was, of course, suspicion. Almost no one had ever heard of the Hoover Institution, and most were skeptical that it was an independent archive geared toward preserving archival documents for study and research (the automatic assumption was that it was an intelligence-gathering organization of possibly nefarious purpose). But even when the first impression of suspicion was overcome, difficulties of a different nature arose: collecting photos and records of people and organizations involved in the conflict, especially the volunteer "battalions" and "regiments" (catch-all terms for paramilitary units formed to supplement the Ukrainian army), was met by the complaint that records did not necessarily exist, or were kept in a chaotic state, or were simply lost, such that even veterans could not prove their military service in order to receive benefits.

If acquiring strictly archival materials is problematic for the reasons presented above, printed matter presents its own difficulties. Archival collecting is usually opportunistic: a curator often must take what is available, not necessarily what is most desirable or important. As a result, the role of the Ukrainian volunteer units is represented in the Hoover Archives by their promotional and recruiting materials. In the case of the Azov regiment, we have an unusual publication in English: *The Black Sun: newspaper of special purpose regiment "Azov,"* as well as other promotional materials. These include issuances by the regiment's "civil corps," which are more directly

THE BLACK SUN
newspaper of special purpose regiment «Azov»
#3
April 2015

SITUATION IN UKRAINE AND AT THE FRONTLINE

Army

Ukrainian scientists from Kyiv invented a new hemostyptic drug «Kvercopas» for military men. It is four times more effective and twice cheaper than the best American counterpart.

***

Ukrainian Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and SE «PA Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant named after A. M. Makarov» refused maintenance of Moscow missile system R-36M (SS-18 Satan). These missiles are the basis of Moscow's nuclear forces. The decision made by Ukrainian specialists may mean the beginning of Kremlin nuclear strength to fall into ruin.

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This year Ukraine will allocate Hr 14 billion for the development of weapons for the army. Last year this number was Hr 3.9 billion.

***

United States are going to provide Ukraine with Ukraine 30 military armored vehicles, 200 ordinary SUVs and UAVs in the course of next weeks. The total cost of the technical batch is $ 75 million.

Economy

The Board of Directors of the International Monetary Fund approved the issuing Ukraine a loan of 17.5 billion US dollars. The money will come within 4 years. The loan is planned to be used to strengthen the Ukrainian economy.

***

Sweden will allocate 175 million Euros to Ukraine to hold the reforms. The money will come during next seven years. Another 100 million Euros will be provided by Sweden in the form of interest-free loan.

***

Ukraine plans to raise the moskal gas transport tariff to the European Union twice as much. This step may increase the price of gas in Europe and lead European countries to refuse of using it. Consequently it may destroy moskal economy.

War

300 million UAH are provided for the implementation of the first stage of work on the construction of defense buildings on the border between Ukrainian-Moskal borders during the current year. The first tranche of 30 million is expected in March.

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Ukraine has approved a plan to build fortifications in the Donbas. They will be built on the current line of clash with moskal bandits.

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Military officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine units that had taken part in

...continuation on page 2

LIFE AT THE BATTLEFIELD

EXPORTED CHAOS

From the beginning of June, 2014, there was yet an idea circulating among the considerable amount of residents of Mariupol, which can be conveyed by a spacy phrase: Putin will come and put things right. Although it had nothing in common with the reality, and was a result of impact made by Kremlin propaganda and hostile mass media, a lot of people welcomed it.

But then the wild hordes of Moscow Khaganate broke into the territory of Eastern Ukraine. At once it became obvious for everyone, even for television-affected adorers of Putin and Stalin, what kind of «rightness» of things came from Russia. This rightness means:

- complete lawlessness;
- flourishing of banditism, robbery of businesses;
- offense of hardworking and lawful people;
- destruction of Ukraine and everything attributed to it;
- replacement of the Russian language and culture with a Russian-obscene «world».

Suddenly the idea that «Putin will come and put things right» has evaporated from minds of the majority of people from Eastern Ukraine. Because Donteck and Luhansk regions were divided into two parts: the first one was subjected to legitimate Kyiv government, while the second fell under the authority of Moscowian orders.

The criminal elements raised poisonously powerless during the ruling of Yanukovich and his clan welcomed those orders. The region, which so to call «led the whole Ukraine», now is not able not only to feed itself, but even to ensure heating and products supply. This obvious fact can not be disproved by any TV zombification.

«Azovians» helped firstly to liberate Mariupol and then to withhold the invasion of Russian bands. During eight months the port city was living peacefully and continues to work under the protection of Azov regiment and other parts of MFU[1] and MIA[2].

Obviously, the big industrial center which permanently produces various goods and services, creates no danger for people walking on its streets, is a like a sore thumb for the ministers-crime bosses of the so called «DNR» and «LNR» who were appointed by Putin, as they have demonstrated their inability either to tune up the production or organize the every-day life of ordinary people in cities and villages. That is why Moscow which has not created any good on the invaded territory began horrifying Ukrainians by:

- demonstration of killed soldiers of the MFU and voluntary battalions in its mass media;
- humiliating treatment of imprisoned Ukrainian soldiers;
- artillery, mortar and missile attacks on peaceful cities and villages.

