

## Reshuffling Four Tiers of Local Leaders: Goals and Implications

Cheng Li

Of the multitude of tasks confronting the top Chinese leadership, controlling local governments and training the future generations of CCP elites have the most intriguing and far-reaching implications. The Chinese leadership's recent plan for a large-scale reshuffling of four tiers of local officials combined with its ambitious mid-career training programs indicate that Hu Jintao is concerned about both the short-term need to consolidate his own power and the long-term future of CCP rule. The upcoming reshuffling will likely provide Hu and his protégés with increased control in both the national and local leaderships, thus making them more effective at carrying out their populist developmental policies. However, the ever-changing domestic and international environment will likely, in the not-too-distant future, push the Chinese political system to be open enough to allow talented young people with diversified backgrounds to become part of the ruling elite.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plans to reshuffle its four-tier local leadership (province, municipality, county, and town) in the next 12 months, from July 2006 to June 2007.<sup>1</sup> All local party committees, including approximately 170,000 senior officials at these four levels, will go through a process of review, reappointment, and reelection.<sup>2</sup> A significant number of local leaders will retire or step down to make way for newcomers.

The Chinese authorities consider this upcoming reshuffling one of the three largest turnovers of local elites since China began its economic reform in 1978. The first occurred in the mid-1980s when Deng Xiaoping promoted a generation of younger and better-educated technocrats to replace veteran Communist ideologues. The second took place in the mid-1990s when Jiang Zemin called for the promotion of entrepreneurial leaders who could achieve higher rates of GDP growth on their local turfs while simultaneously accelerating China's march toward a market economy in an increasingly globalized world.<sup>3</sup> These two major elite turnovers have not only changed the educational and professional composition of the ruling elite in the country, but have also had a strong impact on the trajectory of China's domestic and foreign policies. To a great extent, these two previous phases of elite transformation in the People's Republic of China (PRC) enabled the CCP, the world's largest political party and the second longest continuously ruling party, keep abreast with the ever-changing political environment.

What are the immediate goals and the long-term implications of this upcoming elite reshuffling in the Chinese Communist Party? What are the main barriers and challenges that the Chinese top leadership will confront in this large-scale reshuffling of local officials? In addition to promoting more of his protégés to important posts on the eve of the 17th Party Congress, what other objectives does Hu Jintao intend to achieve? What types of leaders are most likely to be promoted? In what ways will newcomers differ from their predecessors? How will this local elite circulation reflect and affect factional politics within the CCP top leadership? How will this new phase of China's local elite circulation impact both the dynamics of central-local relations and the growing tensions between inland and coastal regions? This article aims to shed valuable light on these intriguing questions.

## The New Regulations on Local Elite Circulation

During the past few years, the Central Committee of the CCP has issued half a dozen important documents explaining the procedures and regulations regarding the nomination, selection, competition, inspection, and resignation of local party and government leaders.<sup>4</sup> The Chinese authorities have issued more regulations on elite recruitment in the past few years than during any previous period of CCP history. These instruments aim to strengthen China's political institutionalization by providing specific guidelines for local leadership reshuffling.

For example, the *Regulations of the Selection of the Party and Governmental Officials (RSPGO)* specify that a candidate for a leadership post at the county chief level or above must meet the following requirements:<sup>5</sup>

- A minimum of five years of work experience, including at least two years at the grassroots level.
- Work experience in at least two posts in the level of leadership that is immediately lower.
- Work experience in a deputy post at the same level of leadership for at least two years if promoted from a deputy post; and work experience in a lower level of leadership for at least three years if promoted from a lower level.
- A bachelor's degree (four years college education) or above.
- The accumulation of three months of training in a party school or other executive training program over a five-year period.

The *RSPGO* document also specifies the selection process. A candidate for a post at the county chief level or above must be nominated by the party standing committee one level above before being subjected to public evaluation, and must be approved by the full party standing committee in a secret ballot. A party standing committee (*changweihui*) must have a minimum of two-thirds of its members when making personnel appointments at the lower level of party leadership, and an appointee must receive majority approval from the full standing committee.

A resolution at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee, held in the fall of 2004, stipulates that the selection of members of the party standing committees at the province, county, city, and town levels must include the following five steps: 1) public evaluation in the locality; 2) an opinion survey; 3) performance analysis; 4) interview of the candidate by a selection and inspection team (*xunshizu*) sent by the CCP Central Committee or by a higher level of the local party committee; and 5) a comprehensive assessment.<sup>6</sup> During the past three years, the Central Committee and each of China's 31 provincial party committees have sent three to five inspection teams to various localities annually to supervise the selection of provincial or lower levels of local leaders. In 2005, for example, the five inspection teams organized jointly by the CCP Central Commission of Discipline Inspection and the CCP Organization Department visited 81 cities in which they evaluated top local leaders.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile, the CCP Organization Department has also set up a nationwide direct telephone line that callers can use to report any wrongdoings of senior local officials. The combination of these measures has significantly increased the transparency of the recruitment process of top local leaders.

According to the *RSPGO*, a principal official at all levels of local leadership must complete one five-year term, but serve no more than two terms in the same position. County-level leaders are usually not promoted or transferred in the middle of their first five-year term; a transfer is required when a local leader has worked in the same position for more than ten years. Local chiefs and other leaders who are in charge of party organization, party disciplinary affairs, courts, procuratorial affairs, and police may not be selected in the county in which they were born. The regulatory guidelines also proscribe the promotion of top local leaders' spouses, children, and *mishu* (personal secretaries) in the county, city or province of their birth.

The document does, however, provide exceptions for "outstanding young leaders" (*tebie youxiu nianqing ganbu*), although it does not explicitly list the criteria by which one can objectively determine who the "outstanding young leaders" are. As has always been the case in the CCP's history, the Organization Department of the Central Committee can apparently determine the pool of cadre reservists (*houbei ganbu*) and thus control the list of "outstanding young leaders." While some of the aforementioned regulations—such as term limits and educational credentials—seem to have been implemented, others remain only lip service. For example, a large number of local chiefs currently work in the same regions in which they were born.<sup>8</sup> Political favoritism, especially patron-client ties, has often been one of the most crucial factors in determining a leader's career advancement. This explains why the *mishu* experience continues to be a stepping-stone for a large number of Chinese political elites.

Despite these problems, the *Regulations of the Selection of the Party and Governmental Officials*, as well as other CCP Central Committee documents have laid out many important procedures and rules for the Chinese local elite circulation, which should help create a sense of regularity and fairness in the local leadership reshuffling. According to the Chinese official media, previous large-scale local elite reshufflings have not required local party committees to comply with so many instructions and guidelines.<sup>9</sup>

## The Reshuffling Plan and Scale

The Chinese authorities consider this upcoming four-tier local elite reshuffling one of the most important events in the country in 2006–7. The local party committees in 14 provinces will reshuffle in the second half of 2006, and the remaining 17 provinces will do the same in the first half of 2007. Newly appointed or reappointed provincial chiefs (party secretaries and governors) will most likely be seated on the 17th Central Committee of the CCP, which will be formed in the fall of 2007. Some rising stars will enter the next Politburo, perhaps even its standing committee, thus becoming official candidates to succeed Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in the near future.

