

Xi Jinping on Chinese Foreign Relations: *The Governance of China* and Chinese Commentary

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The Governance of China is an official compilation of speeches, conversations, and instructions by current PRC President and CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping on a wide range of topics relating to Chinese governance, from domestic development concepts and policies, to ecology, national defense, the campaign against corruption and a range of principles and policies guiding China's growing involvement in world affairs. This article examines those sections of the compilation relevant to Chinese foreign relations, as well as Chinese commentary on the volume.

On October 1, 2014 (China's National Day), the Foreign Languages Press published *The Governance of China*, a compilation of 79 speeches, conversations, and instructions by PRC president and CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping covering the period from November 15, 2012, to June 13, 2014. Compiled by the State Council Information Office of China, the CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, and China International Publishing Group, the 500-plus-page volume is organized into 18 sections, covering Xi's thoughts on a wide range of topics relating to Chinese governance, from domestic development concepts and policies (such as Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, the Chinese Dream, the rule of law, and economic reform), to ecology, national defense, the campaign against corruption, and a range of principles and policies guiding China's growing involvement in world affairs.

With the volume appearing only two years after Xi took office, and given the absence of a similar compilation of speeches by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao during their regimes, the question naturally arises as to why such a book was issued, and why it appeared so soon in the Xi era. Its brief introduction states that the book was published in response to "rising international interest" and "to enhance the rest of the world's understanding of the Chinese government's philosophy and its domestic and foreign policies."¹

More specifically, according to Cai Mingzhao, the deputy minister of the CCP's propaganda department and the head of the State Council Information Office (and a possible compiler and editor of the book), the volume was produced partly in response to growing foreign interest in and concern (which he describes as "conflicted" views) over the impact of China's development on regional and world events. According to Cai, the book thus serves to "better explain China's development concepts, development path, and domestic and international policies, and to answer the international community's concern."²

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This article examines those contents of *The Governance of China* relevant to Chinese foreign relations, as well the small range of Chinese commentary on the volume. As in other issues of the *Monitor*, this commentary is divided into authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and non-authoritative sources, as defined in previous *CLMs*.³

The first section summarizes the main foreign-policy-relevant features of Xi's thought found in *The Governance of China*, dividing them into old and new themes. The second section examines these views in greater detail, as they appear in the five major foreign policy topics presented in the book:

Peaceful Development
New Model of Major-country Relations
Neighborhood Diplomacy
Cooperation with Developing Countries
Multilateral Relations

The third section examines Chinese commentary on the book and Xi's foreign policy speeches in particular.

The fourth and final section assesses the overall significance of the volume as a compilation of Xi's thoughts on foreign policy, and its implications for China's evolving policies and behavior toward the outside world.

Xi's Foreign Relations Themes and Ideas: Much Continuity with Some Notable Change

The foreign policy contents of *The Governance of China* canvass the major official principles, policies and practices of Beijing's external relations under Xi Jinping. Most of these features predate the Xi era, reflecting the major foreign policy priorities of the Chinese government throughout at least the entire reform period beginning in the late '70s. These include:

- The overall need to sustain an amicable external environment conducive to long-term peaceful economic development.⁴
- The promotion of more cooperative and collaborative (“win-win”) patterns of interstate relations and an emphasis on improving China's relations with neighboring countries on the basis of “friendship, equality, sincerity, reciprocity, and inclusiveness.”⁵
- Opposition to “Cold War era” adversarial, zero-sum thinking and policies, “expansionism,” “hegemonism,” and power politics.⁶
- The promotion of a “comprehensive, common, and cooperative security” architecture for Asia and the world.⁷
- A defensive military stance toward the outside world that eschews arms racing and military threats to others.⁸

- Respect for different social systems and development paths and noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations.⁹
- The resolute defense of China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and development interests.¹⁰
- The peaceful resolution of disputes among nations through dialogue and consultation.¹¹
- Support for the creation of a more just and equitable international order within the general context of existing global and regional regimes.¹²
- A commitment to deepening economic reform, in part through China’s expanding involvement in the international system and the “open world economy.”¹³

All of these policies and features have been fundamental elements of Chinese foreign policy for decades; in fact, some have existed since the foundation of the PRC in 1949. So, at its core, Xi Jinping’s foreign policy thinking is highly conventional, virtually indistinguishable from that of his predecessors.

