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STRATEGIKA

CONFLICTS OF THE PAST AS LESSONS FOR THE PRESENT



How can US military readiness meet America's present strategic responsibilities at a time of budgetary shrinkage and growing isolationism?

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About the Posters in This Issue

Documenting the wartime viewpoints and diverse political sentiments of the twentieth century, the Hoover Institution Library & Archives Poster Collection has more than one hundred thousand posters from around the world and continues to grow. Thirty-three thousand are available online. Posters from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia/Soviet Union, and France predominate, though posters from more than eighty countries are included.

The Readiness Vortex

Thomas Donnelly

For the past several years, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been painting a bleak portrait of the state of the armed services. Testifying to the senate Armed Services Committee in January 2015, recently retired army chief Gen. Ray Odierno admitted that army readiness "has been degraded to its lowest level in 20 years." This year, Odierno's successor, Gen. Mark Milley, went farther: the army is not well prepared to engage a major power. "If we got into a conflict with Russia then I think it would place our soldiers' lives at risk," he said. Other service leaders have made similar statements regarding other potential adversaries, including China, Iran, and North Korea.

"We have a lot of 'not availables' in the force right now," continued Milley, underscoring that force readiness is a multiple of sufficient personnel, serviceable equipment, adequate training funds and time, and a host of other factors. The navy, for its part, has a constantly growing backlog of deferred ship maintenance. A recent television report profiled a Marine F/A-18 Hornet squadron that had to wait eighteen months to receive spare parts and was constantly "cannibalizing" parts from one plane to another. Only half of air force fighter pilots—including those who fly the top-of-the-line F-22 Raptor—are receiving the full spectrum of training required. It is small wonder, then, that the chairman of the JCS, Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, agreed with the conclusion drawn by Rep. Mac Thornberry, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, "that we have a significant readiness problem across the services, especially for the wide variety of contingencies that we've got to face."

How can this happen? How is it that a military that should be recovering, now that the wars of the post-9/11 era have "ended," should be in such poor condition?

In fact, the US military has been caught in the vortex of a storm that has been brewing for decades. While the tempest has reached hurricane force during the Obama years, the underlying weather patterns go back to the mid-1980s.

Let us begin by dividing the Obama years into two periods, the most recent shaped most significantly by the 2011 Budget Control Act—meaning that the greatest damage done to the US armed services is the result of a bipartisan agreement between an extremely liberal Democratic White House and a hard-core conservative Republican majority in the House of Representatives. The law, now shaping the fourth of the ten budgets it is supposed to cover, is on track to reduce overall defense spending by about

20 percent from what President Obama planned in his original 2011 budget proposal, roughly a total of $1.5 trillion. There have been minor adjustments to the original figures in the short-term budget deals struck last year and in 2012, but that amounts to less than $50 billion of relief. But that small relief did not make up for the damage done in 2013, when, thanks to a standoff between the White House and Congress, the law's "sequestration" provision came into effect.

Sequestration accelerated the downward spiral in military readiness in ways that are now manifesting themselves. At one point, only 10 percent of the army's fourty-plus active brigades—a total that has now been reduced to just thirty brigades—were fully ready. The budget cuts hit hardest at the small-unit level: personnel review boards had to cut 30 percent of the captains who had joined the army during the Iraq "surge" years. The Navy had to extend ship deployments at the same time it was reducing its maintenance to just 57 percent of what was needed. The air force grounded thirty-one flying squadrons.

At the same time, the Obama administration worked to lock in the reduction in military capacity and capability in two related ways. To begin with, it rewrote its defense strategy to "rebalance" or "pivot to the Pacific." While this was spun as a response to China's military modernization and increasingly aggressive posture in East Asia, the strategy's biggest effect was to pivot away from traditional US interests in Europe and the Middle East. More limited strategic aims allowed for a reduction in the long-standing Pentagon force-sizing construct. Since the end of the Cold War, previous administrations of both parties had accepted that, as a global power, the United States had to be prepared to fight two large-scale wars at the same time. By withdrawing from the Middle East and declaring Europe to be eternally at peace, the White House substantially lowered the bar of military sufficiency.