An important feature of this reshuffling is the fact that a large number of local leaders will have to step down, not because they have reached their retirement age, but because the CCP Organization Department has called for downsizing the membership of party standing committees at all levels of local leadership, especially the number of deputy party secretaries. The Chinese authorities claim that the downsizing of membership in the party standing committee at various levels of local leadership will help reduce bureaucratic inefficiency and enhance official accountability.

According to an official Chinese media outlet, following this reshuffling, each of China's 31 provincial party committees will consist of one full secretary and three deputy secretaries, including one deputy who simultaneously serves as the governor, one deputy who is in charge of disciplinary affairs, and one deputy who is in charge of party organization and propaganda in the province. In addition, each provincial party standing committee must consist of 11 to 13 members.<sup>10</sup>

Table 1 shows the current numbers of secretaries, deputy secretaries, and members of party standing committees in all of China's 31 provinces. Only five provinces (Hebei, Anhui, Fujian, Hainan, and Ningxia) have met the central authorities' requirements for the number of deputy secretaries. Approximately one-third of current deputy party secretaries—who are high-ranking leaders (*gaogan*) in the country—have to vacate their posts as part of the reshuffling. Additionally, about half of the provincial-party standing committees exceed the maximum number of members allowed.

**Table 1**

*Numbers of Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Members of Provincial Party Standing Committees (as of June 2006)*

<i>Province</i>	<i>Number of Secretaries</i>	<i>Number of Deputy Secretaries</i>	<i>Number of Members of Provincial Party Standing Committee</i>	<i>Total</i>
Beijing	1	4	7	12
Tianjin	1	5	8	14
Hebei	1	3	10	14
Shanxi	1	4	6	11
Neimenggu	1	5	8	14
Liaoning	1	4	10	15
Jilin	1	5	8	14
Heilongjiang	1	5	6	12
Shanghai	1	5	9	15
Jiangsu	1	5	7	13
Shandong	1	5	8	14
Zhejiang	1	4	9	14
Anhui	1	3	9	13
Fujian	1	3	9	13
Henan	1	4	10	15
Hubei	1	4	8	13
Jiangxi	1	5	7	13
Guangdong	1	5	9	15
Guangxi	1	5	8	14
Hainan	1	3	9	13
Sichuan	1	5	8	14
Chongqing	1	4	8	13
Guizhou	1	4	9	14
Yunnan	1	5	7	13
Xizang (Tibet)	1	6	6	13
Shaanxi	1	4	8	13
Gansu	1	5	7	13
Qinghai	1	4	10	15
Ningxia	1	3	8	12
Xinjiang	1	5	9	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>419</b>

Sources: All data are from Chinese official sources, including primarily the websites of the Xinhua News Agency and provincial administrations. See <http://xinhuanet.com> and <http://www.china.com>.

According to the CCP Organization Department's regulations, full provincial party secretaries and governors cannot be reappointed once they reach the age of 65, new candidates for the post of provincial party secretary or governor may not be older than 63, deputy party secretaries and standing committee members cannot be reappointed when they reach 63 and 60, respectively, and new candidates for deputy provincial party

secretary and provincial standing committee membership should not be older than 61 and 58, respectively.

Very few current provincial top leaders have surpassed the age restriction outlined in the CCP regulations. Table 2 shows the numbers of provincial party secretaries, deputy secretaries, and members of the standing committee who have reached retirement age based on their current leadership positions. Only two provincial chiefs, Tianjin party secretary Zhang Lichang and Guangxi party secretary Cao Bochun are older than 65. Among the 135 provincial deputy party secretaries, only nine deputy party secretaries (7 percent) have reached retirement age (63), and most currently serve as secretary of the commission for discipline inspection in their provinces, including Luo Shiqian (Shanghai), Zhao Chunlan (Shandong), Huang Yuanzhi (Hubei), Cai Changsong (Hainan), Cao Hongxin (Guizhou), Chen Peizhong (Yunan), and Bu Qiong (Tibet). All of them also currently serve as members of the CCP Central Commission of Discipline Inspection.

**Table 2**

*Numbers of Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Members of Provincial Party Standing Committees Who Have Exceeded the Age Restriction (as of June 2006)*

<i>Province</i>	<i>Secretaries (age 65 or above)</i>	<i>Deputy Secretaries (age 63 or above)</i>	<i>Members of Provincial Party Standing Committees (age 60 or above)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Beijing		1	1	2
Tianjin	1	1		2
Hebei			2	2
Shanxi				0
Neimenggu				0
Liaoning				0
Jilin				0
Heilongjiang			1	1
Shanghai		1		1
Jiangsu				0
Shandong		1	1	2
Zhejiang			1	1
Anhui				0
Fujian			1	1
Henan			2	2
Hubei		1		1
Hunan				0
Jiangxi				0
Guangdong				0
Guangxi	1			1

*(continued)*

**Table 2** (continued)

*Numbers of Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Members of Provincial Party Standing Committees Who Have Exceeded the Age Restriction (as of June 2006)*

<i>Province</i>	<i>Secretaries (age 65 or above)</i>	<i>Deputy Secretaries (age 63 or above)</i>	<i>Members of Provincial Party Standing Committees (age 60 or above)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hainan		1	1	2
Sichuan				0
Chongqing			1	1
Guizhou		1	2	3
Yunnan		1		1
Xizang (Tibet)		1		1
Shaanxi				0
Gansu				0
Qinghai				0
Ningxia			1	1
Xinjiang				0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>25</b>

Sources: All data are from Chinese official sources, including primarily the websites of the Xinhua News Agency and provincial administrations. See <http://xinhuanet.com> and <http://www.china.com>.

Table 2 also shows that of the current 253 members of the standing committees, only 14 (6 percent) have reached retirement age. Among a total of 419 members of provincial standing committees, including party secretaries and deputy party secretaries, only 25 (6 percent) have reached retirement age. The fact that an overwhelming majority of current provincial top leaders are not close to retirement age makes the central authorities' plan to downsize membership on the provincial standing committees particularly difficult.

Party standing committees at the county level also need to make significant reductions in membership seats, especially the posts of deputy party secretaries. According to the Chinese authorities, after the reshuffling, each of the county-level party standing committees must have one secretary and only two deputy secretaries (including one deputy that concurrently serves as county chief (*xianzhang*) and one deputy that is in charge of party affairs).<sup>11</sup>

Table 3 shows the current numbers of party secretaries, deputy party secretaries, and members of the standing committee of counties and districts in the jurisdiction of Beijing. Among the 16 counties/districts listed, only Chongwen District and Miyun County have met the membership seat restrictions outlined above. Most of the counties and districts have more than two deputy secretaries. If the CCP Organization Department's regulations are followed, at least 29 (45 percent) of the current deputy party secretaries at the county/district leadership level in Beijing would necessarily be cut in the reshuffling. Beijing's case is not unique; a majority of counties in the country have excessive numbers of deputy party secretaries at the county-level CCP leadership.

