Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency

Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath

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While in reality adjusting to an evolving situation both on Taiwan and in cross-Strait relations over the past few months, all parties concerned have sought to portray their approaches as consistent and undisturbed by “some situations” that could have thrown things off course. Whether it was the Mainland recalculating its tactics in the light of the spring “Sunflower Movement” or the DPP putting off reconsideration of its policy toward the Mainland until after the November local elections, everyone seemed to see advantage in staying steady on course and avoiding high-profile adjustments. In the absence of reliable indications of where the DPP was heading in its cross-Strait policy Beijing was careful not to commit itself fully to its future policy toward the DPP. However, not only did the Taiwan Affairs Office dismiss assertions that DPP victories in November would lead Beijing to move in the party’s direction and caution that reliance on the mainstay “1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future” would “not work,” but Xi Jinping personally weighed in forcefully reaffirming that “one country, two systems” is the Mainland’s “basic guiding principle” for resolving the Taiwan question and the “best way” to achieve national reunification.

It seemed obvious that the Mainland was surprised, not by the existence of the attitudes and problems that surfaced in the spring, but by the breadth of support in Taiwan for the student-led “Sunflower” protest movement and by the widespread lack of trust and apparent depth of public anxiety about possibly falling into a PRC reunification trap. As one senior Chinese official put it, problems had arisen in the course of cross-Strait economic exchanges and cooperation that had not been considered or noticed in the past, and Beijing would now pay more attention to the groups that would benefit from such exchanges and cooperation. Hence, at least until Xi’s meeting with a pro-unification group from Taiwan in late September, Beijing wrapped itself even more closely around an approach that turned its back on last fall’s emphasis on unification and focused instead on “listening” to various views on the island and reinforcing the argument that “peaceful development” of cross-Strait ties would yield mutual benefits.

The Ma administration also promoted an image of continuing progress in cross-Strait negotiations, albeit in the context of concern that political obstructionism in the Legislative Yuan (LY) would deprive Taiwan of the fruits of those negotiations and eventually cause it to lose out to competitors in the Mainland market such as South Korea.
Led by its new party chair, Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP continued to duck on issues relating to any change in its cross-Strait policy, reserving its position until after the November local elections. In the meantime, seeking to bolster its position in those elections, the DPP hammered away with its charges of the Ma administration’s inefficiency as well as its lack of competence and inability to inspire trust.

**Zhang Zhijun Comes A-calling**

PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Zhang Zhijun’s visit to Taiwan June 25–28 was the most important cross-Strait event since spring, reciprocating Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) head Wang Yu-chi’s trip to the Mainland in February. While some people criticized Zhang’s timing because it overlapped with consideration by the Legislative Yuan (LY) of controversial cross-Strait issues, there was probably very little choice. His visit had been postponed from spring due to the Sunflower demonstrations, and if it had not been rescheduled soon, the opportunity might have slipped away altogether in the face of Taiwan’s looming November 29 local elections and 2016 presidential and legislative contests.

In his travels around the island, the TAO head stopped in New Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Taichung, where he met with the incumbent mayors (including Kaohsiung’s DPP mayor Chen Chu) as well as with local civic and business groups along the way. The most prominent outcome of the visit seemed to be the “institutionalization” of exchanges at the ministerial level, though substantively there was also agreement to discuss further a number of important pending issues. Raucous demonstrations against Zhang led to a curtailment of his schedule, but in determined fashion he appraised the visit as “successful” despite “some situations” while official PRC media described the visit as “epoch-making.”

Beijing described the Sunflower Movement of March and April and those who demonstrated against Zhang in June as representing a “small minority” who wished to derail cross-Strait relations. Nonetheless, it appears that the degree of public support for the student-led Sunflower Movement and the widespread concern expressed about falling into a PRC unification trap caught the Mainland by surprise. In this context, Zhang’s spokesman acknowledged that “some new circumstances had emerged” (出现了一些新情况). Nonetheless, Beijing sought to portray its policy toward Taiwan as consistent and claimed steady progress in cross-Strait dealings. It asserted that it adhered to “four continuities” and insisted that numerous reports that various negotiations had been suspended were inaccurate. Rather, Beijing asserted, the direction and pace of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations had not changed. Instead of yielding to pessimism, the Mainland reasoned that cooperation was based on mainstream popular sentiment on both sides of the Strait that is supportive of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and during Zhang’s visit the two sides agreed to promote such developments and to “more effectively respond to the expectations of the public on both sides of the Strait”
Though it tended naturally to stress some of Taipei’s own concerns, the Ma administration’s assessment was generally upbeat as well. Still, it was clear that the MAC felt it needed to proceed prudently in ongoing negotiations so as not to create misunderstandings and suspicions among the Taiwan public.

Certain specific issues of importance were addressed but not resolved during Zhang’s visit. On the long-pending issue of reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices, even though the key obstacle of “humanitarian visits” had ostensibly been resolved, the most Zhang would say about it was that “On the basis of making reasonable arrangements for the issue of visitations, the two sides will resolve other remaining problems pragmatically and properly and complete their consultations as soon as possible.” In August, senior MAC officials described those “remaining problems” as “technical but politically sensitive.” But by late September, Taiwan officials were saying that what was really holding things up was PRC unease about the stalemate over adoption of an LY oversight bill. It is worth noting, however, yet further delay is possible even after the oversight bill is passed, as DPP officials have been signaling plans to raise specific concerns with aspects of the office exchange agreement once it comes to the LY for approval.

In a meeting with Taiwan scholars, Zhang was also pressed on an issue that has been raised many times by both the Taipei government and the opposition, namely, why the PRC does not recognize the “reality” of the ROC’s existence. He deflected the question by saying that Taiwan was not willing to engage in political negotiations, thus leaving several issues unresolved and conveying the impression that political talks would lead to a change in Beijing’s position on at least some of those issues. That said, recognizing the existence of the ROC hardly seemed likely to be one of them.

Though the task for now is to implement the studies and other measures agreed upon, and he indicated that he has no plan to visit Taiwan again anytime soon, Zhang insisted, “it definitely won’t be my last visit.” Meanwhile, there were mixed signals regarding whether Wang Yu-chi would join Taiwan’s APEC leaders meeting delegation in Beijing in November. When the idea first emerged in the press, it appeared such a meeting would be feasible, but later reports indicated Beijing had vetoed Wang’s inclusion in the Taiwan delegation. A month before the APEC meeting was to convene the issue was still unresolved.