At the same time, while reaffirming long-standing Chinese foreign policy features, *The Governance of China* also provides ample evidence that Xi Jinping has in many instances injected new elements into China’s foreign policy or provided new emphases, formulations, or definitions of the above existing foreign policy features. These include the following notable examples:

- A routine and consistent pairing of the desire for peaceful development and stability with an assertion of the resolute defense of China’s core interests, centered on sovereignty and territorial integrity, security, and development.¹⁴
- An enhanced emphasis on reassuring other nations that China will “never seek development at the expense of any other country’s interests.”¹⁵
- The enunciation of a specific set of medium- and long-term development goals (the Two Centenary Goals (“两个一百年” 奋斗目标) linked to a new concept of the Chinese Dream (中国梦), all directed at attaining the long-standing objective of creating a strong and wealthy China at peace with outside powers.¹⁶
- The creation of new international (and especially Asian) economic and financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund.¹⁷
- The enunciation of a new strategy for large-scale, cross-continental economic development: the One Belt, One Road concept linking China and the Pacific with Europe and the Baltic region via both land and maritime routes.¹⁸
- A strong emphasis on the leading role of the United Nations in specific areas, including most notably cyber security and counterterrorism.¹⁹

- The espousal of cooperative relations among the major powers through adoption of a new concept: “The New Model of Major-country Relations.”²⁰
- A clear and strong rejection of the notion that any nation (presumably including China) can serve as a development model for other nations.²¹

In general, these innovations or enhancements in China’s foreign policy stance reflect Xi Jinping’s more proactive and assertive approach to China’s role in the world and within the Asia-Pacific region in particular. They also reflect his desire for China to make greater use of its growing strengths abroad and to become more in tune with the forces of (especially economic) change under way across the globe.

The Five Sections Relevant to Foreign Relations

A closer examination of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy views and initiatives, organized into the five themes or topics mentioned above, provides a more specific understanding of his priorities and apparent contributions.

Peaceful Development

An emphasis on long-term peaceful development through the maintenance of positive and beneficial relations with the outside world is the core feature of China’s foreign and defense policy line under the reforms. As noted above, Xi reaffirms this view, and the ancillary concepts that support it (e.g., the solemn pledge to “never seek hegemony or commit any act of expansion,” to never seek benefits at others’ expense, to “uphold the international trading system and participate in global economic governance,” and to pursue “mutually beneficial cooperation” and global stability) throughout many speeches found in *The Governance of China*, and especially in the section on Peaceful Development.²²

Moreover, in this section and elsewhere in the book, Xi presents two specific medium- and long-term national development goals (the so-called Two Centenary Goals (“两个一百年” 奋斗目标) mentioned above. Unveiled at the 18th National CPC Congress in November 2012, these consist of: 1) the doubling of China’s 2010 GDP and per capita income by 2020; and 2) the attainment of “a modern socialist country, prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by the middle of the twenty-first century.²³ Both goals are presented as the concrete realization of the “China Dream” concept of national rejuvenation first coined by Xi. While the latter goal has been stated in more general terms during much of the reform era,²⁴ the former goal is obviously more recent, but is similar to statements by previous leaders calling for the doubling of GDP within an earlier decade.²⁵

While reaffirming and making more concrete China’s long-term commitment to peaceful development, Xi also seems to place the defense of China’s core interests (e.g., territorial sovereignty, security, development) alongside such development as an equally important aspect of Chinese foreign policy.²⁶

In fact, in the section on Multilateral Relations (discussed below), Xi states, with regard to territorial disputes with neighboring states and regional stability, that the defense of sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity serve as the “base” upon which China will “maintain good relations with its neighbors and overall peace and stability in our region” (中国将继续妥善处理同有关国家的分歧和摩擦, 在坚定捍卫国家主权、安全、领土完整的基础上, 努力维护同周边国家关系和地区和平稳定大局).²⁷ Moreover, in defending national sovereignty, security, development interests, Xi stresses in the original text of a speech included in this section that China must neither “seek trouble” (不惹事) nor “avoid trouble” (不怕事).²⁸

