USER GUIDE

20TH Century Argentina in the Hoover Institution Archives

By William Ratliff and Luis Fernando Calviño

Introduction

This is a user’s guide to the collection on 20th century Argentina in the Hoover Institution Archives. It is in two sections:

(1) a brief commentary on modern Argentina to provide an historical context for the materials in the Hoover collection, and

(2) a description of the major materials in the collection itself. The collection includes books, magazines, government and other documents, correspondence, photographs, posters, films and tape recordings. They relate most directly to the 1945-1975 period but also illuminate varied aspects of Argentine history, economics, society and culture and life during the entire modern period. Highlights of the collection include, but are not limited to: the largest public collection in the world of correspondence to and from Juan Domingo Perón, a three-times president of Argentina in the mid-20th century, whose influence remains strong today; numerous papers of Juan Atilio Bramuglia, a Peronist organizer, foreign minister and, in 1948, president of the United Nations Security Council; and the personal archive of Dr. Américo Ghioldi, long the leader of the Socialist Party in Argentina and a strong critic of .

Historical Context

Two generations (1837, 1880s) and Their Impact

The first of these two generations of leaders included Juan Alberdi, the father of the 1853 Constitution, modeled on the U.S. Constitution,
who like many of his colleagues was a fervent globalizer in mid-19th century terms. Far more than most leaders in other Latin American countries, Alberdi and others of his generation, prominently including Domingo F. Sarmiento, focused on education. Alberdi also proclaimed what was to become a guiding philosophy for decades of subsequent Argentine governments, namely that “In America, to govern is to populate.” In 1869 Argentina had a population of 1.7 million, about 12 percent of whom were foreign born. Between 1880 and 1930, when immigration was at its peak, 5.9 million people arrived, about half from Italy and a third from Spain and Argentina became overwhelmingly a nation of recent immigrants. The wave of immigration was the foundation of much of the resulting prosperity.

Argentina experienced rapid modernization, political stability and increasing democratization during those five decades. This progress was in large part the result of the consensus of the “Generation of the ‘80s” on how to develop the nation, a level of agreement among Argentine leaders that has not recurred since that time. The British economist David Ricardo said Great Britain sought a fertile land and it can be said without a doubt that it found such a land in Argentina, to the generally accepted benefit of both countries. Many economic and other ties, which had begun while Argentina was still a Spanish colony, flourished as Argentina became a great producer of raw materials demanded by the Industrial Revolution. The fertile Pampas was soon crossed by British-built railroads that sent goods to the port of Buenos Aires for export to Europe. In May 1931 the Buenos Aires newspaper “La Prensa” praised British investments ranging from sugar to cattle, from banks to insurance agencies, and including import and export houses. The paper opined that “To this day rural people attribute to “los ingleses” whatever public work or inspired enterprise is made in its region.”

Links to Britain and Europe benefited from migration, foreign investments, and cheaper means of transportation, most importantly the introduction of the refrigerated ship in 1876, which opened the European market to Argentine beef exports. Buenos Aires was quickly transformed into an immense metropolis; the cultural capital of the Hispanic speaking world. Great buildings rose up reminiscent of Paris, which became and in many ways remained the cultural model for the Argentine people. By 1914 Argentina become one of
the most urbanized countries of the world with about 50% of its population in cities of more than 2,000 inhabitants.

The radical hegemony

During the half century leading to 1930, a prosperous middle-class emerged under the political leadership of the Union Civica Radical or UCR, a party founded in 1891 and led successively by Leandro N. Alem and Hipólito Yrigoyen, which eliminated the previous political domination of the Creole aristocracy. An electoral reform in 1916 ended decades of fraudulent and fixed elections. What was called “radicalism” was brought formally into the Argentine political arena by Yrigoyen, who began a period of hegemony that lasted until the 1930 military coup.

The quality of life and sense of prosperity of the middle-class improved, but the emerging working class did not do so well and other fundamental problems were not confronted. The workers gravitated to their own large working collectivities, the largest unions becoming those of workers in the railways, meat-packing plants and at the docks. The radicals never managed to win over the unions which later became one of the foundations of Peronism. About three-quarters of the millions of migrants during those decades went to the emerging industry and only one-quarter into farming.