The accident of a special notoriety was the bombarding of Mariupol with MRSL «Grad» on 24 January, 2015. From the military point of view it was absolutely irrational act made against peaceful people to spread pain, and fear for the future. However Kremlin creators of national tragedies and mass deaths miscounted. Mariupol residents did not leave the city, and industrial plants did not stop their work.

Petro Volodymyrovych N., 36 years old, the manager in the «Privatbank»:

– It blows my mind how can they kill people who made no harm for Russia and Moscow in particular at all! The whole Ukraine as a state lives in peace, and does not disturbs others. What to disturb us for? I can't understand it.

– Why is it so? They broaden the «Russian world».

– With the help of attacks? Murders? «Humanitarian» tanks and Grads? I will send to hell such «Russian world»!

Then the man became anxious and fell silent. He went away. Seemed like the person took it as offense that the talker could refer him as the Russian-speaking man to the «Russian-obscene» Putin's world.

Oleksandr Ivanovych Sobko, 40 years old, ambulance driver:

– I could never imagine that I will have to drive people injured by the Russian weapon in my native city! Suppose I will have to take weapon soon to defend Mariupol from Putinoids and Ivanukovychies. Otherwise they will make such troubles that we would not know what hit us.

It is rather obvious, that there is enough support from the city itself to defend Ukrainian Mariupol from Moscowian invaders, if to arm the most active residents and teach them military art. And Azov regiment is ready to help the local authority in this great cause!

Volodymyr Mykhaylenko, «Azov» soldier

1 Ukrainian Military forces
2 Ministry of Internal Affairs

related to the political program advocated by Azov and its leader, Andrii Biletskyi. The Azov regiment was known to have a strong base of support in the neopagan movement, hence the solar symbols and other design attributes echo a number of common neopagan themes. The ostensibly Orthodox Christian Sviata [Saint] Maria battalion, active from 2014 to 2016 in Mariupol and later disbanded, is represented by glossy promotional brochures, recruiting stickers, and leaflets with practical advice for the families of active-duty volunteers. Sviata Maria's main recruitment brochure is so slick that it is actually labeled an "art project," lending a surreal feel to what is essentially a call to a life-or-death choice. There are also miscellaneous leaflets, such as an instruction on how to identify a separatist ("spreads fear and panic," among other things), with hotline telephone numbers for informants to call, and a field guide to military equipment used by the Russian Federation and stationed in the Crimea and along the border.

Some materials now in the Archives were originally prepared for distribution on the *Maidan Nezalizhnosti* (Independence Square), the square in central Kyiv where major events are held, including political rallies. The events that led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych and his government began on the Maidan, with protests in late 2013 against Yanukovych's decision to reorient his policy and the country's direction from Europe to the Russian Federation. Protests and demonstrations acquired the nickname "Euromaidan" as a sign of the gathering crowd's preference for a Europe-facing Ukraine. Both before and after 2014, the Maidan was always a good place to visit to collect political ephemera, and several items from and photographs of the Maidan and the burnt-out Trade Unions Building are available in various collections.

Materials relevant to the Maidan protests and the armed conflict that followed can be found in the records and printed matter of Ukrainian political parties and movements. For example, the *Narodna Rada* (People's Council) movement issued statements relating to the Maidan protests of 2014 and then appeals to the population of the Donbass region to remain united with the rest of the country. Researchers can go back and see its earlier statements and programs and also examine how its—and other parties'—positions changed

"THIS GREAT CAUSE": A pro-Ukraine publication unusual for being printed in English,* The Black Sun: newspaper of special purpose regiment "Azov" *(opposite), condemns the "exported chaos" imposed by Moscow-inspired fighters, or, as the newspaper describes them, "the wild hordes of Moscow Khaganate." The regiment was known to have a strong base of support in the neopagan movement, hence its use of solar symbols and neopagan themes.
[Hoover Institution Archives]

RESTORED:* Maidan Nezalizhnosti *(Independence Square) in central Kyiv was the epicenter of major political events that led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych and his government in 2014. Yanukovych fled to exile in Russia. The Trade Unions Building shown here, which faces the square, was the protesters' headquarters during the so-called Euromaidan events, when it suffered severe fire damage. It was later rebuilt. [Hoover Institution Archives]

as a result of the conflict. The Hoover Archives hold a wealth of materials on the 2004 Orange revolution, the 2010 elections that brought Yanukovych into office, and even on the 2018 elections that produced the current president, Volodymyr Zelensky, also against the background of the continuing conflict in the eastern part of the country. Paper materials emanating from the last election were far fewer in volume than in preceding years because of the growing predominance of social media and other nonprint platforms over leaflets, newspapers, and other printed matter.