The consistent pairing of development and the defense of core interests, and in particular the emphasis on the latter (presumably to be attained through the effective application of China’s growing economic and military capabilities) is new. As noted in *CLM* 46, in presenting these twin foreign policy goals, Xi reveals the complex, potentially conflicting tenets of Chinese foreign policy today.²⁹

At the same time, in this section, Xi also places a clear emphasis on the positive function of a stronger China in advancing and preserving a peaceful external environment. That is, he stresses the benefits to others resulting from greater Chinese strength, not its threatening aspects.³⁰

Finally, in this section, it is notable that Xi places a strong emphasis on the critical role of the United Nations in sustaining peaceful development both for China and globally, especially in the areas of cyber security and counterterrorism. Although previous Chinese leaders have stressed the important role of the UN in this regard, the inclusion in this section of the book of two Xi speeches that call for the organization to play a larger role in these two areas is notable.³¹

New Model of Major-Country Relations

This brief section (consisting of only three speeches, directed at Russia, the United States, and Europe) arguably presents the clearest example of Xi’s efforts to recast and reemphasize China’s long-standing stress on the need for cooperative, “win-win” relations among the major powers (and especially with the United States) in an arguably new manner. In particular, he stresses the need and opportunity for the major powers (and indeed at times he says for “all” powers) to develop cooperation and mutual benefit through the creation of a “new model of major-country relations.”³²

Although this newly coined concept is often defined in very vague terms, the speeches contained in this section of *The Governance of China* suggest somewhat more specific rationales and features (assuming that the inclusion of such elements in this section suggests a linkage with the model). These include: an emphasis on mutual benefit and deepened cooperation among nations over “Cold War” era zero-sum thinking and various “hegemonistic,” power-centered policies and behavior; a fundamentally defensive and nonthreatening military stance; and a “comprehensive, common, and cooperative security” architecture for Asia and the world.³³ The model also apparently includes enhanced bilateral dialogues and communication, deepened military-to-military

relationships (which Xi links with a “new model of China-U.S. military relations”), deepened trade and more open markets, and a stress on “multilateralism.”³⁴

Xi also provides an explanation of the *positive* and *negative* forces that supposedly make this cooperative model of inter-state relations both timely and necessary. In the former case, he points to an increasingly multipolar and peaceful pattern of international growth and development “where countries are linked with and dependent on one another at a level never seen before,” thereby creating a “community of common destiny.”³⁵ In the latter case, he cites a growing number of regional and global difficulties and challenges that require cooperation to address, from financial crises to protectionism, “neo-interventionism” and “a web of traditional and non-conventional security threats, such as the arms race, terrorism and cyber security.”³⁶

Neighborhood Diplomacy

In addressing China’s relations with neighboring countries, as suggested in the above bullet list, Xi’s speeches in *The Governance of China* strike certain long-standing Chinese foreign policy themes, including noninterference in domestic affairs, the avoidance of any sphere of influence or effort to dominate regional affairs, improved policy coordination and economic intercourse, respect of regional diversity, the rejection of any “one-size-fits-all” development model, and the management of disputes via “equal-based dialogue and friendly consultation.”

However, among these otherwise largely platitudinous views, Xi notably rejects by implication, and repeatedly, the notion that China can or should serve as a development model for other states. This has arguably never been stressed as much by previous Chinese leaders.³⁷

In addition, Xi Jinping places an arguably unprecedented emphasis on reassuring China’s neighbors regarding Beijing’s current and future intentions via some very concrete policy initiatives designed to stimulate international development. In particular, this section includes the major speeches in which Xi first proposes and describes the new Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road mentioned above, as well as the AIIB.