**Negotiations Resume, but Prospects Remain Clouded**

While both governments argued that negotiations were moving ahead in various channels, the fact remained that the cross-Strait services trade agreement (TiSA) remained stuck in the legislature pending approval of an LY oversight bill, which also was not making progress. As if to rebut the reports that various talks were in limbo due to the LY stalemate, a new round of commodities talks was held in Taiwan in mid-September after an almost 11-month hiatus. But with indications from the Taiwan side ahead of time that they faced a “very, very big gap,” it is not surprising that little progress was made. The two sides talked about the sectors that concerned each the most, but also apparently came away realizing that they needed to learn more about each
other’s industrial and product structure, a task characterized by the chief Taiwan negotiator as “time-consuming.” Moreover, even if that very complicated negotiation on the handling of thousands of items is concluded soon (and though Taiwan is seeking early signature on the agreement, estimates put conclusion likely into 2015 rather than the original end-of-year target date), it is unclear how that agreement could jump the queue ahead of the oversight bill or, whenever it comes up for LY consideration, how it will fare.

Having learned from the TiSA experience, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs undertook an initiative to promote public understanding of the benefits of the proposed agreement, even promising daily updates of negotiations as they are held.

Meanwhile, Taipei hinted it would try to overcome the challenge posed by the projected early approval of a PRC-ROK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) not by speeding up Taiwan’s own negotiating calendar, but by seeking even more favorable PRC tariff treatment for Taiwan than is being given to Korea.

Relatedly, in seeming recognition that Taipei could not speed up the TiSA ratification process in the LY (or the merchandise trade negotiations), after what seemed to some people to be an effort by the Mainland to squeeze Taipei into acting faster by arguing Taiwan could lose market share if an FTA with South Korea were signed before the LY acted, Beijing backed away from that line of argument. While continuing to state that the “ball” was in Taiwan’s court regarding the merchandise trade pact, Beijing replaced its warnings about the dire consequences of delay with reassurances that Taiwan would always hold a favored position. Indeed, CCP Standing Committee Member and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Yu Zhengsheng, who had raised the issue of Taiwan losing out, now stressed that the Mainland was willing to let “Taiwan compatriots” be the first to share the opportunities opened up by the PRC’s development. He observed that the Mainland has always created active conditions for cooperation among companies on both sides and that this cooperation policy would not change. In addition, although Beijing’s chief cross-Strait negotiator said PRC-ROK negotiations were going smoothly and were already 90 percent complete, reports on the latest round of talks suggested tough going, so the point may be moot. In any case, even if the Beijing-Seoul pact is completed in the near future, Yu Zhengsheng tried to reassure Taiwan visitors that China and South Korea would reduce tariffs only gradually to mitigate its impact on the Mainland’s own economy, and that therefore “this would not go so far as to have a disastrous effect” on Taiwan exports.

Nonetheless, even though the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Investment Commission predicted that the annual total of PRC investment in Taiwan in 2014 would approximate the 2013 total, uncertainty in the LY situation and with regard to the upcoming elections seemed to be the culprit in an over 25 percent drop in Mainland investment in Taiwan during the first eight months of the year.
Hinting at some flexibility in the legislature to get things moving, for his part Ma said in late August that he was looking forward to negotiations with the opposition in the LY to push forward the legislative review of the TiSA when the new LY session began in September. What this meant was not clear, and a month into the new session there is no sign of a breakthrough. While DPP chair Tsai Ing-wen sought to lay responsibility for the LY delay at Ma’s feet, primarily due to his “political warfare” against LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng since last September, Ma countercharged that the delay was due to DPP obstructionism, challenging the opposition to explain how the largest opposition party could expect to earn people’s confidence if it did not know how to deal with cross-Strait affairs properly.

Despite the LY situation, the administration was looking for other ways to proceed with cross-Strait activities. It reportedly was giving consideration to breaking out cross-Strait banking sector cooperation from the services trade pact to enable Taiwan banks to operate more freely on the Mainland in the near term, assuming that Beijing agreed.

Other cross-Strait activities were also proceeding. These included a visit to Taiwan in late August by a TAO deputy director who met with a large number of fishermen and their representatives to talk about how to maintain stability in the price of fish exported to the Mainland as well as a potential plan to jointly establish a large seafood factory. (If these efforts succeed, it would be the first time the two sides will have cooperated in fishery operations.)

In terms of how to approach Taiwan’s aspirations for participation in various regional groupings—with a special focus on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Transpacific Partnership (TPP)—the way ahead is unclear. So far Beijing has maintained that the ECFA agenda must be finished first. On the other hand, the potential for some adjustment was seen by some in the fact that it was agreed during Zhang Zhijun’s visit to Taiwan that the two sides would conduct a “joint study” on the matter.

That said, the two sides interpreted the “joint study” agreement differently. As described by Mainland officials, this study was to address appropriate approaches and feasible ways to link cross-Strait cooperation and development to the process of regional economic cooperation. However, a Mainland Affairs Council vice minister said that the “so-called ‘joint study’ merely meant that the two sides could discuss the issues concerning cross-Strait economic cooperation and participation in regional economic organizations if the PRC were a member of such an organization, as it is in RCEP; it “absolutely” did not mean that Taiwan must conduct a joint study with the Mainland before joining regional economic integration. In any case, when asked about the state of play, Taiwan officials reported in mid-August that the TAO had offered no specific work plan and was still doing some research about how the Mainland would approach the study. In mid-October a Mainland official confirmed that the joint study had not yet begun.
**Political Issues**

Although Wang Yu-chi verified reports that Zhang had proposed political talks during his visit to Taiwan (and in a major article in early fall Zhang referred once again to Xi Jinping’s admonition from a year ago that political differences could not be allowed to be passed on from generation to generation), no doubt even without such talks the PRC will continue its efforts to win hearts and minds. How it will do that is still a work in progress. To some extent the Mainland may have reverted to the view that people in Taiwan really only care about their pocketbooks and Beijing seems to have discounted any significant benefit from greater flexibility on such issues as international space.

Moreover, although in the view of some seasoned observers Xi is more open-minded than Hu, there were instances of retrograde and ham-fisted PRC behavior that reinforced Beijing’s image of small-mindedness. A prominent example was seen at the meeting in Portugal of the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS), where the Mainland delegation sought to virtually erase the role of a prominent Taiwan foundation that had been a longtime participant in EASC activities.

