

Continuing Pressures on Social Order

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The recently published edition of the *Blue Book of Chinese Society*, an annual survey of social problems and attitudes published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), gives ample evidence that social problems—income inequality, unemployment, labor disturbances, rural disorder, corruption, and so forth—continue to worsen even as the new government focuses more attention on the plight of those left behind in China’s struggle for economic growth and modernization. There are positive signs as well: overall, incomes are up (according to official statistics); the middle class, depending on how one defines it, is growing; and most people continue to expect incomes to grow. Moreover, the government is increasing the resources it expends on social welfare. But, the most difficult issue remains jobs. China’s booming economy just does not create many jobs relative to either growth or the needs of the society. Thus, social order appears to be a long-term political problem for China.

The issues of increasing income inequality and social instability, particularly in the rural areas, have drawn the attention of specialists inside and outside of China for several years; Cao Jinqing’s 2000 book *China along the Yellow River* and the 2001 publication of Li Changping’s *Telling the Truth to the Premier* brought such issues to a wider audience.¹ In recent weeks the publication of Chen Kuidi and Chun Tao’s best-seller, *Investigation of China’s Peasants*, has again given these issues a high public profile.² The recent publication of the 2004 edition of the *Blue Book of Chinese Society*, however, gives the most updated, comprehensive look at socioeconomic trends and the issue of social stability.

More than editions of previous years, this edition of the *Blue Book* focuses on threats to social stability. Nevertheless, it is useful to start with what appears to be—at least at first glance—the positive side of the story: the rise of China’s middle class. There have been various efforts in recent years to estimate the size of China’s middle class. In his 2001 study of the various strata in Chinese society, Lu Xueyi, the former head of the Sociology Institute at CASS, estimated that the middle class constituted about 15 percent of Chinese society.³ In the *Blue Book*, CASS sociologist Li Chunling takes a careful look at what is meant by “middle class” and assesses different dimensions of this attribution—particularly income, expenditure, profession, and self-identification. Using a random sample survey conducted in November and December 2001 in 73 districts and counties from 12 provinces and directly administered cities, he finds that the size of the middle class depends very much on one’s definition of it. On the one hand, because the data are skewed by people with higher incomes, the average income (arithmetic mean) is much higher than the middle income (median). On the other hand, urban income is much higher than rural income. In Li’s survey, township and municipal incomes were 2.5 times those of rural residents, while average incomes in the townships and municipalities

of developed areas were 5.4 times higher than average incomes in villages in undeveloped areas of the country.⁴ So, the method used by Li and his colleagues was to call “middle class” anyone who had an income above the average for the area in which he or she lived. By this definition, Li found that 24.6 percent of China’s population could be considered middle class.

Perhaps the most interesting finding of Li’s study—and the most relevant to social stability—was that when asked how they viewed their own social standing, 46.8 percent of respondents identified themselves as middle class or higher (whether upper, upper middle, or middle), as shown in table 1.

Table 1
Self-Identification of Social Standing

<i>Stratum</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Upper	1.3
Upper middle	7.1
Middle	38.4
Lower middle	23.2
Lower	20.8
Unclear	1.4
No response	7.8

SOURCE: Li Chunling, “Zhongchanjiecheng: Zhongguo shehui zhide guanzhu de renqun” (The middle stratum: A group in Chinese society worth paying attention to), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 58.

Less comforting, however, were the results obtained when Li combined four measures of belonging to the middle class (income, expenditure, self-identification, and profession). He found that only 4.1 percent of China’s population fit all four definitions of middle class, suggesting that China’s middle class is not well formed at all (using a somewhat relaxed definition of profession, Li found that 7 percent of China’s population could be considered middle class). In looking at who constituted this middle class, Li found that it is overwhelmingly male (63.6 percent), young (57 percent were under 41 years of age), urban (64.6 percent), and well educated (51.1 percent had better than a high school vocational training). Ten percent were party and state cadres, one-sixth were enterprise managers, another one-sixth were private enterprise owners, specialists and technicians made up one-fifth, and office workers (*banshi ren yuan*) exceeded one-third. Only 2.8 percent of rural residents could be considered middle class, while 8.7 percent of urbanites fit all four definitions of being middle class.⁵