As discussed in *CLM* 47, the One Belt, One Road concept or strategy forms a major part of China’s current and future long-term foreign policy approach.³⁸ Overall, according to Xi, these initiatives are designed to create “a new pattern of regional economic integration”³⁹ and an “innovation-driven,”⁴⁰ “open growth model” of development marked by “mutually beneficial reciprocity.”⁴¹

Although most of Xi’s statements in this section are contained in speeches delivered to audiences in neighboring countries, one speech is directed at a domestic audience, during a foreign policy work conference held in October 2013. As noted in *CLM* 46, these remarks clearly indicate an unprecedented emphasis for a Chinese leader on a perceived need for Chinese officials to work more energetically to improve Beijing’s relations with its neighbors and beyond. Xi states:

We should clearly present our domestic and foreign policies to the outside world, explain China in an acceptable way, speak out and make ourselves heard, interpret the Chinese Dream from the perspective of our neighbors and their aspirations for a better life and regional prosperity, and let a sense of common destiny take root.⁴²

This arguably reflects an appreciation of the fact that China's more assertive activities and policies toward its neighbors in recent years have generated significant fears that Beijing will use its growing power and influence to coerce or intimidate others or generally seek advantages at their expense.⁴³

Cooperation with Developing Countries

This section strikes many of the themes found in the previous section, albeit in the larger context of China's relations with all developing states. These include the One Belt, One Road concept; the acceptance of diversity in political, economic, and social development paths; anti-hegemonism and pro-equality among nations; and the usual bromides regarding friendship, mutual respect, equality, noninterference, and so forth. In addition, however, Xi's remarks in this section provide some details regarding the specific type of cooperation that is needed to implement initiatives such as the One Belt, One Road strategy.⁴⁴

Multilateral Relations

The speeches of Xi Jinping contained in this lengthy section provide further details regarding his notion of the need for a new type of cooperative security structure, both globally and within Asia, as well as his emphasis on defending China's core interests. In these speeches, Xi also again stresses the development of the One Belt, One Road concept through a variety of initiatives, including an energy club to "secure stable supply and demand, ensure energy security, and . . . encourage extensive cooperation in such areas as energy efficiency and new energy sources."⁴⁵

As noted in *CLM* 46, Xi's remarks on Asian security are found in greatest detail in his speech (included in this section of the compilation) to the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) given on May 21, 2014.⁴⁶ In these remarks, he provides the strongest assertion yet of the need for Asia to build on its "common destiny" and reject Cold-War-era zero-sum thinking and notions of absolute security or the dominance over regional security affairs of a single nation (read the United States). He also asserts that an effort "to buttress and entrench a military alliance targeted at a third party [read the U.S.-Japan alliance—author] is not conducive to common security."⁴⁷

In place of such concepts and policies, Xi proposes an inclusive, equal-access security system marked by equal rights and responsibilities for its members and respect for sovereignty, independence, and diversity. Such a system should address all manner of security threats (both traditional and nontraditional, individual and region-wide), through "sincere and in-depth dialogue and communication" and create "sustainable security" through a focus on *both* economic development and security.⁴⁸ As an apparent first step

in creating such an ambitious security system, Xi proposes to turn CICA into “a security dialogue and cooperation platform that covers the whole of Asia and, on that basis, explore the establishment of a regional security cooperation architecture.”⁴⁹

In this section, Xi’s remarks also provide perhaps the greatest detail regarding his overall strong support for an open and nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system across the world, for deeper economic reform within China, and his desire to make global governance more equitable and just.⁵⁰ As part of the last goal, he stresses the need to reform the management of the IMF so as to better reflect “the weight of the economic aggregate of the different countries in the world economy.”⁵¹ Although past Chinese leaders have stated these priorities, Xi presents them in these speeches in part as a means of reassuring other nations, during a period of arguably growing concern, that China’s economy will remain strong and stable, open to foreign trade and investment, and supportive of regional growth outside China.