While Argentine industry grew quickly during this period, it never matured in that it remained in the shadow of state protectionism, a characteristic that continues to the early twenty-first century. At the same time, political pressure groups began to emerge that played a crucial role in the future economic developments.

1930 Coup and beginning of the political instability

Though successful in many respects, the radicals consisted of two conflicting tendencies, the "personalistas" and the "antipersonalistas," who in time self-destructed. The first tendency had an inclination toward caudillos while the second remained loyal to some of the conservative and institutional nuances of earlier
governments. The group that was oriented toward strong-man rule accused its political opponents of favoring the old Establishment. In 1928 Yrigoyen was elected by plebiscite for a second time, but his formidable popular support vanished over the next two years and introduced the conditions that, taken with international developments, marked the end of a largely constructive era in Argentine history.

Prior to the implosion of the radicals and the international Great Depression, Argentina had become the most successful nation in Latin America. It was the world’s leading exporter of frozen meat and one of the most important exporters of maize, oats, linseed, wheat and flour. Argentina was the eleventh largest exporting nation in the world and one of the richest countries anywhere in terms of reserves and per capita imports. Argentina had more cars per inhabitant than Great Britain. But the crash of New York’s stock-exchange devastated Argentine economic ties to most of the world and pushed leaders into adopting protectionist policies and increasingly centralized control over the economy that persisted for decades to come.

The nationalistic 1930 military coup led by General Jose F. Uriburu was the first in a series of coups d’etat that led to military or civil-military governments whose domestic and international policies were increasingly contrary to popular interests. The years that followed were rightly called the “infamous decade,” a time of unemployment and stagnation. Globally, this decade also saw the ascent of Hitler and Mussolini in Europe and the beginning of the spread of Soviet influence in many countries. Some analysts have suggested that the conditions and coup of 1930 launched the long process that culminated in the “Dirty War” in the 1970s.

The famous and important Roca-Runciman Treaty was the response in 1933 of General Agustín P. Justo (who was president from 1932 to 1937) to changing international conditions. In greatly simplified form, it significantly increased British purchases of Argentine beef, which had fallen drastically when the Great Depression hit, in exchange for British benefits in Argentine treatment of British trade and investments. This agreement helped Argentina to overcome the worst aspects of its domestic crisis.
1943 Coup and the coming of Peronism

By the early 1940s further political change seemed inevitable. World War II, then several years old, demonstrated weaknesses of the Axis and in Argentina the war brought economic movement toward import substitution, at first with some success. Nationalism was again in the ascendance. Within the Armed Forces of Argentina, a group of colonels, including Juan Domingo Perón, founded the highly influential Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU). The majority of the GOU favored neutrality in the Great War, though that “neutrality” tilted toward the Axis, not least because the military’s organization and training had been strongly influence by Germany. After the defeat of the Nazis in Europe, the United States joined a sector of Argentine public opinion in favoring and getting the dismissal of Perón from the government. He resigned without protest and was quickly arrested, setting the stage for some of the most dramatic movements of 20th century Argentine history.

Peronist decade (1945-1955)

Perón held several important government positions during the first half of the 1940s, including that of Secretary of Labor where he became a strong supporter of Argentine workers. During this period, considering the longer term, he also worked out what he considered the best form of society for Argentina, namely a self-sufficient, corporativist society with the state playing the dominant role in economic affairs.

When Perón was arrested in October the workers semi-spontaneously descended upon the Plaza de Mayo in front of the Casa Rosada (the Argentine “White House”) and demanded his release. Thus October 17 became a major day in Argentine history because it marked Perón’s unequivocal “election” as the favorite leader of “the masses” in Argentina. The presence of Perón and the woman who would soon be his wife, Maria Eva Durarte, on the balconies of the House of Government became an image venerated by many and abhorred by others, an inescapable symbol of modern Argentine history.
October 17th launched a decade of Peronist growth that came to define the new political scene in Argentina, that was a government that could count simultaneously on the support of the Armed Forces, the labor unions and the Catholic Church. Perón attracted a varied of supportive demonstrations ranging from the radicals to the conservatives, passing through the socialists. Unionized labor doubled to almost two million in the last half of the 1940s, becoming the core player in the justicialista movement and Perón government. Oswaldo Ramirez Colina says that determined working class support for Perón occurred because he incorporated them into the social and political life of the country. Perón’s populism stands out in Latin America as a policy designed to give political priority to the social question and quickly incorporate the workers into national life without a social revolution.

