

China's Political Ecology and the Fight against Corruption

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Since the 18th Party Congress convened in November 2012, China has undertaken a wide-ranging campaign against corruption. The campaign has gone on longer, cut deeper, and affected more people than anyone might have imagined two years ago. The course of the campaign has exposed in considerable depth many of the ills of political life in China. Although it seems intended to break up many of the “small circles” that pervade China’s political life, there is no question that the campaign has focused particular attention on the networks around Zhou Yongkang, the former head of China’s security forces, and Ling Jihua, the former head of the General Office. China’s leadership has promised the campaign will continue, so there are likely to be more surprises; perhaps one or more new “tigers” will be exposed.

China’s fight against corruption really began with the conviction of Bo Xilai (薄熙来), the former party secretary of Chongqing municipality and an apparent contender for a seat on the party’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). But since Bo’s case was concluded prior to the 18th Party Congress, he is not mentioned in the running tab the *People’s Daily* website has maintained of ministerial-level cadres who have been taken in for investigation, and he is rarely mentioned in media articles discussing corruption. Perhaps the relative silence surrounding the Bo Xilai case since the 18th Party Congress is intended to minimize the political nature of the current campaign, though the recent arrest of Zhou Yongkang (周永康), the retired former head of the security apparatus, inevitably raises questions about Bo and politics in general.

In any event, in the more than two years since the 18th Party Congress convened in November 2012, 61 cadres at the ministerial level or above have been placed under investigation and/or convicted of corruption or other disciplinary violations (as of March 1, 2015).¹ There are nine provincial-level jurisdictions that have not yet had any ministerial-level cadres investigated: Beijing, Shanghai, Jilin, Zhejiang, Fujian, Gansu, Tibet, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. At the other end of the spectrum, the province with the most ministerial-level cadres investigated is Shanxi, which had seven—eight, if one includes Shen Weichen, who had been moved out of Shanxi in 2013, (see below)—followed by Sichuan (four), Jiangxi (three), and Jiangsu (three). There were eight other provinces with two each, followed by 10 provinces with one each (see below for full table).

Moreover, *Jingbao* (Capital Times), based on the data posted by the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), reported that by year-end 2014, 533 cadres at the department (厅) level had been investigated for corruption. According to this data, the provinces with the most cadres investigated were Guangdong (48), Sichuan (46), Hubei (46), Shanxi (39), and Henan (39).² The figure for Shanxi has since been updated to 45.³

Underscoring the difficulty of getting full, complete, and comparable data, a comprehensive list of names of those detained given on the CDIC website through February 3, 2014, lists 908 individuals, presumably all investigated by the CDIC rather than lower-level DICs. This list gives the names of 62 people investigated in Shanxi Province, but Guangdong still tops the list at 71.⁴

Of the 61 cadres at the department, bureau, or ministerial levels detained from the 16 ministries of the State Council, 17 worked in the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) or its provincial counterparts. The most prominent of the officials exposed was Liu Tienan (刘铁男), deputy head of the NDRC. It is not clear if Liu would have eventually been exposed through other investigations, but his crimes came to public attention through the writings of Lou Changping (罗昌平), an investigative journalist who was then deputy editor of the respected journal *Caixin* (财新). Luo wrote an 18-piece chronicle, called “Notes on Striking Iron” (打铁纪), that was based, at least in part, on material supplied by one of Liu Tienan’s mistresses.⁵ The CDIC followed up on Luo’s revelations, and, in May 2013, Liu Tienan became just the third ministerial-level cadre to “fall off his horse,” as the Chinese expression has it. Later reporting said that his cash and securities ran to 240 million rmb. He also had 7 apartments in the names of his wife and son, who had 25 bank accounts and seven foreign passports between them. Liu Tienan himself had 12 foreign passports and 12 airline tickets.⁶

At the Energy Bureau (能源局), where Liu served concurrently as head, five officials besides Liu were exposed, as were five more in the price department (价格司), and one each in the Department of Employment and Income Distribution (就业与收入分配司) and the Finance Department (财金司) (see Appendix 2).⁷ The problems in the NDRC and its provincial counterparts were, of course, related to the extraordinary power concentrated in the hands of individuals to approve projects, as Liu Tienan himself said.⁸ Moreover, many of these officials had worked with each other for many years, developing very close relations. Power and familiarity proved a hotbed for corruption. It is not surprising that many of these cases were related to prices, particularly those of electricity, water, and pharmaceuticals, over which the state still exercises control. As will be noted below, many of these cases were related to other cases, particularly those of Zhou Yongkang and Ling Jihua (令计划).

Zhou Yongkang

Much has been written about the Zhou Yongkang case; the Chinese press has been unusually forthcoming in printing various guides to Zhou’s activities and the circles of relations he used to build his empire. First and foremost, Zhou relied on his family, including his second wife, Jia Xiaohua (贾晓桦), a former CCTV hostess; his son, Zhou Bin (周滨); and other family members. Second, he relied on relations cultivated during his many years in the oil industry, including Jiang Jiemin (蒋洁敏), the former head of the State Assets Commission (SASAC), Wang Yongchun (王永春), the former deputy manager of CNPC, and Mi Xiaodong (米晓东), a former cadre at CNOOC who worked

closely with Zhou Bin. Third, he relied on his current and former secretaries, including Guo Yongxiang (郭永祥), the former chief secretary (秘书长) of the Sichuan party committee; Ji Wenlin (冀文林), the former deputy governor of Hainan; and Yu Gang (余刚), the former deputy head of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission office. Finally, Zhou used relations he built up during his tenure as Sichuan party secretary from 1999 to 2002, including Li Chuncheng (李春城), the former deputy party secretary of Sichuan Province, who had the dubious honor of being the first ministerial-level cadre to be investigated following the 18th Party Congress.⁹ These overlapping circles of relations allowed Zhou to exercise enormous power and extract equally enormous wealth.

No other member of the PBSC has been held accountable for corruption or any other crime in the reform era, so one has to ask if there were not something besides a desire to purify the party that prompted Xi's determination to go after Zhou. There have been many rumors about a relationship between Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, and the prosecution of Zhou lends support to such speculation. A recent article in *Phoenix Weekly* (凤凰周刊) not only suggests that Zhou and Bo discussed "doing something big" together (大干一场) but also states that the two of them agreed to "fundamentally negate" (彻底否定) Deng Xiaoping's theory of reform and opening. More specifically, the article states that Zhou "created factions, secretly plotted to manipulate, in an effort to stay on another term, and even rise to become head of the National People's Congress, and act as the backstage boss of some forces" (拉帮结派, 密谋操控, 试图继续留任, 甚至企图升任全国人大委员长, 当某些势力的后台老板). Although *Phoenix Weekly* is based in Hong Kong, its content is subject to control by the Chinese government.¹⁰

The problems at the NDRC and Zhou Yongkang's efforts to create a large, influential, and wealthy network of officials and family suggest endemic problems in a system in which power is highly centralized and not subject to public scrutiny. But no place better illustrates the pernicious political ecology of contemporary China than Shanxi Province. Although the problems of Shanxi are linked to those of Ling Jihua, the former head of the General Office, and probably would not have been exposed if Ling had not come under scrutiny, they nevertheless illustrate the sort of deeply rooted problems that will not be solved simply by cashiering various officials—no matter how many are disciplined.