Chinese Commentary

As one might expect given Xi Jinping’s high political profile and apparent reputation within China as a decisive, strong, and popular leader, authoritative Chinese commentary to a great extent consists of hagiography reminiscent of the Mao Zedong era.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi provides a prime example. He states

Comrade Xi Jinping’s foreign policy thoughts penetrate historical materialism and dialectical materialism’s perspectives and methods, containing profound Chinese wisdom, shining with the brilliance of thoughts that are advancing with the times, possessing richness, depth, and clear characteristics, and having a high degree of strategy, foresight, and good articulation and guidance.⁵²

Various quasi-authoritative and non-authoritative articles by senior Chinese military and civilian officials and Chinese scholars also contain a fair amount of hagiography. For example, in a paroxysm of Marxist euphoria, one observer states that:

Comrade Xi Jinping’s foreign policy thinking . . . reflects the brilliance of Marxist materialist dialectics (马克思主义唯物辩证法) and demonstrates the dialectical unity between both domestic and international politics, the dialectical unity between principles and flexibility, the dialectical unity between keeping a low profile (韬光养晦) and proactive behavior in foreign affairs, and the dialectical unity between peaceful development and the protection of core national interests (国家核心利益).⁵³

For this observer, the obvious tensions in China’s foreign policy today are apparently merely dialectical opposites, presumably to be united eventually in a higher and greater synthesis!⁵⁴

Some authoritative sources attempt to assess the importance of the book in slightly more specific and useful terms. For example, Cai Mingzhao, mentioned above, identifies five central features of the book, one of which is directly relevant to foreign policy. He states that: “the book declares China’s commitment to peaceful development and demonstrates China’s image as a responsible major country.”⁵⁵

This largely reflects an understanding of the main purpose of the book, which is, as indicated above, to reassure the world that China’s growing capabilities will contribute significantly to peace and prosperity, not rivalry and aggression. As Cai states:

In this book, we can see that from weaving the Chinese Dream and the African Dream to building a more comprehensive Sino-African relations, from establishing a Silk Road economic belt to building a 21st-century maritime Silk Road, from upholding the correct view on justice to perfecting global governance mechanisms, General Secretary Xi’s new ideas and new concepts express China’s sincere hope to benefit the world.⁵⁶

The importance of *The Governance of China* to Beijing’s efforts to reassure the world that China will continue to develop and that its rise will benefit everyone is a major theme of all Chinese sources, in fact.⁵⁷

Some quasi-authoritative observers stress the supposed worldwide popularity of *The Governance of China* as an indication of “other countries’ willingness to draw inspiration from China.”⁵⁸ *Zhong Sheng* contends that China has gained international recognition for the governance strategy contained in *The Governance of China*—reflected especially through its economic successes and China’s growing influence internationally. The author adds that China’s refusal to impose its own growth model onto others has added to China’s soft power in the world.⁵⁹

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, only a relatively few non-authoritative Chinese sources comment on the foreign policy aspects of *The Governance of China*. Most sources that address the book simply summarize its main points and emphasize its importance in defining and explaining China’s policies in the 21st century, often in glowing terms.

The majority of the sparse commentary on Xi’s foreign policy thoughts stresses his treatment of the strategy of peaceful development and its implications for China’s relations with the outside world. Several observers reiterate the point, mentioned above, that the focus on peaceful development, and indeed the entire rationale for publishing the book, derives from foreign (and in particular Western) concerns regarding the long-term implications of China’s rise for global stability and order.⁶⁰

In response to these concerns, Xi’s foreign policy thoughts in *The Governance of China* are seen by some non-authoritative commentators as a detailed effort to explain the deep-rooted and long-term nature of China’s peaceful development strategy, grounded not only

in Chinese history and thought but also, perhaps more convincingly, in China's deepening interdependence with the outside world.⁶¹

Indeed, several commentators draw attention to Xi's repeated references to the dynamic interactive nature of China's relationship with the world. One commentator remarks:

Whether or not the path of peaceful development can be successful depends, to a great extent, on whether we can turn the world's opportunities into China's, and China's opportunities into the world's. We can advance if China and the world interact well and cooperate for common gain.⁶²

Unsurprisingly, some non-authoritative Chinese commentators link Xi's stress on peaceful development with his notion of the need to develop a new mode of major-country relations based on "win-win cooperation."⁶³ And several observers stress that Xi's foreign policy initiatives, such as the "One Belt, One Road" strategy, and his linkage of the China Dream with the desires of other developing societies, "demonstrates China's willingness to be a responsible major country."⁶⁴

Concluding Observations

Xi Jinping's foreign policy thoughts as presented in *The Governance of China* largely involve the repackaging and in some cases the embellishment or modification of long-standing Chinese policies and views. To a very great extent, Xi presents himself as a strong advocate of conventional thoughts on peaceful development, cooperative interstate ties, noninterference, a defensive force posture, and other core tenets of Chinese foreign policy evident since at least the advent of the reform era and often earlier.