LIFE IN THE TURBULENT EAST

Collecting material from the region of the conflict itself, in eastern Ukraine, presents vastly greater difficulties. A good deal of printed matter is issued

in the Donbass itself, particularly in the two separatist capitals, Donetsk and Luhansk. Obviously, collecting on the spot requires finding people willing to do this in circumstances where anything more than the casual purchase of a newspaper or two, not to mention the systematic collection of all the daily press in the region, might draw the attention of the security services. Then there is the question of transferring large quantities of such books, periodicals, and other issuances across the border or across the Ukrainian front lines. And if one goes the latter route, there is yet the question of how the Ukrainian security services would react to seeing this literature coming from the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) zone, which is how the Ukrainian government refers to the separatist territories in the East.

Having never heard of Hoover, many Ukrainians were suspicious. They assumed it was an intelligence-gathering outfit of possibly nefarious purpose.

Extensive runs of periodical publications before 2014 are also very helpful in understanding the origins of the conflict and the mutual animosity that pervades both sides. The Soviet and Post-Soviet Independent Publications collection of the Hoover Archives features extensive holdings of periodicals from the Crimea and other Ukrainian regions dating from late Soviet times and the early years of Ukrainian independence up to the outbreak of the conflict, an extraordinarily valuable resource for studying and comparing public opinion across regions, both predominantly Russian-speaking as well as Ukrainian-speaking.

Turning to the region of the conflict itself, a particularly significant catch is *TV Plius*, the major weekly newspaper of Slovyansk, one of the first towns where the fire of insurrection was lit. Like many small-town publications, before the conflict this newspaper focused on local issues and its survival was based on two factors: advertising revenue and the public demand for the upcoming week's TV schedule. Its content in the early months of 2014 was standard: new municipal traffic lights, road safety, problems with utilities and rising rates, celebrity gossip, sports, the crossword puzzle, and humor ("Santa Claus, I want to lose weight"—"OK, I'll break your jaw so you can't eat"). As events in the capital took a violent turn, the newspaper reported on them and on their reception in Slovyansk. For example, the issue of February 20, 2014, carries an article on the Slovyansk Municipal Council meeting of February 19, where the council members called for a moment of silence to

Как распознать «бытового» сепаратиста?

- Призывает к введению российских войск или предлагает сдаться России.
- Пропагандирует российскую символику, навязывает понятие «русского мира».

- Оскверняет ценности украинского народа, ставит под сомнение факт существования украинской нации, украинского языка и т. п.
- Распространяет слухи о несуществующей угрозе русскому языку (русскоязычному населению) на территории Украины.

- Оскверняет символы Украинской государственности – флаг, гимн, герб.
- Восхваляет так называемые днр, лнр.
- Протестует против мобилизации.
- Инициирует мероприятия, где призывают к свержению власти и массовым беспорядкам.

- Распространяет ложь и разжигает межнациональную нетерпимость (расизм, ксенофобию, антисемитизм).
- Сеет страхи и панику, упаднические настроения.

СЕПАРАТИСТ ДАЖЕ ТОТ, КТО АГИТИРУЕТ ПРОТИВ МОБИЛИЗАЦИИ ИЛИ ЖДЕТ ПРИХОДА ПУТИНА! Наказание: 7–12 лет лишения свободы (ст. 110 УК Украины).

Если вы столкнулись с проявлением «бытового» сепаратизма – звоните на горячую линию СБУ, Правительственную горячую линию и фиксируйте факты на телефон, камеру, фотоаппарат.

0 800 507 309 Правительственная горячая линия

0 800 501 482 Горячая линия СБУ

Бесплатно со стационарных телефонов

remember those killed in Kyiv, but only those who died on the pro-government side. On March 27, the newspaper carried articles on picketing outside city hall and on local political graffiti that began to appear across the region: "Donbass is not L'viv [referring to the Western Ukrainian city], Donbass is Russia." Pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian groups were actively organizing and gathering their forces, yet everyday life continued: people bought and sold property through the classified ads, the local theater staged a play, the library put on a poetry and song festival, rangers had trouble controlling local poachers.

A curator could spend a lifetime sifting through the opinions of every person who had an opinion to express, but no real knowledge to impart.

By April 10, the situation as reflected in *TV Plius* had become quite nervous. Local activists were collecting signatures to petition Putin for military intervention. Others were collecting food and goods to aid the Donetsk activists who had already taken over their municipal administration building. With this issue, publication was interrupted until the end of July, as the editor, Svetlana Viunichenko (who graciously donated the newspaper to the Hoover Institution), had to flee Slovyansk, which had been taken over by an armed group commanded by Igor Strelkov on April 12. The next issue ("the first postwar issue," as it was proclaimed) was released only on July 31, with articles about what had transpired during the preceding months. A photograph under the heading "Help the Investigation" depicts a group of armed men, with a note from the local police to help identify them or provide other information. Most of the rest of the newspaper is devoted to problems associated with destroyed infrastructure, unexploded bombs, celebrity gossip, sports, and humor ("The best exercise for your hands is counting money"). Life goes on.