**Table 3**  
*Numbers of Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of County/District Standing Committees in Beijing (as of June 2006)*

<i>District/County</i>	<i>Number of Secretaries</i>	<i>Number of Deputy Secretaries</i>	<i>Total</i>
Dongcheng	1	5	6
Xicheng	1	5	6
Chongwen	1	2	3
Chaoyang	1	4	5
Haidian	1	6	7
Fengtai	1	5	6
Mentougou	1	4	5
Fangshan	1	3	4
Tongzhou	1	3	4
Shunyi	1	4	5
Daxing	1	4	5
Changping	1	3	4
Pinggu	1	3	4
Huairou	1	4	5
Miyun	1	2	3
Yanqing	1	4	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>77</b>

Notes and sources: All data are from Chinese official sources, including primarily the websites of the Xinhua News Agency for municipal government of Beijing (<http://www.beijing.gov.cn>) and its links to various county and district administrations in the city. Beijing has a total of 18 counties and districts. The data on county party leaders of Xuanwu District and Shijingshan District are not available.

In the “Directive of Selecting and Fostering County Chiefs” recently issued by the CCP Organization Department, the Chinese authorities specified that a majority of county chiefs (full county party secretaries and full county government heads) should be about 45 years of age.<sup>12</sup> Among the 20 county or district chiefs in Beijing whose ages are identified in the sources, only seven (35 percent) were born in the 1960s; most of the county chiefs were born in the 1950s and they are now in their fifties. A majority of deputy party secretaries at the county level also were born in the 1950s. It is likely that in the upcoming reshuffling the county-level leadership will have more personnel turnover than will the provincial level of leadership.

The leadership change at the township level will also likely be substantial. In the spring of 2006, Hunan Province, selected by the CCP Organization Department as a sample experiment, completed the leadership reshuffling of its 2,171 party committees at the township level. According to the plan, the members of the party committee may not exceed seven. For those economically backward and less populous towns, the number of members of the party committee is restricted to five. Each town should have one party



secretary and only one deputy party secretary, who often simultaneously serves as the town government head (*xiangzhang*).<sup>13</sup>

Table 4 summarizes some important changes after the recent reshuffling of the township party committees in Hunan Province. The number of deputy party secretaries and members of the party committees has been reduced by 70 percent and 26 percent, respectively while the average age of committee members has decreased by two years. Most of the current township leaders were born in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and are thus in their mid-30s. The percentage of members with junior-college education or above has increased by 9.1 percent and the percentage of female members has increased by 2.3 percent.

**Table 4**  
*Results of the Recent Township Elite Reshuffling in Hunan Province (Spring 2006)*

	<i>Prior to the Reshuffling</i>	<i>After the Reshuffling</i>
Number of Members of Township Party Committees	17,473	12,945
Number of Deputy Party Secretaries	7,993	2,362
Average Age of Members of Township Party Committees	38.4 years	36.4 years
Percentage of Leaders with Junior College Education or Above	77.8%	86.9%
Percentage of Woman Leaders	7.7%	10%

Sources: *Renmin ribao*, 22 May 2006. Also see [http://news3.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2006-05/22/content\\_4582070.htm](http://news3.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2006-05/22/content_4582070.htm).

Although the Chinese authorities apparently aim to make local party leadership more efficient, the plan for the large-scale downsizing of local elites may face some strong resistance from all four tiers of local elites. Some of the methods that the top Chinese leadership applied in the two previous reshufflings may not necessarily work in this instance. During the reshuffling of the mid-1980s, most of the incumbent officials at all four tiers of local leadership were also veteran communist leaders; they had hardly any educational credentials and were usually quite old. Many of these retired leaders were transferred to the Advisory Commission of the CCP Central Committee or served as advisors in the local leadership. Meanwhile, a younger generation of elites, who were mostly engineers by training, entered the political leadership at all four levels of local administration. As part of the compensation for veteran leaders' forced retirement, many of the children of senior leaders were promoted to leadership positions. Some of the most prominent "princelings" today, such as Trade Minister Bo Xilai, Zhejiang party secretary Xi Jinping, and governor of the China Development Bank Chen Yuan, were all promoted to the political leadership at county/district level during that time.

In the mid-1990s reshuffling, the dynamic market reform at the time not only pulled some entrepreneurial elites into the political leadership, but also pushed some local leaders to “jump into the seas” (*xiahai*), by pursuing their personal business careers. Additionally, some retired or less promising political elites moved from the party and government leadership posts to other leadership bodies such as the local people’s congresses and the local people’s political consultative conferences. These moves not only paved the way for the newcomers, but also provided an opportunity for those political elites who were fired to either retreat to the “second front” (*erxian*) or to pursue a second career in the business sector.

In the impending local reshuffling, however, most of the incumbent leaders in provincial party committees have not yet reached retirement age. Those in the county or township party committees are much younger, despite the fact that they may have exceeded the age restriction for these levels of top leaders as determined by the CCP Organization Department. Most will probably not be transferred to leadership posts in local people’s congresses or the local people’s political consultative conferences because these institutions are no longer seen as the “second front” or “honorary home for elders” (*zhengzhi yanglaoyuan*).<sup>14</sup> Instead, the Chinese authorities now consider these two institutions important venues for demonstrating the “governing capacity” of CCP officials. Some of the CCP officials who serve in these institutions are actually rising political stars. Meanwhile, due to growing competition in the business world, major Chinese firms are interested in recruiting the most capable and promising leaders, rather than retired or disfavored local officials.

Although the recent official Chinese documents regarding local elite reshuffling warn against wrongdoing such as political favoritism and bribery, these documents fail to explain what will happen to the large number of local leaders who will lose their jobs as the result of the upcoming reshuffling. Because these local leaders will most likely move to the business sector, increased official corruption, especially various forms of bribery and attempts to buy power or to use political influence to make money may result.

In a report recently published in *Outlook Weekly*, Chinese journalists found that in Jiangsu’s Tongzhou city, half of local leaders take a one-year leave during which they work as deputy general managers, assistant general managers, or advisors of major business firms in the city. This practice of “new entrepreneurs with red hats” (*xin hongding shangren*) is also common in many other provinces, causing serious concern about the growing rampancy of official corruption.<sup>15</sup> But, on the other hand and perhaps even more importantly, if this reshuffling is handled inappropriately and unfairly, the large number of dissatisfied local leaders could potentially increase the existing tension between the national leadership and local administrations.

## Consolidating Hu’s Power: *Tuanpai*’s Best Chance for Promotion

The upcoming large-scale reshuffling of local elites is particularly intriguing because it occurs at a time of major policy shift in the country—from Jiang’s elitist developmental

strategy to Hu Jintao's populist approach.<sup>16</sup> According to Hu, at a time when China faces serious challenges such as environmental degradation, energy scarcity, employment pressures, and economic disparity, the government should pay more attention to issues of social fairness and social harmony. To a great extent, Hu's populist initiatives have already begun to change China's course of development in the following four important ways: from obsession with GDP growth to a greater reliance on environmentally friendly methods of growth, which aims to consume less energy;<sup>17</sup> from an excessive emphasis on urban construction, foreign investment, and foreign trade to greater concern for rural improvement with a focus on stimulating domestic demand; from a single-minded emphasis on coastal development to a more balanced regional development approach; and from a policy that favors entrepreneurs and other elites to a populist approach that protects the interests of farmers, migrant workers, the urban unemployed, the elderly, and other vulnerable social groups.