Exposing Corruption in Shanxi

The gradual exposure of deeply rooted corruption in Shanxi Province started after the CDIC's Sixth Inspection Group, led by Ye Dongsong (叶冬松),¹¹ stayed in Shanxi for two months, from October 30 to December 29, 2013. In a report given to Shanxi Province in February, 2014, Ye warned that the inspection group had discovered that some leading cadres had used their positions to seek benefits, that the efforts to fight corruption in the province were insufficient, and that there were irregularities in the promotion of cadres. Moreover, the files of some cadres were unclear, incomplete, and erroneous. It was necessary, Ye said, to seriously investigate instances of running around soliciting support

for official positions (跑官要官), to stop bribery in elections, and prevent cadres with problems from being promoted (带病提拔).¹²

Jin Daoming

Only three days after this meeting, the CDIC announced on its website that Jin Daoming (金道铭), the former head of the Discipline Inspection Commission in Shanxi, had been detained for investigation. Jin's career suggests the sort of cadre who is supposed to ensure honesty, not be a source of corruption. Most of his career had been in Beijing, so he seemed to be outside the corrupting networks of Shanxi, but even in Beijing, as a senior official with the CDIC, he had developed relations with Shanxi officials and business owners (and probably with people from other provinces as well). Born in Beijing in 1953, Jin, a Manchu, came up through the Communist Youth League (CYL) system in Beijing, becoming deputy secretary of the Eastern District (东城) CYL in 1979. In 1990 he began in the Ministry of Supervision and three years later, after working in an office jointly managed by the Ministry of Supervision and the CDIC, he was transferred to the latter organization as a deputy department- (副局长) level cadre. In 1997 he was appointed deputy chief secretary (副秘书长) of the CDIC, and later headed a CDIC office in the Ministry of Transportation. Then, in 2006, he was sent to Shanxi to head the provincial Discipline Inspection Commission and became a member of the provincial party standing committee. In March 2011, Jin left the DIC system to take charge of the provincial Political and Legal Commission.¹³

It seems likely that Jin's appointment to Shanxi was organized by Yuan Chunqing (袁纯清), who had served as Jin's boss from 1997 to 2001 when Yuan was chief secretary of the CDIC and Jin was his deputy. Yuan was transferred to Shaanxi in 2001 and came to Shanxi as provincial party secretary in 2006, the same time as Jin.¹⁴

When Jin came to Shanxi he threw himself into his investigative duties, sending 56 inspection teams out to different units in the coal industry. After half a year, his final report concluded that behind the newly rich mine bosses lay newly rich cadres. Jin sent his report simultaneously to the provincial party committee and to the CDIC, earning the praise of the latter. In August 2008 a provincial leading group to fight corruption in the coal and coking industry was established. The group included not only Jin Daoming, but also Chen Chuanping (see below) and others who would be cashiered in the subsequent campaign against corruption. Altogether, prior to March 2011, Jin investigated some 2,000 cases and retrieved 30 billion rmb. This seemingly impressive result was nevertheless later described as "putting up a show" and more than one mine owner was protected by Jin.¹⁵

There are hints that Jin may have been targeted well before the CDIC Inspection Group came to Shanxi. In March 2011, Li Zhaoqian (李兆前), who had been head of the Shandong provincial DIC, was transferred in from Shandong and took over the provincial DIC from

Jin Daoming. Perhaps this was a routine transfer; after all, Jin had been head of the DIC since 2006, but losing his position on the standing committee appears unusual. Jin was seemingly promoted to head of the provincial Political and Legal Commission, but he retained that position for only eight months. He was subsequently only deputy party secretary and head of the provincial party's party school. Somewhat curiously, he was named a vice chair of the Shanxi provincial people's congress in January 2014, but only a month later was detained for questioning.¹⁶

One reason Jin may have been targeted was his relationship with Shen Weichen (申维辰), another Shanxi official who was fated to fall (see below). Another reason Jin may have fallen was his relationships with two sisters, Hu Xi (胡昕) and Hu Lei (胡磊). The two sisters were not only Jin's mistresses but also his business partners. Their names were connected to a least seven enterprises in Taiyuan, all of which had grown in 2008–2009 after they had met Jin. They were also involved in real estate, development, coal, and electricity. They brought their father, Hu Xiangjun (胡祥俊), and their mother, Xiao Guihua (肖桂花), in to help run their businesses.¹⁷

Three months after Jin fell, on July 23, his old subordinate on the provincial DIC, Yang Senlin (杨森林), was taken in for investigation. Usually the CDIC would not investigate a department-level (厅级) cadre, but Yang had worked as Jin's subordinate for five years so no doubt could shed light on Jin's activities.

Shen Weichen

The second official to fall was Shen Weichen, who was then party secretary of the China Association of Science and Technology (中国科学技术协会) but whose career (and crimes) had been in Shanxi. Born in 1956 in Shanxi's Lucheng (潞城) county, Shen joined the party in 1979 and rose through the ranks quickly. By the age of 30, he was already a deputy department-level (副厅级) official. He was head of the CYL in Jindongnan Prefecture, and from 2000 to 2006 served as head of the Propaganda Department in Shanxi. Then in 2006, he was appointed to be secretary of Taiyuan City, which is where his corruption issues are said to have become serious.¹⁸ According to a report on the Caixin website (财新网), Shen “connived with and protected” land developers, “directly causing the real estate market in Taiyuan to be chaotic.”¹⁹ Jin Daoming, as head of the provincial DIC, opened an investigation into Shen, but soon dropped it, suggesting a close relationship with Shen.²⁰ In 2010 Shen was promoted to be deputy head of the Central Propaganda Department, which seems to be one explanation for the investigation group's observation that some cadres with problems were nevertheless promoted (Shen was certainly not the only one with such problems). Then, for reasons that are not clear, he was moved in 2013, at the age of 57, to the much less powerful Association for Science and Technology. He was taken in for investigation by the CDIC on April 12, 2014, and expelled from the party in December. There is one report that suggests that an investigation of a leading singer exposed her affair with Shen and led to his detention. According to the same report,

people in Taiyuan said Shen “sold a lot of land, produced a movie, and slept with a lot of women.”²¹

Du Shanxue

On June 19, 2014, it was announced that Du Shanxue (杜善学), then serving as vice governor of Shanxi, had been detained for investigation. Du, born in 1956 in Shanxi’s Linqi (林奇) county in Yuncheng (运城) City, graduated in the first class of Shanxi Finance and Economics College (陕西财经学院) following the Cultural Revolution. Sent to the provincial Finance and Trade Commission, Du quickly established himself by writing an article on extrabudgetary funds at a time when they were coming under pressure. Only three months after this article was published, Du was transferred to the provincial government office to help write reports for provincial leaders. Later he worked in the provincial Finance Department (财政厅) for six years, rising from deputy bureau head (副处长) to deputy department head (副厅长). In 2003, Du was appointed mayor of Changzhi (长治) City where he built his reputation by beautifying the city, thus responding to the center’s call for “scientific development.” It was in Changzhi City that he formed a close relationship with former mayor Zhang Bao (张保), and later in Lüliang City that he became close to former mayor Ding Xuefeng (丁雪峰) and to deputy mayor Zhang Zhonghe (张中和). All three of these officials have been cashiered in the current campaign against corruption.²² It was also in Changzhi that Du and his younger brother, Du Shantang (杜善堂), who later would also be detained, engaged in the selling of offices. It has been reported that positions as township heads cost several hundreds of thousands of rmb while county headships cost more than a million; aspirants to higher offices usually needed financial backers.²³

In 2011, the provincial party committee underwent changes and Du hoped to join the standing committee, but he was beaten out by Nie Chunyu (聂春玉), who had served in Lüliang (吕梁) for eight years (see below). However, Du was transferred to Lüliang to replace Nie. Apparently he continued his enterprise in selling offices in Lüliang, which became the main basis for his later detention. Finally, at the provincial party’s 11th party congress, in 2011, Du was named to the standing committee as chief secretary (秘书长). It turned out, however, that this position was not a good fit for the strong-willed Du, and only a year later he was given a position as one of the vice governors, and Nie Chunyu took his place as chief secretary.²⁴

Ling Zhengce

At the same time, indeed on the same day (June 19), the CDIC announced that Ling Zhengce 令政策, the older brother of Ling Jihua 令计划, the former head of the General Office and close aide to Hu Jintao, had been detained. Ling Zhengce is the son of Linghu Ye, who is now 103 years old. When the war against Japan broke out, Linghu Ye abandoned his wife and daughter and went to Yanan. Relying on the medical knowledge he had learned from his father, Linghu Ye was, at the age of 28, named a section head at the

hospital in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia revolutionary base area. Around 1949–1950 he remarried and fathered five children, all named after party terms frequently appearing in the paper at that time: Fangzhen (direction), Zhengce (policy), Luxian (line), Jihua (plan), and Wancheng (completion). After the revolution, Linghu Ye worked as an official (different reports give different accounts of his career), but in 1962, when he was 52 years old, he took his family back to Shanxi and settled not in his natal village but in a nearby village. As a Yanan cadre and rank 13 cadre, he was considered a high-ranking official and received a salary of 165 yuan per month. Together with his wife's 60 rmb monthly salary as a nurse, the two had an income equal to that of the rest of the village combined.²⁵

