

STRATEGIKA

CONFLICTS OF THE PAST AS LESSONS FOR THE PRESENT



Will NATO Survive as a Credible Alliance—and Should It?

IN THIS ISSUE

Peter R. Mansoor • Josef Joffe • Ken Jowitt • Ralph Peters • Bing West



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ABOUT THE POSTERS IN THIS ISSUE

Documenting the wartime viewpoints and diverse political sentiments of the twentieth century, the Hoover Institution Library & Archives Poster Collection has more than one hundred thousand posters from around the world and continues to grow. Thirty-three thousand are available online. Posters from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia/Soviet Union, and France predominate, though posters from more than eighty countries are included.



Whither NATO?

Peter R. Mansoor

Formed in 1949 in response to the onset of the Cold War, the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, according to British General Hastings Lionel Ismay, the first Secretary General of the alliance, was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” Sixty-five years after the creation of NATO, little it seems has changed with the exception that Germany has regained its place as an economic powerhouse and one of the dominant political actors on the Continent. NATO is now a means of keeping both the United States and Germany integrated in European affairs, while serving as a hedge against Russian revanchism in Eastern Europe.

NATO is the centerpiece of US-European relations. The linchpin of the alliance is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that “an armed attack against one or more of them [NATO members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” and that all members are obliged to assist the state(s) under attack. Article 5 has been invoked only once in NATO’s history, after the terrorist attacks against the US homeland on September 11, 2001. Following the destruction of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon, NATO aircraft flew 360 combat air patrol sorties over American cities, with 830 crew members from 13 allied nations involved in the effort. Meant to deter Soviet adventurism in Europe, Article 5 has only been used once, ironically to protect the United States from non-state actors.

The initial impetus for the formation of a mutual defense pact was the blockade of Berlin and the Communist-inspired coup in Czechoslovakia that brought that nation into the Soviet orbit. Alarmed by Soviet Premier Josef Stalin’s strong arm tactics and frightened by the prospect of the Red Army rolling over Western Europe, ten European nations (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland) along with Canada and the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, NATO states realized their military capabilities were insufficient to stop a determined Communist attack. In January 1951 they formed the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), under the command of US General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, to direct NATO forces. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in February 1952 in Lisbon, the member states agreed to embark on an ambitious military buildup of ninety-six ground divisions, a figure subsequently lowered to just

thirty-five divisions that would be bolstered by significant nuclear capabilities. Greece and Turkey joined the alliance shortly thereafter.

The United States funneled \$20 billion in military assistance to European militaries from 1951–1953, but despite this aid NATO lacked the conventional strength to serve as little more than a tripwire in the event of a Soviet attack. An attack by the Red Army would be followed inevitably by the use of nuclear weapons to stem the red tide, with all the massive destruction such actions would entail. For NATO to possess an effective conventional deterrent, Germany would have to rebuild its military forces. The French objected to such a policy without controls; they did not want the Germans to possess military forces that could threaten French security. Only in 1955, after a change in government and in the wake of defeat in Indochina, did the French agree to allow the Germans to rearm, but only under NATO command and with the proviso that German forces could not be used outside NATO territory. With German forces added to the alliance, NATO was able to act as a more credible deterrent to Soviet expansionism in Europe. West German rearmament came at a price, however, as it also led to the creation of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-dominated military alliance that included Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and East Germany. The two opposing sides of the Cold War in Europe had hardened into competing alliances.

France did not remain satisfied within an American-led NATO. After assuming the French presidency in 1958, Charles de Gaulle argued for the creation of a tripartite directorate that would in his view give France an equal role to that enjoyed by the United States and Great Britain. Rebuffed in his demands, de Gaulle formed an independent nuclear *Force de Frappe* capable of protecting France against attack without relying on NATO or the US nuclear umbrella. In stages de Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO control, banned the stationing of foreign (meaning US) nuclear weapons in France, and removed the French Atlantic and Channel fleets from NATO command. In 1966 he took the final step of removing French military forces from NATO's integrated military command and ordering the removal of US and other NATO troops from French soil. Piqued by this demand, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointedly inquired of de Gaulle whether the order included the bodies of American soldiers in French cemeteries. They remained, but American forces departed. NATO's headquarters relocated from Paris to Mons, Belgium.¹

During the four decades of the Cold War, NATO's focus was on the forward defense of West Germany and the nuclear umbrella over Europe that ensured the Red Army stayed on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain. During this period the United States fought significant wars in Korea and Vietnam and intervened with military forces in a number of other hot spots around the world, supported at times by NATO member states but never by



the alliance as a whole. NATO land forces were concentrated in Germany, with priority given to the defense of the North German Plain and the Fulda Gap. By 1980 the increase in Soviet land power, however, made a conventional defense of Western Europe increasingly problematic. NATO countered this threat by stationing thousands of tactical nuclear warheads and hundreds of intermediate range nuclear tipped missiles in Europe, while at the same time seeking a comprehensive arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The result was a worsening of relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as significant antinuclear weapons demonstrations in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the alliance remained stable, even adding Spain as its sixteenth member in 1982.