The implementation of this new developmental strategy apparently requires a new kind of political elite with some much-needed skills and credentials. A candidate's technical expertise may not be as valuable as his or her social popularity. A background in party organization, propaganda, and united front work are no longer considered less valuable than experience in foreign investment and trade, as was the case for the past two decades. Leadership experience in an advanced coastal region is helpful, but experience in working with a poor and backward region is even more critical to a candidate's career advancement. Hu's populist policy initiatives ensure that local leaders are increasingly accountable to the constituents they serve. Public evaluation has played an increasingly important role in the selection of local leaders. A Chinese expert on leadership studies recently argued that a candidate's "popularity index" (*renqi zhishu*), which includes his or her views and record regarding environmental protection, is an important criterion for political promotion.<sup>18</sup>

These new selection criteria are particularly beneficial for leaders who advanced their careers through the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), the so-called *tuanpai* officials. Table 5 lists all 62 current provincial chiefs (party secretaries and governors or mayors) in China's 31 province-level administrations. Seven party secretaries and nine governors are *tuanpai* leaders, accounting for 23 percent and 29 percent of the country's provincial party secretaries and governors, respectively.<sup>19</sup> Almost all worked in the CCYL national or provincial leadership under Hu Jintao when he was in charge of the organization in the early 1980s. With the exception of Jiangsu party secretary Li Yuanchao, who is a "princeling," most of these provincial chiefs with *tuanpai* backgrounds come from humble family backgrounds.<sup>20</sup>

A majority of current *tuanpai* leaders have worked and/or previously advanced their careers in inland provinces. Many have worked in the field of party affairs rather than governmental administration. Very few of these *tuanpai* leaders can claim expertise in areas of finance, foreign trade, and foreign investment. Because *tuanpai* leaders have, for the most part, not worked in the economic and financial domains, they are arguably less susceptible to corruption than are their counterparts who are in charge of economic affairs.

**Table 5** *Provincial Chiefs (as of June 2006)*

<i>Province/City</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Native</i>	<i>Year Born</i>	<i>Year Appointed</i>	<i>Previous Position</i>	<i>16th CC</i>	<i>Educational Level</i>	<i>Academic Major</i>	<i>Political Network</i>
Beijing	Party Secretary	Liu Qi	Jiangsu	1942	2002	Beijing Mayor	Politburo	M.A.	Engineering	
	Mayor	Wang Qishan	Shandong	1948	2003	Hainan Secretary	Member	College	History	Princeling
Tianjin	Party Secretary	Zhang Lichang	Hebei	1939	1997	Tianjin Mayor	Politburo	Junior College	Management	
	Mayor	Dai Xianglong	Jiangsu	1944	2002	Governor, People's Bank	Member	College	Economics	
Hebei	Party Secretary	Bai Keming	Hebei	1943	2002	Hainan Secretary	Member	College	Engineering	Princeling
	Governor	Ji Yunshi	Jiangsu	1945	2002	Jiangsu Governor	Member	College	Physics	CCYL
Shanxi	Party Secretary	Zhang Baoshun	Hebei	1950	2005	Shanxi Governor	Alternate	M.A.	Economics	CCYL
	Governor	Yu Youjun	Jiangsu	1953	2005	Hunan Deputy Secretary		Ph.D.	Philosophy	
Neimenggu	Party Secretary	Chu Bo	Anhui	1944	2001	Hunan Governor	Member	College	Engineering	
	Governor	Yang Jing	Neimenggu	1953	2004	Huhehaote Secretary	Alternate	Junior College	Chinese	CCYL
Liaoning	Party Secretary	Li Keqiang	Anhui	1955	2004	Henan Secretary	Member	Ph.D.	Economics	CCYL
	Governor	Zhang Wenyue	Fujian	1944	2004	Liaoning Deputy Secretary	Alternate	College	Geology	Wen Jiabao's friend
Jilin	Party Secretary	Wang Yunkun	Jiangsu	1942	1998	Jilin Governor	Member	College	Engineering	
	Governor	Wang Min	Anhui	1950	2004	Suzhou Secretary		Ph.D.	Engineering	
Heilongjiang	Party Secretary	Qian Yunlu	Hubei	1944	2005	Guizhou Secretary	Member	College	Economics	CCYL
	Governor	Zhang Zuoyi	Heilongjiang	1945	2003	Labor Minister	Member	College	Russian	
Shanghai	Party Secretary	Chen Liangyu	Zhejiang	1946	2002	Shanghai Mayor	Politburo	College	Engineering	Shanghai Gang
	Mayor	Han Zheng	Zhejiang	1954	2003	Shanghai Vice Mayor	Member	M.A.	Economics	Shanghai Gang
Jiangsu	Party Secretary	Li Yuanchao	Jiangsu	1950	2002	Jiangsu Deputy Secretary	Alternate	Ph.D.	Law	CCYL and Princeling
	Governor	Liang Baohua	Jiangxi	1945	2003	Jiangsu Vice Governor	Alternate	College	Journalism	

*(continued)*

**Table 5**—continued

Zhejiang	Party Secretary	Xi Jinping	Beijing	1953	2002	Fujian Governor	Member	Ph.D.	Law	Princeling
	Governor	Lu Zushan	Zhejiang	1946	2003	Zhejiang Vice Governor	Alternate	M.A.	Party Affairs	
Anhui	Party Secretary	Guo Jinlong	Jiangsu	1947	2004	Tibet Secretary	Member	College	Physics	
	Governor	Wang Jinshan	Jilin	1945	2003	Anhui Vice Governor	Member	M.A.	Economics	
Fujian	Party Secretary	Lu Zhangong	Zhejiang	1952	2004	Fujian Governor	Member	College	Engineering	
	Governor	Huang Xiaojing	Fujian	1946	2004	Fujian Vice Governor		College	Engineering	CCYL
Jiangxi	Party Secretary	Meng Jianzhu	Jiangsu	1947	2001	Shanghai Deputy Secretary	Member	M.A.	Engineering	Shanghai Gang
	Governor	Huang Zhiquan	Zhejiang	1942	2001	Jiangxi Vice Governor	Member	College	Engineering	
Shandong	Party Secretary	Zhang Gaoli	Fujian	1946	2002	Shandong Governor	Member	College	Economics	
	Governor	Han Yuqun	Jiangsu	1943	2003	Shandong Vice Governor		College		
Henan	Party Secretary	Xu Guangchun	Zhejiang	1944	2004	Radio, Film, & TV Minister	Member	College	Journalism	Shanghai Gang
	Governor	Li Chengyu	Ningxia	1946	2003	Henan Vice Governor	Alternate	Junior College	Party Affairs	CCYL
Hubei	Party Secretary	Yu Zhengsheng	Zhejiang	1945	2001	Construction Minister	Politburo	College	Engineering	Princeling
	Governor	Luo Qingquan	Hubei	1945	2003	Hubei Vice Governor	Member	M.A.	Party Affairs	
Hunan	Party Secretary	Zhang Chunxian	Henan	1953	2005	Transportation Minister	Member	M.A.	Management	
	Governor	Zhou Bohua	Hunan	1948	2003	Hunan Vice Governor		M.A.	Party Affairs	
Guangdong	Party Secretary	Zhang Dejiang	Liaoning	1946	2002	Zhejiang Secretary	Politburo	College	Economics	
	Governor	Huang Huahua	Guangdong	1946	2003	Guangdong Vice Governor	Member	M.A.	Party Affairs	CCYL
Guangxi	Party Secretary	Cao Bochun	Hunan	1941	1997	Liaoning Deputy Secretary	Member	Junior College	Engineering	
	Governor	Lu Bing	Guangxi	1944	2003	Guangxi Deputy Secretary		College	History	
Hainan	Party Secretary	Wang Xiaofeng	Hunan	1944	2003	Hainan Governor	Member	College	Engineering	
	Governor	Wei Liucheng	Henan	1946	2003	CEO of China Oil Corp.	Alternate	College	Engineering	Oil Industry