On a more positive note, in August the PRC’s Maritime Search and Rescue Center and Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration carried out a joint search and rescue drill near Matsu Island, the third time they have done this and plans were announced soon after for another such joint exercise in 2016. Still, Taipei continued to resist Beijing’s efforts to make common cause on more political maritime issues such as sovereignty questions in the South China Sea.

All of this was largely overwhelmed by Xi’s statement to a visiting pro-unification delegation from Taiwan that “peaceful reunification, one country, two systems’ is the Mainland’s guiding principle for resolving the Taiwan question and the best way to achieve national reunification” (“和平统一、一国两制”是我们解决台湾问题的基本方针，我们认为，这也是实现国家统一的最佳方式). This formulation has consistently been rejected across the political spectrum in Taiwan, and although Xi sought to soften the point by saying that the Mainland would take into account Taiwan’s history and circumstances—and perhaps in time one might learn what he has in mind—it had no impact on the negative reaction to his statement in Taiwan. If anything, his resurrection of the linkage stressed last fall between peaceful development and peaceful reunification only intensified the reaction. Finally, the turmoil that almost immediately afterward broke out in Hong Kong over implementation there of “one country, two systems” only served to drive yet another nail into the coffin of the that approach in the minds of people in Taiwan.

Even before the recent demonstrations in Hong Kong, the attitudes of people in Taiwan were reinforced by the PRC State Council White Paper on the practice of “one country, two systems” in the former British colony. That paper sternly reminded readers that China’s central government asserts comprehensive jurisdiction over all local administrative regions and that there is no such thing as “residual power.”
And as if to make sure no one missed the relevance of Beijing’s attitude regarding center-local relations to cross-Strait relations, the day after the White Paper was issued, in a response to Tainan Mayor William Lai Ching-teh’s argument to a Shanghai audience that Taiwan’s future must be decided by Taiwan’s people, the TAO reiterated the Mainland’s long-standing position that the island’s future must be decided by “all the people” of China, “including” the people of Taiwan. Predictably this statement met with a universally hostile response in Taiwan. 

Still, Beijing did make various efforts to improve its understanding of Taiwan and its image there. In addition to Zhang Zhijun’s visit, other senior visitors pursued agendas guided by the new emphasis on better understanding the thoughts and sentiments of the “three middles and one young” (三中一青), i.e., the grassroots in Taiwan, including small and medium enterprises, the middle and lower classes, the common people in central and southern Taiwan, and the youth. This was an important focus of ARATS Vice President Sun Yafu’s agenda when he traveled to Taiwan in mid-June, where his agenda included conversations with Taiwan independence advocates Koo Kuan-min and Wu Rong-yi at the Taiwan Brain Trust. In that exchange, Sun pushed hard on the PRC’s commitment to promoting cross-Strait peaceful development and continuing to adopt effective measures to advance cross-Strait interactions.

Although he predicted that deeper problems were inevitable and stressed, therefore, the necessity that people on both sides “give each other more understanding, respect and consideration from the perspective of one family,” Yu Zhengsheng adopted a similar line. Yu reaffirmed the concept of putting people first as well as seeking benefits for them as the starting point and foundation of Taiwan policy.

The possibility of a summit meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping at the APEC leaders meeting in Beijing in November was finally put to bed with Ma’s appointment of former Vice President Vincent Siew to represent him. But the question of such a meeting at a different venue continued to attract attention. In part this was because Ma had on several occasions expressed his interest in a meeting with Xi, frequently reiterating, “we will not give up [on holding a summit] if given a chance, but we will not push for it if conditions are not ripe.” Such a meeting would help lay an important foundation for future cross-Strait dealings, he has argued.

The PRC’s interest in a Xi-Ma meeting has also been evident in stories about possible “creative” approaches by Beijing regarding venue even going beyond the “conventional” idea of a meeting in Singapore.

In light of all of this, rumors continued to circulate about the possibility that quiet cross-Strait discussions of the issue were going on at some level. But no obvious solutions to the questions of venue, titles, and agenda were evident, while public opinion in Taiwan seemed to be cooling on the idea.
The DPP, unsurprisingly, voiced concern over a secret deal for a Ma-Xi meeting designed to advance Ma’s political agenda and demanded a full public accounting.\(^{71}\) DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen called on the Ma administration to allow the LY to oversee the process of arranging such a meeting as well as to allow the public to follow the discussions and negotiations that would take place during such a meeting.\(^{72}\)

To what extent this issue will get tied up with the ouster of the deputy head of MAC and SEF, Chang Hsien-yao, based on possible charges of leaking information to Beijing—or even spying on behalf of the PRC—remains to be seen. At this writing, as voices in Taiwan, primarily from the DPP, are calling for a suspension of all negotiations with the Mainland and a review of agreements already reached, both the Ma administration and the PRC have sought to downplay the significance of the Chang case. Beijing declined to comment on the matter at all for over three weeks other than asking for clarification from the MAC about what was going on and how it would affect future interactions\(^{73}\) while also expressing the hope that the Taiwan media would not make “irresponsible and unfounded” conjecture on the issue.\(^{74}\) TAO head Zhang Zhijun finally did make a minimal statement in early September, saying he hoped that cross-Strait peaceful developments would not stagnate over a “recent isolated case.”\(^{75}\) In any case, while this matter has severely roiled the waters in Taiwan in recent weeks, we are not going to try either to detail the controversy here or speculate on its implications. Presumably we will have greater clarity on the matter by the time of the next CLM essay.

**DPP Goes on the Offensive against Ma, Ducks on Cross-Strait Policy**

In her resumed role as DPP chair, spearheading the local election campaign for late November, Tsai Ing-wen has engaged in a relentless attack on the Ma administration’s capabilities and performance. At the party’s national congress in late July she proclaimed: “The time for change has arrived…This year, 2014, will be the year when change comes to Taiwan…The 2014 elections will mark the beginning of the transformation of Taiwan’s politics.”\(^{76}\)

But despite the intensity of the campaign, and the advantage that DPP or DPP-backed candidates seem to enjoy in specific local constituencies in the run-up to the November municipal election, polls did not immediately reflect a major shift in overall public attitudes, and some media commentators cautioned against any assumptions about a major shift in power.\(^{77}\)

In the course of the discussion, Tsai continued to deflect consideration of the party’s cross-Strait policy until a more propitious moment, presumably after the November elections and perhaps even further until after, as she clearly hopes, she locks up the DPP presidential nomination.