Researchers will find much else of value in this newspaper if they dig deeply enough. A glance at the ads offers a lesson in economics: the price of cheese went down 12 percent after the conflict, while sour cream rose nearly 100 percent (the price of the newspaper itself rose about 25 percent); and bottled beer was cheaper than bottled water.

BEWARE: A leaflet (opposite) issued in Ukraine gives guidance on how to identify a separatist ("spreads fear and panic," among other things), and gives hotline numbers for informants to call. The first icon shows a figure holding a sign saying "#Putin, help." [Hoover Institution Archives]


Запис у добровольчі підрозділи
093 - 450 81 60
БРАТСТВО
Батальйон АЗОВ
Сотня Ісуса Христа

HEAVY MESSAGING

The Hoover Institution is fortunate to have a complete set of *TV Plius* from January to October 2014. Other local newspapers, such as *Kramatorskaia Pravda* (Kramatorsk Truth), *Novosti Kramatorska* (Kramatorsk News), *Vostochnyi proekt* (Eastern Project), and *Tekhnopolis*, with its complete list of bomb shelters in Kramatorsk, are represented by scattered or individual issues.

Three special Donbass issues of the pro-Ukrainian *Narodna Armiia* (People's Army) for 2015 are devoted to counterpropaganda and contain "wanted" posters of separatist leaders, some of whom are now dead (Aleksei Mozgovoi, Aleksandr Zakharchenko). From the "Donetsk People's Republic" (Russian acronym: DNR) side, there is *Mirnyi Donbass* (Peaceful Donbass), the weekly official newspaper of the People's Soviets of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. With its articles and photographs depicting confident ministers and flourishing industry, one would be hard put to find evidence that a war was on, except for a photo of a bombed-out apartment building on page 7 of the issue for February 3, 2015. The conclusion of the accompanying article on three children from the apartment building reads, "The war has forced them to choose who they want to be when they grow up: 'OMON, Spetsnaz, "Berkut" [riot police, special forces operatives, and a type of SWAT unit].' These aren't the words of momma's boys, but of real Donetsk tough kids, grown up faster thanks to the Kyiv terrorists."

Most of the news is devoted to destroyed infrastructure, unexploded bombs, celebrity gossip, sports, and humor.

Also from the DNR we have leaflets calling for participation in the referendum of May 11, 2014. Heavily laden with World War II imagery and associations, these materials clearly play on an emotional connection to the Soviet past in opposition to what is represented as "Nazism" coming from

ON A MISSION: The Jesus Christ battalion (opposite) sprang from the Azov regiment but distanced itself from Azov's neopagan image by stressing a Christian orientation. It too was active in special operations against Russian-backed separatists. Together with the Sviata Maria (Saint Mary) battalion, formed near Mariupol in 2014, it promoted itself in glossy promotional brochures, recruiting stickers, and leaflets. This soldier's patch reads* In Hoc Signo Vinces, *the Latin motto associated with Constantine's heavenly mandate to conquer under the Christian cross. [Hoover Institution Archives]

КАТЕХІЗИС

the Ukrainian West. Other leaflets and pamphlets derive from political and cultural organizations, such as the *Slovyanskaia partiia* (Slavic Party), *Donbasskaia Rus'*, Novorossiia Party, and the Sviatogor Cultural-Historical Society for the Development of the Donbass, in addition to numerous anonymous issuances.

It has also been possible to collect some random material from various DNR government institutions, such as documents of the supreme court, including a codex of ethical behavior for judges and other functionaries. This material forms a valuable complement to the official legal documents and codices issued by the Donetsk People's Republic. These laws are, unsurprisingly, modeled on those of the Russian Federation. The Hoover Institution appears to be the only Western repository holding this set of material.

Pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian groups were busy organizing and gathering strength, yet in one small-town newspaper everyday life continued.

Aside from official publications, other books and pamphlets reflect attempts to formulate a regional identity, construct an economy, and develop political parties and civic organizations. Needless to say, much of this literature is colored by propaganda, and a good deal of it is pure propaganda. It has been possible to acquire a number of publications that predate the crisis of 2014, in many instances by several years. Some memoirs of participants have also been published in the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics and are available in the West only in the Hoover Library. In addition to the memoir literature, an effort has been made to collect other literary representations of the conflict, such as poetry.

THE VIEW FROM RUSSIA

Finally, there is relevant material from the Russian Federation, especially from leftist and pro-communist groups collecting aid for the separatist forces. One such leaflet issued by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation shows Denis Parfenov, a Moscow municipal Duma candidate in the 2014 elections who also coordinated assistance for the "Red Moscow" to

DEDICATED: Under the title "Catechism," this image depicts a call for female volunteers to serve in the Jesus Christ battalion, with the text of the brochure explaining the mission and philosophy of the Ukrainian unit. [Hoover Institution Archives]

SEPARATED: An election poster in the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) features the black, blue, and red and two-headed eagle of the self-proclaimed republic's flag. In February 2022, Russia formally recognized the DNR and the Luhansk People's Republic as independent states. [Hoover Institution Archives]

help the people of the Donbass "in connection with the war and genocide in Ukraine."