Since the president issued his "defense planning guidance"—and, at the time, both the White House and the Pentagon boasted about Obama's personal involvement in the process—the world has defied these planning assumptions. In 2012, Vladimir Putin had not annexed Crimea, invaded eastern Ukraine nor intervened in Syria; the Islamic State did not exist nor had Iran embarked on its effort to subdue northern Arabia; China had not created artificial islands nor built military airfields on reefs less than 150 miles from Manila. In other words, geopolitical realities have forced even the reluctant Obama administration into a redeployment of forces even as it maintained its lowered planning standards, continued force reductions, and budget cuts. Nor has the Republican Congress, despite winning a Senate majority in 2014, raised any serious objection.

The net result is yet another dip in overall force readiness. Perhaps the most notable single measure of the problem is the emptiness of the "pivot" of force to the Pacific. The combination of a shrinking fleet and unforeseen commitments elsewhere has meant that

the navy has never had sufficient presence in the western Pacific, and most notably in the South China Sea. In the four years since the "rebalanced" strategy was announced, the navy has been unable to position two aircraft carriers in that theater for only a single month. In April, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter staged a big show when the carrier USS *John C. Stennis* sailed through the South China Sea, declaring, "We have been here [in Asia] for decade upon decade." In fact, the *Stennis,* more than halfway through its deployment—a tour billed as the "Great Green Fleet" because of the navy's efforts to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels—had been in the South China Sea for just a week.

But the US military was already headed for readiness woes before the budget law was enacted. In the first two years of his presidency, Obama directed more than $300 billion in cuts to weapons procurements, most notably capping the size of the F-22 fleet at 187 aircraft instead of the 350 previously—and 750 originally—planned. It's no accident that pilots don't have enough Raptors to train with or that, in response to the Russian expedition to Syria, the air force has had to transfer F-22s from Alaska—that is, from the Pacific—to the Middle East. And now that those aircraft have been sent home for refitting, the service is hard-pressed to replace them.

To be fair, the Obama administration and its accountant accomplices on Capitol Hill are merely seizing on the opportunities created by previous presidents. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, George W. Bush chose to fight his wars without any structural increase in US armed forces. "You go to war with the Army you have," lamented Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2014, "not the Army you might want." It was not until Rumsfeld was fired and the Iraq "surge" of 2007 that the Bush administration asked to expand the military. Despite sizeable increases in defense spending, very little of the money was spent on weapons modernization beyond procurements like the $30 billion for massive Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles—useful for convoys in Iraq, but without much other purpose. Rumsfeld, who came to office determined

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to impose a "transformation" of the American military, shortchanged current programs like the F-22 and F-35 fighters, the navy's Zumwalt destroyer, and pretty much every system the army had on the books.

But even Rumsfeld's task was made easier by the large budget and force reductions and so-called "procurement holiday" that began in the Clinton years. The active-duty army in 1991 included 780,000 soldiers; by the end of the 2018 budget year it could be as low as 420,000. The navy had a little less than 500 ships; today it is on a path to 282. The air force had twenty-six tactical fighter wings—of seventy-two planes each—and is headed for thirteen wings of fifty-four planes.

Finally, it should be noted that the demand for "jointness"—greater interconnectedness among the separate armed services—instilled by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1985 has increased the overall readiness challenge. It is remarkable that fighters based on an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea can provide close air support to remote combat outposts in Afghanistan, but the price tag and complexity of such operations is immense. The corresponding cost of preparing to fight in a joint-service style is likewise larger than in a more traditional, service-specific manner. Ironically, greater service autonomy would likely mean greater operational flexibility and combat readiness.

In sum, "doing more with less" has been the motto of the post-Cold War military, and it should be no surprise that the result is not simply diminished capacity and capability but diminished readiness. A force that is too small can never catch up with demand. As the Army's Training and Doctrine Command admitted in a recent assessment: the "Army is too small to protect the Nation and its interests abroad and to uphold US international obligations around the world." The problems of preparedness are not apparent in small, short engagements: the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 were lopsided affairs. But these shortfalls of capacity crippled both post-invasion efforts. And, as the service chiefs make plain, taking on any tougher adversary now would reveal shortfalls in capability. And that is the difference between an incomplete victory and real defeat.