The fall of the Iron curtain in 1989 led shortly thereafter to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, removing NATO's major adversaries and with them its *raison d'être*. These events caused serious soul-searching in the alliance, which reevaluated its strategic purpose. NATO found new meaning in "out of area" missions in Europe, South Asia, and Africa. NATO aircraft launched airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces in August 1995, and a large NATO ground contingent participated in the subsequent multi-year peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. In 1999 NATO led a bombing campaign against Serbia and engaged in a subsequent peacekeeping mission that led to Kosovar independence a decade later. Outside of Europe, beginning in 2003 NATO forces in Afghanistan participated in the International Security Assistance Force, which included troops from forty-two countries. NATO also sent a small training mission to Iraq to assist in rebuilding Iraqi military forces after the US invasion. Starting in August 2009, NATO sent naval forces to protect commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden from Somali pirates. In 2011 NATO led efforts to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1973. During the seven months of the operation, NATO aircraft flew 9,500 sorties and provided the firepower that eventually toppled Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi from power. The Libyan intervention, however, also highlighted the failure of many NATO states to invest adequately in their military forces, with a number of units running out of munitions by the end of the operation. The continued diversion of government budgets from military to social welfare spending has left many NATO militaries a shell of their former Cold War selves.


As controversial as its out of area operations, NATO has also expanded into areas of Eastern Europe and the former Warsaw Pact. The first tranche of enlargement came in 1999 with the addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.² Five years later NATO added Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as member states. In 2009 Albania and Croatia joined the alliance. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro all participate in NATO's membership action plan, which serves as NATO's review mechanism for aspiring members. Russia's concern that Georgia

and Ukraine, both located in what Moscow terms the “near abroad,” would follow suit is part of the reason for its military intervention in those nations. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the continued existence of NATO has kept most of the Continent peaceful for the longest stretch in recorded history.

The Greek historian Thucydides once famously stated that nations go to war for one of three reasons: fear, honor, and interest. One could extend this reasoning to why nations form alliances, and why those alliances remain intact or fall apart over time. Despite NATO’s manifest military weaknesses, strong incentives continue to hold the alliance together. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Georgia and Ukraine has spooked his neighbors, especially those new NATO member states in Eastern Europe. Fear of Russian revanchism has served as inspiration for the maintenance of a healthy military relationship among NATO allies and has led to commitments of NATO ground and air forces (on a rotating basis) in the Baltic States and Poland. As importantly, NATO has served as an integrating mechanism for Europe for more than sixty-five years. Its dissolution would leave the Continent without a unified military force, the existence of which ensures stability in an area of the world that for many centuries was the most warlike on the globe. Rather than an anachronism of the Cold War, NATO today plays a pivotal, stabilizing role in European security, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

1 In 2009 France rejoined NATO’s military command structure, while retaining its independent nuclear deterrent force.

2 A unified Germany became part of NATO on October 3, 1990.



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Europe to the World: “Count Me Out!”

Josef Joffe

World Order, Henry Kissinger muses in his eponymous book, requires somebody—a state or an institution—to maintain it. He holds up the Westphalian System, put in place after the murderous Thirty Years’ War, as one institutional pillar. As another instance, he cites the Congress of Vienna (1815), which spawned the Quadruple as well as the Holy Alliance. The former (Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia) was to take care of strategic stability. The latter (Russia, Prussia, and Austria) was to preserve legitimacy—monarchical rule.

Another system of order was guaranteed by Britain for four centuries. This was the balance of power, with Britain as impresario, mastermind, and holder of the balance. It gave post-Napoleonic Europe a century without major war. Conversely, when there was neither a state nor an institution to safeguard order, the system reaped World War II. Thereafter, the mantle fell on the shoulders of the United States, circa 1947 to...when?