Whatever one’s definition of middle class, it is apparent that private enterprises are becoming ever more important in China’s economic structure and employment picture. According to Zhang Houyi, a sociologist at CASS, by the end of June 2003 there were 2.7 million registered private enterprises in China employing some 35.62 million

people.⁶ As is well known, private enterprises are an increasingly important part of China's economy. From 1993 to 2002, the number of registered private enterprises increased from 237,900 to 2,435,300. In the same period of time, the number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has decreased from 1,951,700 to 1,172,500, and the number of collective enterprises has decreased from 5,156,500 to 1,885,900. Also in the same period, the registered capital of SOEs has increased from 2.55 trillion yuan to 4.95 trillion yuan, while the registered capital of collective enterprises has declined from 1.32 trillion yuan to 9.95 billion yuan. Meanwhile, the registered capital of private enterprises has increased from 18 billion yuan to 2.47 trillion yuan. That means that the registered capital of private enterprises has increased from 4.4 percent of the total registered domestic capital to 29 percent.⁷ In 2002, private enterprises hired nearly 7 million new workers (an increase of 25.63 percent), including some 580,000 who had been laid off from SOEs (though it should be noted that over 100,000 of these started their own private enterprises by investing their own capital).⁸ These private enterprises, however, are distributed highly unevenly throughout the country. At the end of 2002, some 68.91 percent of private enterprises were located in the east.⁹

The *Blue Book* argues that one of the main changes in the entrepreneurial class in recent years has been its members' increasing desire to participate in politics in one manner or another. This desire has found an outlet mainly through their participation in people's congresses and Chinese people's political consultative conferences (CPPCCs) at various levels. According to Zhang Houyi, there are some 900 private entrepreneurs nationwide participating in people's congresses at various levels and another 30,000 participating in CPPCCs. In Zhejiang's Fuyang municipality, there are 256 representatives in the local people's congress, of whom 78 (about 30 percent) are private entrepreneurs; of the 208 members of the local CPPCC, 21 (about 10 percent) are private entrepreneurs.¹⁰ Of the 133,200 members of village committees in Zhejiang, 30 percent are "masses who have gotten rich first."¹¹

According to the fifth national survey of private entrepreneurs (done at the end of 2001), 29.9 percent of them are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The apparent dramatic increase in their participation—the fourth national survey done in 2000 showed 19.8 percent to be members of the CCP—was a reflection of the privatization of the Chinese economy. In the recent survey, there were 833 SOEs that had been "reconstituted" (*gaizhi*) as private enterprises; the leaders of 422 of these enterprises were private entrepreneurs. If that number is deducted from the survey sample, the results are nearly identical with those two years beforehand. More interestingly from a political perspective, over 90 percent of these party-member private entrepreneurs joined the party first, then became private entrepreneurs. Especially interesting is the fact that Jiang Zemin's famous call in 2001 to allow the admission of private entrepreneurs into the party had little impact in the months following his speech. Of those surveyed, only 16 private entrepreneurs—0.5 percent of the number of CCP members—had joined the party since Jiang's speech. Moreover, only 11.1 percent of private entrepreneurs expressed an interest in joining the party; it appears that their demands were directed more at securing a political status than at actually joining the party.¹²

As the concentration of private enterprises in the eastern part of the country and the extremely low number of middle-class people living in rural areas suggest, income inequality provides fertile ground for social instability—especially when there is widespread corruption in addition to perceptions that party and state cadres have been the chief beneficiaries of reform.

Rural Instability

One of the chief sources of social tension is the tendency of the politically well connected in the rural areas to take care of themselves and ignore the needs—or worse, actively harm the interests—of the remaining population. The difficulty of maintaining social stability in the countryside is suggested by the overwhelming disparity concerning resources and those living on government salaries (even if those salaries are often in arrears): across China, county and township governments account for 20 percent of total fiscal revenues but support 71 percent of public employees.¹³ Approximately one-third of the counties and two-thirds of townships operate under debt; accordingly, some 80 percent of townships have difficulty paying wages regularly.¹⁴ In these areas, relations between cadres and the masses are tense, and conflicts are continuous. Rural society is certainly not stable.¹⁵