*(continued)*

**Table 5**—continued

Chongqing	Party Secretary	Wang Yang	Anhui	1955	2005	Dep. Sec. Gen., State Council	Alternate	M.A.	Management	CCYL
	Mayor	Wang Hongju	Chongqing	1945	2003	Chongqing Vice Mayor	Member	College	Math.	
Sichuan	Party Secretary	Zhang Xuezhong	Gansu	1943	2002	Personnel Minister	Member	College	Chinese	Hu Jintao's Friend
	Governor	Zhang Zhongwei	Sichuan	1942	2002	Sichuan Vice Governor	Member	Junior College	Party Affairs	CCYL
Guizhou	Party Secretary	Shi Zhongyuan	Hebei	1946	2005	Dir., State Publishing Bureau	Member	College	Politics	
	Governor	Shi Xiushi	Henan	1942	2001	Guizhou Vice Governor	Member	College	Engineering	
Yunnan	Party Secretary	Bai Enpei	Shaanxi	1946	2001	Qinghai Secretary	Member	College	Engineering	
	Governor	Xu Rongkai	Chongqing	1942	2002	Yunnan Deputy Secretary	Member	College	Engineering	
Tibet	Party Secretary	Zhang Qingli	Shandong	1951	2005	Xinjiang Deputy Secretary	Member	College	Party Affairs	CCYL
	Governor	Qiangba Puncog	Tibet	1947	2003	Tibet Deputy Secretary	Alternate	College	Engineering	
Shaanxi	Party Secretary	Li Jiangguo	Shandong	1946	2002	Tianjin Deputy Secretary	Member	College	Chinese	
	Acting Governor	Yuan Chunqing	Hunan	1952	2006	Shaanxi Deputy Secretary	Alternate	Ph.D.	Economics	CCYL
Gansu	Party Secretary	Su Rong	Jilin	1948	2003	Qinghai Secretary	Member	M.A.	Economics	
	Governor	Lu Hao	Hebei	1947	2001	Lanzhou City Secretary	Member	College	Engineering	
Qinghai	Party Secretary	Zhao Leji	Qinghai	1957	2003	Qinghai Governor	Member	College	Philosophy	
	Governor	Song Xiuyan	Tianjin	1955	2004	Qinghai Deputy Secretary	Alternate	M.A.	Party Affairs	CCYL
Ningxia	Party Secretary	Chen Jianguo	Shandong	1945	2002	Shandong Deputy Secretary	Member	Junior College	Economics	
	Governor	Ma Qizhi	Ningxia	1943	1998	Ningxia Deputy Secretary	Member	College	History	CCYL
Xinjiang	Party Secretary	Wang Lequan	Shandong	1944	1995	Xinjiang Deputy Secretary	Politburo	M.A.	Party Affairs	CCYL
	Governor	Simayi Tielwaerdi	Xinjiang	1944	2003	Xinjiang Deputy Secretary	Alternate	College	Math.	

Notes: CCYL = Chinese Communist Youth League, Dep. = Deputy, Dir. = Director, Gen. = General, Sec. = Secretary.

Source: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-02/20/content\\_476046.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-02/20/content_476046.htm).

*Tuanpai* officials have the age advantage as most of them are younger than their competitors at the same level of leadership. Table 5 shows that, of a total of 62 provincial chiefs, 15 were born in the 1950s. Among these younger provincial chiefs, eight (53 percent) are *tuanpai* leaders. They include Liaoning party secretary Li Keqiang (born in 1955), Jiangsu party secretary Li Yuanchao (b. 1950), Shaanxi acting governor Yuan Chunqing (b. 1952), Chongqing Party Secretary Wang Yang (b. 1955), and Shanxi party secretary Zhang Baoshun (b. 1950). All worked in the CCYL leadership for many years or even decades, including working directly under Hu Jintao in the CCYL Secretariat in the early 1980s. The first three also hold Ph.D. degrees and studied law (either as undergraduates or graduates). All eight provincial chiefs with *tuanpai* backgrounds currently serve on the 16th Central Committee of the CCP as full or alternate members. They are the leading candidates for seats on the next Politburo.

Officials with CCYL backgrounds have also occupied many seats on the provincial standing committees, and many also have an age advantage over other members. The age factor is particularly important as the CCP Organization Department requires that after reshuffling, each provincial standing committee must have at least three members under 50 and one about 45. Table 6 shows the backgrounds of the 20 youngest members of China's 31 provincial standing committees at present. These prominent provincial leaders are all in their early to mid-40s, and are often seen as the rising stars in the province-level leadership. Their backgrounds and career experiences may indicate a trend toward a specific set of collective characteristics possessed by the next generation of Chinese leaders. Nine (45 percent) have advanced their careers through the CCYL. Sun Jinlong, party secretary of Anhui Province's capital city Hefei, and Hu Chunhua, executive deputy party secretary of Tibet, both previously served on the Secretariat of the CCYL Central Committee. Five others served as CCYL provincial secretaries.

The omnipresence of leaders with CCYL backgrounds is also evident in the lower levels of local leadership. These local leaders who have advanced their careers through the CCYL are on average about five to ten years younger than other leaders at the same level. This gives them tremendous political advantage in the Chinese leadership recruitment system that places a huge emphasis on age limits.

As an example, among the seven youngest county or district chiefs in Beijing (those who were born in the 1960s), four are *tuanpai* officials. Chaoyang district head Lin Keqing (b. 1966) was former CCYL secretary of Dongcheng District; Yanqing District party secretary Hou Jinshu (b. 1963) was former CCYL secretary of the People's University in Beijing; Yanqing district head Sun Wenkai (b. 1966) previously served as CCYL deputy secretary of Beijing Agricultural University, and Xuanwu district head Wang Gang (b. 1968) was former CCYL secretary of Beijing Jiaotong University. Lin, Hou, and Wang also worked as *mishu* or office directors earlier in their careers.