All we know is that Obama’s America has tired of the burden. It has all but withdrawn from Europe. It has pulled out of Iraq. It may yet leave Afghanistan. The region most in need of an ordering force is the Greater Middle East. But the United States is proving a reluctant warrior, as evidenced by its half-hearted attempt to stem the advance of ISIS. Nor will the United States add military muscle to diplomacy in order to dissuade Tehran from acquiring the Bomb. Concurrently, the United States is disarming. Defense spending is falling steeply. In 2011, it was a bit more than \$700 billion.

The projected figure for 2015 is around \$570 billion, according to *Jane’s Defense Weekly* (December 3, 2014). So who will take care of business?

Not Europe, the largest economic entity on the globe, with a combined GDP exceeding the American one. The EU population of 500 million looms over America’s of 320 million. But its strategic performance is pitiful. In 2011, defense spending totaled \$267 billion—38 percent of American defense outlays. The line points straight downward. The projection for 2015 is \$250 billion.

Nations can always reverse spending trends, as post-Obama America will probably do if the Republicans hold on to the Congress and capture the White House in 2016. But Europe’s problems run deeper. The downward trend is embedded in Europe’s cultures and politics, and it is a lot longer than two American election cycles. The drop in defense spending—actually, disarmament—reflects a secular transformation. Put harshly, Europe is neither able nor willing to act as a strategic player. The continent that once ruled the world, whose empires once spanned the globe, is happy to be a bystander or tag-along of the United States. Thus in Iraq I (1991), in Serbia (1999), and Iraq II (2003). In no instance but one did Europe take the initiative. When it did, with France plunging into the bombing campaign against Gaddafi’s Libya, the Europeans soon ran out of ordinance. In fact, the heavy lifting with stealth bombers and precision-munitions was done by the US Air Force and Navy.

So much for the spending gap, with the EU devoting about 1.5 percent of GDP to the military and the United States more than twice as much. But the “culture gap” is the more critical divide. With the on-off exception of Britain and France, the rest has all but forsaken the “Clausewitzian Continuum,” the idea that force is a tool of the national interest and an indispensable instrument of policy.

The EU, for all its underlying might, is an “empire of peace”—an empire of trade, institutions, cooperation, and diplomacy. The Continent’s old warrior culture has waned along with such quintessentially European inventions as nationalism and “reason of state.” This evolution was perfectly rational in the glory days between the end of World War II and the post-imperial hangover of the United States after Iraq and Afghanistan. These were the decades of security on the cheap, courtesy of the United States, which once had 300,000 troops stationed in NATO-Europe. (“Cheap” is not quite fair, as European members devoted between 2 and 5 percent to the military, yet with the exception of France and Britain, European armies never had to fight.)

The problem today is threefold. As Europe is disarming, the American pillar of world order is wobbling while the threats are coming closer. These are not yet strategic threats embodying the risk of a direct attack. But neither are they merely sub-strategic like the terror massacres in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005. Let’s call them “proximate threats,” as exemplified by the Ukraine and ISIS.

The Crimea Grab and the quasi-occupation of south-eastern Ukraine bespeak Russia’s attempt to restore its old East-European empire or, failing that, to draw former republics and satrapies into its sphere of influence. The use of force ranges from direct (Crimea) to masked (Donetsk). A second threat is the



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forcible expansion of militant Islam, as illustrated by ISIS and sundry terror groups like al-Nusra that have advanced to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. Much closer is Erdogan’s Turkey, a country that is re-Islamicizing while growing ever more hostile to the EU. It is no longer sheer fantasy to see Turkey turning against NATO membership. That scenario would spell serious strategic trouble for the Alliance and the EU.

To sum up: Europe continues to see itself as an “island of peace,” but it is no longer a safe place. Expansionism, terror, and war are edging closer—toward the heart of Europe as well as to its south-eastern flank. The issues are becoming clearer by the day, yet the

strategy is not. The truth remains that Europe is neither willing nor able to use force to safeguard global order. Even if it wanted to do so, it lacks the requisite military wherewithal.

Could Europe then contribute to regional order? That depends on how much push is added to shove. The EU has accepted the Crimean grab and may yield on the Ukraine, but thus encouraged, Russia's next stop might be the Baltics and/or Poland. That is NATO's red line, but Moscow knows that the Alliance can't put too many men and too much materiel on this

line. There is too much fog and fluidity in this arena to make brash predictions.

Joffe's Law says: If you can't predict, assert the general. These are: Europe cannot and will not act strategically. It is disarming rather than rearming. It wants to shelter its "empire of peace" at almost all costs. But it is slowly revisiting the apparently eternal premises of its happy existence. After almost two generations of peace, war and violence are creeping closer. Will the return of yesterday's demons trigger cultural and political change? This author will only say: It should.