The problem of township indebtedness is basically a problem of the 1990s. According to Zhao Shukai, a researcher at the State Council's Development Research Center, debt has risen for many reasons—enterprise failures, the effort to extend universal education through ninth grade, the problems left over from the closing of rural cooperatives, the delay in adjusting agricultural structure, wining and dining, etc. At the same time, channels of revenue have become narrower—agriculture is not profitable, and enterprises in the rural areas frequently do not do well. Nevertheless, higher levels in the administrative hierarchy continue to demand that revenues be sent up, and townships do not have the strength to resist. And, the number of cadres has increased. According to the survey Zhao and his associates did, the number of cadres at the township level is about three times what it was in the 1980s. Township cadres have little idea how to solve their debt problems, and they face pressures from above and resistance from below.¹⁶

Zhao argues that these revenue issues have distorted the entire incentive structure of township governments. When “grasping development to promote stability” becomes “grasping wages to preserve stability,” then the way in which village cadres approach problems changes. In many places, guaranteeing revenue is not just the responsibility of the leading cadres but has become the concrete task of all township employees. The survey found that township leaders make the collection of taxes and fees the task of specific cadres. If these cadres don't collect the revenue, not only are they not paid, but they also have to make up the difference themselves.¹⁷

Part of the problem is the incentive structure that townships use to evaluate villages. In the 1,000-point scale normally used, 450–500 points are given for collecting taxes and fees, another 200 points are allocated for maintaining social stability, and

another 100 points are dedicated to family planning. That leaves only 200 points or so for evaluating public works and other tasks that village cadres are assigned.¹⁸ It is a system designed to exacerbate cadre-villager relations. What sets off conflict, however, are usually either instances of land being requisitioned without adequate compensation or perceptions of corruption.¹⁹ At the same time, the rights consciousness of peasants has increased, making conflict all the more likely to occur.²⁰

Labor Relations

If excessive exactions, corruption, and land requisitions are basic causes of rural disturbances, then the tense state of labor relations continues to threaten urban stability. Unemployment remains critical. Despite the rapid growth of the economy last year (9.1 percent according to official figures), the numbers of officially (registered) unemployed and laid-off (*xiagang*) workers continue to increase. In the first three months of 2003, there was a total of 7.75 million registered unemployed, an increase of 750,000 over the same period in 2002. In the second and third quarters of the year, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis pushed the number of registered unemployed from 4.1 percent in the first quarter (already a historic high) to 4.2 percent. If *xiagang* workers are included, the real unemployment rate is above 8 percent. Moreover, the reemployment rate of those laid off has been falling—from 50 percent in 1998 to 26.2 percent in 2002. Long-term unemployment has also been increasing—55.2 percent of the registered unemployed have been unemployed for over two years.²¹

In a reflection of the difficult employment situation, labor disputes have been increasing. According to Qiao Jian of the China Labor Relations College (*Zhongguo laodong guanxi xueyuan*), in the first half of 2003 labor arbitration committees accepted 99,800 new cases involving 296,000 workers, increases of 36.7 percent and 43.5 percent, respectively, over the same period the previous year.²²

Corruption

According to Zhao Shukai, there are two outstanding causes of rural conflict: the requisitioning of land and corruption. Corruption is an issue that has received enormous official attention in recent years, but according to Wen Shengtang of the Supreme People's Court, the problem of corruption continues to worsen. In the first nine months of 2003, the people's procuratorate at various levels investigated 32,759 cases, of which 905 involved sums of over 1 million yuan.²³

According to Wen, there are some new tendencies in official corruption that are particularly noteworthy. First, the number of cases involving the “number one person” (*yibashou*) has increased notably. For instance, in the past 10 years, Guizhou has prosecuted 103 people at the prefecture/office (*ting*) level and above; 54 (52 percent) of these were “number one” leaders.²⁴ Second, the length of time in which corruption goes undiscovered has been getting longer. Of the seven cases involving corruption at the vice

ministerial level or above between 1980 and 1988, the average length of time corruption continued before discovery was 1.43 years. In the 16 similar cases in the 1998–2002 period, the average length of time was 6.31 years—with the longest case continuing undetected for 14 years.²⁵ Third, the illegal selling of office has been increasingly concealed behind a facade of correct procedure. For instance, Li Tiecheng, the former vice chairman of the Baishan Municipal CPPCC in Jilin who was sentenced to 15 years in jail for corruption, spoke of his selling offices when he was a county party secretary:

Every time prior to the verification of cadres, I would hold a secretaries' office meeting to set a "tone." I would use the age, work experience, educational background, experience, and rank of those who had given me gifts to set a standard and demarcate a scope. I absolutely would not name anyone's name, but would let the Organization Bureau go "find people" within the "scope" I had demarcated. After they had found them, we could proceed according to procedures. On the surface, the rationale was clear and the procedures lawful, but in reality, this was using individuals to draw lines and using individuals to define the scope. I used this method to reward all those who had given me gifts.²⁶

Fourth, the age of corrupt officials has been declining. Of those convicted of corruption in 2002, 48.42 percent were under the age of 35. Finally, corrupt officials are regularly promoted despite investigative procedures intended to prevent such promotion. Of the 37 cases of high officials convicted of corruption since 1992, 22 of those officials had been promoted since they began taking bribes.²⁷

Public Opinion

The *Blue Book* contains three surveys—one of "experts," one of midlevel cadres attending the Central Party School, and one nationwide survey involving over 11,000 respondents—that address aspects of public opinion. The first and third of these surveys affirm the perception that there is a considerable amount of social tension in China, while that of midlevel cadres reflects opinions that seem strangely unattuned to these tensions. Perhaps the most important finding of these surveys from the perspective of social order is that most people believe that party and state cadres have benefited more than any other group from reform and opening up (though private enterprise owners were a close second), as shown in table 2. Perceptions of whether party and state cadres have been the primary beneficiaries of reform vary, however, by the income of the respondents. Lower-income people are more likely than higher-income people to see cadres as benefiting from reform (see table 3) and, as discussed below, are more likely to perceive cadre-mass relations in negative terms.

Table 2

Urban Residents' Impression of the Group That Has Benefited Most from Reform and Opening Up

<i>Social group</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Percentage selected</i>
Party and state cadres	1	59.2
Private enterprise owners	2	55.4
Actors and artists	3	43.0
Individual entrepreneurs	4	33.0
SOE managers	5	29.3
Specialists and technicians	6	24.3
Teachers	7	14.9
Peasants	8	3.4
Workers	9	1.5
Others	10	0.5

SOURCE: Liang Dong, “Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu ji ganqun guanxi de diaocha fenxi” (Analysis of a survey on party and state cadres and cadre-mass relations in China), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 35.

Table 3

Percentage of People Who Believe That Party and State Cadres Have Been the Greatest Beneficiaries of Reform, by Income Level

<i>Income Level</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Above 1,500 yuan	53.7
1,251–1,500 yuan	52.2
1,001–1,250 yuan	54.2
751–1,000 yuan	59.8
501–750 yuan	64.1
Below 501 yuan	70.5

SOURCE: Liang Dong, “Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu ji ganqun guanxi de diaocha fenxi” (Analysis of a survey on party and state cadres and cadre-mass relations in China), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 39.

When asking about cadre-mass relations, the author, Liang Dong of CASS, divided respondents by their social standing according to both objective criteria—based on type of employment—and subjective criteria—based on how people saw their own social standing. Although people with low social standing are more likely in general to perceive cadre-mass relations as tense, those who identify themselves as on the bottom of the social hierarchy do so in much greater numbers (see table 4).

Table 4

Do You Feel That Cadre-Mass Relations Have Taken a Turn for the Better Since Reform and Opening Up?

<i>(Subjective categorization of social standing)</i>					
<i>Category</i>	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
Highest	11.1	27.8	22.2	27.8	11.1
High	11.4	30.7	24.3	27.1	6.4
Upper middle	6.1	38.6	20.8	27.5	6.9
Middle	3.3	36.3	20.6	31.0	8.8
Lower middle	3.1	28.5	17.6	38.0	12.7
Lower	2.1	24.0	16.6	40.3	16.9
Lowest	2.4	19.3	12.5	36.7	29.1

<i>(Objective categorization of social standing)</i>					
<i>Category</i>	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
Highest	13.6	25.0	18.2	37.5	5.7
High	4.8	36.1	15.1	32.2	11.9
Upper middle	3.0	30.7	19.6	34.8	11.9
Middle	3.3	31.4	21.0	33.0	11.3
Lower middle	3.0	33.2	21.0	32.3	10.6
Lower	3.6	37.5	20.8	26.7	11.4
Lowest	3.0	31.1	18.5	34.2	13.2

SOURCE: Liang Dong, “Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu ji ganqun guanxi de diaocha fenxi” (Analysis of a survey on party and state cadres and cadre-mass relations in China), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 47.