When the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966, Ling Zhengce was in middle school. He became a Red Guard, and was chosen by his commune to go to Tiananmen Square where he saw Mao Zedong review the Red Guards. In 1971, 19-year-old Ling Zhengce was appointed to a position in the provincial confidential affairs office (机要处). But after that, promotions came slowly. It was not until 1986 that he got his first promotion; he became a deputy department head (副处长) in the party committee's office and then deputy department head in the confidential affairs office. In 1997, Ling Zhengce became deputy head (副厅长) of the provincial grain office, an office dominated by people from Yuncheng. Suddenly in 2000, Ling Zhengce was promoted to be the deputy head of the provincial Development and Reform Commission, a much more important post than he had held before. Four years later, he was made head of the commission, and then in 2008, he became deputy head of the provincial Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).²⁶ It should be noted that in the period when Ling Zhengce was being promoted to deputy department head (副厅长) and then to deputy minister (副部长) level, his younger brother, Ling Jihua, was rising quickly in Beijing. It was in 1995 that Ling Jihua was promoted to the General Office and then in 1999 he became deputy head of that office. It is not hard to imagine that this connection influenced Ling Zhengce's career in Shanxi (see below).

It was at the time when Ling Zhengce was at the Development and Reform Commission that the reforms in the coal industry were having an effect and revenues were growing steeply. With this increased income, the Development and Reform Commission undertook many new projects, including a 150-ton stainless steel plant at Tai Steel. Its coming on line doubled Tai Steel's production capacity and made it a globally competitive company. And it made the careers of Ling Zhengce's friends, particularly those from Yuncheng. At the time, Chen Chuanping (陈川平, see below) was head of Tai Steel. Shortly after this project came on line Chen was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee, and then, two years later, Taiyuan party secretary. Another project was the building of the Shanxi central-south railway, a line that stretches from Lüliang in Shanxi to Rizhao (日照) port in Shandong, which brought Ling into frequent contact with Liu Zhijun, the then minister of railways who was removed in February 2011 and charged with corruption.²⁷

Nie Chunyu

A month later, on August 23, the CDIC announced that Nie Chunyu (聂春玉), a member of the provincial party standing committee and its chief secretary (秘书长) had been detained for investigation. Nie Chunyu had been party secretary of Lüliang city for eight years, 2003–2011. As mentioned above, Nie had been promoted to the provincial party standing committee ahead of Du Shanxue, who replaced Nie as party secretary in Lüliang.

Born in 1955, Nie Chunyu worked for 8 years in his home town of Houma (侯马), serving as deputy secretary of the local CYL, member of the party committee of the local commune, and as the deputy secretary of the administrative committee. In 1984 he jumped from the commune to the provincial Policy Research Office (政策研究室), where he remained for 19 years. In 2003, when he was transferred to Lüliang, the price of coal broke the 300 yuan per ton mark, double the price in 2002.²⁸ In 2000, the price of coal had been controlled by the state at only 20–30 yuan per ton. This rapid increase in price obviously benefited the local government—GDP grew quickly in Lüliang, increasing from less than 90 billion yuan in 2000 to over 800 billion in 2010, making Lüliang the fourth wealthiest city in Shanxi and its fastest growing city. Nie's career prospered with Lüliang; in 2006 he became its party secretary, and in 2011 he was promoted to the provincial party standing committee.

It was in these years that provincial policy toward mines, guided by Beijing, was changing. In 2004, the province issued a document encouraging private ownership. This allowed private ownership to be more clearly separated from local government ownership. But then in 2008, policy was reversed and mines were merged. But both reforms were directed by the government, and so mine owners went one after the other to the government, whether to prevent their mines from being closed, or to argue for compensation if they were, or to borrow money to enlarge their mines. With the consolidation of mines in 2008, there were only 355 left, a figure cut to 115 in 2009, and eventually to 27. This process entailed ever-closer relations between mine owners and government officials. It became customary that on New Year's and mid-Autumn festival the mine owners would send money to officials. One mine owner told Caixin that every Spring Festival he would distribute at least 1 million rmb to relevant officials. In this way, relations between mine owners and officials became increasingly tight.²⁹

In 2009 Nie Chunyu promoted an election in the 13 districts and townships under Lüliang. The election was arranged so that there were five stages from selecting candidates, ending with personal interviews to the party committee of Lüliang, who would cast the decisive votes. At each stage, candidates had to send money, the amount increasing with the stage. Many cadres told Caixin that they believed the reason Nie Chunyu promoted this election was so that he could raise enough money to enhance his own chances of being promoted. Others believed that the corruption in this election was more related to trying to balance the interests of different factions, using Nie Chunyu, as

an outsider, to decide.³⁰

After Nie Chunyu was detained, Yuan Yuzhu 袁玉珠, CEO of Shanxi Zhongyuan Iron and Steel; Jia Tingliang 贾廷亮, CEO of Datuhe Coke; and Di Xilu 氏喜陆, board chair of Xililiu Coke Group, were all taken away for investigation, and the political careers of Zheng Mingzhu 郑明珠, deputy head of the Lüliang People's Congress, and Yan Gangping 阎刚平, a member of the standing committee of Lüliang party committee, both ended.³¹

Chen Chuanping

On the same day that Nie Chunyu was detained, the CDIC also announced that Chen Chuanping 陈川平, another member of the provincial party standing committee and concurrently party secretary of Taiyuan was detained. Chen's case was closely linked with that of Ling Zhengce and was illustrative of the native place and personal ties that are so prominent in Shanxi. Chen was born in Pinglu (平陆) county—Ling Zhengce's hometown—in Yuncheng City in 1962. His father was Chen Tiankui 陈天奎, former head of Taiyuan's People's Congress. In 1982, after graduating from Shenyang Metallurgy and Machinery College (沈阳冶金机械专科学校), Chen took a position as deputy of a workshop at Taiyuan Iron and Steel, known as Taigang (or Tai Steel). Chen rose extremely rapidly, particularly after 1992 when he briefed a central leader on problems at Taigang. Then, at the age of 33 he became deputy CEO of Taigang, and five years later was promoted to CEO.

It was during Chen's tenure as CEO that his request to build a facility that could produce 1,500,000 tons of stainless steel was approved by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which made Taigang globally competitive and highly profitable. Chen became a star and was named as a "meritorious entrepreneur." It was at this time that Ling Zhengce was head of the provincial reform and development commission, and their relationship was reportedly very close.³²

In 2007 Chen became an alternate member of the 17th Central Committee. In 2008 he was named a vice governor of Shanxi, and in 2010 he became a member of the Shanxi provincial party standing committee and concurrent party secretary of Taiyuan. When Chen Chuanping took over as party secretary of Taiyuan, he replaced Shen Weichen 申维辰, who was transferred to the center as deputy director of the Propaganda Department and later investigated by the CDIC (see above).

As vice governor of the province, Chen was responsible for the coal sector, oversaw state-owned assets, national defense technology work (科工), employment, and social security, to which was later added production safety. So, as vice governor, Chen controlled a substantial amount of the Shanxi economy. Later in 2010, he lost his position as vice governor (for which no reason is given) but remained on the party standing committee, a position that was reconfirmed by the provincial party congress in 2011.³³

It was as vice governor that Chen Chuanping oversaw the merger of most of Shanxi's coal mining companies. This wave of mergers was vigorously opposed by merchants from Zhejiang, particularly Wenzhou, and it was Chen who led the response. Overall, Shanxi's 2,200 mines were reduced to only 130, and the coal industry was dominated by only a few especially large industrial groups. This merger of mines was accomplished without a single mine being auctioned off; all were bought through negotiation. Power was unconstrained. But mine safety was greatly improved.³⁴

Bai Yun

A week later, on August 29, the CDIC website revealed that Bai Yun (白云), Shanxi's head of the United Front Work Department had been detained for "serious violations of [party] discipline and law"—the usual formulation for corruption. Bai Yun, born in 1960, was the daughter of a leading cadre in Yanbei (雁北) prefecture, who later rose to be deputy mayor of Datong (大同) City. In 1976 she joined the military, and in 1984 she returned to civilian life as an instructor in the Shuozhou (朔州) City department of propaganda. Two years later she became a cadre in the Pingshuo (平朔) mining district and began a 17-year career in the Communist Youth League (CYL). In 1987 she joined the CYL party committee in Shuozhou, and in 1993 she rose to the provincial CYL party committee. In 2001 she became provincial party secretary of the CYL and became full department-level (正厅级) cadre at only 41 years of age.