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international security policy, European-American relations, Europe and Germany, and the Middle East. A professor of political science at Stanford, he is also a senior fellow at Stanford's Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies. In 1990–91, he taught at Harvard, where he remains affiliated with the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. His essays and reviews have appeared in the *New York Review of Books*, *Times Literary Supplement*, *Commentary*, *New York Times Magazine*, *New Republic*, *Weekly Standard*, *Newsweek*, *Time*, and *Prospect* (London).



A Refashioned NATO

Ken Jowitt

NATO's character and mission were clearly delineated at its inception. Its mission was to countervail Soviet military power, specifically an attack on Western Europe. The fixed focus was the Fulda Gap.

Its character was bureaucratic; its leadership was charismatic. Its leader, the United States, had gained its charisma through military victory in Asia and Western Europe. And in bureaucratic fashion, orders came down from Washington. Those who failed to obey orders, like the French and British in the Suez affair, were rebuked and desisted or later, like the French, they had one option, exit.

The ethos of the alliance was political-ideological as well as military and like the military was sharply delineated: the Free World led by the United States opposed to the Soviet Empire. The two dimensions overlapped concretely and against geography in the case of Greece and Turkey, where political-ideological and military geography led to their membership.

And there was symmetry up to a point. The Warsaw Pact was led by the other World War II charismatic hierarchy, the Soviet Union, and attempted defection was followed by similar either-or outcomes, similar but far from identical leadership responses, violent repression (e.g., DDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia), and/or forced excommunication.

Military conflict between these two entities was limited to peripheral areas like Korea and Vietnam, thereby minimizing escalation to nuclear war between the two leaders, an outcome vividly guaranteed by

the mutually accepted doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction.

Then the Soviet Union imploded (primarily because it was terminally corrupt, not absolutely contained) and communism everywhere became extinct. And NATO became obsolete. Inertia is a remarkably underrated and powerful force that as much as anything explains NATO's persistence. Vested interests are an even more powerful force for maintaining an



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organization even when it has lost its mission and defining ethos. The predictable response to the latter from those interests is a Salk Foundation-like search to discover a proximate mission justifying its continued existence and relevance. In short, it is hardly surprising NATO still exists, but as what?

As an anxiety reducing agent for West European and American military-political elites, neither of whom can make sense of the world we live in. But it is precisely NATO's shift from fear reduction in a barricaded Cold War Europe to anxiety reduction in a world of poorly delineated frontiers that demonstrates NATO's irrelevance and futility.

But surely that conclusion can be swiftly refuted. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya one might argue that NATO has proved not only its military efficacy, but also a remarkable capacity for radical adaptability to novel military circumstances.

And if so the credit clearly goes to its leader, the United States. Coalitions of the willing, leading from behind (not, as the polemicists insist, always an unwise measure), assumption of civilian tasks, extension of

mission to shifting arenas out of the alliance's original charter...

In light of these adaptations, one could say that the United States and NATO have shed their rigid, geographically concrete, bureaucratic organization for a Silicon Valley flex; they have opted for post-modern definition suited for the frontier realities of contemporary international military conflict.

One could, and would be wrong!

It is more accurate to see NATO and its American leadership's responses to frontier violence as ad hoc and opportunistic: bricolage, not architectonic, dizzy with confusion, not with success. NATO needs to be drastically reconceived, but the chances of that happening are at best remote.

Radical revision of powerful inertial institutions requires trauma. Putin's actions in Ukraine might provide the trauma and be the catalyst.



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Defending the Indefensible: NATO's Baltic States

Ralph Peters

Expanding NATO to include the Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was a moral imperative and politically irresistible. Militarily, it was folly.

Anyone who has walked the gorgeous art nouveau streets of *fin-de-siècle* Riga or wandered the medieval heart of Tallinn grasped immediately that this is *Europe*, that, despite centuries of Russian occupation, brutality and, at last, Stalin's near-genocide, Russification never stuck. These cultures were shaped by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, by German philosophy and Nordic *Geist*, by the brick architecture of the North German Plain and the fanciful stucco of *Belle Epoque* Paris and Brussels. These three finely wrought democracies have nothing in common with Russia—a realm forever scarred by Asian encounters—other than memories of suffering and a lingering minority of Russophones. To exclude these courageous, ambitious, and creative states from NATO would have been to compound a succession of monstrous wrongs. We did the right thing.