Perón governed from 1946 to 1955, when he was ousted by a military coup, oriented from the beginning by the conviction that a global third conflict was inevitable and that Argentina had to face these circumstances in conditions of autonomy. This meant his economic model would have its bases in nationalism, statism, strong redistribution of the wealth and national self-sufficiency. In 1949 he reformed the national constitution of 1853 to give a dominant role to the state and enable his re-election as president, which occurred in 1952.

In foreign policy, Perón’s government proposed the “Third Position,” distanced almost equally between capitalism and Marxism, the antecedent of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries that was born in 1955 at Bandung, Indonesia. In short, Perón moved with all possible independence in the context of the Cold War. In the field of the international policy it was a balancing of the principle of self-determination of peoples and the solidarity with the small countries, actions that fortified the national conscience and at the same time gave Argentina a very individual position in the world.

During his time in office, Perón increased to an unprecedented degree the national markets for agricultural and industrial goods. This was a clear stimulus to the growth of the industrial sector even as it turned agricultural production away from a focus on exportation to
internal consumption. Thus, in 1950 some 80% of the cattle and grains produced in Argentina were consumed domestically. Also dating from this time was the Argentine Institute for the Production or Trade (IAPI), which Perón created to monopolize the foreign trade in order to put in practice his first government’s great income redistribution. This redistribution of wealth had a central role in the massive labor mobilizations as well as Peronist policy.

Evita Perón

Perón’s second wife, Maria Eva Duarte, was a woman of remarkable personality who is still controversial and mysterious. The General reportedly described her as "Of fragile presence but of vigorous voice, with long hair falling loose on her back, and ardent eyes." They were married for seven years, during Perón’s peak of power, and she contributed much to his successes.

Evita, as the people called her, held no formal positions in the government though she played a central role in the direction of private aid to the State and in the social allocation of these resources. She maintained an exhausting schedule of working from very early in the morning to past the midnight, in particular with the Eva Perón Foundation which worked with the poorest Argentines. Long before she died on 26 July 1952 of a malignant disease, she had helped split Argentines into Peronists and furious anti-Peronists. She remains well known today, not least because of the musical “Evita” by British composer Andrew Lloyd Webber.

End of the Peronist mandate

By the time of his fall in the 1955 military coup, Perón had taken Argentina to the limits of the economic model he had promoted since 1946. Agricultural productivity declined and the country lost harvests in 1951 and 1952 because of drought, oil production fell and the technological backwardness in the industry became evident. The state had grown by 100% between 1940 and 1954 and the national was excessively regulated. The trade unions had become central in the field of the social security through social works programs.
Perón himself had recognized some of these problems and in the early 1950s began investing more international political capital in developing ties to the United States. This trajectory, which was terminated by the 1955 coup, was demonstrated by Argentina’s signing of the “Atoms for Peace” Treaty, the visit of Milton Eisenhower and especially an agreement with the Standard Oil of California, which was never approved by Congress. He also increasingly supported the privatization of industry and foreign investments, all of which was recognized in a US CIA report of 1954. But though Perón launched some last minute rectifications and the economy improved somewhat, the general’s increasingly authoritarian policies turned many Argentine’s against him, especially in the wake of Evita’s death in 1952. Indeed, while he had had the support of the Church and Army he lost even their support as the 1950s progressed and each ultimately played a decisive role in the downfall of the “justicialista” government in 1955.

The government’s relationship with the Church was confused and ridden with conflicts. Still Perón cultivated the Church and its leaders for a while actually "ordered" believers to support the president’s initiatives in exchange for diverse privileges to themselves. It was only over time that Church leaders understood how Perón was utilizing them as an instrument for securing and maintaining support from the popular masses. A variety of factors that finally caused Church to turn against Perón. When some Peronist militants were accused of burning several churches in Buenos Aires, virtually every Catholic became a militant, and the Church itself devoted its experience and organizational skills, to oppose the government. The final act was the expulsion from the country of several ecclesiastical dignitaries which brought Perón’s excommunication.