The opinions of the experts surveyed by Lu Jianhua of the Sociology Institute at CASS largely agreed with broader public opinion. Nearly three-quarters (73.4 percent) of the experts in the survey said that the primary beneficiaries of reform were party and state cadres, while 67 percent said that the biggest losers were workers and 21.1 percent thought peasants were the biggest losers. These experts were very sensitive to the growing inequalities in Chinese society, though nearly half of them (45 percent) thought such inequalities could be addressed over a 5–10 year period. Another 41 percent of the experts were not so optimistic, saying that such inequalities would persist for an extended period of time.²⁸

The cadres who were surveyed at the Central Party School apparently were not given a choice of “party and state cadres” when asked which group had benefited the most from reform; they saw actors and artists as the greatest beneficiaries, followed by individual entrepreneurs and private enterprise owners, SOE cadres, staff in foreign-invested enterprises, and intellectuals.²⁹

Although the cadres identified income disparities, unemployment, and corruption as the three most serious social problems facing China, most seemed to be optimistic about the social situation and the future. For instance, when asked for their overall evaluation of the social situation, 5.2 percent of the cadres responded “excellent”

(*feichang hao*) and another 79.3 percent answered “fairly good” (*bijiao hao*). Combined, this total of 84.5 percent was substantially higher than the 72.2 percent who answered “excellent” or “fairly good” in 2002.³⁰ When asked about the prospects for residents’ income in 2004 in the areas where they, the cadres, were from, 6.9 percent predicted it would “increase greatly” and another 69.8 percent said it would “increase somewhat.” No one picked the category “decrease somewhat” or “decrease greatly.” This projection displayed considerably more optimism than the previous year’s respondents had shown about prospects for 2003. When asked in 2002 about the likelihood local incomes would increase in 2003, only 50.4 percent had said “increase greatly” or “increase somewhat,” compared with 76.7 percent in the 2003 survey.³¹ It is not immediately obvious why, in the face of the obvious social problems China faces, these midlevel cadres were so optimistic about China’s situation.

Conclusion

The data presented in the *Blue Book* suggest a growing concern with social order; a remarkable 45.9 percent of the experts interviewed by Lu Jianhua stated that they believed “there was some possibility” (*you xie keneng*) that there would be a “comprehensive social crisis,” and another 11 percent thought that it was “very likely.” That means nearly 60 percent of the experts interviewed held a pessimistic view of China’s future. If one counts as pessimistic, as does Lu Jianhua, the additional 17.4 percent who said the situation was “very difficult to judge,” then one gets a very pessimistic view of China’s social situation from these experts.³² Certainly much of the empirical data contained in the various chapters of the *Blue Book* points in a similar direction.

Since Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took over in 2002 and 2003, respectively, they have made efforts to highlight the plight of those who have been left behind and to put forward a new conception of social development. Indeed, Lu Xueyi says that “the greatest accomplishment of 2003 was raising and realizing a change in perspective on development.”³³ One should not exaggerate the difference between the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras; efforts to expand social welfare and safety nets began under Jiang, but they have been expanded under Hu. In other words, there has been an effort to put resources behind official rhetoric, though one could argue that it is too little, too late.

For instance, the number of people covered by the minimum standard-of-living protection expanded from 1.84 million in 1998 to 2.67 million in 1999, 4.02 million in 2000, 11.7 million in 2001, and 20.6 million in 2002. Some 15 billion yuan is now spent on guaranteeing a minimum standard of living.³⁴ Similarly, in the beginning of 2003, the State Council decided that in the future, added resources given to education, science and technology, medicine, health care, and culture should be primarily invested in the rural areas. In the first half of 2003, almost 24 billion yuan in state bonds was issued to increase infrastructure in the rural areas, and in the latter half of the year an additional 3.25 billion yuan was allocated. In addition, efforts to expand the reform on rural taxes required 30 billion yuan from the central government.³⁵