Finally leaving the CYL, Bai Yun was appointed deputy secretary of Lüliang prefecture (before Lüliang became a city) in 2003, working under Nie Chunyu for three years. Then in 2006 she was transferred to Yangchuan (阳泉) City as acting mayor. Becoming mayor shortly thereafter, she soon had greater temptations and opportunities to pursue corruption. Bai Yun never developed a reputation as a strong leader, and the organization of the coal industry in Yangquan was apparently chaotic. Under the influence of mine operators, areas were divided up and peasants forcefully removed from their land. People petitioned, but the petitions went nowhere. Later, only two weeks after Bai Yun was cashiered, Wang Min (王民), who worked in Yangquan with Bai Yun for four years as the head of the Discipline Inspection Committee, was subjected to investigation. Finally, in 2012 she became party secretary of Yuncheng City, and then became head of the United Front Work Department the following year, joining the provincial party standing committee.³⁵

Ren Runhou

On the same day that Bai Yun was detained, Ren Runhou (任润厚), a vice governor, was also detained. Born in 1957, Ren appears to have arisen through talent and hard work. His first job was as a worker in a coal mine. In 1981, he was given an opportunity to go to the Shanxi Mining Bureau Employee College (陕西矿务局职工大学) for three years, after which he became a secretary in the Mining Bureau. In 1989 Ren was sent to the Malan Mine as an assistant engineer; in 1994 he was promoted to deputy manager of the mine. In 1998

he was assigned deputy head of the Shanxi Coal Cadre Training Institute (山西煤炭管理干部学院) where he rapidly instituted a number of reforms.

Then in 2000 Ren was appointed deputy CEO and deputy party secretary of Lu'an Mining (Group), Ltd. (山西潞安矿业[集团]有限责任公司). The timing was good for Ren. China's economy was taking off, state controls on the price of coal were being lifted (allowing the price of coal to rise from 20–30 yuan per ton in 2002 to 160 yuan or more per ton in 2003). The consolidation of the mining industry in Shanxi in 2008 made Lu'an one of the largest mining groups in Shanxi. It was at this time that Ren eyed becoming vice governor in charge of the mining sector. Unfortunately for Ren, he was beaten out by Chen Chuanping, who had made his career at Tai Steel and who had a close relationship with Ling Zhengce (see above). But two years later, Chen became party secretary of Taiyuan, and Ren finally became vice governor in 2011. Being appointed vice governor was apparently no easy matter. One of the others who had hopes to be appointed, Zhang Bingsheng 张兵生, then mayor of Taiyuan, was accused of campaigning for ballots (拉票) and it turned out that some of his text messages accused Ren of bribing officials.³⁶

Only half a year after Ren became vice governor, his old subordinate, Liu Rensheng (刘仁生), deputy head of the Lu'an Mining Group, was convicted of corruption. At the same time, Ren was diagnosed with throat cancer. And on August 29, 2014, Ren became the seventh vice-governor-level official in Shanxi to be detained for investigation. Only a month after being detained, Ren succumbed to cancer.³⁷

Yuan Chunqing Falls

The CDIC's campaign against corruption in Shanxi culminated on September 1, when Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan (刘云山, himself from Shanxi) and Zhao Leji (赵乐际), Politburo member and head of the Organization Department, came to Shanxi to announce that provincial party secretary Yuan Chunqing 袁纯清 would be transferred to become deputy head of the Central Agricultural Leadership Small Group and would be replaced by former party secretary of Jilin, Wang Rulin (王儒林). This announcement caught the eye for many reasons. First, announcements of changes in provincial party leadership are normally made by someone of deputy head of the Organization Department rank; indeed, just the day before it was deputy head of the Organization Department Wang Qinfeng 王秦丰 who had announced that Wang Rulin was stepping down as party secretary of Jilin. To have a Politburo Standing Committee member announce such a change underscored the seriousness with which the center was taking the issue of corruption in Shanxi. Second, the transfer of Yuan Chunqing seemed to indicate that he was not being punished for corruption but rather for being ineffective (though his relationship with Jin Daoming suggests there may have been other factors). Third, Wang Rulin had been in the news not long before because Wang Qishan had sharply upbraided him for "formalism" at a group meeting at the NPC in March—remarks that were later deleted from the web.³⁸ Apparently Wang and other leaders were

more concerned with fighting corruption than leadership style.

In September 2014, Tang Tao, who had been in charge of the Organization Department, was transferred out of Shanxi to be deputy minister of Personnel Resources and Social Security (人力资源和社会保障), but has not been charged with corruption. Finally, in October, one more member of the Standing Committee, Yuan Zhaoming, was transferred out of the province. He was transferred to the State Safety Inspection Bureau (国家安监总局) as deputy director, but he has not been accused of corruption. Nevertheless, he had replaced Jin Daoming as head of the provincial Discipline Inspection Commission and obviously had not upheld party discipline in the province. Apparently, like Yuan Chunqing, he was being transferred more for incompetence than corruption.

In any event, with Yuan Zhaoming's transfer, seven members of the previous standing committee had been detained for corruption (eight if one includes Shen Weichen, who had served on the previous standing committee 2006–2010), two had been transferred out for apparent incompetence, and eight people had been added in 2014. So the provincial party standing committee looked very different in October 2014 than it had only a year previous (see table 1, below). It should be noted that the personnel changes significantly reduced the number of standing committee members with CYL affiliation. Of the eight Shanxi standing committee members removed, six (including Bai and Shen) had come up through the CYL, whereas only three of the eight people appointed to the standing committee had affiliations with the CYL, although those three included the new provincial party secretary, Wang Rulin. Of greater importance is that at least seven of the eight officials appointed, and probably all eight, are not natives of Shanxi.³⁹ As a result, only three of the 13 members of the standing committee are from Shanxi. This suggests a real effort to break up the tight networks that have dominated Shanxi politics and to strengthen the hand of Beijing. Of particular interest in this regard is Huang Xiaoming, who has long served in the CDIC and was promoted in 2012 to the standing committee of that organization. He will take over as secretary of the Shanxi provincial DIC as well as deputy head of the Central Department of Supervision. Perhaps it is not over-reading the situation to suggest that Huang will act as Wang Qishan's eyes and ears in Shanxi.⁴⁰ Also interesting is Lou Yangsheng, who served successively as deputy party secretary and mayor of Jinhua City in Zhejiang, party secretary of Lishui City in Zhejiang, chair of the Zhejiang provincial people's congress between 1999 and 2008. In 2008 he became deputy head of the Zhejiang provincial CPPCC and concurrently head of the provincial United Front Work Department.⁴¹ He thus must be very familiar to Xi Jinping, who was appointed party secretary of Zhejiang in 2002.

One person whose name has not come up in various discussions of provincial affairs is Li Xiaopeng—son of former premier Li Peng—who was appointed to the Shanxi provincial party standing committee in May 2008 and became vice governor after a long career as head of the Huaneng Group, one of the largest energy companies in China. Li Xiaopeng was appointed acting governor and then governor after Wang Jun was transferred to Inner

Mongolia as party secretary. His position in Shanxi has not been affected. The only report that sheds light on his recent activities appears to be one on his government work report, delivered on January 28, in which he expressed determination to stop corruption and prevent anyone who is guilty from remaining at large.⁴²