1955 Coup and subsequent regimes

At the end of his increasingly authoritarian decade in office, Perón’s rhetorical challenge to those who criticized him intensified. In late August he said “With our exaggerated tolerance we have gained the right to repress them violently” and “This it is the last call and the last warning that we make to the enemies of the people. After today, it will
be actions and not words." In September of 1955, the Armed Forces, inspired by the anti-Peronism vibrant in a broad cross-section of society, acted and Perón fled from the country.

Perón had marched into exile, but he and Peronism remained a powerful force in Argentine society. The ousted leader’s objective was to demonstrate that no one could govern Argentina without or against Peronism. During nearly 18 years abroad, Perón remained an active if absent player by encouraging people to vote or reject individual candidates, striving to undermine individual leaders who had gained power by election or coup, manipulating labor organizations and affairs, and promoting his own interests and eventual return. Thus between 1955 and 1972 there were openly military governments of Lonardi and Aramburu, civilian governments of Frondizi, Guido and Illia and military government of Onganía, Levingston and Lanusse. That is, the military coup had introduced a 28-year period of instability and often violence under a string of ineffective civilian and military governments.

**Argentinean Left and Extremist Organizations**

Argentina’s Socialists had some early successes, and even elected one of its members to the chamber of deputies in 1904, the first Socialist elected to national office in Latin American history. The Sáenz Peña Law of 1912 guaranteed universal male suffrage, which actually gave the vote to less than half of the male population because only that many were citizens. Many Socialists were long harsh critics of the Radicals, as many later criticized the Peronists, whose labor policies undercut the appeal of socialism in this critical sector. In 1946 the Socialists, who strongly supported the Democratic Union against Perón, won no national representative for the first time in decades. The Communists, led for decades by Victorio Codovilla, constantly pontificated about leading the masses but never won significant popular support. This was so despite the widespread influence of Marxism in the education system. Perón probably had several reasons for tolerating them: they demonstrated his toleration of one of the extremes bettered by his “Third Position” and they constantly demonstrated to the “oligarchs” that some political options were much worse for them than Peronism.
And there certainly were more disruptive groups than the Peronists, the Socialists of even the Communists, though in some respects they were derivative of those groups. There were “Fidelistas” or “Guevaristas” who during much of the 1960s and 1970s advocated and practices the “armed road” to power. (Che Guevara himself was an Argentine.) In some degree these groups were connected to Castro’s Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) organization set up in Havana in 1967, which openly advocated violent revolution and alliances with revolutionary movements all over the world. The death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967 coincided with the birth of several Argentine organization operating in large part in his image, but with roots going back to others as well. Two were Left Peronist, the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) and the Montoneros, who had killed Vandor, and one had its origins more in Trotskyism, the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), with it strong Guevarist characteristics, two of which became major players in the disruptions of the next decade. Other uprisings occurred at least semi-spontaneously, including the 1969 “Cordobazo) the second most important city in the country, in Cordova Province north of Buenos Aires, and the seat of the national automotive industry.

**Perón’s exile and return**

Perón’s exile activities and campaigns were conducted from several countries, but primarily after 1959 from Spain where he constantly received Argentines and others who supported his effort to make Argentina ungovernable in his absence, sought to bring about his return to Buenos Aires and power or were more academically or journalistically interested in his past and plans.

Both in power and then in exile, Perón considered syndicalism the “spine” (the “columna vertebral”) of the justicialist movement. The control of the movement became increasingly critical with the rise in power within the Peronist “62 Organizations” of Augusto Timoteo Vandor of the metal workers union, who in the late 1960s sought to strike a deal with President (General) Onganía which would have created a Peronism without Perón. When Vandor was assassinated in 1969 by Montoneros guerrillas, Perón was freer to press his
program to return to Argentina. As Mauricio Rojas has pointed out, industrialists had become a very powerful lobby, on the one hand, while industrial workers were both numerous and well organized, on the other. In line with the nationalism and ideologies of the day, they all emphasized highly planned and protected economic development that proved to be a “dead end.”