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Sustaining Military Readiness—The Devil Is in the Details

Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.)

Today's global security crystal ball is murky, but a safe assumption is that the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe will remain unsettled with nests of terrorist activity, motivation, and recruitment; with sanctions lifted Iran's conventional military reemergence in the region will further challenge the security environment in the Middle East; Northeast Asian allies, China, and the United States will continue to react to an unpredictable regime in North Korea and the increasing military heft and flexing of China will disquiet the broader Indo-Pacific region as China and the United States continue their strategic dance of cooperation and competition. The connectedness of our world, our interests in it, and the singular stabilizing role of the United States make American retreat a very bad strategic option.

Although many continue to see the compelling need for the United States to remain engaged militarily, American public opinion, after over a decade of war, will argue against even modest deployments of our sons and daughters to foreign lands. That aversion is reinforced by loud voices asserting other nations are not doing enough to carry their share of the load, so why should we bear the burden? Adding fuel to that argument will be the increasing reluctance of non-allies to host US forces on their soil due to increasing sensitivity of their publics of a perceived loss of sovereignty because the United States is conducting military operations from their bases and facilities. Regardless of those attitudes, no other nation is ready and able to step up to the global stabilizing role of the United States That incumbency means we must be ready for our time of continuing disorder. It cannot be business as usual. We must open our aperture of thought and get away from our recent land-centric view of military force, our current bias that most future military operations will be against ISIS or a resurgent Russia, and the dangerous assumption that our military of tomorrow will be capable and ready.

Today's understanding and discussion of American military capability, capacity, and response is far too superficial. Debates go on about where and how the US military should respond or where US stabilizing presence must be. These are mostly within an insular defense policy community, and very absent in our political season among potential commanders-in-chief. So very few address the erroneous assumption that the capacity and readiness of the US military are or will be as they have been in years past.

Our military, indeed any military, is what it buys in people (i.e., numbers, skills, and competence), capital investments (e.g., ships, airplanes, ground force equipment, networks), and operating accounts (i.e., deployed operations, preparatory training, and equipment maintenance). We acknowledge erratic, unpredictable budget processes are hurting our

military, but we allow that internal disorder to continue. We focus too much on the total amount of spending for defense as a measure of efficacy and commitment, and how that figure can be attained through budget machinations such as raising the top line by manipulating funds in various defense appropriations. Some highly regarded defense policy experts ignore the internal pressures on defense spending and offer the simplistic solution of "doing away with sequestration" as if lifting caps on defense spending and eliminating the illogical procedural constraints of sequestration are the solution to our problem. The fact is, absent a catastrophic event American public opinion will be slow to demand a more rigorous assessment of defense needs and funding, nor will the budget floodgates be thrown open. The devil, ominously, lives in the details. Failure to dig into those details, particularly the amount available for capital investment, will leave our military inadequately prepared for the security environment and events of the future.

As we dig into those details we must measure outcomes on two scales—capability and capacity. The increasing complexity of warfare, the systems we use today, and the technology we must have for tomorrow demand capabilities better than those of our adversaries. While we must provide the very best to those we send in harm's way, unfortunately, our fixation on capability is squelching the discussion on capacity—adequate numbers of capital assets to deter, engage, and prevail. Numbers still matter greatly. The United States has the great benefit of conducting military operations far from our shores thus insulating our public from conflict, but that distance adds to the numbers of things needed to provide credible, persistent forward presence.

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What to do to best meet America's strategic responsibilities going forward

1) Get serious and call out the details of our defense budget. Cease fixating on the total amount, and honestly assess and debate the trends in the budget categories of personnel, capital investments, and operating accounts. Drive reform and make the hard political decisions in personnel policy and compensation to control those smothering costs while incentivizing the skills and competencies for the future. Face the reality that the investment account is being eroded from within by growing personnel costs. If that squeeze is not met head-on quickly, our nation's military capacity and our industrial base that produces it will wither away. Getting it back will be a wish not a reality.