Table 1

Shanxi Party Standing Committee, 2011 and 2014 (October)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>From Shanxi?</i>	<i>DOB</i>	<i>CYL Affiliation?</i>	<i>Year appointed</i>
Yuan Chunqing 袁春清	Party secretary	No	1952	Yes	2010
Wang Jun 王君	Deputy party secretary; governor	Yes	1952	No	2008
Jin Daoming 金道铭	DIC	No	1953	Yes	2006
Li Xiaopeng 李小鹏	2 nd deputy governor	No	1959	No	2008
Hu Suping (f) 胡苏平	Head, Propaganda	Yes	1956	No	2008
Gao Jianmin 高建民	Executive Vice Governor	Yes	1960	Yes	2006
Tang Tao 汤涛	Head, Org. Department	No	1962	Yes	2009
Li Zhaoqian 李兆前	Head DIC	No	1962	No	2011
Chen Chuanping 陈川平	Taiyuan Party Secretary	Yes	1962	No	2010
Zhang Shaohua 张少华	Political Commissar, Shanxi MD	Yes	1954	No	2010
Wang Jianming王 建明	Political & Legal	No	1962	No	2010
Nie Chunyu 聂春玉	Chief Secretary	Yes	1955	Yes	2009
Du Shanxue 杜善学	Vice Governor	Yes	1956	No	Nov. 2011

Standing Committee, October 2014

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>From Shanxi?</i>	<i>DOB</i>	<i>CYL affiliation?</i>	<i>Year appointed</i>
Wang Rulin 王儒林	Party secretary	No	1953	Yes	2014
Li Xiaopeng 李小平	Deputy party secretary; governor	No	1959	No	2008
Lou Yangsheng 楼阳生	Deputy party secretary	No	1959	Yes	2014
Hu Suping 胡苏平	Head, Propaganda Department	Yes	1956	No	2008
Gao Jianmin 高建民	Deputy governor	Yes	1960	Yes	2006
Huang Xiaowei 黄晓薇	Discipline Inspection	No	1961	No	2014
Wu Zhenglong 吴政隆	Taiyuan party secretary	No	1964	No	2014
Zhang Shaohua 张少华	Political commissar, Shanxi MD	Yes	1954	No	2010
Wang Jianming 王建明	Political & Legal	No	1962	No	2010
Sun Shaocheng 孙绍骋	United Front	No	1960	No	2014
Wang Weizhong 王伟中	Chief secretary	?	?	No	2014
Fu Jianhua 付建华	Deputy governor	No	1958	No	2014
Sheng Maolin 盛茂林	Head, Organization Department	No	1960	Yes	2014

NOTES: Bai Yun was added to the Standing Committee in 2013 when Wang Jun was transferred to Inner Mongolia. She was detained in 2014. Li Zhaoqian was transferred out of Shanxi in October 2014 to become deputy director of the State Safety Inspection Bureau (国家安监总局副局长). He has not been accused of corruption. Shen Weichen served on the Standing Committee 2006–2010.

The Political Ecology of Shanxi

Corruption in Shanxi Province is not a new problem and it appears that the central government has been trying to control it, at least to some extent, for some time. There were six Shanxi natives on the 10th standing committee, down from nine on the ninth party committee, suggesting an ongoing effort (in many provinces, not just Shanxi) to reduce local influence and thereby strengthen Beijing's hand. Indeed, the dispatch of Yuan Chunqing, who had been working in the CYL and CDIC in Beijing, to Shaanxi and

then Shanxi is part of the trend in recent years to put outsiders in charge of provinces (and, in this case, to extend Hu Jintao's control). Similarly, Jin Daoming was sent from the CDIC in Beijing to run the DIC in Shanxi, Li Zhaoqiang was transferred from Shandong to replace Jin Daoming at the DIC, Tang Tao was transferred to Shanxi to run the Organization Department, and Wang Jianming was sent from the Supreme Procuratorate (indeed, the anti-corruption department) to manage the Political-Legal Commission. The appointment of all these outsiders to run critical departments in Shanxi suggests a major effort to bring the province to heel long before the current campaign against corruption began.

Judging by the recent exposures, it appears that they did not make much progress against deeply entrenched interests in the energy-rich province. Part of the problem lies in strong local factions. As the description above of efforts to crack down on corruption suggest, local networks based in Lüliang and Yuncheng have played a predominant role. It will be recalled that Nie Chunyu served for eight years as party secretary in Lüliang. When he was transferred out in 2011, Du Shanxue replaced him as party secretary. Ten months after being appointed party secretary, Du was promoted to the provincial party standing committee. It was highly unusual for there to be two people from the same place on the standing committee, indicating the influence Lüliang wielded in the province. From 2003 to 2006, Bai Yun was deputy secretary of Lüliang, and when Nie Chunyu was promoted to be chief secretary, Bai Yun took his place as head of the United Front Work Department.⁴³

The other major clique in Shanxi is from Yuncheng (运城). Ling Zhengce is from Yuncheng's Pinglu (平陆) county and his father, Linghu Ye (令狐野), was a bureau-level (处级) cadre. At least four of his five children have prospered in politics or business (the eldest son, Ling Luxian 令路线 is deceased), so the Ling family exercises a great deal of influence in Pinglu and Yuncheng. Ling Zhengce served as deputy head of the provincial planning commission and head of the Development and Reform Commission from 2000 to 2007. Ling Wancheng (令完成) went into business. A sister, Ling Fangzhen (令方贞) was reportedly detained in July, along with her husband, Wang Jiankang (王健康), who was deputy mayor of Yuncheng City.⁴⁴

Obviously in a province so rich in, and so dependent on, natural resources, it seems natural that the influence of the mining companies is great. As we have seen, Ren Runhou was able to be appointed as a vice governor directly from his business background. Chen Chuanping had similarly built his career at Taiyuan Iron and Steel before entering government. And Li Xiaopeng (李小鹏), the son of former premier Li Peng (李鹏), had long been in the electricity business before entering government. Given this movement from business to high levels of government, it can be imagined how extensive the ties are at somewhat lower levels in the hierarchy. Thus, it is not hard to imagine why influential mine owners are often able to work with provincial officials to thwart efforts to reform the mining industry. Similarly, in Shanxi, retired officials are able to retain a great deal of influence. After all, when they are in office, they work hard to cultivate successors, and when they are out of office they retain influence with their successors. When outsiders are appointed to high office, as they have been in recent

years, they do not know their way around the networks and often have to rely on the advice of retirees.⁴⁵

The biographical information of those detained for corruption suggest that quite a few officials get a head start by having a father who attained a reasonably high position (Linghu Ye is the most obvious example, but Chen Chuanping's father was head of the Taiyuan People's Congress and Bai Hua's father had been a leading cadre in Yanbei prefecture). Many of the officials came up through the CYL organization, and they all seemed to know one another, with senior cadres promoting junior associates. One cannot comment on the competence of such officials—we do not have enough information—but competence does not seem to have been enough to gain promotion: Relations and money were necessary ingredients.

The Link to Ling Jihua

Ling Jihua, born in 1956, was sent to the countryside in 1973 as an “educated youth” (知青). In 1975, he joined the CYL and was assigned to the Luping county CYL committee. The following year he joined the CCP and in 1978 was transferred to Yuncheng prefecture. 1979 was a critical year for Ling Jihua. The national CYL was recruiting people, and, upon Bo Yibo's recommendation, Ling Jihua moved to Beijing to take up a position in the Propaganda Department of the CYL. In 1985 he was promoted to be deputy director of the Theory Department. It was in 1985 that Hu Jintao took over as first secretary of the CYL. A decade later, in 1995, Ling moved to the Central Office of the CCP, and in 1999 became the deputy director of the Central Office and concurrently head of the research office. After Hu Jintao became general secretary, Ling Jihua became head of the Central Organ Staffing Committee (中央机构编制委员会) and head of Hu Jintao's office. In 2007, Ling Jihua took over as head of the Central Office, and later that year, at the 17th Party Congress, Ling was named to the Secretariat.

On March 18, 2012, however, his son, Ling Gu, was killed in an automobile accident on the Fourth Ring Road, crashing into a bridge support at high speed. Two young women were seriously injured, one of whom later died. Ling Gu was driving a Ferrari, reportedly given to him by Chen Chuanping.⁴⁶ Presumably because the Ferrari crash would reveal wealth beyond his ostensible income, Ling asked Zhou Yongkang to suppress the news.⁴⁷ In August, the news apparently spread to Jiang Zemin and other high-ranking party members, and Ling was suddenly removed as head of the Central Office and transferred to the much less powerful United Front Department as director. He was subsequently removed from his position on the Secretariat.