During his final years in exile, Perón played all the cards he could to return to power. That meant supporting all sorts of groups as a way of appealing to all sorts of constituencies, from unions to guerrillas. He visited Argentina for a month at the end of 1972 but returned to Spain having selected his stand-in candidate for the March 1973 elections, Héctor Cámpora. Cámpora won with some 49% of the vote, but he was unable to control the pressures of the violent left, in particular the aforementioned Montoneros and ERP, leaving that for Perón himself who returned triumphantly to Argentina in June, after almost 18 years abroad. Cámpora resigned, Perón was elected president with 62% of the votes and took power in October with his third wife, Isabel, as his Vice President. By then he was more of a myth than a man. Perón cracked down on the extremists but died the following July, leaving the government to Isabel, who tried but could not cope. She lasted until the military coup of 24 March 1976 which dissolved parliament, put her under house arrest in the resort area of Bariloche, and launched the “dirty war” against in particular the Montoneros and ERP, which were carrying out major terrorist attacks and military operations in several parts of the country. The March coup was widely supported because of the level of national unrest and the national longing for stability.

“Dirty War” to invasion of the Falklands Islands

But the March coup set in motion another dark period, one of “state terrorism,” in Argentine history. It is generally held that some 30,000 people died in the course of repressing the insurgents and all who were or even might be supporting them. The wound to society has yet to heal. Public support for the military government nose-dived because of repression and the limitations on political activities. Even the economy was a disaster leaped from the six billion dollars left by the government of Isabel Perón to 43 billion in 1982. Early that year
then-President Leopoldo Galtieri tried to refurbish the regime’s image by invading the Falkland Islands (which the Argentines call the Malvinas), seized by the British in 1833 and still fervently claimed by Argentina. Great Britain launched military forces that in ten weeks forced an Argentine surrender and withdrawal. The humiliating defeat forced the military government to retreat and reintroduce a democratic system that has continued, with many challenges, to the present.

Democracy Again: Alfonsin, Menem and . . . .

In 1983 Raul Alfonsin, the undisputed leader of the Union Civil Radical (UCR) party, defeated the disunited Peronists in national presidential elections. Alfonsin jailed major military leaders for their roles in the “dirty war” and is still heralded as the leader who restored democracy to the country. But he chose not to, or was unable to, undertake major socioeconomic reforms needed for several generations and by the end of his government inflation had reached 5,000%. Shortly after Carlos Menem won the 1989 presidential elections, and some six months before the scheduled end of his term in office, Alfonsin just packed up and left, turning the government over to his successor to pick up the pieces and mend fences.

Carlos Saúl Menem was a political caudillo and governor from La Rioja, an admirer of the legendary 19th century caudillo Facundo Quiroga who had been imprisoned by the military government. In 1988, to the surprise of his own party colleagues, he won the support of the Peronist movement against a strong rival, Antonio Cafiero. A year later he again surprised many pundits by winning the election against Radical Eduardo Angeloz.

Although the media often represented him as a traditional Peronist, he soon launched a program of deep structural changes, in line with other world nations that turned to free market economies in the 1990s. During the “Menemist” decade Argentina experienced its strongest period of economic growth since the early 19th century. Menem and his Economic Minister, Domingo Cavallo, deregulated the economy, privatized the state-owned companies, diminish the poverty and attracted voluminous foreign investments and
established a stable, cooperative relationship with the United States. He managed a constitutional reform and was re-elected in 1995. Some corruption drew much attention and came to characterize the decade, overshadowing its many achievements.

Fernando de la Rua succeeded Menen by the end of 1999 at the head of an electoral alliance bringing together Radicals, Peronists who were disillusioned with Menem and groups of leftists. Once in office, the alliance was weakened by internal differences and the decade ended with a severe economic crisis. The de la Rua government collapsed altogether at the beginning of the new millennium and was followed by a parade of “presidents” over a short period of time, leading to the ascension of Eduardo Duhalde who ended the convertibility system adopted almost a decade earlier to stabilize the currency. This and the broader national malaise precipitated a devaluation of the Argentine peso with deep economic, political and social consequences.