2) There is no switch that will turn ISIS and other like groups off. The fight against them will be a long slog. Our special operations forces will remain on point. Invest in their resilience. They are the best of the best, have been at it a long time, and the future will be more of the same. They and their families must have the attention and the resources to maintain the unforgiving pace and nature of their deployments.

3) The maritime Middle East is sure to become more challenging, not less. Emphasize the value and importance of offshore presence in the Middle East, and refocus on the Eastern Mediterranean and the strategic sea-lanes of the Middle East, particularly the entrance to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf—China and Iran already are. Our navy, frankly, has been absent from the Mediterranean Sea at a time when disorder is growing along its periphery and Russian naval forces are more present there. Return to a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. Consider if a Marine Expeditionary Unit (which was once the case) had been offshore and ready during the attack on our diplomatic post in Benghazi in 2012, would the outcome have been the same? In the mid and long term the impact of Iran, free of sanctions, on the Middle East's strategic sea-lanes and choke points and on regional navies will be far greater as it recapitalizes its navy and air force.

4) Honestly assess the type and capacity (*numbers*) of naval and air forces needed in the Pacific and Indian Oceans equal to those vast spaces and capable of reassuring allies and friends that we are the decisive force in the region. Do not benchmark naval power as the total numbers of ships in our navy. Make the time, thoughtfully analyze, and have a meaningful discussion about the numbers and types of *fighting* ships and aircraft needed to address the growing anti-access area denial strategies of that region.

5) Support the army's current, commendable effort in redesigning (my term) its force of active, guard, and reserve. Support means overcoming cultural and bureaucratic inertia and providing the funds to train those redesigned units for prompt and repeated deployments, not just in areas of interest today but globally as uncertainty defines the future.

6) Don't forget the mundane but essential dimension of military logistics. Increased naval presence, at-sea logistics and, regardless of how light the army becomes, prompt sealift to move heavier units will continue to define America's global reach and punch on land and sea.

We can drift blissfully into the future assuming the force we need is the force we will have. Strategically that is a dangerous assumption. Future global security challenges and demands may be uncertain, but what is certain is the need to urgently and honestly get into the details of what we must do to assure our future military capability and capacity.

Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.), an Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, (2011–13) graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1973. In September 2007, Admiral Roughead became the twenty-ninth chief of naval operations after holding six operational commands and is one of only two officers in the navy's history to have commanded both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Admiral Roughead is the recipient of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, and various unit and service awards.

Readiness Writ Large

Admiral James O. Ellis Jr., USN (Ret.)

In the years immediately following the (first) end of the Cold War, the search for elusive readiness metrics in the Department of Defense was all-consuming. As the pressures mounted, first to write and then to cash the "peace dividend" check, policy pronouncements were made and working groups and war rooms were established, all asserting the existence of and searching for the Holy Grail: a suite of detailed readiness metrics that could precisely detail the impact of every procurement dollar cut and every training event curtailed. That unsuccessful effort faded quickly as new and unexpected security challenges emerged and the "New World Order" proved to be anything but orderly.

We now find ourselves in a related, if not similar, effort as we attempt, in a fiscally constrained and increasingly threatening world, to define where to put each national security dollar so as to leverage to best effect its enhancement of our national security. We believe that significant potential resides in technological advancements, termed a "Third Offset" strategy. After a decade and a half of conflict and confronting an even more uncertain future, we also struggle with the cost and question the value of fully recapitalizing air, land, and sea forces ridden hard over many years. We seek the right balance of technologically innovative and classic manpower-intensive capabilities, of conventional and special operations forces, and we attempt to fairly quantify both the potential and limitations of technology across a growing number of domains. We viscerally realize that things are changing but cannot yet discern whether we are on a linear track to a completely new national security environment, or are at the beginning of a dimly recognizable cycle that returns us, inexorably, to a world we once knew of peer competitor(s), increasing confrontation, and, if not a Cold War, at least a Hot Peace.