These moves came just as rumors were circulating that Ling might enter the Politburo Standing Committee at the 18th Party Congress. Such an expectation was reasonable, since all other heads of the General Office in the reform era were Politburo members and many had joined the Standing Committee (Ling's predecessors were: Wang Gang, Zeng Qinghong, Wen Jiabao, Wang Zhaoguo, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin). But Ling's sudden move to the United Front Department indicated the end of his political career and suggested that Hu Jintao would fade from influence, as indeed he has since the 18th Party Congress.

That Ling would not just fade into obscurity but rather face disgrace has been expected since his older brother, Ling Zhengce, was detained on June 19. The day after Ling Zhengce was taken in for investigation, the Xinhua News Agency ran a report called “Even if You Have Somebody at Court, It Won’t Work” (朝里有人也不灵), that all but explicitly pointed to Ling Jihua. The article took off from the old saying, “if you have somebody at court, you can be an official,” to say that this will not work anymore. It used the example of former minister of railways Liu Zhijun, whose brother was deputy head of the Wuhan railway bureau, to underline that justice would eventually catch up to such people. “If [a position] is based on corruption or private interest,” it said, then “no matter how high the official or how powerful he is, sooner or later, they will end like the Liu brothers.”⁴⁸ The implication for the Ling brothers seemed obvious.

Ling Jihua’s fate was further indicated by the investigation into the activities of his younger brother, Ling Wancheng. Ling Wancheng had begun a career as an official, rising to become deputy head of the CLY organization at the Xinhua News Agency and deputy chief of staff at that organization, but at the age of 44 he gave up officialdom and went into business. Adopting the name Wang Cheng, he founded Huijin Lifang Investment Management Center in 2008.⁴⁹ Earning millions, Wancheng left for the United States in 2014, but returned later that year to face investigation.⁵⁰ His wife, Li Ping, was also investigated, as was his brother-in-law, Wang Jiankang (王健康), deputy mayor of Yuncheng City. There have been reports that Ling Jihua’s wife, Gu Liping (谷丽萍), has also been investigated.

There have been strong suggestions in PRC media that Ling Jihua built on his Shanxi connections. For instance, one article describes the activities of the so-called Western Hills Club (西山会) that Ling Jihua organized no later than 2007. It was made up of high officials from Shanxi, and was said to be the center of an enormous “power-money empire.” One of its members was the well-known female entrepreneur Ding Shumiao (丁书苗), whose illegal business dealings with former minister of railways Liu Zhijun (刘志军) were exposed after Liu fell.⁵¹ Another was Guo Jinghua (郭京华), the wife of the former deputy head of the NDRC and head of its Energy Bureau (能源局), Liu Tienan, who was also targeted in the current campaign against corruption. Liu Tienan was born and raised in Beijing, but his provincial origin (籍贯) was Shanxi, and he was said to have been introduced into the club by Ling Jihua personally. The club would meet at least once a quarter, and reportedly did not allow cellphones, secretaries, or mistresses. Apparently such clubs, based on native place or occupation, are common throughout China.⁵²

On December 22, 2014, Xinhua announced that Ling Jihua was suspected of “seriously violating party discipline” and would undergo investigation.⁵³ This was the first time in party history that the head of the Central Office had been so charged.

Politics

The politics behind the current campaign are difficult to ignore even under the most benign assumptions. Even if one assumes that the goal of Bo Xilai’s activities in Chongqing was just to secure a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, that Zhou

Yongkang only intended to stay on as an influential retiree, and that Ling Jihua hoped to enter the Politburo Standing Committee, one can see clearly that Xi Jinping would face an enormous problem in uniting the PBSC. It would have been very difficult to get things done in such a divided body. Hu Jintao certainly led the investigation into Bo Xilai's activities, but he could only have done so with the support of Xi Jinping (the heir apparent) and the backing of retired PBSC members such as Jiang Zemin. If there was, as *Phoenix Weekly* suggests, collaboration between Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, then that would have violated the most basic norms of party conduct and explain the launching of the campaign, even if corruption had not been a major issue. And the relationship between the Bo family and the Ling family, given their extensive involvement in Shanxi politics, is intriguing if not clear. We do not know if Bo Xilai retained an interest in Shanxi politics, inherited from his father, or if Ling Jihua collaborated in any way with Bo Xilai. Chinese media have admitted collaboration between Ling Jihua and Zhou Yongkang, at least in the matter of hushing the news surrounding Ling Gu's fatal automobile crash.

Whatever the degree of collaboration, the campaign against corruption has clearly targeted the networks of Zhou Yongkang and Ling Jihua. Of the 61 ministerial-level cadres investigated so far, 19 (including Zhou and Ling) have clear links to Zhou and Ling. The number of department-level cadres in Sichuan and Shanxi further suggests a determination to root out these networks lock, stock, and barrel. According to a recent report, 15,450 cadres in Shanxi have been disciplined.⁵⁴

On a broader level, the exposure of very tight, personal networks suggests strongly that we have not been witnessing the institutionalization of Chinese politics, as many had hoped, but rather a likely deterioration in institutions. There has always been a tension in the Chinese Communist Party between the personal networks that seem to be essential to getting ahead in politics and the needs of the party to minimize such factionalism. In this case, the balance had obviously tilted very far in the direction of personal networks trumping the party, and one of Xi Jinping's objectives has been to restore the party as a viable instrument of rule.

The question for the future is whether Xi can do so. Up to this time, the main effort appears to be strengthening Beijing's control over the provinces by sending people directly from Beijing to run provincial discipline inspection commissions and subject local discipline inspection commissions to vertical control. In the past, such efforts to strengthen vertical control have encountered opposition from local party secretaries, who feel that their power is being curtailed. Efforts to root out local networks in Shanxi and elsewhere and to strengthen vertical controls, however well intended, will undoubtedly encounter strong resistance. Whether such efforts can really change the way power operates at the local level seems doubtful.

APPENDIX 1: Development and Reform Commission's Cadres Detained

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Date Detained</i>
Liu Tienan 刘铁男	Deputy Head, NDRC	May 2013
Cao Changqing 曹长庆	NDRC Price Department, head	August 2014
Liu Zhenqiu 刘振秋	NDRC Price Department, head	September 2014
Zhou Wangjun 周望军	NDRC Price Department, deputy head	September 2014
Li Caihua 李才华	NDRC Price Department, deputy head	September 2014
Guo Jianying 郭剑英	NDRC Price Department, dep. inspector	September 2014
Zhang Dongsheng 张东生	NDRC Finance Department, head	August 2014
Xiong Bilin 熊必琳	NDRC Industrial Department	June 2014
Xu Yongsheng 许永盛	NDRC Energy Department, deputy head	May 2014
Liang Bo 梁波	NDRC Energy Department Electricity Bureau, deputy head	June 2014
Wei Pengyuan 魏鹏远	NDRC Coal Department, deputy head	May 2014
Hao Weiping 郝卫平	NDRC Nuclear Electricity Department, head	April 2014
Wang Jun 王骏	NDRC New Energy Department, head	May 2014
Yao Mugen 姚木根	Jiangxi Development & Reform Commission, head	March 2014
Liu Xueku 刘学库	Hebei Development & Reform Commission, head	January 2014
Zhu Zuoli 祝作利	Shaanxi Development & Reform Commission	February 2014
Ling Zhengce 令政策	Shanxi Development & Reform Commission, head	June 2014

Appendix 2: Minister-Level Cadres Detained

Central Cadres

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date detained</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Ties</i>
Yi Junqing 衣俊卿	January 17, 2013	Director, Central Translation and Compilation Bureau	
Liu Tienan 刘铁男	May 12, 2013	Deputy director, NDRC	Ling Jihua
Jiang Jiemin 蒋洁敏	September 1, 2013	Chair, National Resources Commission	Zhou Yongkang
Li Dongsheng 李东生	December 18, 2013	Deputy secretary, Public Security	Zhou Yongkang
Yang Gang 杨刚	December 27, 2013	Deputy secretary, Quality Inspection Bureau	Zhou Yongkang