In the 2003 presidential elections Carlos Menem received the most votes (less of 25%) in the first round but decided not to compete in a run-off election against runner-up Néstor Kirchner. Kirchner assumed the presidency and in 2008 . . . .

The Modern Argentina Collection

The Perón Collection

There are many thousands of Hoover Institution and Stanford University book and serial titles dealing in significant degree with modern Argentina. These provide a research foundation for using Hoover’s Argentine archival collection, the focus of this user guide. The heart of this collection is materials by and about Juan Domingo Perón and his time in office and exile. Around two thousand letters directed to Perón and sent by Perón from his different places of residence constitute a major part of the collection. As noted above, Perón was able to influence many events in Argentina even while he was abroad, and to maintain his leadership of the nation’s Peronists. Perón stayed in close contact that way with many followers and other
national political figures as well as people from other countries. Since Perón’s sources of information were varied and sometimes contradictory, complicating his efforts to keep up on what was happening in Argentina diagonally across the Atlantic Ocean.

Letters were particularly important because Perón obviously didn’t have the conveniences of early 21st century technology. Even phone calls were infrequent because they were so expensive. Many of the most important Argentine political players of the day corresponded with Perón during his exile, and some of their letters are included in the Hoover collection. These included Arturo Frondizi, Hector Villalón, Atilio Bramuglia, Pedro Michelini, Andres Framini, Vicente Leonidas Saadi, Jorge Antonio, Rogelio Frigerio, Raul Matera, Augusto Vandor, Antonio Cafiero, Remorino Hieronymite, Rodolfo Galimberti, Pablo Vicente, among many others.

Perón wrote to these and other people in the mornings. He was careful to make carbon copies of his letters, which means that we now have copies from his files (some 200 in the Hoover collection) of what he wrote to his contacts in Argentina. We must emphasize the importance of his correspondence with Pablo Vicente, who acted as the delegate of the Peronist Command and apparently coordinated many communications to and from Perón). Vicente was a retired Army Major who had been an aide to Perón in 1954 and 1955 and had participated in the revolution of General Valley in 1956. He resided in Montevideo at this time and his two hundred letters in this collection, often many pages long, review in detail what was happening in Argentina, along with his interpretations.

This correspondence gives us clear signals about many aspects of Perón’s links and relationships and the enormous reach of his shadow across the Atlantic. For on thing, there was the high degree of bellicosity among his followers, ranging from distrust to intrigues to open conflict among those who often fought viciously for Perón’s favor. This increased as hope for his possible return increased. These and other letters make it clear how Perón’s relationships with his correspondents went up and down and how ties to the caudillo sometimes shifted abruptly and dramatically.
Another important collection is Perón’s letters to Maria de la Cruz, a Chilean writer, feminist and politician who greatly admired Perón and was a link to Chilean President Carlos Ibáñez. There are also substantial collections of letters to Hipólito Paz, his former foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, and to Américo Barrios, Atilio Garcia Mellid and others. (The de la Cruz and Paz letters, edited and introduced by Samuel Amaral and William Ratliff, were published in 1991 by Legasa editorial in Buenos Aires under the title *Juan Domingo Perón: Cartas del Exilio*.

The Hoover collection also includes the archive of Juan Atilio Bramuglia, a Peronist organizer, foreign minister, and in 1948 president of the United Nations Security Council, as well as Peron’s hand-written official letter of resignation from the presidency written to the Argentine military on 22 September 1955 and a handwritten document addressed at the same time to the Argentine people on the subject of his departure. The collection also includes tape recordings, including Perón’s press conference with the foreign media in November of 1972, just after his brief return to Argentina. Beginning in 1990, additional materials were incorporated on the administration of President Carlos Saul Menem, including interviews with the president and his economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, among others.

**The Ghioldi Collection**

The Hoover Institution contains a rich collection of speeches and writings, correspondence, notes, reports, memoranda, studies, printed matter, photographs and sound recordings constituting much of the personal archive of Américo Ghioldi, leader of the Socialist Party in Argentina. Other portions of his library were donated to Argentine institutions, including the Library and Museum of the House of Representatives.