**Table 6** *Backgrounds of Youngest Members (born after 1958) of Provincial Party Standing Committees (as of June 2006)*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Current Position</i>	<i>Native of</i>	<i>Year Born</i>	<i>Year Appointed</i>	<i>Level of Education</i>	<i>Academic Major</i>	<i>Main Career</i>	<i>CCYL Experience</i>	<i>Mishu Experience</i>
Sun Zhengcai	Beijing Chief of Staff	Shandong	1963	2002	Ph.D.	Agronomy	Rural Administration		Beijing Chief-of-Staff
Chen Chaoying	Dir. Tianjin S&T Commission	Hebei	1958	2003	M.A.	Computer Sci.	Science & Technology		
Deng Kai	Yanbian Prefecture Secretary	Liaoning	1959	2004	M.A.	Economics	CCYL	Jilin Deputy Secretary	Jilin Office Director
Wang Rong	Suzhou Secretary	Jiangsu	1958	2004	Ph.D.	Agronomy	University Administration		University Office Director
Chen Miner	Director Zhejiang Propaganda Department	Zhejiang	1960	2002	M.A.	Party Affairs	Rural Administration		
Li Qiang	Zhejiang Chief-of-Staff	Zhejiang	1959	2005	College	Agronomy	Rural Administration		Zhejiang Chief-of-Staff
Sun Jinglong	Hefei Secretary	Hubei	1962	2005	Ph.D.	Economics	CCYL	Secretary Central Committee	
Pan Yiyang	Kanzhou (Jianxi) Secretary	Guangdong	1961	2003	Ph.D.	Philosophy	CCYL	Guangdong Secretary	
Yu Xinrong	Nanchang Secretary	Jiangxi	1959	2003	Ph.D.	Management	<i>Mishu</i>		Jiangxi Deputy Chief-of-Staff
Liu Wei	Director Shandong Org. Dept.	Shandong	1958	2001	Col	Party Affairs	CCYL	Anhui Secretary	
Ye Dongsong	Director Henan Organization Department	Anhui	1958	2004	M.A.	Economics	Industrial Administration		
Li Jingzhao	Guangxi Vice Governor	Hebei	1958	2004	Ph.D.	Economics	Industrial Administration		
Ma Zhengqi	Wanzhou (Chongqing) Secretary	Chongqing	1959	2002	M.A.	Party Affairs	<i>Mishu</i>	County Secretary	Chongqing Office Director
Wang Xiaodong	Guiyang Secretary	Jiangxi	1959	2000	?	?	<i>Mishu</i>		Guizhou Chief-of-Staff
Li Jiang (F)	Director Yunnan Org. Dept.	Yunnan	1958	2003	College	Engineering	CCYL	Yunnan Secretary	
Hu Chunhua	Tibet Executive Deputy Secretary	Hubei	1963	2005	M.A.	Party Affairs	CCYL	Secretary Central Committee	Tibet Chief-of-Staff
Li Pengxin	Haixi (Qinghai) Secretary	Shanxi	1960	2001	M.A.	Party Affairs	CCYL	Qinghai Secretary	
Nuer Baikeli	Xinjiang Deputy Secretary	Xinjiang	1961	2003	M.A.	Party Affairs	CCYL	University Secretary	Xinjiang Deputy Chief-of-Staff
Li Yi	Director Xinjiang Propaganda Department	Xinjiang	1960	2005	M.A.	Economics	<i>Mishu</i>		Xinjiang Office Director
Xiaokaiti Yiming	Director Xinjiang TV & Radio	Xinjiang	1959	2005	M.A.	Management	CCYL	Xinjiang Secretary	

Notes & Sources: CCYL = Chinese Communist Youth League, Dept. = Department, Dir. = Director, F = Female, Org. = Organization, S&T = Science and Technology. Data are from Chinese official sources, including primarily the websites of the Xinhua News Agency and provincial administrations. See <http://xinhuanet.com> and <http://www.china.com>.



Half of the young and promising provincial leaders listed in Table 6 have also served as *mishu*, office directors, or chiefs-of-staff during their political careers. The *mishu* experience has apparently remained an important stepping-stone for a leader's career advancement, despite the CCP Organization Department's order to restrain the promotion of *mishu*. For example, Li Yi, director of the Propaganda Department of Xinjiang, began his career as *mishu* at the CCP committee of Xinjiang in 1984, one year after he graduated from Xinjiang University. During the past two decades, he has served at one time or another as *mishu* to senior leaders in the province and as deputy office director and deputy chief-of-staff in the CCP committee of Xinjiang.

The prevalence of the *mishu* phenomenon is undoubtedly an indication of nepotism and patron-client relations within the Chinese leadership. *Mishu* clusters usually do not form a monolithic organization or a formal network. Normally a senior leader lacks enough *mishu* for them to form a comprehensive political faction. Instead, the *mishu* phenomenon may primarily reflect a departing senior leader's attempt to ensure that his or her *mishu*-turned-successor will best protect the leader's interests after he or she steps down.

*Mishu* often foster coalition building, contribute to negotiation and interdependence among various factions, and increase political consultation and compromise in the Chinese political process.<sup>21</sup> The managerial skills of *mishus*, especially those skills developed in the process of coalition building and consensus making, may prove extremely valuable when they become influential political leaders. *Mishu*-turned-leaders may in a way contribute to factional compromises in Chinese elite politics, and thus prevent the system from collapsing due to vicious power struggles.

Meanwhile, Hu's populist approach and his like-minded *tuanpai* officials may help reduce the social tensions between elites and the masses in the country today, especially tensions over the enormous economic disparities resulting from a two-decade-long, single-minded drive for GDP growth. The rise of *tuanpai* leaders in the Chinese national and local leadership may help restrain the enormous power of some large business interest groups (*liyi jituan*), which are often associated with China's state-owned—and often monopolized—industries such as urban construction, energy, telecommunication, transportation, and banking. Not surprisingly, it was reported that Hu Jintao, in the most recent Politburo study session held in May 2006, criticized these business interest groups for undermining “social fairness” (*shehui gongping*).<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, both *mishu*-turned leaders and *tuanpai* officials have inherent limitations and weaknesses. The former are characteristically too cautious to make tough decisions on both the economic and socio-political fronts, while the latter usually lacks leadership experience in economic affairs. Recognizing this dynamic, the CCP Organization Department particularly stresses the need to “optimize the leadership team” by forming a party standing committee whose members' expertise and skills are complementary (*zhuanye peitao, youshi hubu*).<sup>23</sup> Specifically, the local party committee should make an effort, as a 2006 document released by the CCP Organization Department stipulates, to recruit candidates from state-owned enterprises, higher

education, and research institutions.<sup>24</sup> Song Fufan, a professor at the Central Party School and an expert on the CCP leadership, recently argued that, “To enhance the governing capacity of a CCP local organization, the standing committee should include the members who are experts in industrial development, finance, law, and urban management.”<sup>25</sup>

The effort by the central leadership to recruit leaders with more economics-oriented backgrounds and increased expertise in some technical areas also reflects the need to counterbalance the growing power of Hu Jintao and his *tuanpai* protégés. Other political factions, such as the “Shanghai Gang” and “princelings,” whose members are often known for their experience in foreign investment, trade, and banking, may now be on the defensive even though they will not allow Hu’s *tuanpai* officials to dominate all top leadership posts. Table 5 shows that members of the Shanghai Gang and princelings still occupy a significant number of posts among China’s provincial chiefs. Hubei party secretary Yu Zhengsheng, Guangdong party secretary Zhang Dejiang, Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu, Shanghai mayor Han Zheng, Zhejiang party secretary Xi Jinping, Jiangxi party secretary Meng Jianzhu, and Henan party secretary Xu Guangchun are either prominent members of the Shanghai Gang or have strong ties to former party chief Jiang Zemin and Vice President Zeng Qinghong. Zeng is often seen as the “strongest balancer” to Hu’s power in the Chinese leadership. Many of them will likely be promoted to more-influential positions at the next year’s party congress.