Gu Junshan 谷俊山	March 31, 2014	Deputy director, PLA General Logistics Department	
Xu Caihou 徐才厚	June 30, 2014	Retired vice chair, CMC	
Shen Weichen 申维辰	April 12, 2014	Party secretary, State Science Association	Ling Jihua
Song Lin 宋林	April 17, 2014	Board chair, Huarun Group	
Wang Shiting 王师廷	May 16, 2014	Chair, China Travel Service, Hong Kong	
Su Rong 苏荣	June 14, 2014	Deputy chair, National CPPCC	
Zhou Yongkang 周永康	July 29, 2014	Retired, PBSC	Zhou Yongkang
Sun Zhaoxue 孙兆学	September 15, 2014	CEO, China Aluminum Corporation	
He Jiacheng 何家成	Oct. 11, 2014	Vice president, Central Academy of Administration	
Yang Jinshan 杨金山	October 23, 2014	Deputy commander, Chengdu Military Region	
Ling Jihua 令计划	December 22, 2014	Former Head, General office	Ling Jihua
Sun Hongzhi 孙鸿志	December 26, 2014	State Bureau of Administration of Industry and Commerce	

Provincial Cadres

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date detained</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Ties</i>
Ni Fake 倪发科	June 4, 2013	Deputy governor	Anhui	
Han Xiancong 韩先聪	July 12, 2014	Anhui CPPCC, deputy chair	Anhui	
Tan Xiwei 谭栖伟	March 3, 2014	Chongqing People's Congress, deputy chair	Chongqing	
Wan Qingliang 万庆良	June 27, 2014	Guangzhou party secretary	Guangdong	
Zhu Mingguo 朱明国	November 28, 2014	Guangdong CPPCC, chair	Guangdong	
Li Daqiu 李达球	July 6, 2013	CPPCC, deputy chair	Guangxi	
Liao Shaohua 廖少华	October 28, 2013	Zunyi party secretary	Guizhou	

Ji Wenlin 冀文林	July 2, 2014	Hainan, vice governor	Hainan	Zhou Yongkang
Tan Li 谭力	July 8, 2014	Vice governor	Hainan	
Liang Bin 梁滨	November 20, 2014	Hebei, Organization Department, head	Hebei	
Qin Yuhai 秦玉海	September 21, 2014	Henan People's Congress, deputy chair	Henan	
Sui Fengfu 随风富	November 27, 2014	People's Congress, vice chair	Heilongjiang	
Fu Xiaoguang 付晓光	December 17, 2013	Heilongjiang Yabuli Resort, deputy head	Heilongjiang	
Han Xuejin 韩学健	December 22, 2014	Daqing, party secretary	Heilongjiang	
Chen Pohuai 陈柏槐	November 19, 2013	Hubei, CPPCC, deputy chair	Hubei	
Guo Youming 郭有明	November 27, 2013	Vice governor	Hubei	
Tong Mingqian 童名谦	December 18, 2013	CPPCC, deputy chair	Hunan	
Yang Baohua 阳宝华	Nay 26, 2014	CPPCC, deputy chair	Hunan	
Wang Suyi 王素毅	July 3, 2013	United Front, head	Inner Mongolia	
Pan Yiyang 潘逸阳	September 17, 2014	Standing Committee member	Inner Mongolia	
Li Jianye 李建业	October 17, 2013	Nanjing, deputy secretary	Jiangsu	
Zhao Shaolin 赵少麟	October 11, 2014	Standing Committee, chief secretary	Jiangsu	
Yang Weize 杨卫泽	January 4, 2015	Nanjing, Party Secretary	Jiangsu	
Chen Anzhong 陈安众	December 6, 2013	People's Congress, vice chair	Jiangxi	
Yao Mugen 姚木根	March 22, 2014	Vice governor	Jiangxi	
Zhao Zhiyong 赵智勇	June 3, 2014	Standing Committee, chief secretary	Jiangxi	
Chen Tiexin 陈铁新	July 24, 2014	CPPCC, deputy chair	Liaoning	
Mao Xiaobing 毛小兵	April 24, 2014	Xining, party secretary	Qinghai	
Zhu Zuoli 祝作利	February 19, 2014	CPPCC, deputy chair	Shaanxi	

Jin Daoming 金道铭	February 27, 2014	Deputy secretary	Shanxi	Ling Jihua
Shen Weichen 申维辰	April 12, 2014	Former vice governor	Shanxi	Ling Jihua
Du Shanxue 杜善学	June 19, 2014	Vice governor	Shanxi	Ling Jihua
Ling Zhengce 令政策	June 19, 2014	CPPCC, deputy chair	Shanxi	Ling Jihua
Chen Chuanping 陈川平	August 23, 2014	Taiyuan, Party secretary	Shanxi	Ling Jihua
Nie Chunyu 聂春玉	August 23, 2014	Standing Committee, chief secretary	Shanxi	Ling Jihua
Bai Yun 白云	August 29, 2014	Standing Committee member	Shanxi	Ling Jihua
Ren Runhou 任润厚	August 29, 2014	Vice governor	Shanxi	Ling Jihua
Li Chuncheng 李春成	December 13, 2012	Deputy secretary	Sichuan	Zhou Yongkang
Guo Yongxiang 郭永祥	June 23, 2013	Vice governor	Sichuan	Zhou Yongkang
Li Chongxi 李崇禧	December 29, 2013	CPPCC, chair	Sichuan	Zhou Yongkang
Wu Zhangshun 武长顺	July 20, 2014	Standing Committee member	Tianjin	
Shen Peiping 沈培平	March 9, 2014	Deputy secretary	Yunnan	
Zhang Tianxin 长田欣	July 12, 2014	Standing Committee member	Yunnan	
Bai Enpei 白恩培	August 29, 2014	Party secretary	Yunnan	

Notes

¹ See the listing on the 人民日报 (*People's Daily*) website at

<http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0105/c1001-26326662.html>.

² “31 省份533名厅局级官员涉贪被查” (533 people at the department level were investigated in 31 provinces), 人民网 (People's web), January 9, 2015, retrieved from <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0109/c1001-26354229.html>.

³ “山西去年处分违纪干部 15,450 人, 市厅级干部 45 人” (Last year Shanxi disciplined 15,450 people, including 45 at the city/department level), 人民网 (People's web), February 10, 2015, retrieved from <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0210/c1001-26542095.html>.

⁴ I am grateful to Yanning Chen for compiling this list.

⁵ For Luo's blog, see http://zhenhua.163.com/special/luochangping_10/.

⁶ “刘铁男5处住宅查处25个银行账号包养8名情妇” (Liu Tienan had 5 apartments with 25 bank accounts; he supported 8 mistresses), 台湾网 (Taiwan web), June 7, 2014, recovered from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/231/233407.html>.

⁷ “魏鹏远家中搜出2亿多现金” (Over two hundred million in cash found in Wei Pengyuan’s residence), *Zhongxinwang* 中新网 (Central web), October 31, 2014, recovered from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/231/234275.html>.

⁸ “刘铁男1句话可大量减轻王岐山反腐工作量” (One sentence from Liu Tienan could lighten Wang Qishan’s anti-corruption work load), 苹果日报 (Apple daily), September 24, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/231/233441.html>.

⁹ “周永康带坏了那些干部?” (Which cadres did Zhou Yongkang lead astray?), 京报 (Capital times), January 22, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/231/235723.html>.

¹⁰ 李光 (Li Guang), “周永康曾与薄熙来密探要‘大干一场’” (Zhong Yongkang once talked secretly with Bo Xilai about “doing something big”), 凤凰周刊 (Phoenix Weekly), January 13, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/231/235534.html>.

¹¹ Ye Dongsong was born in Anhui’s Wuwei (无为) county in November 1958. After being sent to the countryside (插队) in 1977, Ye went to the Geology Institute (地质学院) to study mining from 1978 to 1982. In the mid-1980s he served in the Organization Department of Anhui’s Mining Department. After studying for a master’s degree at Nankai University in 1990–1991, Ye rose to become the deputy director of the Anhui Mining Department. In 1998 he moved to the central government, becoming department chief (司长) in the Financial Affairs Section of the Ministry of Geology. After a year at the Central Party School, he rose to become, from 2001 to 2004, deputy minister of the State Land Resources Ministry. In 2004, he was appointed head of the Organization Department of Henan and a member of the provincial party committee. In 2011 he became head of the Henan provincial CPPCC. He was named head of the Sixth Inspection Team in November 2013 (<http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/叶冬松>).

¹² “中央第六巡视组向山西省反馈巡视情况” (The sixth inspection team gives feedback to Shanxi on circumstances found by the inspection), retrieved from http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwyw/201402/t20140224_18960.html.