Among these, his clearest point of emphasis regards China's long-term commitment to a policy of peaceful development requiring a largely stable and cooperative set of relations with outside powers. As we have seen, for Xi, such a policy is deeply rooted in both enduring Chinese needs and values and long-term international trends toward interdependence, as well as a growing set of global challenges that demand greater levels of inter-state cooperation.

Xi's emphasis on this policy and its supporting justification undoubtedly reflect the desire of the Chinese leadership to provide a more convincing and reassuring argument for why China's rise will not threaten others. Other reassuring notions found repeatedly in the five foreign-policy-relevant sections of the book include a commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes through negotiation, an open, non-protectionist global trading system, and an avowed respect for different political and social systems, all long-standing policies. Moreover, his new initiatives, such as the One Belt, One Road concept and the AIIB, are also designed to provide concrete examples of how China's growing strength can benefit others, while of course serving China.

All of this should be good news for China's neighbors and other states heavily involved in various relationships with Beijing or desiring greater ties. That said, Xi does not spell

out exactly how Beijing will resolve the uncertainties and tensions that will inevitably accompany China's growing power and influence, despite the desire for cooperation and development. In fact, Xi's foreign policy speeches provide a basis for real concern about how a stronger China will address those other views and policies he espouses over which there is no doubt considerable disagreement within the international community. Foremost among these are: a heightened stress on the defense of Chinese sovereignty claims, opposition to "Cold War era" security alliances in favor of a new type of cooperative security architecture, and the creation of a more just and equitable international order. Although certainly evident in earlier times, these three elements form a central part of Xi's foreign policy thinking, constituting areas where he arguably believes a stronger China might more effectively influence the global order while advancing core Chinese interests.

Unfortunately, Chinese commentary on these and other points in *The Governance of China* sheds no light on how the potential contradictions within Xi's foreign policy thinking will be addressed, much less resolved. Indeed, most Chinese commentators do not even recognize the existence of such contradictions, except to present them as inevitable parts of an eventual dialectical synthesis! This lack of real public analysis of Xi's foreign policy thinking no doubt reflects the potential dangers involved in appearing to criticize the views of a seemingly dominant leader engaged in a de facto purge of supposedly "corrupt" citizens and opponents of reform. If the Xi Jinping regime genuinely wants to reassure others about its commitment to a peaceful and stable international order, it will need to more directly and thoroughly examine how the various potential contradictions within Xi's foreign policy thinking will be resolved as China's power grows.

Notes

¹ Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), Publisher's Note.

² Cai Mingzhao, "An Important Document that Comprehensively and Objectively Recognizes Contemporary China—An Introduction to *The Governance of China*," *Renmin*, September 29, 2014, <http://theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2014/0929/c40531-25757337.html>.

³ Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 38 (Summer 2012), <http://www.hoover.org/research/chinese-leadership-and-elite-responses-us-pacific-pivot>.

⁴ Xi, *The Governance of China*, pp. 292, 326, 328.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 271–273, 274–276, 277–282, 297–305, 306–308, 309–311, 315–319, 320–324, 325–329, 333–341, 342–343, 344–352, 355–359, 363–364, 369, 373–377, 383–388, 389–396.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 272, 293, 298–299, 322, 390.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 322, 328, 363, 389–396.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 237–239, 301.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 299, 316, 321, 337, 346, 356, 391.

¹⁰ Ibid., 273, 292–293, 326.

¹¹ Ibid., 282, 307–308, 309–311, 321, 347–348, 363, 366, 392.

¹² Ibid., 356.

¹³ Ibid., 345–346, 368–372.

¹⁴ Ibid., 271–273, 292–293, 326.

¹⁵ Ibid., 273.

¹⁶ Ibid., 272, 292, 301, 306, 325–326, 328, 341, 345, 351, 365.