Although some provincial leaders may not be closely associated with the Jiang-Zeng faction, their experiences and backgrounds also differ greatly from those of Hu’s *tuanpai* leaders. Among the 20 youngest members of provincial party standing committees listed in Table 6, two are renowned scholars who have long worked in scientific research and education. Chen Chaoying (b. 1958), director of the Tianjin Science and Technology Commission, began his professional career at China’s leading shipbuilding research institute after graduating from the Harbin Institute of Technology in 1982. From 1986 to 1988, Chen studied computer science at the Free University in Belgium where he received a master’s degree. After he returned to China in 1988, he worked as deputy chief engineer, chief engineer, vice director and director of the research institute, which sent him to study abroad. In 2003, at the age of 45, he was appointed head of science and technology development in Tianjin.

Wang Rong (b. 1958), party secretary of Suzhou, is a rising star in the Chinese provincial leadership. He received his Ph.D. in agricultural economy and management at the Nanjing University of Agronomy in 1987. After graduation, he worked at the same university as an instructor, associate professor, associate dean, and assistant president. From 1991 to 1992, Wang studied at Tilburg University in Holland as a visiting scholar. After working as an office director and assistant president at the Nanjing University of Agronomy from 1992 to 1993, he was promoted to vice president of the university in 1994. Later, he also served as president of the Jiangsu Academy of Agronomy, deputy head of the Agricultural Bureau, and head of the Educational Bureau, both in the Jiangsu provincial government. In 2001, Wang was appointed mayor of Wuxi; two years later he was appointed party secretary of the city. In 2004 he was transferred to Suzhou, where he

has served as its party secretary. Wang's two predecessors in Suzhou, former party secretaries Chen Deming and Wang Min, were promoted to be Shaanxi governor and Jilin governor, respectively. It is expected that Wang Rong will soon follow suit and be promoted further.

The profiles of Chen and Wang are, of course, exceptions rather than norms at a time in which *tuanship* leaders are on the fast track for promotion. This dynamic highlights a serious deficiency in the Chinese political system. It is particularly problematic at a time when China not only faces many daunting domestic challenges such as employment, the environment, energy, health care, and economic disparities, but also has become increasingly sensitive to global financial and economic realities. Unless the Chinese leadership can incorporate the country's "best and brightest," especially the new generation of global-minded and down-to-earth economic entrepreneurs and knowledge elites, China will have a difficult time overcoming these complex socioeconomic challenges on both domestic and international fronts.

## Training the Next Generation of CCP Leaders

The CCP top leadership appears poised to confront a series of political dilemmas. The party needs to recruit young, talented individuals with diverse backgrounds and skill sets (educated either at home or abroad) into the party leadership at various levels. But at the same time, the pluralist trend of party elites may make the CCP less cohesive. In the view of Hu Jintao, a strong political network, as exemplified by the current prevalence of CCYL officials, is conducive to stability in China's political system, and thus to the continuation of CCP rule in the country. But this patron-client favoritism contradicts Hu's recent appeal to promote inner-party democracy. Additionally, despite all the party rhetoric supporting the recruitment of foreign-educated Chinese nationals into the political leadership, the Chinese authorities do not really trust returnees, especially those who spent many years in Western countries.<sup>26</sup> However, Chinese policymakers are increasingly dependent upon the expertise and knowledge of those who are familiar with international finance and trade as well as the cutting-edge development of science and technology in the world. The contradictory interests of the CCP's top leadership are evident and must be resolved in order for the country to continue to diversify its most influential governing bodies.

The Chinese authorities seem to understand all these dilemmas and challenges. To a great extent, the simultaneous reshuffling of four tiers of local party leaders, especially the emphasis on the age requirement for each tier, is motivated by a concern for the continuation of the CCP leadership in the future. An important feature of this upcoming local elite reshuffling is its specific requirement for mid-career training of local leaders as proposed by the CCP Organization Department.

In 2003, soon after Hu Jintao took the top leadership position, the CCP Organization Department announced that between 2003 and 2008, all leaders at the county and bureau level (*chuji*) or above must attend full-time training at least three

months in length (cumulative). According to this plan, about 500 provincial-ministerial-level leaders, 8,800 prefecture-division-level leaders, and 100,000 county- and bureau-level leaders must participate in these training programs.<sup>27</sup> For the top Chinese leadership, the mid-career training program can serve multiple purposes. It can help enhance ideological indoctrination, political networking, disciplinary reinforcement, educational credentials, and professional development of the future CCP leaders.

The Central Party School (CPS) has played the most important role in the mid-career training of CCP elites. With a faculty of approximately 600, including 168 professors and 159 associate professors, the CPS has granted 266 Ph.D.'s and 1,126 master's degrees since 1981.<sup>28</sup> Although the CPS usually hosts about 1,600 students for various training programs every semester, it alone cannot meet the huge demand for local leaders' mid-career training required by the CCP Organization Department's pronouncement. Provincial party schools have shared much of the responsibility for the training programs.

Under Hu's leadership, the Central Committee of the CCP also established three national executive leadership academies (*guojia ganbu xueyuan*) in Shanghai's Pudong, Jiangxi's Jingangshan, and Shaanxi's Yan'an, respectively. In the congratulatory letter for the founding of these three academies in 2005, Hu Jintao stated that they would not only enhance party officials' leadership skills, but also "serve as a window for international exchanges and cooperation."<sup>29</sup> In fact, the CPS and these three newly established national executive leadership academies have frequently invited foreign speakers and hosted many international conferences on various domestic and global issues.

Meanwhile, the CCP Organization Department has consistently sponsored study abroad programs for high- and middle-level party and government leaders. For example, between 1998 and 2005, about 300 PRC officials were granted master's degrees at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. The university provided Chinese mid-career cadres with a one-year program in which some courses were taught entirely in Chinese. Each year, the CCP Organization Department has sent 10 mayors to study at the university while the provincial party committees have sent the rest.<sup>30</sup> Local leaders who have advanced their careers through the CCYL usually do not have extensive lists of professional credentials. They thus are often selected to participate in one-year or other short-term foreign training programs for the main purpose of appearing well-educated. Those who have undergone this process are referred to as being "gilded" (*dujin*).