Yet, viewed from a military and strategic perspective, this stage of enlargement increased NATO's risk not only of war, but of losing that war's first campaign. While Russia's military remains slovenly and overhyped (do look closely at footage from eastern Ukraine), it is big—big enough to plunge, blunder, and bully its way across these relatively tiny countries with their backs against a cold sea. A ground defense of the borders would be impossible; a defense in depth impractical without geographical depth. Responding effectively to a Russian invasion would require the use of airpower employed in mass and with ferocity against targets on

the Russian side of the border. And Russia—especially, under its barbaric (if brilliant) new czar—would take pleasure in destroying those luminous capital cities out of spite. Any show of courage by NATO—for which one must nonetheless hope—would result in immediate escalation and sadistic devastation.

Then...what is to be done?

The best way to protect the Baltics and avoid war on that front is to support Ukraine with arms, training, and financial support. Keep the czar occupied in the south to protect the north.

The romantic gesture of expanding NATO to include the Baltic States demands hard-headed realism for their—and NATO's—preservation.

We are, of course, unlikely to challenge Putin in Ukraine with the requisite determination. Still, Ukraine will occupy Putin through the final months of the current American president's strategically inept administration. But woe unto the next president, who will have to defend the Baltic states when Putin paws their borders to test his resolve.

RALPH PETERS is the author of twenty-nine books, including works on strategy and military affairs, as well as best-selling, prize-winning novels. He has published more than a thousand essays, articles, and columns. As a US Army enlisted man and officer, he served in infantry and military Intelligence units before becoming a foreign area officer and global scout. After retiring in 1998, he covered wars and trouble spots in the Middle East and Africa, and remains Fox News's strategic analyst. His recent *New York Times* best seller, *Cain at Gettysburg*, received the 2013 Boyd Award for Literary Excellence in Military Fiction from the American Library Association.

Where Is NATO's Military Headed?

Bing West

Peter Mansoor concluded his overview of NATO by writing, "Fear of Russian revanchism has served as inspiration for the maintenance of a healthy military relationship among NATO allies...a pivotal, stabilizing role in European security, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future."

Umm. How foreseeable is that the future—one year, one decade, one century? While Peter wrote in the conventional geopolitical jargon that befits a professor, he revealed his warrior's heart. That is, it was Col. Peter Mansoor who commanded an armored brigade in urban combat against both al-Qaeda and Shiite fanatics.

Regrettably, NATO is less stalwart than Peter projects. Peter noted that Putin "spooked the new NATO member states in Eastern Europe." That is true; but no NATO nation has offered arms for Ukraine to defend itself against the naked Russian invasion. Peter then, more sanguinely, observed that this "led to commitments of NATO forces in the Baltic States and Poland."

Umm. That was too optimistic. Today, the Baltic States and Poland are as unnerved by President Obama as by President Putin. For 75 years, European security has been undergirded by American resolve, concerning which NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has recently expressed unease. NATO. As the leaders of the Baltic States and Poland repeatedly and diplomatically point out, Mr. Obama has been careful not to commit to deploy in an exercise either substantial American forces or antimissile systems to their states.

The retort can be that the truly strong do not have to indulge in symbolism. But which NATO countries have the real sinew of force below the bluster of rhetoric? NATO Europe continues to cut its defense budgets and atrophy its military muscle. Where is America in relation to NATO? Are we mutually developing the same types of forces to deter and, if challenged, to win the next war?

Of course not. Most European nations devote less than 2 percent to defense. In 2009, Marine General James Mattis relinquished command of "NATO Transformation" to a French general. This signaled that American military leaders evaluated the European force structure as impossibly secondary, lacking the resources to remain modern. Even Great Britain must deploy American aircraft on board its crown carrier, HMS *Queen Elizabeth*. The cause is penury.

In America, the Defense budget is robust. But as the commander-in-chief, President Obama has set a steady course of reducing American military commitments and global leadership. His message is to do less with less. He has shown indifference bordering on outright skepticism about America ever again going to war, once he has extricated us from Afghanistan and Iraq. Beyond that, there seems to be no threat. He has gone through three secretaries of defense who left without a kind word for his stewardship.

Putin forcefully rearranged national borders and fealties, and NATO—both America and Europe—acceded without resort to force or support for Ukraine.

If that is the end of Putin's ambitions, all will be forgotten in a few years.

Meanwhile, in the Middle East, a massive thunderstorm is gathering. The Obama administration has turned a blind eye to the Islamist State in Syria and Iraq. If ISIS ceases beheading Westerners, the United States and NATO may stay uninvolved, allowing ISIS to consolidate its revolution into a de facto state, as did the Shiite clerics in Iran in 1979.