In that regard, although the issue of “freezing” the DPP 1991 “Taiwan independence” plank is the subject of sharply disparate views within the party at this point, which is one reason Tsai wants to put off addressing it,\(^{78}\) it is the most likely area where the party might in due course show some flexibility. This is especially so since a strong majority of
the public seems to support the idea. However, despite her overall approach of pragmatism toward relations across the Strait, of which an eventual “freeze” could be a part, Tsai’s expressed confidence that the Mainland would “shift in the direction” of the DPP if it won a substantial victory in November was rebuffed by Beijing both publicly and privately.

Publicly, a TAO spokesman responded to Tsai’s statement with familiar formulas that there would not be the slightest compromise in opposition to Taiwan independence “splittist” plots. Privately one senior official asked rhetorically what basis there might be for Tsai’s statement about a PRC shift.

In the wake of the party’s non-action on the freeze proposal at its July 20 national congress, the TAO spokesman went further. Addressing the familiar Mainland requirement that the DPP has to give up its “Taiwan independence” advocacy of “one country on each side” [of the Strait], he observed that even if the 1991 plank were frozen and the party tried to base cross-Strait relations instead on the 1999 Kaohsiung Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, “that would not work” (行不通). Although the logic of this rebuff is not new, Beijing rarely if ever has been that direct in rejecting the 1999 resolution before.

The Mainland seems genuinely to be asking itself whether the DPP is holding to its cross-Strait line simply as part of its effort to resume office or instead is seeking to position things to eventually achieve Taiwan independence. Whatever judgment people might make, all of this led one senior Mainland expert on Taiwan to argue that the DPP remains the biggest obstacle to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. He cited the party’s obstructionism in the legislature and its position on Taiwan independence as still being a “real threat” (現實威脅). He also said that if Tsai Ing-wen does not intend, or is not able, to adjust the party’s Mainland policy, then the Mainland “should not harbor any illusions about the DPP” (不應該對民進黨抱有幻想). Freezing the Taiwan independence plank would be an important indicator regarding reconciliation between the DPP and CCP, he said, but it would not be the only indicator. In a judgment reminiscent of how Beijing approached Chen Shui-bian when he was first elected, this expert said that the CCP will not only listen to what the DPP says but, “more important”, it will watch what it does.

While there have been obvious signs of different points of emphasis and even discontent within the DPP, most senior DPP stalwarts have stood by Tsai’s approach. When Tainan Mayor Lai visited the Mainland for the first time in early June, he generally echoed Tsai’s positions. Arguing for greater cross-Strait cooperation rather than confrontation, Lai pointed out to his Mainland interlocutors that the call for independence preceded the DPP’s formation and that altering the DPP’s 1991 “independence party platform” would not help reconcile differences. Rather, he argued, the pro-independence narrative represents the idea of many in Taiwan and further understanding about the spirit of the platform is needed on the PRC’s part if it wishes to forge stronger ties between the sides. At the same time, Lai reiterated a position adopted
by the party some years ago, that while the DPP advocates independence for Taiwan it would respect the decision of the people of Taiwan with regard to Taiwan’s future.\textsuperscript{91}

The TAO responded to Lai stating, “we welcome all Taiwan compatriots equally no matter what he or she advocated in the past, as long as he or she currently favors, supports and participates in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.”\textsuperscript{92} But, the spokeswoman reiterated, the Mainland’s opposition to the “Taiwan independence separatist conspiracy” is clear, consistent, firm, and unshakable.

On the other hand, after his return to Tainan, Lai also urged moderation within the party, saying that if DPP members insist on focusing on tensions between the two sides, the party could find it difficult to make headway in cross-Strait ties.\textsuperscript{93} Moreover, DPP gadfly Julian Kuo Cheng-liang pointed out that DPP local officials such as Lai and Chen Chu had a different stand from Tsai Ing-wen with respect to such issues as Free Economic Pilot Zones (FEPZs). The mayors, he explained, were by and large receptive to the FEPZ program, whereas Tsai publicly opposed it.\textsuperscript{94}

In general, Tsai and the DPP took a position that welcomed cross-Strait exchanges, but “without preconditions.”\textsuperscript{95} She told a foreign audience in Taipei that the party’s engagement with the Mainland “will be consistent, responsible, and predictable” (將會是具一致性、負責任、可預測的).\textsuperscript{96} Since it is well known that the PRC will deal with individual DPP leaders but not with the party unless it embraces “one China” and abandons “Taiwan independence,” the call for “no preconditions” and the effort to project a position of reasonableness without accepting some form of “one China” would seem to fall rather short of what Beijing is calling for.

Overall, of course, however the party eventually positions itself on cross-Strait policy (which we will talk about more in future essays), the DPP has tried to treat that policy as “just one of” the major issues facing Taiwan.\textsuperscript{97} That said, when Tsai has criticized Ma for overemphasizing ties with the Mainland as opposed to diversifying Taiwan’s economic relations with the region (a widely endorsed goal), she appears to have put principled considerations ahead of practical ones. That is to say, voters might respond to the DPP’s criticism of the Ma administration’s domestic economic policies and performance as well as aspects of various cross-Strait agreements negotiated in recent years. However, while Tsai’s argument that cross-Strait relations must be “synchronized with Taiwan’s integration into regional economic activity” (同步融入區域經濟的整合), including TPP, RCEP, and bilateral trade accords,\textsuperscript{98} may be reasonable in theory and desirable as a matter of policy, in practice it would seem to give short shrift to a critical reality: Beijing has a potentially very large role in determining whether any of those efforts at diversification will succeed. One example of where Beijing has demonstrated its willingness to throw its weight around in this regard was the recent public statement by the PRC ambassador to Malaysia directly opposing a Malaysia-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA).\textsuperscript{99} Moreover, Taiwan’s economic affairs minister indicated quite recently that the Mainland has obstructed economic and trade talks with more than one partner who earlier had been willing to proceed.\textsuperscript{100}
The Ma administration has, of course, also sought to promote market diversification and it has adopted the position that it need not—and cannot—depend only on Beijing’s agreement. Further, it has argued, along with the DPP, that it is critical for the United States, Japan, and others to support Taiwan’s participation in international arrangements. Indeed, on substantive grounds there is every reason to maintain that when Taiwan qualifies, Washington, Tokyo, and others should express their backing in order to help create a positive international climate.

Nonetheless, while the Ma administration does not accept that Taiwan needs the PRC’s “consent” to sign agreements, in acknowledging that one of the most important reasons to complete the ECFA agenda is to gain Beijing’s support for broader Taiwan economic and trade diversification, it has implicitly recognized the reality of Beijing’s sway over many of Taiwan’s trading partners.