¹⁷ Ibid., 321, 328, 349, 387, 395.

¹⁸ Ibid., 283–289, 310, 317–319, 320–324, 327, 348–350, 395.

¹⁹ Ibid., 274–276.

²⁰ Ibid., 297–305, 306–308, 309–311.

²¹ Ibid., 283–289, 299, 316, 321, 337, 346, 356, 391.

²² Ibid., 271–273, 277–282, 290–293.

²³ Ibid., 291.

²⁴ “Jiang Zemin’s report at the 15th Party Congress,” September 12, 1997, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526285.html>; “Jiang Zemin’s report at the 16th Party Congress,” November 2002, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65444/4429121.html>; “Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th Party Congress,” October 25, 2007, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/67507/6429846.html>; and “Hu Jintao’s report at the 18th Party Congress,” November 8, 2012, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm.

²⁵ “Jiang Zemin’s report at the 15th Party Congress,” “Jiang Zemin’s report at the 16th Party Congress,” and “Hu Jintao’s report at the 18th Party Congress.”

²⁶ See Xi, *Governance of China*, p. 273, “While pursuing peaceful development, we will never sacrifice our legitimate rights and interests or China’s core interests. No foreign country should expect China to trade off its core interests or swallow bitter fruit that undermines China’s sovereignty, security or development interests.”

²⁷ Ibid., 366.

²⁸ See He Longde, “The Way for Governance,” Hebei Party Institute of CPC, Cadre Learning Website, <http://www.hebdx.com/tabid/102/InfoID/23889/frtid/269/Default.aspx>. The phrase “neither ‘seek trouble’ nor ‘avoid trouble’” was not mentioned in the book, even though Hong Kong media, including *Phoenix News*, *Takung Pao*, and *Wenwei Pao*, reported the use of that phrase in Xi’s March 28, 2014, speech at the Korber Foundation in Berlin (Xi, *The Governance of China*, 290–293.).

²⁹ Michael D. Swaine, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 46 (Winter 2015), <http://www.hoover.org/research/xi-jinpings-address-central-conference-work-relating-foreign-affairs-assessing-and>.

³⁰ See Xi, *Governance of China*, 272, “We must seize the opportunity and run our own affairs well so as to make our country stronger and more prosperous, and our people lead a better life. This will enable us to pursue peaceful development by relying on our growing strength.”

³¹ Ibid., 275, “the UN should play a leading role in international affairs. Regarding the fight against terrorism, the UN should play a bigger role by promoting clear-cut criteria

of right and wrong so as to advance the fight against terrorism of all forms. It should also serve as the main channel in protecting cyber security, advocate rules, sovereignty and transparency in this regard, respect the concerns of different countries over information safety, and achieve common management.”

³² Ibid., 299.

³³ Ibid., 237–239, 272, 293, 298–299, 301, 322, 328, 363, 389–396, 390.

³⁴ Ibid., 301, 306–308.

³⁵ Ibid., 298.

³⁶ Ibid., 298.

³⁷ Ibid., 299, 316, 321, 336, 337, 346, 356, 391.

³⁸ Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 47 (Summer 2015), <http://www.hoover.org/research/chinese-views-and-commentary-one-belt-one-road>.

³⁹ Ibid., 327–328.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 381.

⁴¹ Ibid., 379.

⁴² Ibid., 328; and Swaine, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs.”

⁴³ Swaine, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs.”

⁴⁴ Xi, *Governance of China*, 348–349.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 375.

⁴⁶ Swaine, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs.”

⁴⁷ Xi, *Governance of China*, 391.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 393.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 393.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 356.

⁵¹ Ibid., 371.

⁵² Wang Yi, “A Key Weapon in Guiding Chinese Foreign Diplomacy under New Conditions,” *Renmin*, February 12, 2015, <http://zj.people.com.cn/cpc/n/2015/0212/c337202-23882482.html>.

⁵³ Han Qingxiang, “Theoretical Innovation that Reflects the Brilliance of Marxist Philosophy—Reading *The Governance of China*,” *Renmin*, February 7, 2015, <http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2015/0206/c1003-26517033.html>. Han is the deputy education director of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China (中央党校副教育长).

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