¹³ 欧阳艳琴 Ouyang Yanqin, “山西贪官录之八：金道明的权鞭” (Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part 8: The whiphand of Jin Daoming), retrieved from <http://china.caixin.com/2014-10-23/100742459.html>.

¹⁴ “山西反腐观察之二” (Observing Shanxi’s fight against corruption, part 2), September 4, 2014, retrieved from http://china.caixin.com/2014-10-14/100738262_all.html - page2.

¹⁵ “Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part 8: The whiphand of Jin Daoming.”

¹⁶ <http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/金道铭>. See also 王俊 (Wang Jun), “山西反腐观察之四：山西政坛‘矿难’与‘重建’” (Observing Shanxi’s fight against corruption, part 3: “Mine disaster” and “rebuilding” Shanxi’s political circle), 大公网 (Dagongwang), September 5, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/11/232964.html>.

¹⁷ “金道铭红眼白手套” (Jin Daoming’s lovers and white gloves), Caixin, May 8, 2014, retrieved from <http://china.caixin.com/2014-05-08/100674698.html>. For an illustration of their enterprises, see <http://datanews.caixin.com/2014/jindaoming/index.html>.

¹⁸ 山西腐败窝案：金道铭，玲政策，杜善学关系盘根错节 (The nest of corruption in Shanxi: The twisted roots and gnarled branches relating Jin Daoming, Ling Zhengce, and Du Shanxue). Retrieved from <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0714/c1001-25279936.html>.

¹⁹ “欧阳艳琴，‘山西贪官录之四：申维辰的名与事’ (Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part four: Shen Weichen’s reputation and reality), Caixin, October 17, 2014, retrieved from <http://china.caixin.com/2014-10-16/100739459.html>.

²⁰ “The nest of corruption in Shanxi: The twisted roots and gnarled branches relating Jin Daoming, Ling Zhengce, and Du Shanxue.”

²¹ <http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/申维辰>

²² <http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/杜善学>

²³ “山西反腐观察之二：一些‘老人’爱干政” (Observing Shanxi’s fight against corruption, part 2: Some ‘old people’ like to interfere in politics), 大公报 (*Impartial*), September 4, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/11/232952.html>. See also Ouyang Yanqin 欧阳艳琴, “山西贪官录之七：杜善学的是非成败” (Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part 7: The rights and wrongs, successes and failures of Du Shanxue), retrieved from <http://china.caixin.com/2014-1-22/100741648.html>.

²⁴ “Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi.”

²⁵ Ouyang Yanqin 欧阳艳琴 and Luo Jieqi 罗洁琪, “‘山西贪官录’之一：令政策往事” (Record of Shanxi corrupt officials, part 1: Ling Zhengce’s past), 财新网, October 13, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/231/233839.html>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ It will be noted below in discussing Ren Runhou that a separate source gives the price of coal in 2003 as 160 yuan per ton. It is not clear if the two sources are talking about different dates or simply give different figures. Whatever the actual price of coal, it is apparent that it was rising very rapidly.

²⁹ “山西贪官录之二：聂春玉之选择” (Nie Chunyu’s choice), retrieved from http://china.caixin.com/2014-10-14/100738262_1.html.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ouyang Yanqin 欧阳艳琴, “山西贪官录之三” (Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part three), retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.com/article/231/233913.html>.

³³ On Chen’s career, see Ouyang Yanqin, “Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part three.”

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ouyang Yanqin 欧阳艳琴, “山西贪官录之六” (Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part six), retrieved from http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4db133c80102v7vg.html, and <http://www.baike.com/wiki/白云>.

- ³⁶ Ouyang Yanqin 欧阳艳琴, “山西贪官录之五: 任润厚的坎坷省坐路” (Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part five: Ren Runhou’s bumpy road to provincial office), retrieved from <http://china.caixin.com/2014-10-17/100739921.html>.
- ³⁷ “Record of corrupt officials in Shanxi, part five,” and “山西原副省长任润厚落马33天后去世” (Shanxi’s previous vice governor Ren Runhou dies 33 days after falling from office), http://finance.eastmoney.com/news/1350_20141018435540260.html.
- ³⁸ Amy Qin, “王岐山批评吉林省委书记言论被删除” (Wang Qishan’s words criticizing Jilin party secretary Wang Rulin deleted), <http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20140313/c13formalism/>.
- ³⁹ Biographical information on Wang Weizhong does not give either the date or location of his birth, but he has not spent time in Shanxi in the course of his career.
- ⁴⁰ See “李玉赋卸任中央纪委副书记 黄晓薇 卸任检察部副部长” (Li Yufu appointed deputy secretary of CDIC, Huang Xiaowei appointed deputy minister of Ministry of Supervision), 搜狐新闻 (*Suohu news*), October 26, 2014, retrieved from <http://news.sohu.com/20141026/n405468027.shtml>.
- ⁴¹ “Lou Yangsheng.” See <http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/楼阳生>.
- ⁴² “李小鹏: 塌方式腐败严重损害山西形象” (Li Xiaopeng: Landslide corruption severely damages the image of Shanxi), 中国网 (China web), January 28, 2015 (retrieved from http://news.china.com.cn/2015-01/28/content_34676504.htm).
- ⁴³ Zhang Enjie 张恩杰 and Feng Mingwen 冯明文, “山西反腐观察之三: 从官场崩塌到会场萧条” (Observing Shanxi’s fight against corruption, part 3: From the collapse of officialdom to a lifeless meeting) 法治晚报 (*Legal evening post*), September 5). Retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.com/article/11/232957.html>.
- ⁴⁴ “曝令计划姐姐令方针夫妇备查 令计划缺席政协会议” (Revealed that Ling Jihua’s elder sister, Ling Fangzhen, and her husband are being investigated; Ling Juhua is absent at a meeting of the CPPCC), *Wenxuecity*, July 24, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2014/07/24/3458110.html>.
- ⁴⁵ “山西反腐观察之二: 宜些‘老人’爱干政, 观察之二: 一些‘老人’爱干政” (Observing Shanxi’s fight against corruption, part 2: Some ‘old people’ like to interfere in politics), 大公报 (*Impartial*), September 4, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.org/article/11/232952.html>.
- ⁴⁶ “山西籍京官组成的神秘组织,” (Beijing officials from Shanxi organize a secret organization), 腾讯微信公共平台“金融圈” (Tengxun weixin public forum, “financial circles”), December 22, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.com/article/231/235217.html>.
- ⁴⁷ 欧阳艳琴 Ouyang Yanqin and 罗洁琪 Luo Jieqi, “令计划转折” (Ling Jihua’s turning point), *Caixinwang* (Caixin web), December 22, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.com/article/231/235211.html>.
- ⁴⁸ “新华社评令政策落马: 朝里有人也不灵” (The Xinhua News Agency appraises Ling Zhengce’s fall from power: Even if you have someone at court, it will not be effective), *Tianya shequ* (<http://www.tianya.cn>), June 20, 2014, retrieved from <http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-50909-266-1.shtml>.

⁴⁹ Keira Lu Huang, “Youngest Brother Made a Billion from Investments,” *South China Morning Post*, December 24, 2014.

⁵⁰ “Net Closes on Former Top Aide to Hu Jintao,” *South China Morning Post*, October 23, 2014.

⁵¹ “山西籍京官组成的神秘组织” (Mysterious organization of Beijing officials from Shanxi), retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.com/article/231/235217.html>, and “媒体曝刘志军罗马后一段话描述和丁书苗母女赤裸关系” (After Liu Zhijun’s fall, the media exposes a conversation that describes his brazen relationship with Ding Shumiao and her daughter), retrieved from <http://finance.ifeng.com/business/renwu/20130503/7989945.shtml>.

⁵² “山西籍京官组成的神秘组织” (Mysterious organization of Beijing officials from Shanxi), 滕迅 微信公共平台 “金融圈” (Tengxun weixin public forum “financial circles”), December 22, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.chinaelections.com/article/231/235217.html>.

⁵³ <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1226/c1001-26281242-59.html>

⁵⁴ “山西去年处分违纪干部15450人 市厅级干部45人” (Shanxi disciplines 15,450 people, 45 at the municipal and department level), *Renminwang* (人民网, People’s web), February 10, 2015, retrieved from <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0210/c1001-26542095.html>.