Perhaps the simplest to collect are the books and periodicals issued in the Russian Federation or Ukraine outside the ATO. Most Western research libraries rely on vendors and blanket orders to procure their printed matter, yet vendors themselves look primarily to large publishers and centrally located distributors for their wares. Even so, some significant works related to the conflict—whether they be memoirs or propaganda pieces—never get into the vendors' systems and consequently into Stanford's holdings. Though the Hoover Institution's mandate is to focus on archival material, such ephemeral printed matter—rare, unusual, and difficult to find—is also an important part of the collecting mission, especially where its influence is significant and its preservation would benefit scholars attempting to understand the nature and consequences of the conflict.

Мирный Донбасс

Еженедельная информационно-аналитическая газета

ЭКОНОМИКА
Донбасс способен возродиться

ВЛАСТЬ 4
Республика работает с чистого листа

ДОНБАССКИЙ ХАРАКТЕР 7
Королева «танечного царства»

КОЛЕСО ИСТОРИИ 8
Английский «плюс» России Донбасса

На Западном информационном фронте без перемен

Почему Европе нет дела до тысяч жертв на Донбассе

JE SUIS DONBASS

В Добрый путь

Обращение главы Донецкой Народной Республики

Александр Захарченко,
глава Донецкой Народной Республики

"JE SUIS DONBASS": **Mirnyi Donbass *(Peaceful Donbass)*, *the weekly official newspaper of the People's Soviets of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, attempts to show the breakaway areas as having normally functioning governance and industry. But an article describes children there growing up tough in reaction to "the Kyiv terrorists."*** [Hoover Institution Archives]

COLLECTIONS: Several postage stamps issued by the DNR portray fighters who died in clashes with Ukrainian forces (or were victims of assassins) in a heroic light. Despite the rapid growth of "born digital" archival material, both in Ukraine and elsewhere, paper documentation of the issues, people, and events of the conflict is still important. [Hoover Institution Archives]

Lev Vershinin, for example, is a popular blogger born in Odessa and now residing in Spain, whose thoughts on Ukrainian history and the origins of "Ukrainian Nazism" have been condensed into a book titled *Ukraina—vechnaia ruina* (Ukraine—The Eternal Ruin), not held by any library other than the Hoover Institution, the New York Public Library, and UNC Chapel Hill, despite the fact that thousands read Vershinin's posts and he is one of the more influential political bloggers writing in Russian.

Similarly, Vitalii Zakharchenko's *Krovavyi Evromaidan—prestuplenie veka* (The Bloody Euromaidan—Crime of the Century), published in St. Petersburg in 2016, is held by only a handful of Western libraries, despite the fact that Zakharchenko was minister of internal affairs during the Maidan events in 2014 and—regardless of whether one agrees with him—his description of events and his exposition of decision making at the highest levels of government (including decisions regarding the use of force to suppress the protestors) need to be taken into account as part of

the historical record. Following the collapse of Yanukovych's government, Zakharchenko also escaped to the Russian Federation, where he now resides.

The obvious propagandistic or biased nature of many books issued on the conflict or by participants in events should not detract from their value as historical sources, because the more sources researchers have available from all sides and points of view, the easier it will be to analyze them and draw objective conclusions about the subject at hand.

Aleksandr Dugin is another important intellectual whose ideas have consequences in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. In June 2014, this Moscow University professor was released from employment for his video appeal to "Kill! Kill! Kill!" Ukrainians, and he was subsequently hired as chief editor for Tsargrad TV. The second edition of his *Geopolitika Rossii* (Geopolitics of Russia) is held by only two North American libraries: the Hoover Institution and the Edmonton Public Library. This book is important because in it, Dugin lays out his understanding of the Ukrainian crisis, which is that the resolution of this crisis is existentially fundamental to the continued survival of the Russian Federation. This point of view is far from marginal, and Dugin's thought has long been understood by Western academics to have a following among representatives of authority within the Russian Federation.

The Izborsk Club, a neo-Soviet intellectual group whose members range from former KGB generals to writers and journalists, has its own glossy, colorful magazine, *Novaia zemlia: zhurnal Izborskogo kluba* (New Land: The Journal of the Izborsk Club). The magazine covers events and state building in the Donbass region, and contains interviews with government officials and field commanders and descriptions of life in urban centers and at the front, alongside endless sighs over "the good old days" of the USSR. Only the Hoover Institution and the Library of Congress are making an effort to collect a full run of this important ideological publication, issued since 2014 in Donetsk. A recent article by George Washington University professor Marlene Laruelle in *The Russian Review* shows just how significant the Izborsk Club is and how its thinking permeates the higher levels of government in the Russian Federation.

Before the conflict, the newspaper's survival depended on two things: ad revenue and the public demand for the upcoming week's TV schedule.