Meanwhile, although Taiwan’s economy is growing reasonably well (most predictions for 2014 GDP growth now center somewhere around 3.5 percent or even higher) and unemployment has dipped slightly below 4 percent, public opinion remains generally downbeat about the economy as well as much else. With the local elections only weeks away, one might normally assume this negative attitude would redound to the benefit of the “out-of-power” party. In fact, however, as suggested earlier, recent polling shows a general dissatisfaction with both major parties. As a result, party identification according to two major polls is pretty even. While that parity represents a slide over time for the KMT and the Blue camp, the fact is that the DPP and the Green camp have not substantially benefited.

Some relatively short-term factors could enter in to tilt the election decisively in one direction or another, as the Taiwan electorate has been known to shift suddenly in response to major events. But that is not true of all events, even major ones. As an example of the latter, while the tragic gas explosion in Kaohsiung at the end of July resulted in a lot of finger pointing regarding who was responsible, and while it will hopefully lead to some reforms with respect to laying and monitoring of pipelines in the future, it is unlikely to have a major impact on either the Kaohsiung mayoral election or the broader the political scene.

Perhaps more fundamental is a question of who can attract the youth vote. Both sides are working hard to corral it, and both may succeed to some extent. But the leaders of the Sunflower Movement, while obviously opposed to the Ma administration, have also expressed dissatisfaction with the DPP. So, while the effort to woo young people might matter in terms of political participation in the long run, whether it will have a short-term impact is not obvious.

Notes

1 Wang Zongming, “Sun Yafu delivers a speech in Taipei: peaceful development will not be interrupted” (孫亞夫臺北演講：和平發展不能中斷), China Review News, August 7, 2014,
As translated by Open Source Center (OSC, CHO2014070142396130), the items of consensus reached between the two sides included: Continue to deepen cross-Strait economic cooperation and promote the ECFA’s followup negotiation process and initiate joint study work as soon as possible; discuss in a pragmatic manner proper methods and feasible ways on the convergence between cross-Strait common development and regional economic cooperation process; make continued consultations on mutual setting up of representative offices between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation; pragmatically and properly resolve other leftover problems and complete consultations at an early date on the basis of making reasonable arrangements for visitation problems; continue to push for the study and resolution of mainland tourists’ transit problem in Taiwan and of facilitating the exchange of visits between the compatriots on the two sides of the Strait; support relevant authorities of the two sides of the Strait to conduct timely communication through proper channels; continue to jointly cultivate the cross-Strait tourism market, strive to maintain tourism quality and promote the healthy, orderly, and sustainable development of cross-Strait tourism; support relevant authorities on the two sides of the Strait to appropriately expand non-group tours of mainland citizens to Taiwan; continue to expand and deepen exchanges and cooperation in culture, education, science and technology between the two sides of the Strait; promote exchanges in news media between the two sides of the Strait; vigorously support and carry out exchanges of visits between grassroots people and between youths and students between the two sides of the Strait.

In the next step, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council will continue to maintain communication and contact, and gradually push for implementation of the agreed items through appropriate channels.


The “four continuities” were: 1) The Mainland will continue to push forward cross-Strait economic interactions and cooperation; 2) The Mainland will continue to promote healthy and orderly development of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan; 3) The Mainland will continue comprehensive interactions with the grassroots in Taiwan; and 4) The Mainland will continue to provide facilities for cross-Strait interactions and exchanges of personnel. (“Sun Yafu: Xi Could Come to Taiwan First,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], June 16, 2014, http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14669.)


Private conversations.


Private conversation.

Ch’ou P’ei-fen, “With the failure to pass the oversight bill, the reciprocal establishment of offices is stuck” (民主監督條例不過卡死互設辦事機構), Storm Media, September 25, 2014, http://www.stormmediagroup.com/opencms/investigate/detail/5ef743fe-43fc-11e4-88c5-ef2804c85a1/?uuid=5ef743fe-43fc-11e4-88c5-ef2804c85a1.

Private conversation.


During his visit to the United States in September, Zhang explained the three principal tasks in the coming phase of the Mainland’s Taiwan work. The first, he said, was to continue efforts to strengthen and consolidate mutual political trust across the Strait and to make sure that the momentum of peaceful development was not interfered with or disrupted. Second, the Mainland would continue to promote cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation to make sure that people benefit from peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and develop an even more solid foundation and powerful driving force for peaceful development. That would include followup talks on the ECFA agenda, allowing Mainland travelers to transit through Taiwan en route to other destinations, the exchange of representative offices, and a “joint study by the two sides on connecting simultaneous economic development across the Strait to Taiwan’s participation in regional integration” (共同研究兩岸經濟共同發展和台灣參與區域經濟整合相銜接). Third, the Mainland would
continue to fight against “Taiwan independence” and to eliminate the “negative factors” (消极因素) that disrupt peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and exchanges and cooperation. (“Zhang Zhijun talks about his visit to the United States: strengthen mutual trust in peaceful development of cross-Strait relations” (张志军访美之行：增强对两岸关系和平发展信心), China Review News, September 7, 2014, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201409/t20140907_7247662.htm.)

It was later reported that Zhang had said that while the Mainland would study the possibility of allowing PRC travelers to transit Taiwan en route to third destinations, because this would require passport examination and hence constitute a “political issue,” for the sake of equity Taiwan should abolish Taiwan Strait mid-line restrictions. The MAC responded that allowing transit stops is a practice of ordinary air transport and travelers would not “enter” Taiwan, implicitly rejecting Zhang’s demand. (Lan Hsiao-wei, “In order for Mainland travelers to change planes [in Taiwan], Taiwan must revoke the Taiwan Strait mid-line” [陸客中轉 台須開放海峽中線], China Times, September 9, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140909000388-260108.)


24 Yang Wen-chi and Lin An-ni, “Mainland suspends all negotiations; President’s Office and the government seek remedy” (兩岸各項協商中斷 府院谋求補救), Economic Daily, June 9, 2014, accessed June 9 at http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT4/8728131.shtml?ch=rss_endpopular, currently available at http://www.fyjs.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=1053561. According to this article, the negotiations that were suspended included the commodities trade agreement and an agreement on a dispute resolution mechanism (both ECFA follow-on accords), plus agreements on airline schedules, sightseeing, sea transportation and postal services.