The CCP Organization Department has also signed an agreement for educational exchange with the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The agreement specifies that between 2003 and 2008, a total of 300 senior Chinese leaders will participate in a training program at Harvard lasting several months. Furthermore, in 2006, the CCP Organization Department, in collaboration with Beijing University, Columbia University, Sciences Po Paris, and the London School of Economics and Political Sciences, launched the "advanced training program of global public policy."<sup>31</sup> The program is intended to broaden the global perspective of prefecture- and bureau-level

Chinese leaders and to strengthen their managerial skills, thus enabling them to better handle new challenges. According to the CCP Organization Department, by 2008 at least one or two leaders in 80 percent of the county/district/bureau-level organizations in the country will have had some foreign training.<sup>32</sup>

The ambitious mid-career training programs for political elites and the plan for a large-scale reshuffling of four tiers of local leaders indicate that Hu Jintao and other top Chinese leaders are concerned about both the short-term need to consolidate their own power and the long-term future of CCP rule. It seems inevitable that Hu and his *tuanpai* officials will become more powerful as a result of the reshuffling and that they will more effectively carry out their socioeconomic policies in accordance with their populist developmental strategy. One may even expect that *tuanpai* officials will likely constitute the major force in the ruling elite for the next 10 to 15 years, although they will have to share power with other competing factions because of their own weaknesses. It is far from certain, however, that the Hu leadership will be able to derive any guarantee of the CCP's long-term rule. No one knows who will govern China or what dominant sociopolitical model the country will follow.

China is in the midst of major changes. As a result of the rapid rise of the private sector in recent years, most ambitious young people are no longer considering political officialdom as the best channel for their upward mobility. Interestingly enough, most of the children of the third and fourth generations of leaders are engaged in business. Almost none of the children of current prominent leaders pursue careers in party or CCYL affairs. Instead, many currently serve as CEOs, trustees, general managers, and partners of major business firms (either state-owned or multinational corporations). This suggests that the channel of elite selection—the game for competing for political power—in China may profoundly change in the future generation. Arguably the most important challenge for the upcoming reshuffling is whether the top Chinese leadership can be open enough—and bold enough—to allow talented young people to become part of the ruling elite. The prevailing sign from the Chinese authorities at present, however, is at best a sense of caution and control.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The author is indebted to Qi Ge and Yinsheng Li for their research assistance. The author also thanks Sally Carman, Luke Forster and David Sands for suggesting ways in which to clarify the article.

<sup>2</sup> *Shijie ribao* (World Journal), 29 May 2006, p. C1.

<sup>3</sup> Ye Duchu, a professor at the Central Party School and a leading Chinese expert on the CCP, recently compared this upcoming reshuffling of local leaders with two previous turnovers in the Chinese media. See <http://www.sina.com.cn>. 10 May 2006.

<sup>4</sup> For a detailed discussion of these documents, see <http://www.xinhuanet.com>. 17 January 2006.

<sup>5</sup> For the whole document, see [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/18/content\\_695422.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/18/content_695422.htm). The CCP Central Committee also issued regulations regarding supervision, see [http://news3.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-07/13/content\\_971053.htm](http://news3.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-07/13/content_971053.htm).

<sup>6</sup> See [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-05/30/content\\_4620620.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-05/30/content_4620620.htm).

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.chinesenewsnet.com>. 8 June 2006.

<sup>8</sup> For more details of this phenomenon, see Cheng Li, “Think National, Blame Local: Central-Provincial Dynamics in the Hu Era,” *China Leadership Monitor* 17 (winter 2006), pp. 17–19.

<sup>9</sup> See [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-01/17/content\\_4062960.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-01/17/content_4062960.htm).

<sup>10</sup> *Liaowang xinwen zhoukan* (Outlook news weekly), 11 April 2006.

<sup>11</sup> *Renmin ribao* (People’s Daily), 26 May 2006, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Shijie ribao*, 21 February 2006, p. C1.

<sup>13</sup> For the details of elite reshuffling at the township level in Hunan Province, see *Renmin ribao*, 22 May 2006. Also see [http://news3.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2006-05/22/content\\_4582070.htm](http://news3.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2006-05/22/content_4582070.htm).

<sup>14</sup> Gong Xueping, chairman of Shanghai People’s Congress, recently made similar remarks to the Chinese national media. *Dongfang liaowang zhoukan* (Oriental outlook), 2 June 2006, pp. 36–41.

<sup>15</sup> *Liaowang xinwen zhoukan*, 29 May 2006. See <http://news.sohu.com/20060529/n243456425.shtml>.

<sup>16</sup> For a detailed discussion of this policy shift, see Cheng Li, “Hu’s Policy Shift and the *Tuanpai*’s Coming-of-Age.” *China Leadership Monitor* 15 (summer 2005).

<sup>17</sup> At the recent meeting of the National People’s Congress, the Hu-Wen administration called for a 20 percent reduction per unit of output in energy consumption, a 10 percent reduction in industrial pollution, and a 33 percent reduction in industrial use of water in the next five years.

<sup>18</sup> See <http://www.sina.com.cn>. 10 May 2006.

<sup>19</sup> Those who worked in the lower level of CCYL leadership in the early 1980s or advanced their careers primarily through other political networks are not considered to be *tuanpai* officials. Among the 62 current provincial chiefs, Shanghai’s mayor Han Zheng and Hebei party secretary Bai Keming are usually not seen as *tuanpai* leaders because they are closely associated with the Shanghai Gang or have strong ties with Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong. Qinghai secretary Zhao Leqi and Guizhou secretary Shi Zhongyuan served briefly in local CCYL leadership posts. However, they had no close political association with Hu Jintao and the CCYL Central Committee in the early 1980s; thus they are not considered to be *tuanpai* officials.

<sup>20</sup> According to some sources in Hong Kong and Taiwan, Xinjiang party secretary Zhang Qingli is a nephew of Zhang Wannian, former vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, but this family background has not been verified in Chinese official sources. *Shijie ribao*, 30 May 2006, p. C2.

<sup>21</sup> In their recent study of the multifaceted role of *mishu* in China during the reform era, James Mulvenon and Michael Chase observed that *mishu* often “handle communication and coordination between leaders, and even smooth over personal disputes or policy rifts.” See “The Role of *Mishus* in the Chinese Political System: Change and Continuity.” In David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds. *Chinese Leadership in the Twenty-First Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation*. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 141. For more discussion on the subject, see Cheng Li, “The *Mishu* Phenomenon: Patron-Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics.” *China Leadership Monitor* 4 (fall 2002).

<sup>22</sup> See <http://www.chinesenewsnet.com>. 30 May 2006.

<sup>23</sup> *Renmin ribao*, 14 May 2006, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup> *Diyi caijing ribao* (The first economic and financial daily), 10 May 2006.

<sup>25</sup> See <http://www.sina.com.cn>. 11 April 2006.

<sup>26</sup> For more discussion of this issue, see Cheng Li, “The Status and Characteristics of Foreign-Educated Returnees in the Chinese Leadership.” *China Leadership Monitor* 16 (fall 2005).

<sup>27</sup> Zhang Xinke, “*Hu-Wen xinzheng guanyuan de xitong peixun*” [The systemic training of officials under the Hu-Wen leadership]. *Qianshao* (Front line), October 2005, p. 14.

<sup>28</sup> See <http://www.ccps.gov.cn/dxjj/index.jsp>.

<sup>29</sup> Quoted from the website of China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong, see <http://61.129.65.35/renda/node3284/node3286/userobject1ai39720.html>.

<sup>30</sup> Zhang, “*Hu-Wen xinzheng guanyuan de xitong peixun*,” p. 15.

<sup>31</sup> See <http://www.chinanews.com>. 6 June 2006.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*