КРАСНАЯ
МОСКВА
ПОМОЖЕМ
ДОНБАССУ!
координатор по сбору помощи
Денис ПАРФЕНОВ
ПАТРИОТИЧЕСКИЙ ФРОНТ

PAST AND FUTURE

Plenty of literature also has been issued on the Ukrainian side. Most of this is collected by Stanford University Libraries through vendors, but certain items fit the collecting scope and mission of the Hoover Institution. Among these is a pamphlet indicative of the complexities of this conflict. Titled *Ukrains'ka pravoslavna tserkva: mify ta istyna* (The Ukrainian Orthodox Church: Myths and Truth), the pamphlet attempts to extricate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate from the political turmoil of the conflict, insisting that its priests are not FSB agents (the FSB is the successor to the KGB in the Russian Federation), that the church is not Moscow's fifth column, that they do not pray for Putin and do not ban Putin's opponents from communion, and even that they do not use the Russian language in the religious services (ceremonies are indeed conducted in Old Church Slavic).

Much of this literature is colored by propaganda. A good deal of it is pure propaganda.

Born-digital and video materials in various formats (mainly DVDs) are also produced both within the region of the conflict as well as outside. There is, in truth, too much to collect, but an effort is made to curate the more significant resources and to attempt to preserve at least the individual physical items that are acquired for the Archives.

A quick detour back to Hoover's origins: paper-based documents. Some individuals have heard of "Igor Strelkov," the pseudonym of Igor Girkin, one of the early field commanders of the rebel groups in eastern Ukraine, who rose to prominence in the late spring and early summer of 2014, and then was recalled to Moscow in August. Little is known for certain of his past: he has claimed that he was an officer of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation; others have discussed his involvement in the military re-enactment subculture. Those interested in establishing the facts of his biography might be directed to a little-known article he wrote in 1997 for the Russian émigré journal *Nashi vesti*. Only a handful of US libraries had

IN MOSCOW: A leaflet issued by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (opposite) shows Denis Parfenov, a Moscow municipal Duma candidate in the 2014 elections who was among those coordinating assistance for Donbass separatists "in connection with the war and genocide in Ukraine." [Hoover Institution Archives]

ЖУРНАЛ ИЗБОРСКОГО КЛУБА НОВОРОССИИ

НОВАЯ ЗЕМЛЯ

ОКТЯБРЬ 2016 № 9 (23)

subscribed to this periodical; among them was the Hoover Institution. Issues 446 and 447 for 1997 contain an article by "Strelkov" titled "On the Train," detailing his experiences during the Second Chechen War. Perhaps a small piece of the historical puzzle, but one that nevertheless contributes to the picture of the worldview of one of the key figures in the conflict that erupted in 2014. Girkin/Strelkov emerged as one of the popular leaders of the eastern Ukrainian (pro-Russian) militias in the early weeks of the conflict. His story immediately became important to follow.

Though Internet archiving is still in its infancy, uncoordinated and somewhat chaotic, it was possible to harness the tools available early in the conflict to document important events and opinions. The Internet Archive, based in San Francisco, served as a base for a project led by Archive-It, a web archiving service for libraries and archives. Its goal was to preserve some of the important sources of information then appearing about the conflict on the Internet: articles from the press, official sites, and so on. I compiled a list of blogs and other Internet sources, including local municipality sites, and sent them to the administrators so they could "crawl" the pages at least once a day. With a growing ocean of possible sources and little time and resources available to monitor them for their worth, it was necessary to choose a few that looked most promising.

A post went up, saying: "We just shot down an An-26 plane in the vicinity of Toreza. . . . We warned them—don't fly in our sky."

Among these were two platforms maintained directly by Girkin/Strelkov and his entourage. One was a page on VKontakte (the Russian version of Facebook), where someone regularly updated events under his pseudonym (Igor Strelkov), the updates presumably emanating primarily from him. The page came to singular prominence during the conflict when, on July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down over Ukrainian territory. Even as the news of the tragedy was emerging, a post went up, saying, "We just shot

THE FUTURE? The Izborsk Club, a neo-Soviet intellectual group, publishes* Novaia zemlia *(New Land) in Donetsk to promote state building in the breakaway areas. It expresses nostalgia for the "good old days" of the Soviet Union. This cover features "Motorola," a separatist figure. The Izborsk Club is influential among the higher levels of government in the Russian Federation. [Hoover Institution Archives]

down an An-26 plane in the vicinity of Toreza. . . . We warned them—don't fly in our sky." Soon after, the post was removed, illustrating how important it is to crawl the Internet not once a day, but perhaps as often as every few minutes to avoid missing crucial, yet ephemeral, "documents" of history. It was clear the deplorable boast referred to the Malaysia Airlines jet. Dutch prosecutors' investigation of the crash has led to the issuance of an international arrest warrant for Strelkov.