26 Milly Lin and Lilian Wu, “Taiwan, China conclude latest round of trade talks,” CNA, September 12, 2014, http://focus taiwan.tw/news/aeco/201409120030.aspx. According to Taiwan’s chief negotiator, Yang Jen-ni, director-general of the Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan’s concerns focused on the four key sectors of autos, petrochemicals, flat panels,
and machine tools, while the PRC was more concerned about “old economy sectors” such as textiles, garments, and shoes.

It was also reported that the Mainland demanded that Taiwan open its market to 830 kinds of agricultural products and primary industrial goods, whereas the Taiwan negotiators said they would continue to give priority to Taiwan’s agricultural development and the interests of Taiwan farmers. While they said that they would therefore continue to ban Chinese agricultural products that may have food safety concerns or affect Taiwan farmers’ interests, it was unclear whether Taiwan would allow an increase of certain agricultural products on an ad hoc basis. (Liu Li-shan, “Tariff reductions on the four big industrial products in the commodities trade talks will be discussed again next time” (貿易談判四大產業降稅 下回再議), UDN, September 12, 2014, http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN5/8930839.shtml.)

In any event, a PRC commerce ministry spokesman concluded after the latest round of talks that whether the commodities trade agreement could be completed before the PRC-ROK FTA would be determined by the willingness of what he called “high-echelon officials” on both sides of the Strait to make concessions and to open their markets on “an equal footing.” (“Mainland official: Disparity in market liberalization stalls cross-Strait MTA,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], September 17, 2014, http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=15144.)

32 “Yu Zhengsheng on STA: Mainland has to move on,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), July 8, 2014, http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14786. According to this account, Yu brought up the services trade agreement (TiSA) with a visiting Taiwan General Chamber of Commerce delegation, implicitly pointing to the pending PRC FTA with South Korea and arguing that the Mainland would not deliberately delay concluding various “other” bilateral trade accords and agreements while waiting for Taiwan to ratify the TiSA. As he put it, China “cannot move too slowly.” In this same timeframe, PRC Vice Minister of Commerce Gao Yan was quoted as saying that it would be “a pity” if PRC-ROK agreement came first and Taiwan lost its edge and started to lag behind. (John Liu, “Taiwan trade talks still on table: MOC vice minister,” China Post, July 9, 2014, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2014/07/09/411959/Taiwan-trade.htm.)

According to some estimates, a PRC-ROK FTA could affect as much as 20 or 25 percent of Taiwan’s exports to the Mainland, resulting in a loss of 5 percent of its market


46 Private conversation.

47 Private conversation.

“Striving to advance the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations is an unstoppable historic trend—studying the important remarks of General Secretary Xi Jinping regarding work related to Taiwan” (努力推动两岸关系和平发展成为不可阻挡的历史潮流—学习习近平总书记关于对台工作 的重要论述) Qiu Shi, September 12, 2014, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014-09/11/c_1112445496.htm.

Rita Cheng and Elizabeth Hsu, “Zhang describes his Taiwan trip as ‘a successful visit.’” Zhang was cited as having told visiting Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin in Beijing after the TAO chief’s return to the Mainland that he sensed most people in Taiwan at the grassroots do not like talking politics but care more about economic problems, so future development of cross-Strait ties should concentrate on economic issues and practical people-to-people exchanges.


The essence of the matter is that a senior (vice minister-level) PRC official disrupted the meeting of the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) in Portugal in July by seeking the removal material relating to long-time sponsor of the event the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation and of references to an exhibition and donation of books by the Taiwan National Central Library. The President of EACS posted a letter of protest following the event that read in part:

“Under no circumstances will the EACS ever bow to demands to censor the contents of conference materials that its members have themselves funded, in this case its Conference Programme, by, for example, altering the text provided by its long-term sponsor the CCKF, or by deleting mention of the exhibition and donation of books by the Taiwan National Central Library, or by the deletion of any other information that conference organizers deem relevant to include.


A detailed report of the incident was also posted on the EACS website at http://www.chinesestudies.eu/index.php/432-test.


Chang Kuo-wei, “Foreign ministry rules out cross-Strait cooperation in territorial claims in the South China Sea” (聲索南海 外交部稱兩岸不會合作), China Times, September


To get the full flavor of this point, and its likely impact in Taiwan, it is worth reviewing in full the point made in the White Paper:

**Fully and Accurately Understanding the Meaning of “One Country, Two Systems”**

“One country, two systems” is a holistic concept. The “one country” means that within the PRC, HKSAR is an inseparable part and a local administrative region directly under China’s Central People’s Government. As a unitary state, China’s central government has comprehensive jurisdiction over all local administrative regions, including the HKSAR. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorization by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power. It is the power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is subject to the level of the central leadership’s authorization. There is no such thing called “residual power.” With China’s Constitution stipulating in clear-cut terms that the country follows a fundamental system of socialism, the basic system, core leadership and guiding thought of the “one country” have been explicitly provided for. The most important thing to do in upholding the “one country” principle is to maintain China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and respect the country’s fundamental system and other systems and principles.

The “two systems” means that, within the “one country” the main body of the country practices socialism, while Hong Kong and some other regions practice capitalism. The “one country” is the premise and basis of the “two systems,” and the “two systems” is subordinate to and derived from “one country.” But the “two systems” under the “one country” are not on a par with each other. The fact that the mainland, the main body of the country, embraces socialism will not change. With that as the premise, and taking into account the history of Hong Kong and some other regions, capitalism is allowed to stay on a long-term basis. Therefore, a
socialist system by the mainland is the prerequisite and guarantee for Hong Kong’s practicing capitalism and maintaining its stability and prosperity. For Hong Kong to retain its capitalist system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy with “Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong” according to the Basic Law, it must fully respect the socialist system practiced on the mainland in keeping with the “one country” principle and, in particular, the political system and other systems and principles in practice. The mainland should respect and tolerate the capitalism embraced by Hong Kong while upholding its socialist system, and draw on the successful experience of Hong Kong in economic development and social management. Only by respecting and learning from each other can the “two systems” in the “one country” coexist harmoniously and achieve common development.


The reaction in Taiwan was predictably fierce across the political spectrum. The Mainland Affairs Council issued a statement: “We will insist that the developments concerning Taiwan’s future and cross-Strait relations should be determined by Taiwan’s 23 million people, as ordained by the structure of the Constitution of the Republic of China. This is the consensus reached in Taiwan.” (Katherine Wei, “Taiwan’s future to be decided by its people: MAC,” China Post, June 12, 2014, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relationships/2014/06/12/409959/Taiwans-future.htm.)