Such sizable investments of central resources suggest that the central government is finally coming to grips with the magnitude of the problem it faces, although as Lu Xueyi notes, the government's failure to address effectively the issue of transfer payments (from wealthy provinces to less developed ones) has brought about no fundamental change in regional disparity; indeed, the latest figures show that regional differences continue to grow.³⁶ Most of all, as the figures above suggest, China needs to be able to create more jobs, particularly in the interior. Some possibly good news comes from the interior province of Jiangxi where, Zhang Houyi notes, the local government declared in late 2000 that expanding the number of private enterprises would be taken as an indicator of being "ideologically emancipated" (*sixiang jiefang*). In 2002, the rate of growth of private enterprises in Jiangxi was 12 percentage points higher than the national average.³⁷ If this statistic represents real growth, rather than just another effort to reach artificial targets set by a political campaign, it could indicate a heartening sign in an otherwise largely barren landscape.

Notes

¹ Cao Jinqing, *Huanghe bian de Zhongguo* (China along the Yellow River) (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 2000), and Li Changping, *Wo xiang zongli shuo shihua* (Telling the truth to the premier) (Beijing: Guangming chubanshe, 2002).

² Chen Kuidi and Chun Tao, *Zhongguo nongmin diaocha* (Investigation of China's peasants) (Beijing: Renmin wenxian chubanshe, 2004).

³ Lu Xueyi, *Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jieceng yanjiu baogao* (Research report on social strata in contemporary China) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002), 73.

⁴ Li Chunling, "Zhongchanjieceng: Zhongguo shehui zhide guanzhu de renqun" (The middle stratum: A group in Chinese society worth paying attention to), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 59–62.

⁶ Zhang Houyi, "Jinru xin shiqi de Zhongguo saying qiye zhu jieceng" (China private enterprise head stratum in the new period), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 311.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 312.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 314.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 316.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 318.

¹¹ Fan Ping, "2003 nian Zhongguo nongmin fazhan de jiben zuangkuang" (Basic circumstances in the development of China's peasants in 2003), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 306.

¹² Zhang Houyi, "Jinru xin shiqi," 318–19.

¹³ Li Peilin, "Zhongguo jingji shehui fazhan de wenti he qushi" (Problems and trends in China's economic and social development), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 76.

¹⁴ Zhao Shukai, "Lishixing tiaozhan: Zhongguo nongcun de chongtu yu zhili" (A historic challenge: Conflict and governance in China's villages), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 217.

¹⁵ Lu Xueyi, "Zouxiang quanmian, xietiao, kechixu fazhan de Zhongguo shehui" (Toward a more comprehensive, balanced, and sustainable development in Chinese society), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui*

xingshi fenxi yu yuce, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 4–5.

¹⁶ Zhao Shukai, “Lishixing tiaozhan,” 217–18.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 218.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 220.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 221.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 222.

²¹ Qiao Jian, “2003 nian: Xin yilun jigou tiaozheng xia de laodong guanxi” (Labor relations in 2003, under a new round of structural adjustment), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 285.

²² *Ibid.*, 291.

²³ At the National People’s Congress meeting in March 2003, the report of the Supreme People’s Court stated that in the previous five years, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate had investigated 207,103 cases, of which 5,541 were large cases involving over 1 million yuan. That is an average of 41,420 cases and 1,108 large cases a year. If the figures for the first nine months of 2003 continued for the full year, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate will have investigated 43,679 cases, of which 1,206 will have involved over 1 million yuan. See Wen Shengtang, “2003 nian de fanfubai douzheng” (The struggle against corruption in 2003), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 158.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 161.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 161.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 162.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 162–63.

²⁸ Lu Jianhua, “Zhuanjia yanli de shehui xingshi jiqi qianjing” (The social situation and its prospects in the eyes of specialists), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 19.

²⁹ Xie Zhiqiang, “Dangzheng lingdao ganbu dui 2003–4 nian Zhongguo shehui xingshi de jiben panduan” (The basic judgments of leading party and state cadres regarding China’s social situation in 2003–4), in *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce*, ed. Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 25.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

³² Lu Jianhua, “Zhuanjia yanli,” 20.

³³ Lu Xueyi, “Zouxiang quanmian, xietiao, kechixi fazhan,” 7.

³⁴ Li Peilin, “Zhongguo jingji shehui fazhan,” 76.

³⁵ Lu Xueyi, “Zouxiang quanmian, xietiao, kechixu fazhan,” 4.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁷ Zhang Houyi, “Jinru xin shiqi,” 318.