In this way, the Hoover Institution is doing its best to continue to capture and preserve both traditional paper documentation, including photographs, posters, and printed matter, as well as born-digital documentation from sources as wide-ranging as social media, DVDs, and official websites, including those of unrecognized governments and agencies. It is certainly not the full spectrum of everything that has ever been shown, seen, said, or written about the conflict, but it is a valuable curated cross-section of materials presenting various viewpoints and drawn from different and opposing sources. ■

***Special to the* Hoover Digest.**

Patroness of the Bells

The venerable bells in Hoover Tower have a new namesake: Lou Henry Hoover, former first lady and lifetime lover of music.

By Elena S. Danielson

Last October, the Hoover Institution announced the renaming of the carillon atop Hoover Tower in honor of Stanford alumna Lou Henry Hoover (1874–1944), class of 1898. The famous bells are now the centerpiece of the Lou Henry Hoover Carillon and Observation Platform. This accomplished woman led a life of achievement in a number of fields:

» In scholarship, she made a lasting contribution to our understanding of the history of technology with her and her husband's 1912 translation and deciphering of the sixteenth-century mining treatise by Georgius Agricola, *De Re Metallica,* which won a gold medal from the Mining and Metallurgical Society of America.

» Her architectural design skills are visible on campus with the beautiful and original home she built, the Lou Henry Hoover House (1920), today a national historic landmark and home to Stanford University's president and his family.

» Her philanthropic career is legendary. Her work for the Girl Scouts, serving as president twice, helped grow a small organization of a few dozen girls into a national network with eight hundred thousand members.

***Elena S. Danielson** is archivist (emerita) at the Hoover Institution.*

HARMONIOUS: Stanford University carillonneur Timothy Zerlang performs in October 2021 during the dedication of the Lou Henry Hoover Carillon and Observation Platform. The former first lady was known for her philanthropy, her scholarship, and her creative energies. [Hoover Institution]

Less well known, but equally important, is her contribution to American cultural life by promoting chamber music, first in the White House and then at Stanford. Dedicating the carillon to Lou Henry Hoover is highly appropriate.

MUSIC MATTERED

While serving as first lady from 1929 to 1933, she started a tradition of concerts after state dinners that continues to this day. She also expanded the concert programming usually associated with formal events at that time by, for example, inviting the choirs from two traditionally African-American universities to perform (the Hampton Choir and the Tuskegee Institute Choir) as well as a musician with a Native American background.

The White House years also offered opportunities to establish or strengthen ties to people who would later play important roles in the growth of music at Stanford, which for the first fifty years of its existence did not have a formal music department with a music major, although there was a band,

as we know, and a fine university organist, Warren D. Allen. One memorable White House occasion was the formal state dinner for the king and queen of Siam—King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambhai Barni—on April 29, 1931. The dinner was followed by a concert by a charismatic harpist named Mildred Dilling (1894–1982), who was well known at the time for appearing on stage with stars such as Bing Crosby and is even credited with giving Harpo Marx his first lessons playing her favored instrument.

Lou often invited a friend named Elizabeth Sprague Coolidge (1864–1953) to the White House. No relation to Calvin Coolidge, the "other Mrs. Coolidge," as she sometimes called herself, established a foundation for chamber music at the Library of Congress. Elizabeth Coolidge not only sponsored performances but also commissioned compositions, notably Aaron Copland's *Appalachian Spring*.

After leaving the White House and returning to her campus home, Lou often hosted Elizabeth Coolidge at Stanford. After becoming acquainted with the university, Lou's good friend from the Library of Congress began extending her generous funding to campus concerts, beginning with the outstanding Belgian quartet known as Pro Arte String Quartet in 1934. These musical offerings continued on an informal basis for a number of years, typically free of charge.

A turning point came in 1937, when Lou completed her second term as president of the Girl Scouts, announcing, "I think I would like to play with many different things—none of which are quite so exacting in their demands as being head of a big definite organization. Having more time, for instance, to play with things like Stanford music!"

Not wasting any time, Lou and Elizabeth Coolidge met with interested music supporters in the Lou Henry Hoover House on August 10, 1937, her husband's birthday. With organizing by Lou and matching funds from Elizabeth Coolidge, the unofficial musical program grew and became known as the Friends of Music at Stanford. Lou drafted a constitution to formalize the organization and convened a meeting of the new board again at her campus home. On January 23, 1940, she was the first to sign the constitution and for a year served as the first president, ably assisted by eight others including Hans Barkan (1882–1960), professor of ophthalmology and a classically trained violinist. All of this organizing would later lead to the founding of a department of music, still assisted by the Friends of Music.

Lou Henry Hoover expanded the tradition of White House concerts that continues to this day.