Alternatively, the next American president could commit to war. In that case, undoubtedly NATO Europe will contribute special forces and some aircraft. In any war, American generals will accede authoritative positions and courtesies to NATO European militaries of any size. Allies are essential for the advancement of a civilized world with a global set of restraining rules and protocols.

Peter Mansoor is correct in arguing that NATO plays "a pivotal, stabilizing role in European security." However, the reason is that the threats are peripheral,

not that the will of the alliance is iron. All European NATO countries know the underlying truth; they have chosen to play a lesser, supporting role in their own defense. Only America has the sheer bulk, ingenuity, and determination to hold intact Western civilization for another what...three years, three decades, or three centuries? We have no way of predicting. The trends are not definitive, to put it charitably

BING WEST is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the Reagan administration. He is a graduate of Georgetown and Princeton Universities where he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow, and served in the marine infantry in Vietnam. A best-selling author, he has written nine books on military history and travels frequently to war zones. His latest book is entitled *One Million Steps: A Marine Platoon at War* (2014).

POLL: WHAT IS NATO'S FUTURE?

- ☐ NATO's unity and resources are fine. That is why it keeps the peace.
- ☐ NATO is recalibrating and will soon recover its Cold War-era relevancy and stature.
- ☐ NATO will remain as a continued euphemism for American hard power.
- ☐ NATO will soon end when Putin enters a Baltic State.
- ☐ NATO is already over; the members have no uniform interests.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

WILL NATO SURVIVE AS A CREDIBLE ALLIANCE—AND SHOULD IT?


1. Is NATO too big or too small?
2. How should NATO change requirements for membership?
3. Will NATO deter Vladimir Putin from entering a member Baltic state?
4. What did recent US changes in foreign policy do to NATO?

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

- Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (Columbia University Press, 2004).
- David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone* (Princeton University Press, 2014).
- Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (PublicAffairs, 2001).
- Brian J. Collins, *NATO: A Guide to the Issues* (Praeger Security International, 2011).
- Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Brookings, 2001).
- Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
- Stanley R. Sloan, *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2010).
- James Stavridis, *The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO* (Naval Institute Press, 2014).

IN THE NEXT ISSUE

ARE CARRIER GROUPS, TRADITIONAL FIGHTER WINGS, AND INFANTRY DIVISIONS ANACHRONISTIC OR WILL THEY REMAIN TIMELESS ASSETS IN BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OF THE FUTURE?



Military History in Contemporary Conflict

As the very name of Hoover Institution attests, military history lies at the very core of our dedication to the study of “War, Revolution, and Peace.” Indeed, the precise mission statement of the Hoover Institution includes the following promise: “The overall mission of this Institution is, from its records, to recall the voice of experience against the making of war, and by the study of these records and their publication, to recall man’s endeavors to make and preserve peace, and to sustain for America the safeguards of the American way of life.” From its origins as a library and archive, the Hoover Institution has evolved into one of the foremost research centers in the world for policy formation and pragmatic analysis. It is with this tradition in mind, that the “Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict” has set its agenda—reaffirming the Hoover Institution’s dedication to historical research in light of contemporary challenges, and in particular, reinvigorating the national study of military history as an asset to foster and enhance our national security. By bringing together a diverse group of distinguished military historians, security analysts, and military veterans and practitioners, the working group seeks to examine the conflicts of the past as critical lessons for the present.

Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict

The Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict examines how knowledge of past military operations can influence contemporary public policy decisions concerning current conflicts. The careful study of military history offers a way of analyzing modern war and peace that is often underappreciated in this age of technological determinism. Yet the result leads to a more in-depth and dispassionate understanding of contemporary wars, one that explains how particular military successes and failures of the past can be often germane, sometimes misunderstood, or occasionally irrelevant in the context of the present.

Strategika

Strategika is a journal that analyzes ongoing issues of national security in light of conflicts of the past—the efforts of the Military History Working Group of historians, analysts, and military personnel focusing on military history and contemporary conflict. Our board of scholars shares no ideological consensus other than a general acknowledgment that human nature is largely unchanging. Consequently, the study of past wars can offer us tragic guidance about present conflicts—a preferable approach to the more popular therapeutic assumption that contemporary efforts to ensure the perfectibility of mankind eventually will lead to eternal peace. New technologies, methodologies, and protocols come and go; the larger tactical and strategic assumptions that guide them remain mostly the same—a fact discernable only through the study of history.



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