Ghioldi devoted his professional life to involvement in the nation’s education, politics and diplomacy. Ghioldi personally was more moderate than his brother, Rodolfo Ghioldi, who was a top official in Argentina’s Communist Party. The Socialist Party too was generally moderate by Argentine standards in its positions and appealed mainly to more educated workers in the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires.
Province. Internal tensions led to a split in the party. Ghioldi was considered on the Right of the Socialist Party. He was firmly anti-Castro and broke with those in his party who wanted to strike deals with Peronism, which he considered a variant of fascism. In 1956 he supported military repression of dissidents with the oft-quoted line, “The milk of clemency is over” (“se acabo la leche de la clemencia”).

From 1925, when Ghioldi was elected Councilman of the City of Buenos Aires for the Socialist Party, until his death in 1984, Ghioldi was one of the protagonists of the Argentine politic. He was national representative for the Socialist Party representing the Capital City of Buenos Aires in 1932-1936; 1936-1940; 1940-1944; 1962-1966; Representative National Constituent for the Socialist Party for the Constitutional Reformation of 1957 in the Ciudad de Santa Fe and member of the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party. He was journalist, lecturer and Director of "La Vanguardia" official publication of the Socialist Party. He wrote numerous books that reflect the Argentine political scene from 1930 to 1984. During his later years he worked some with Argentina’s military governments and finished his career as ambassador in Portugal during dictatorship 1976-83.

The Ghioldi materials are of great interest to researchers and include:

* numerous pieces of correspondence by and to Ghioldi;
* many journalistic pieces written by Ghioldi;
* texts of speeches and commentaries;
* cassettes with interviews made by various journalists;
* pamphlets and other publications of the Socialist Party;
* many journalistic articles on Ghioldi;
* reviews of Ghioldi’s parliamentary work;
* materials on his political campaigns;
* photographs of his public and family life;
* extensive material on education, a topic that occupied much of Ghioldi’s time.
* abundant material about important subjects for the nation, ranging from visits of foreign leaders, to information on organizations supporting violent conflict to the near war with Chile over the Beagle Channel Islands.
Concluding Comments

Argentina has always had rich natural resources and immense possibilities, but its path to national development and stability for ongoing common good has been uneven at best. Several periods in particular seemed to offer hope for fundamental change and permanently improved conditions, though both failed in the end to set a permanent development trajectory. These periods were the second half of the nineteenth century, the beginning of the twentieth century and the end of the twentieth century. More than a century ago, Argentina was one of the fastest growing countries in the world and the success of that period help the country to survive many decades of decline during the twentieth century. At the end of the past century Argentina, which had fallen far behind the developed world generally, was rapidly moving toward the ranks of the world’s most productive nations, but its failure to succeed was marked most dramatically by the crash of the early twenty-first century.

Analysts in Argentina and abroad have long asked and continue to ask, in the words of American historian Colin Maclachlan, “What went wrong?” Argentine-American political scientist Carlos Waisman examined the process decades ago whereby Argentina deliberately chose policies that reversed development and moved the country backward from the developed to the underdeveloped world. Argentine professor Mariano Grondona has written on the cultural and institutional factors that have held the country back. Argentine historian Angel Jozami asked “why?” and posed the grim but real challenge Argentina faces today, namely either resolving its problems of sliding into a catastrophic regression of the sort described previously by Waisman. Are the policies of the current Kirchner government of laying the foundation for permanent growth or are they again momentary success built on an unsustainable foundation? And to what degree are Argentina’s problems and challenges similar to those found in other Latin American, and other, countries?

The Hoover Institution archival collection on modern Argentina one of the richest in the world, provides the raw materials of historical analysis that can help future analysts from all countries to better
understand the past and present in order to, if they will, realistically reform for a better future.

Stanford/Buenos Aires -- September 2007 -

20. Bibliography


CIA, Informe de la. Probables desarrollos en la Argentina (publicado el 9 de marzo de 1954).


Grondona, Mariano. Bajo el imperio de las ideas morales: Las Causes No Economicas del Desarrollo Economico.

Harrison, Lawrence and Samuel Huntington, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. (Basic Books, 2000).

Jozami, Angel. *Argentina, la destrucción de una nación* (La Tercera/Mondadori 2003).