As one KMT legislator put it, “Every time the (Taiwan Affairs Office) issues a statement, it becomes more difficult for lawmakers here to review legislation. I implore [TAO officials] to keep their mouths shut.” ((國台辦)每一次再發一次言，我們立法院要審法案就會更難，所以請他們先閉嘴吧”) (“Chinese official’s comment on Taiwan sovereignty rankles Taiwanese politicians,” Formosa Television News [FTVN], June 11, 2014, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sn=91B06425B040CD7713D15771170DB017.)

ARATS Vice President Sun Yafu responded to that criticism during a visit to Taiwan shortly thereafter that “it isn’t a matter of agreeing or not agreeing, that is our view” (「這是我們的看法」「不是認同不認同的問題」). (Chou Yi-ling, “Sun Yafu is low-key in speaking of Taiwan’s future” [台灣前途說 孫亞夫低調], CNA [domestic], June 12, 2014, http://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/201406120275-1.aspx.)


   Afterward, Koo Kuan-min said that while Zhang should be treated as a guest, the Mainland’s attitudes are unacceptable. He reported that he had told Sun Yafu, “If China’s basic attitude does not change, then having ten people like Zhang Zhijun visit will do no good.” (“Koo Kwan-min: Making nice with Zhang Zhijun is not enough,” Taiwan News Online, June 30, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2516709.)


67 In his late-June interview with Wealth magazine, Ma laid out at somewhat greater length than usual his rationale for pursuing such a meeting (assuming conditions could be agreed). He said, “Mainland China is our No. 1 trade partner, our No. 1 region of business investment and the source of our highest trade deficit. We have more than 8 million people visiting back and forth between Taiwan and China. Under such conditions, it should be natural for the leaders of the two regions to meet, and such a meeting is not something that should not happen…It is especially important for some key concepts and principles, such as the ‘1992 consensus’ and ‘one China, with different interpretations.’ We should stabilize these concepts in a high-level summit meeting, so that it can become a ‘highly stable framework.’ This would be good for both Taiwan and mainland China.” He reiterated, however, that meeting at APEC “is our only plan” though adding, “but we cannot force the issue.”(Tzou Jiing-wen and Jason Pan, “Meeting with Xi to lay foundation: Ma,” Taipei Times, June 20, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/06/20/2003593195.)

68 Tsai Hui-chen, “Xi Jinping’s suggestion to meet Ma in Kinmen fails to become a reality, Yu Zhengsheng pinch hits” (習近平提議到金門會馬破局 俞正聲代打), Storm Media, June 23, 2014, http://www.stormmediagroup.com/opencms/investigate/detail/5204d2a6-f77c-11e3-b79d-ef2804cba5a1/?uuid=5204d2a6-f77c-11e3-b79d-ef2804cba5a1.

69 In a mid-September interview, former TAO Deputy Director Wang Zaixi laid out a very ambitious set of goals for a Ma-Xi meeting. He observed that settling cross-Strait political differences would be an important goal, and in this vein, he said, officially ending the state of hostilities was one objective. For this, Wang went on, it was very important to establish military mutual trust mechanisms. He also talked of coming to a common understanding on opposing Taiwan independence as well as “jointly safeguarding the territorial integrity of the motherland” (共同捍衛祖國領土完整), all of which could be written into a peace accord. Signing such an accord might not mean
achieving unification, but it would establish that the two sides are of one family, Wang said. (Lin Yan, “Wang Zaixi talks with China Review News: Cross-Strait relations cannot be reversed” [王在希語中評：兩岸關係不會逆轉], China Review News, September 17, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=93&kindid=10095&docid=103387172.) While one can see the benefit of such a set of goals from Beijing’s perspective, the very ambitiousness of the proposal makes it virtually impossible for Taiwan.

A poll conducted in late June asked respondents if they supported a meeting between Ma and Xi before Ma’s term ends in 2016. The result was that 54.4 percent opposed it, 26.5 percent said it was necessary and 19.1 percent gave no answer. A similar poll in August last year had found that 43.2 percent supported such a meeting, while 36 percent disapproved of it.

Asked what issues should be raised if the meeting took place, “Taiwan’s future should be decided by its 23 million people” ranked first among the responses at 77.1 percent. It was followed by “respect for the ‘status quo’ of the Republic of China (ROC)” at 73.7 percent, non-interference in Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and activities at 73.5 percent, renouncing the use of force against Taiwan at 72 percent, and a bilateral peace agreement at 65.3 percent. (Chris Wang, “Support for Ma and Xi meeting plummets: poll,” Taipei Times, July 1, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/07/01/2003594089. The original polling data from TISR are at “Public opinion poll press release, Survey of trends in Taiwan public opinion on two sides, two government and freezing the Taiwan independence plank” [台灣民心動態調查、兩岸兩府與凍獨政策民調 新聞稿], June 30, 2014, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/files/archive/224_af5cee95.pdf.)

A poll by TISR later in the summer revealed that respondents had mixed views about Ma’s reasons for wanting to go to the APEC leaders meeting in Beijing in November and to meet with Xi Jinping. 21.4 percent thought it was to secure Ma’s personal place in history; 25.5 percent thought it was to obtain benefits for Taiwan; 15.5 percent thought it was to begin cross-Strait political talks; 18.2 percent saw it as aimed at moving toward unification with the Mainland; and 19.2 percent didn’t know or had no response. (“Public opinion poll press release, Survey of trends in Taiwan public opinion on Ma-Xi meeting together with unification vs. independence and identity” [台灣民心動態調查、馬習會與統獨認同之民心調查 新聞稿], TISR, August 29, 2014, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/files/archive/250_fc4e7cfa.pdf.)


Justin Su and James Lee, “Freezing Taiwan independence clause will take time: DPP head,” CNA, July 2, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aip/201407010037.aspx. At the party congress, Tsai argued that there was not enough time in the meeting to consider the issue thoroughly and referred it to the party’s Central Executive Committee (Chris Wang, “DPP’s Tsai evades charter clause fight,” Taipei Times, July 21, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/07/21/2003595581.)


The issue of the independence clause also occasioned a sharp exchange between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. Ma suggested that “Taiwan independence” is not really an issue, so there is no need to place any emphasis on it, to which Tsai retorted: “He is not the DPP chairman. President Ma should mind his own business. We will take care of ourselves. He doesn’t need to bother.” (Wang Yu-chung and Lee Hsin-fang, “Ma, Tsai spar on independence clause,” Taipei Times, July 3, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/07/03/2003594239.)