Some, or all, of these efforts may yet succeed. But even as one is drawn to the budget details and procurement programmatics that will, inevitably, shape national security readiness for good or ill, there are even more fundamental questions that need to be addressed. The first question should be: "Ready for what?" followed by the corollaries: "Where, when, and why?"

WHAT: The military is often accused of preparing for the last war when, in fact, it is they who are simultaneously expected to "learn from history," deal effectively with today's challenges, and perfectly predict and respond to the future. Ensuring the nation's security is a capstone exercise in risk management, defined in what I call "The Four M's." One must dispassionately and consistently *measure* the risk, *minimize* the risk to the extent possible, *manage* the risk that inevitably remains, and, finally, be prepared with a *mitigation* plan when everything goes to hell, as it assuredly will at some point.

Those defining the "what" in military readiness must also understand the wisdom of Pascal's Wager, which reminds us that the *probability* of an event is not the same as the *consequences* of the event. That is why discussion of nuclear deterrence must bookend the national security conversation that then flows across

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multi-domain conventional conflict to unconventional warfare and, now, potential confrontations in space and cyberspace.

WHERE: Throughout history we have been singularly unsuccessful in predicting where challenges to our national security will arise. Despite modern intelligence technology, we failed to anticipate events in the Balkans, were surprised by the invasion of Kuwait, did not foresee the scope of the Chinese buildup in the South China Sea, and could not conceive of a scenario in which Russia would annex Crimea. One may plan for a hundred contingencies; fate will ultimately deal you the 101st.

The politically and geographically disparate character of our national security challenges should remind us of several things. First, we need to be better at seeing the world through the eyes of others, be they friend or "other," and not as predisposed to mirror-imaging. Second, our forces, especially land and maritime, need to be regionally present if we are to shape events before they occur, the essence of deterrence. You cannot surge trust. And finally, we need to understand that we will be sharing the security burden with others and that, while they both have advantages and disadvantages, an *alliance* and a *coalition* are not at all the same thing.

WHEN: One could infer from the focus on much of modern weaponry that increased speed of response is always desirable. A more measured consideration might indicate that is not always the case. A key element of national security and the essential element of deterrence concepts is a complete understanding on the part of potential adversaries of the cost of their actions. Modern communication and even social media travel at light speed; understanding and insights do not. When confronted by a security challenge, it requires time for any organization and its leaders to fully internalize the implications, deliberate courses of action, and consider or accept alternative outcomes even as we newly appreciate that the outrage of their people, incited by social media, can radically shape that decision. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a case in point: President Kennedy, over the advice of some of his military advisors, implemented a lengthy blockade, allowed time for Russian leaders to sense American resolve, and then facilitated a negotiated deal that allowed both sides to claim victory. To ignore the time dimension in national security crises risks, at best, getting action and response out of phase and, at worst, driving a crisis divergent.

WHY: The most challenging part of debating readiness and courses of action should not be the "what?" but the "why?" How does this action comport with or

POLL: What needs to be done about the US defense budget?

- ☐ It must be cut further, given fiscal uncertainty and America's changing profile in world affairs.
- ☐ Recent cuts have finally brought defense spending into proper balance and prompted needed reassessments.
- ☐ Defense spending must be gradually increased over time to restore lost programs and manpower.
- ☐ Defense spending must be upped immediately to protect the United States and its alliances.
- ☐ We are now in a crisis; only a vast rearmament and expansion of the military will ward off a war.

redefine our central strategy? It can be easy to focus on the short-term objective, clear and unarguable. It can be much more difficult to see and address the longer-term implications regionally, politically, or societally. But recent experience has painfully taught us that overall strategy must be a central issue. Tactical energy in a strategic vacuum is a recipe for disaster.

Finally, a strategy must be capable of measuring the scope, duration, and costs of the overall military undertaking, not merely in monetary but also in human terms. Held in the balance, how do the benefits of humanitarian intervention, overthrow of a despotic regime, or preemption of weapons of mass destruction weigh against the societal, social, and security costs imposed on the populace? When the effort is complete and the effects are known, in the English expression, "Will it be worth the candle?" This readiness judgment, too, is an ethical responsibility of the nation's civilian and military leaders for which they are, or should be, uniquely accountable.