RING OUT: The bells of the Belgian Pavilion at the New York World's Fair of 1939 took their place atop the completed Hoover Tower. Some bells were recast, and more were added to expand the instrument's range, before the carillon was rededicated in 2002. [Kevin Scheirer—Stanford News Service]

And 1940 was none too early to start planning music for Stanford's Golden Jubilee celebration in 1941. The Friends of Music and a special committee for music with Barkan and Warren D. Allen went to work recruiting the San Francisco Symphony to play an afternoon concert on Founders' Day, March 9, 1941, in Memorial Church and then an evening concert on June 20, 1941, at Frost Amphitheater, with an illuminated Hoover Tower in the background. Both concerts featured an original composition, "Ode to Truth," by the then well-known American composer Roy Harris. Undoubtedly, both Lou and Elizabeth Coolidge were actively working on these plans as well, although more behind the scenes. (The generous gifts from Elizabeth Coolidge continued until Lou's death in 1944, at which point they stopped.)

A major feature of the fiftieth-anniversary celebrations in 1941 was the dedication of Hoover Tower, designed as both a landmark and a library devoted to the pursuit of peace. Architect Arthur Brown Jr., who had previously built two monumental towers in San Francisco (the permanent Coit Tower and the temporary Tower of the Sun), designed an elegant tower structure for Stanford with a traditional angled roof and a reading room on the top floor to take advantage of the stunning view of the Bay Area. Groundbreaking was

scheduled for the summer of 1939. The tall and complex structure was to be completed by June 1941 for the dedication to be part of the Golden Jubilee.

On May 19, 1939, just three months before groundbreaking, Herbert Hoover sent university president Ray Lyman Wilbur a telegram offering to buy the carillon at the Belgian Pavilion of the New York World's Fair to crown the tower with eighteen thousand pounds' worth of bronze bells manufactured by the Marcel Michiels foundry of Tournai, Belgium.

Given the former president's work to rescue starving Belgians during the German occupation of World War I, a project Lou wholeheartedly assisted, the connection to Belgium resonated with both of them. As they had traveled through Europe, especially in Belgium, Lou Henry and Herbert Hoover often heard carillons and bells ringing from church towers and guild halls, as a symbol of community cohesion. As the Belgian ambassador to the United States Robert Ponthoz had noted, "Our belfries were established as . . . the symbol of our cherished civic rights and civic liberties." And in 1939, as war was once again threatening Europe and raging in Asia, this particular carillon carried additional significance, since the largest of the original carillon bells bore the inscription "Una pro pace sono," or "For peace alone do I ring."

Ever since 1941, the bells have added a festive note to graduations and special occasions.

Arthur Brown immediately recognized that the carillon was important to the Hoovers. The three of them discussed the alteration to the crown of the tower, and Herbert Hoover recalled in later years that it was Lou who recommended that Brown draw inspiration for a dome from the bell tower of the "new" cathedral in Salamanca, Spain.

Brown sprang to work and re-engineered the entire structure to incorporate a belfry. Purchasing the bells—and transporting, housing, and installing them in an acoustically appropriate space—was complicated, arduous, and expensive. Yet in all of this frenzied activity, Brown always found time for a special personal touch. Knowing Lou's love of music, the architect made the time to purchase and send her a book on the history of carillons, a very welcome gift enjoyed by both Hoovers.

PERFECT PITCH

Concerts on the new carillon were immediately popular with students as well as the public. Like the carillons in Belgium, the concerts provided joy in

***FAMILY: Margaret Hoover, great-granddaughter of Lou Henry Hoover, tries out the carillon after the dedication. She is the host of the PBS interview show* Firing Line with Margaret Hoover.** [Hoover Institution]

good times and consolation in tough ones. Every evening during the fiftieth-anniversary Golden Jubilee Commemoration week, ending June 20, 1941, the Belgian musician Kamiel Lefevere, carillonneur of Riverside Church, New York, gave twilight concerts on the carillon to the great delight of visitors. Ever since 1941, the bells have added a festive note to graduations and special occasions. Often the long-term carillonneur Professor James Angell (1924–2006), an engineering professor, would play the bells at five o'clock as staff started to leave for the day. As a public instrument, the carillon added a new dimension to musical life at Stanford.

However, the original Belgian bells were never in perfect harmony: the sound was cheerful, but a bit "jangly." Hoover Director Ralph Lutz pointed this out as early as 1943, and for decades Angell advocated a restoration and expansion to provide concert-quality music from this mammoth instrument. Angell's protégé Tim Zerlang also promoted the idea. Eventually, the bells were removed and shipped to a foundry in the Netherlands, Royal Eijsbouts

foundry in Asten, since the Belgian Michiels foundry had long gone out of business. Many bells had to be replaced, and an additional octave was added to provide a total of forty-eight bells, the largest of which weighs 2.5 tons. The music the updated carillon produces is now in perfect pitch, as expected of a concert-quality instrument. Lou Henry Hoover would approve.

The Friends of Music at Stanford was instrumental in establishing high-quality music programs at the university.

It is appropriate to rededicate the carillon in honor of this woman to whom music was so important and who brought many concerts to campus. Those who hear Stanford's bells ring out today should also hear two reminders: that the original purpose of the tower was to promote peace, and that the original purpose of programming music at Stanford, as envisioned by Lou Henry Hoover, was to promote harmony in all senses of the word.

***Special to the* Hoover Digest.**



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