Tsai explained the party’s position on cross-Strait relations as follows:

At present, the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future represents the consensus within the DPP on Taiwan’s future and the status of cross-Strait relations; indeed, it has become the consensus of the people of Taiwan. On the basis of this consensus, the DPP hopes that the two sides of the Strait can engage in more stable and higher quality interactions, to increase mutual understanding and build mutual trust. Thus, we will adopt a more confident, proactive, and pragmatic attitude in our approach, while also demonstrating our stability and consistency. But we will continue to insist that no cross-Strait contact may harm Taiwan’s democracy, threaten our national sovereignty, or undermine the ability of the people of Taiwan to carry out their will as the master of their own house. This principle and stance is one that will never change.”


In an interview in July, Tsai put it this way. Because it attracted so much attention, we quote it in full:

I have to admit that from 2008 to 2012, the party was focused on contesting elections and spent very little time on taking care of external matters. Now, both subjective and objective conditions are better than they were in 2012. We are also confident that we can maintain stable relations with China so that cross-strait relations would not be affected by a change in the ruling party.

If you were China, how would you view this round of elections? In the previous round, they were afraid of making a bad bet. They had put their money in 2008 on the KMT, and if the situation had been reversed in 2012 (i.e., the KMT and Ma had lost to the DPP and Tsai), then that would have indicated the failure of all of its Taiwan policies and led to the resignations of many people. And Hu Jintao’s historical legacy would have had to be rewritten. So they were very nervous. They felt pressure to protect Ma Ying-jeou and not allow the tables to be turned in Taiwan.

But after 2012, a new phase has begun. China is now again worried about betting on the wrong horse in 2016, being forced to deal with a situation it cannot control and having to interfere heavily.

Simply put, whoever has power, different parties will shift their direction toward those with power. The DPP’s biggest challenge is to do well in this year’s local elections. If we do well, even China will shift in the direction of the DPP. If they feel that the DPP has the best chance of winning in 2016, they will automatically create the conditions for that.

In my experience, when China wants to do something, it is able to do it. It has a huge system to handle Taiwan issues. If China shifts course, the United States will have no reason to object.”


Private conversation.

“TAO: DPP’s desire to use the ‘Resolution on Taiwan’s Future’ to handle cross-Strait relations will not work” (国台办: 民进党想以“台湾前途决议文”处理两岸关系行不通), Xinhuanet, July 21, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wly/201407/t20140721_6677499.htm.


One point that seemed more confined to specific individuals than others was former Vice President Annette Lu Hsiu-lien’s complaint that Tsai had arbitrarily decided that the DPP should back non-party candidate Ko Wen-je for mayor of Taipei. Lu demanded that if Ko loses (as of this writing he is ahead of KMT candidate Sean Lien, but the gap is reportedly closing), Tsai should step down as DPP chair. (“Annette Lu: Hold Tsai Ing-wen accountable if Ko Wen-je loses,” Taiwan News Online, June 17, 2014, http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=2506523&lang=eng_news&cate_rss=TAIWAN_eng.)


“Taiwan Affairs Office: We hope that all Taiwan parties and people from all sectors of society will actively support cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation” (国台办: 希望台湾各党派各界人士积极支持两岸交流合作), June 7, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wly/201406/t20140607_6280687.htm.


97 In her speech to the DPP national party congress, Tsai identified numerous issues, including the staggering cost of housing, the increasing cost of everyday goods, stagnating salaries, a dysfunctional plan for a 12-year mandatory education system, a social welfare system that makes it increasingly difficult to take care of the young and old, problems with food safety, the lack of an engine of economic growth, the lack of economic strategy, a broken constitutional structure that does not properly reflect the public will, a lack of transparency in cross-Strait relations (which are monopolized by business interests), and the loss of a grasp of fairness. Saying that Taiwan deserved a government that is more efficient and more capable, Tsai identified a fundamental issue as the lack of trust in government and in politics. (“Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen’s Remarks at the DPP National Party Congress,” DPP News Network, July 22, 2014, http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.com/2014/07/chairperson-tsaing-wens-remarks-at.html.)


99 “Huang Huikang: Not opposed to unofficial relations—Malaysia-Taiwan must not sign an FTA” (黃惠康：不反對非官方聯繫 馬台不能簽自貿協定), Sin Chew Daily, August 19, 2014, http://news.sinchew.com.my/node/382358. It may well be that negotiation of an “economic cooperation agreement” with Kuala Lumpur would not generate such a direct objection, since its “official” character could be fuzzed up, as in the case of New Zealand, Singapore, and others. But PRC officials continue to refuse to express blanket acquiescence (as opposed to case-by-case consideration) even to “economic cooperation agreements,” due to concern about the “status” of Taiwan as one of the agreement partners and the need to avoid any sense of “officiality.” What seems clear is that Beijing has no intention of changing its position in the absence of cross-Strait political dialogue to establish clear ground rules.

In this case, the fact that the Malaysian king was due to pay a state visit to China shortly may have given Beijing additional leverage to voice its objection without fear of criticism from the government in Kuala Lumpur. (“Yang di-Pertuan Agong and consort accorded state welcome in Beijing,” Malaymail online, September 4, 2014, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/news/malaysia/article/yang-di-pertuan-agong-and-consort-accorded-state-welcome-in-beijing.)
103 Although one economic ministry official briefing the LY in June said that six countries were negotiating bilateral FTAs with Taiwan (Malaysia, Vietnam, Chile, Peru, Brunei, and Australia; Judy Li, “Taiwan Negotiates with 6 Nations to Ink FTA,” Taiwan Economic News, June 10, 2014, http://cens.com/cens/html/en/news/news_inner_46378.html), in late August the economics minister acknowledged that “more than one country” had planned to negotiate economic pacts with Taiwan early this year, but the plans did not move forward after the PRC stepped in and told them “the timing is not right” until after the ECFA follow-on agreements were completed. (Wu Ching-chun and Y.F. Low, “Economics minister urges support for trade pact with China,” August 30, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201408300030.aspx.) He did so again responding to inquiries at the LY in October. (Liu Ching-ju, “Duh Tyzz-jiun: When cross-Strait relations are healthy this aids in negotiating and signing FTAs” [杜彥軍：兩岸關係好有助洽簽FTA], China Times, October 7, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20141007000110-260203.)
104 The process and other details of the November elections, including which seats are at stake, are available at “Year-end election campaign to roll September 1,” Taiwan News Online, August 31, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2561314.