James O. Ellis Jr. retired as president and chief executive officer of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Ellis holds a master's degree in aerospace engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is a graduate of the Navy Test Pilot School and the Navy Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun).

Discussion Questions

How can US military readiness meet America's present strategic responsibilities at a time of budgetary shrinkage and growing isolationism?

1. To what degree are present defense challenges similar to those of the late 1930s?

2. Does the US have too few and too expensive weapons, and should it make more and less costly planes and ships?

3. Are US budget deficits and soaring national debt as dangerous as recent cutbacks in defense?

4. Does a reduced US military pressure allies to take on a fair share of common defense or only weaken the alliance?

Suggestions for Further Reading

On current readiness:

- James Cunningham, "Readiness Tracker, Volume 1: The Military's Limited Surge Capacity," (AEI, January 2016). https://www.aei.org/publication/readiness-tracker-volume-1-the-militarys-limited-surge-capacity/
- Andrew Tilghman, "America's Military: Readiness 'on a shoestring'," *MilitaryTimes* (2016). http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2014/12/13/americas-military-readiness-on-a-shoestring/20186051/

On the long-term gap between strategy and resources:

- Thomas Donnelly, Mackenzie Eaglen, Gary J. Schmitt, et al. "To Rebuild America's Military," (AEI, October 2015). http://www.aei.org/publication/to-rebuild-americas-military/?utm_source=paramount&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mediamwcssreport&utm_content=report
- William J. Perry and John P. Abizaid, "Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review," (United States Institute of Peace, July 31, 2014). http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR_0.pdf

On the nature of military preparedness:

- Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Brookings Institution Press, 1995). http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/1995/military
- Todd Harrison, "Rethinking Readiness," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall 2014). http://csbaonline.org/publications/2014/08/rethinking-readiness/

In the Next Issue

What are the strategic ramifications for the West?
Should a few European Union members leave the union?

Military History in Contemporary Conflict

As the very name of Hoover Institution attests, military history lies at the very core of our dedication to the study of "War, Revolution, and Peace." Indeed, the precise mission statement of the Hoover Institution includes the following promise: "The overall mission of this Institution is, from its records, to recall the voice of experience against the making of war, and by the study of these records and their publication, to recall man's endeavors to make and preserve peace, and to sustain for America the safeguards of the American way of life." From its origins as a library and archive, the Hoover Institution has evolved into one of the foremost research centers in the world for policy formation and pragmatic analysis. It is with this tradition in mind, that the "Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict" has set its agenda—reaffirming the Hoover Institution's dedication to historical research in light of contemporary challenges, and in particular, reinvigorating the national study of military history as an asset to foster and enhance our national security. By bringing together a diverse group of distinguished military historians, security analysts, and military veterans and practitioners, the working group seeks to examine the conflicts of the past as critical lessons for the present.

Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict

The Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Conflict examines how knowledge of past military operations can influence contemporary public policy decisions concerning current conflicts. The careful study of military history offers a way of analyzing modern war and peace that is often underappreciated in this age of technological determinism. Yet the result leads to a more in-depth and dispassionate understanding of contemporary wars, one that explains how particular military successes and failures of the past can be often germane, sometimes misunderstood, or occasionally irrelevant in the context of the present.

Strategika

Strategika is a journal that analyzes ongoing issues of national security in light of conflicts of the past—the efforts of the Military History Working Group of historians, analysts, and military personnel focusing on military history and contemporary conflict. Our board of scholars shares no ideological consensus other than a general acknowledgment that human nature is largely unchanging. Consequently, the study of past wars can offer us tragic guidance about present conflicts—a preferable approach to the more popular therapeutic assumption that contemporary efforts to ensure the perfectibility of mankind eventually will lead to eternal peace. New technologies, methodologies, and protocols come and go; the larger tactical and strategic assumptions that guide them remain mostly the same—a fact discernable only through the study of history.



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